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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Management: Theory and Applications
by
Renyu Zhang
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor Nan Yang, Chair
Professor Fuqiang Zhang, Co-Chair
We develop the models and methods to study the impact of some emerging trends
in technology, marketplace, and society upon the pricing and inventory policy of a rm.
We focus on the situation where the rm is in a dynamic, uncertain, and (possibly)
competitive market environment. The market trends of particular interest to us are:
(a) social networks, (b) sustainability concerns, and (c) customer behaviors. The two
main running questions this dissertation aims to address are: (a) How these emerging
market trends would inuence the operations decisions and protability of a rm; and (b)
What pricing and inventory strategies a rm could use to leverage these trends. We also
develop an eective comparative statics analysis method to address these two questions
under dierent market trends.
Overall, our results suggest that the current market trends of social networks, sus-
tainability concerns, and customer behaviors have signicant and interesting impact upon
the operations policy of a rm, and that the rm could adopt some innovative pricing
and inventory strategies to exploit these trends and substantially improve its prot. Our
main ndings are:
(a) Network externalities (the monopoly setting). We nd that network externalities
prompt a rm to face the tradeo between generating current prots and inducing
future demands when making the price and inventory decisions, so that it should
increase the base-stock level, and to decrease [increase] the sales price when the
x
network size is small [large]. Our extensive numerical experiments also demon-
strate the eectiveness of the heuristic policies that leverage network externalities
by balancing generating current prots and inducing demands in the near future.
(Chapter 2.)
(b) Network externalities (the dynamic competition setting). In a competitive mar-
ket with network externalities, the competing rms face the tradeo between gen-
erating current prots and winning future market shares (i.e., the exploitation-
induction tradeo). We characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilib-
rium in both the simultaneous competition and the promotion-rst competition.
We show that, to balance the exploitation-induction tradeo, the competing rms
should increase promotional eorts, oer price discounts, and improve service lev-
els. The exploitation-induction tradeo could be a new driving force for the fat-cat
eect (i.e., the equilibrium promotional eorts are higher under the promotion-rst
competition than those under the simultaneous competition). (Chapter 3.)
(c) Trade-in remanufacturing. We show that, with the adoption of the very commonly
used trade-in remanufacturing program, the rm may enjoy a higher prot with
strategic customers than with myopic customers. Moreover, trade-in remanufac-
turing creates a tension between rm protability and environmental sustainability
with strategic customers, but benets both the rm and the environment with my-
opic customers. We also nd that, with either strategic or myopic customers, the
socially optimal outcome can be achieved by using a simple linear subsidy and tax
scheme. The commonly used government policy to subsidize for remanufacturing
alone, however, does not induce the social optimum in general. (Chapter 4.)
(d) Scarcity eect of inventory. We show that the scarcity eect drives both optimal
prices and order-up-to levels down, whereas increased operational exibilities (e.g.,
the inventory disposal and inventory withholding opportunities) mitigate the de-
mand loss caused by high excess inventory and increase the optimal order-up-to
levels and sales prices. Our extensive numerical studies also demonstrate that dy-
namic pricing leads to a much more signicant prot improvement with the scarcity
eect of inventory than without. (Chapter 5.)
xi
(e) Comparative statics analysis method. We develop a comparative statics method to
study a general joint pricing and inventory management model with multiple de-
mand segments, multiple suppliers, and stochastically evolving market conditions.
Our new method makes componentwise comparisons between the focal decision vari-
ables under dierent parameter values, so it is capable of performing comparative
statics analysis in a model where part of the decision variables are non-monotone,
and it is well scalable. Hence, our new method is promising for comparative statics
analysis in other operations management models. (Chapter 6.)
xii
1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Price and inventory are denitely two key operations decisions of any rm that delivers
(physical) products to customers. The development of advanced information technologies
facilitates the sellers to plan, implement and take advantage of the dynamic pricing
strategies. Thanks to the IT decision support applications, sellers are now able to optimize
sales prices and inventory control policies based on complex analytics and optimization
methods. Therefore, the joint dynamic pricing and inventory management strategies
have been extensively studied in the literature, and widely used in practice. For example,
Amazon not only dynamically adjusts the sales prices of thousands of its items everyday,
but also adopts a complex procurement and delivery system to manage its inventories.
The emerging trends in technology, marketplace, and society have led to unprece-
dented challenges to optimize their pricing and inventory control policy. The primary
goal of this dissertation is to develop the models and methods to understand the impact
of some emerging market trends upon a rm's pricing and inventory policy. Specically,
we consider three types of current market trends: (a) social networks, (b) sustainability
concerns, and (c) customer behaviors.
 Social networks. The recent fast development of online social media has signif-
icantly intensied the interactions between customers. The social networks make
customers easily know and follow their friends' purchasing decisions, thus giving rise
to (positive) network externalities for almost all products. That is, customers are
more likely to purchase a product if there are more other customers who purchase
the same product. Network externalities enable rms to use current customers to
attract future customers and, thus, may have interesting implications on the pricing
and inventory policy of a rm.
 Sustainability concerns. In the recent years, the society embraces an increasing
trend of sustainability/environmental concerns. Remanufacturing, and the asso-
ciated trade-in program to collect used products for remanufacturing, have been
1
increasingly used for the sake of its environmental benet. We are especially inter-
ested in characterizing how trade-in remanufacturing would inuence the pricing
and production policy of a rm, and the economic and environmental values of this
business practice. From the government's perspective, it is also interesting to study
the public policy that could improve the social welfare when taking into account
rm prot, customer surplus, and environmental impact.
 Customer behaviors. We study two customer behaviors in this dissertation. The
rst is the strategic waiting behavior of customers. With this behavior, customers
will strategically seek for future discount and trade-in opportunities. We are curious
about the impact of strategic customer behavior upon the economic and environ-
mental values of trade-in remanufacturing. The second customer behavior studied
in this dissertation is the scarcity eect of inventory, which refers to the phenomenon
that customers are discouraged by high inventory and encouraged by low inventory
available to them. The operational implications of the scarcity eect of inventory
have also been analyzed in this dissertation.
1.2 Contribution
In this dissertation, we establish dynamic programming and game theoretic models
to study the dynamic pricing and inventory control issues under the presence of these
new market trends. Our focus is to address two main questions: (a) How these emerging
market trends would inuence the operations decisions and protability of a rm; and
(b) What pricing and inventory strategies a rm could use to leverage these trends. Our
analysis reveals that the current market trends of social networks, sustainability concerns,
and customer behaviors give rise to some new tradeos the rm has to balance and, thus,
have signicant and interesting impact upon the operations policy of a rm. On the other
hand, the rm could adopt some innovative pricing and inventory strategies to exploit
these trends and substantially improve its prot. To facilitate the analysis of the two
main questions, we also develop an eective comparative statics analysis method for a
general class of joint pricing and inventory management models.
Network externalities (the monopoly setting, Chapter 2). We study the im-
pact of network externalities upon a rms pricing and inventory policy under demand
2
uncertainty. The rm sells a product associated with an online service or communication
network, which is formed by (part of) the customers who have purchased the product.
The product exhibits network externalities, i.e., a customer's willingness-to-pay and, thus,
the potential demand are increasing in the size of the associated network. We show that
a network-size-dependent base-stock/list-price policy is optimal. Moreover, the inventory
dynamics of the rm do not inuence the optimal policy as long as the initial inven-
tory is below the initial base-stock level. Hence, we can reduce the dynamic program to
characterize the optimal policy to one with a single-dimensional state-space (the network
size). Network externalities give rise to the tradeo between generating current prots
and inducing future demands, thus having several important implications upon the rm's
operations decisions. Compared with the benchmark case without network externalities,
the rm under network externalities sets a higher base-stock level, and charges a lower
[higher] sales price when the network size is small [large]. When the market is stationary,
the rm adopts the introductory price strategy, i.e., it charges a lower price at the begin-
ning of the sales season to induce higher future demands. The price discrimination and
network expanding promotion strategies can eectively leverage network externalities and
improve the rm's prot. Both strategies facilitate the rm to (partially) separate gener-
ating current prots and inducing future demands through network externalities. Finally,
we perform extensive numerical studies to demonstrate the signicant prot loss of ignor-
ing network externalities. We also propose near-optimal heuristic policies that leverage
network externalities by balancing generating current prots and inducing demands in
the near future.
Network externalities (the dynamic competition setting, Chapter 3). We
study a dynamic competition model, in which retail rms periodically compete on promo-
tional eort, sales price, and service level over a nite planning horizon. The key feature
of our model is that the current decisions inuence the future market sizes through the
service eect and the network eect, i.e., the rm with a higher current service level
and a higher current demand is more likely to have larger future market sizes and vice
versa. Hence, the competing rms face the tradeo between generating current prots and
inducing future demands (i.e., the exploitation-induction tradeo). Using the linear sep-
arability approach, we characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium in both
the simultaneous competition and the promotion-rst competition. The exploitation-
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induction tradeo has several important managerial implications under both competi-
tions. First, to balance the exploitation-induction tradeo, the competing rms should
increase promotional eorts, oer price discounts, and improve service levels under the
service eect and the network eect. Second, the exploitation-induction tradeo is more
intensive at an earlier stage of the sales season than at later stages, so the equilibrium
sales prices are increasing, whereas the equilibrium promotional eorts and service levels
are decreasing, over the planning horizon. Third, the competing rms need to balance
the exploitation-induction tradeo inter-temporally under the simultaneous competition,
whereas they need to balance this tradeo both inter-temporally and intra-temporally
under the promotion-rst competition. Finally, we show that, in the dynamic game with
market size dynamics, the exploitation-induction tradeo could be a new driving force
for the \fat-cat" eect (i.e., the equilibrium promotional eorts are higher under the
promotion-rst competition than those under the simultaneous competition).
Trade-in remanufacturing (Chapter 4). We investigate the impact of strategic
customer behavior on the economic and environmental values of the trade-in remanufac-
turing practice. There are several major ndings. First, under trade-in remanufacturing,
a rm may earn a higher prot with strategic customers than with myopic customers,
which diers from the common belief that rms dislike forward-looking customer be-
havior due to its detrimental eect on prot. This is because strategic customers can
anticipate the future price discount brought by the trade-in option, so when the revenue-
generating eect of remanufacturing is strong enough, they might be willing to pay a
higher rst-period price than the myopic customers. Second, we show that strategic cus-
tomer behavior may create a tension between protability and sustainability: On one
hand, by exploiting the forward-looking customer behavior, trade-in remanufacturing is
more valuable to the rm with strategic customers than with myopic customers; on the
other hand, with strategic customers, trade-in remanufacturing may have a negative im-
pact on the environment and also on social welfare, since it may give rise to a signicantly
higher production quantity without improving customer surplus. Therefore, our research
demonstrates that it is important to understand the interaction between trade-in reman-
ufacturing and strategic customer behavior. Finally, to resolve the above tension, we
study how a social planner (e.g., the government) should design a public policy to max-
imize social welfare. It has been shown that subsidizing remanufactured products alone
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may lead to undesired outcomes; however, the social optimum can be achieved by using
a simple linear subsidy and tax scheme for all product versions.
Scarcity eect of inventory (Chapter 5). We analyze a nite horizon periodic
review joint pricing and inventory management model for a rm that replenishes and
sells a product under the scarcity eect of inventory. The demand distribution in each
period depends negatively on the sales price and customer-accessible inventory level at the
beginning of the period. The rm can withhold or dispose of its on-hand inventory to deal
with the scarcity eect. We show that a customer-accessible-inventory-dependent order-
upto/dispose-down-to/display-up-to list-price policy is optimal. Moreover, the optimal
order-up-to/display-up-to and list-price levels are decreasing in the customer-accessible
inventory level. When the scarcity eect of inventory is suciently strong, the rm
should display no positive inventory and deliberately make every customer wait. The
analysis of two important special cases wherein the rm cannot withhold (or dispose
of) inventory delivers sharper insights showing that the inventory-dependent demand
drives both optimal prices and order-up-to levels down. In addition, we demonstrate
that an increase in the operational exibility (e.g., a higher salvage value or the inventory
withholding opportunity) mitigates the demand loss caused by high excess inventory and
increases the optimal order-up-to levels and sales prices. We also generalize our model
by incorporating responsive inventory reallocation after demand realizes. Finally, we
perform extensive numerical studies to demonstrate that both the prot loss of ignoring
the scarcity eect and the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect are signicant
Comparative statics analysis method (Chapter 6). We consider a general joint
pricing and inventory management model, in which a rm sources from multiple supply
channels to serve a market with multiple demand segments. Moreover, both the market
size of each demand segment and the reference procurement cost of each supply channel
are uctuating over the planning horizon according to an exogenous Markov process.
Comparative statics analysis is essential in this model, but the commonly used implicit
function theorem (IFT) approach and monotone comparative statics (MCS) approach are
not amenable. Hence, we develop a new comparative statics method for this model. We
utilize the method to characterize the structure of the optimal policy and the impact of
market uctuation, demand segmentation, and supply diversication upon the optimal
policy in each period. The new method establishes the desired comparative statics results
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by iteratively linking the comparisons between optimizers and those between the partial
derivatives of the objective functions. The method makes componentwise comparisons
between the optimizers with dierent parameter values, so it applies to the models where
not all of the optimal decision variables are monotone in the parameter, and it is well
scalable. The method does not require the objective function to be twice continuously
dierentiable or jointly supermodular. We also employ this comparative statics method
to study a joint price and eort competition model.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 examine
the impact of network externalities upon the pricing and inventory management policy
in the monopoly and dynamic competition settings, respectively. In Chapter 4, we study
how strategic customer behavior would inuence the economic and environmental values
of trade-in remanufacturing. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the combined pricing and
inventory control issue under the scarcity eect of inventory. Chapter 6 is devoted to
the development of a new comparative statics analysis method for a general class of joint
pricing and inventory management models. We conclude the dissertation in Chapter 7,
where we also discuss potential directions for future research. All proofs are relegated to
the Appendices. For Chapters 2 to 6, the notations within each chapter are self-contained,
so the same notation may have dierent meanings in dierent chapters.
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2. Operations Impact of Network Externalities: the Monopoly
Setting
2.1 Introduction
1Network externalities refer to the general phenomenon that a customer's utility of
purchasing a product is increasing in the number of other customers who buy the same
product. See, e.g., [66]. With the fast development of information technology, network
externalities have become a key driver of protability for a high-tech rm. Take Apple
as an example. Around year 2000, Apple computers were better, by all accounts, than
the PCs with the Windows system. However, the vast majority of desktop and laptop
computers ran Windows as their operating systems because of network externalities (see,
e.g., [107]). Due to Windows' dominating role in the operating system market, software
developers made only one sixth as many applications for Macintosh as they did for Win-
dows by the time of Microsoft's antitrust trial. This, in turn, made Apple computers
unattractive to new consumers, despite its functional advantages (see [65]). At the era
of smartphones, however, Apple becomes the winning side of the network externalities
game. Since the launch of App Store in 2008, there have been more than 1.4 million
mobile apps with more than 75 billion downloads on this digital distribution platform.
The App Store not only generates huge revenues (Apple takes 30% of all revenues gener-
ated through apps), but also creates large availability of apps for iPhones, thus enabling
Apple to exploit network externalities to a large extent. As a consequence, iPhones have
a market share of 47:4% among all smartphones in November 2014 (see, e.g., [101]).
The example of Apple clearly demonstrates the importance of network externalities
upon a rm's success in the market. In particular, the online mobile software distributing
platform App Store plays an important role in strengthening the network externalities
of Apple products, and in boosting the sales of iPhones. As an analogous example,
Xbox Live, the online multiplayer gaming network for Xbox game consoles, signicantly
intensies the network externalities of Xbox consoles. This is because the value of an
1This chapter is based on the author's earlier work [190]
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Xbox to an user increases if she has more opportunities to play games with her friends
on Xbox Live (see, also, [127]). Thus, the size of the online gaming network Xbox Live
is crucial to Microsoft's game console business, and the rm should manage the size
of this network carefully. Being aware of this, Microsoft oered a discount of $50 for
Xbox One customers who guaranteed to sign up for Xbox Live Gold membership for at
least one year ([85]). This strategy helps Microsoft price discriminate in favor of the
customers who would join Xbox Live. In another promotion, the 12-month Xbox Live
Gold membership was discounted by 33% in February 2015 to attract Xbox customers
into the online gaming network ([153]).
Firms like Apple and Microsoft naturally face the question of how to optimally co-
ordinate the price and inventory policy of their products (iPhone and Xbox One). To
address this question, we study a periodic-review single-item dynamic pricing and inven-
tory management model under network externalities. The rm may launch an online
service network associated with the product (e.g., App Store and Xbox Live). With the
recent trends of online social media, the associated network can also be in the form of a
social communication network (e.g., Facebook), where customers share their purchasing
and consumption experiences of the product. To model network externalities, we assume
that a customer's willingness-to-pay is increasing in the size of the associated network.
Moreover, in each period, a fraction of the customers who make a purchase would join
the network, whereas the rest directly leave the market. We call the former customers the
social customers, and the latter ones the individual customers. The rm may generate
revenues from the network via, e.g., service fees. This model enables us to characterize
the optimal pricing and inventory policy of a prot-maximizing rm under network ex-
ternalities. Our analysis highlights the impact of network externalities upon the rm's
optimal price and inventory policy, and identies eective strategies to exploit network
externalities.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst in the literature to study the dynamic
pricing and inventory management problem under network externalities. We show that
a network-size-dependent base-stock/list-price policy is optimal. Moreover, we make
an interesting technical contribution in this chapter: The inventory dynamics of the
rm would not aect its optimal policy. As a consequence, the optimal policy can be
characterized by a dynamic program with a single-dimensional state space (the network
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size). We perform a sample path analysis of the inventory system and show that, if the
rm adopts the optimal policy and the initial inventory is below the initial base-stock
level, the inventory level of the rm will stay below the optimal base-stock level in each
period throughout the planning horizon with probability 1. Under the base-stock/list-
price policy, inventory will not aect the optimal policy if it is below the base-stock level.
Therefore, although the rm carries inventory, the optimal policy does not depend on the
inventory dynamics once it falls below the base-stock level of any decision period. With
a simple transformation to normalize the value of current inventory, we can reduce the
dynamic program that characterizes the optimal policy to one with a single-dimensional
state space (the network size). This dimensionality reduction result signicantly simplies
the analysis, and enables us to deliver sharper insights on the managerial implications of
network externalities.
Our analysis reveals that network externalities drive the rm to balance the tradeo
between generating current prots and inducing future demands. Under network exter-
nalities, since customers have a higher willingness-to-pay with a larger network size, the
optimal list-price are increasing in the current network size. The optimal expected de-
mand and base-stock level, however, may be either increasing or decreasing in the current
network size. Moreover, network externalities give rise to higher potential demand, thus
driving the rm to increase the base-stock level in each period. The optimal sales price,
however, may be higher or lower under network externalities, because the rm should
decrease the sales price to induce higher future demands when the network size is small,
and increase the sales price to exploit the better market condition when the network size
is big. From the intertemporal perspective, the rm should put more weight on inducing
future demands at the early stage of a sales season. Thus, when the market is station-
ary, the rm charges lower prices at the beginning of the planning horizon. Hence, the
widely-adopted introductory price strategy (oering price discounts when starting the
sales season of a product) may stem from network externalities.
We demonstrate the eectiveness of two commonly adopted strategies in the presence
of network externalities: (a) price discrimination and (b) network expanding promotion.
The key uniform idea of both strategies is that, the rm employs an additional leverage
(price or promotion) to (partially) separate generating current prots and inducing future
demands through network externalities. Under the price discrimination strategy, the rm
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tailors (potentially) dierent prices to dierent customer segments based on their social
inuences. The prices for both the social and individual customers help generate current
prots, but the price for the social customers has the additional role of inducing future
demands via network externalities. Therefore, it is optimal for the rm to oer discounts
to social customers to induce future demands, and compensate for the reduced margin in
the social segment with an increased margin in the individual segment.
Our model validates the use of (costly) network expanding promotions (e.g., oer-
ing discounts for the service fee of the associated network or investing in social media
marketing strategies). When network externalities are suciently strong or the marginal
prot of the associated network is suciently high, it is optimal for the rm to oer net-
work expanding promotion, regardless of its inventory level. The optimal sales price in
each period is higher with network expanding promotion than without. In other words,
the rm employs network expanding promotions to induce future demands via network
externalities, while charging a premium product price to generate higher current prots
from selling the product.
We perform extensive numerical studies to demonstrate that (a) the prot loss of
ignoring network externalities is signicant, and (b) some easy-to-implement heuristic
policies can eectively exploit network externalities and achieve low optimality gaps. Our
numerical results show that ignoring the demand-induction eect of network externalities
leads to a signicant prot loss, especially when the network externalities intensity, the
social customer proportion, or the network size carry-through rate is high. In this case,
the rm faces a strong tradeo between generating current prots and inducing future
demands, so ignoring network externalities yields a misleading myopic policy. On the
other hand, the heuristic policies that dynamically maximize the prot in a moving time
window of no more than 5 periods enable the rm to leverage network externalities to
a large extent, and achieve low prot losses relative to the optimal policy. Although
completely ignoring network externalities gives rise to signicant prot losses, the rm
can eectively exploit network externalities by balancing the current prots and the near
future demands.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we position this
chapter in the related literature. Section 2.3 presents the basic formulation, notations
and assumptions of our model. Section 2.4 analyzes the base model. We discuss how
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price discrimination and network expanding promotion strategies help exploit network
externalities in Section 2.5. The numerical studies are reported in Section 2.6. In Section
2.7, we conclude this chapter by summarizing our main ndings. All proofs are relegated
to Appendix A.1.
2.2 Related Research
This chapter is built upon two streams of research in the literature: (a) network
externalities and (b) joint pricing and inventory management.
Network externalities have been extensively studied in the economics literature. In
their seminal papers, [102, 103] characterize the impact of network externalities upon
market competition, product compatibility, and technology adoption. [62, 67] study the
network externality in nancial markets. Several papers also study dynamic pricing un-
der network externalities. For example, [61] characterize the optimal nonlinear pricing
strategy for a network product with heterogenous customers. [19] consider the optimal
dynamic monopoly pricing under network externalities and show that the equilibrium
prices increase as time passes. [38] show that, for a monopolist, the introductory price
strategy is optimal under demand information incompletion or asymmetry. [36] study
the optimal pricing strategy in a network with given network structure, and characterize
the relationship between optimal prices and consumers' centrality. Recently, the oper-
ations management (OM) literature starts to take into account the impact of network
externalities upon a rm's operations strategy. For example, [185] propose and analyze
the consumer choice models that endogenize network externalities.
The literature on the joint pricing and inventory management problem under stochas-
tic demand is rich. [137] give a comprehensive review on the single period joint pricing
and inventory control problem, and extend the results in the newsvendor problem with
pricing. [70] show that a list-price/order-up-to policy is optimal for a general periodic-
review joint pricing and inventory management model. When the demand distribution
is unknown, [138] address the joint pricing and inventory management problem under
demand learning. [47, 48, 49] analyze the joint pricing and inventory control problem
with xed ordering cost. They show that (s; S; p) policy is optimal for nite horizon, in-
nite horizon and continuous review models. [52] and [96], among others, study the joint
pricing and inventory control problem under lost sales. In the case of a single unreliable
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supplier with random yield, [112] show that supply uncertainty drives the rm to charge
a higher price. [88] and [43] characterize the joint dynamic pricing and dual-sourcing
policy of an inventory system facing the random yield risk and the disruption risk, re-
spectively. When the replenishment leadtime is positive, the joint pricing and inventory
control problem under periodic review is extremely dicult. For this problem, [136]
partially characterize the structure of the optimal policy, whereas [26] develop a simple
heuristic that resolves the computational complexity. [46] characterize the optimal joint
pricing and inventory control policy with positive procurement leadtime and perishable
inventory. When the rm adopts supply diversication to complement its pricing strat-
egy, [195] characterize the optimal dynamic pricing/dual-sourcing strategy, whereas [173]
demonstrate how a rm should coordinate its pricing and sourcing strategies to address
procurement cost uctuation. We refer interested readers to [50] for a comprehensive
survey on joint pricing and inventory control models.
This chapter contributes to the above two streams of research by incorporating net-
work externalities into the standard joint pricing and inventory management model,
studying the impact of network externalities upon a rm's pricing and inventory pol-
icy, and identifying eective strategies and heuristics to exploit network externalities.
Finally, from the modeling perspective, this chapter is related to the literature on
inventory systems with positive intertemporal demand correlations (see, e.g., [100, 89,
16]). The key dierence between our work and this line of research is that we endogenize
the pricing decision in out model and, thus, the rm can partially control the demand
process via network externalities. As a consequence, our focus is on the tradeo between
generating current prots and inducing future demands, whereas that literature focuses
on the demand learning and inventory control issues with intertemporally correlated
demands. The new perspective and focus of our work enable us to deliver new insights
on the managerial implications of network externalities to the literature on inventory
management with intertemporal demand correlations.
2.3 Model Formulation
Consider a periodic-review backlog joint pricing and inventory management model of
a rm who sells a network product (e.g., a smartphone or a video game console) over
a T -period planning horizon, labeled backwards as fT; T   1;    ; 1g. We assume that
12
there is an online service network associated with the product (e.g., the App Store or
the Xbox Live) or an online social communication network (e.g. Facebook), so that
(part of) the customers who purchase the product can join the network and exhibit
network externalities onto potential customers in the future. More specically, in each
period t, a continuum of innitesimal customers arrive at the market. Each customer
requests at most one product. Following [102], we assume that the willingness-to-pay
of a new customer in period t is given by V + (Nt), where V is the customer type
uniformly distributed on the interval ( 1; Vt] with density 1, and () is a nonnegative,
concavely increasing, and twice continuously dierentiable function of the network size at
the beginning of period t, Nt. Hence, V is the type-V customer's intrinsic valuation of the
product that is independent of network externalities, whereas () captures the network
externalities of the product, i.e., the larger the associated network, the greater utilities
customers gain to purchase the product. We call () the network externalities function
hereafter. For technical tractability, we assume that the customers are bounded rational
so that they base their purchasing decisions on the current sales price and network size,
instead of rational expectations on future prices and network sizes. Therefore, a type-
V customer would make a purchase in period t if and only if V + (Nt)  pt, where
pt 2 [p; p] is the product price the rm charges in period t. In each period t, there exists
a random additive demand shock, t, which captures other uncertainties not explicitly
modeled (e.g., the macro-economic condition of period t). Hence, the actual demand in
period t is given by:
Dt(pt; Nt) := Vt + (Nt)  pt + t;
where t is independent of the price pt and the network size Nt with E[t] = 0. Moreover,
ft : t = T; T   1;    ; 1g are i:i:d: continuously distributed random variables. Without
loss of generality, we assume that Dt(pt; Nt)  0 with probability 1, for all pt 2 [p; p] and
Nt  0.
We now introduce the dynamics of the network sizes fNt : t = T; T   1;    1g. Given
the current network size Nt, the network size of the next period, Nt 1, is determined by
two eects. First, some customers may leave the network. For example, a game player
may lose its enthusiasm in online gaming three years after purchasing the Xbox console.
Analogously, an iPhone user may switch to Samsung for her next smartphone. Thus,
given Nt, let Nt be the remaining number of customers staying in the network in period
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t   1, where  2 [0; 1] is the carry-through rate of the network size. Second, a fraction
of new customers who purchase the product in period t would join the network. Not
all new customers will join the network and exhibit positive externalities onto potential
customers in the future, because, e.g., some Xbox players only play the games o-line
and, thus, are not part of the Xbox Live network. Clearly, these players exert few, if any,
network externalities onto other customers. For any given (pt; Nt), let Dt(pt; Nt) be the
number of new customers who opt to join the network associated with the product, which
we call the social customers hereafter, where  2 (0; 1] is the proportion of such customers
in the market. The other (1  )Dt(pt; Nt) customers who exert no network externalities
are called individual customers hereafter. Although we implicitly assume that the utility
functions of the social and individual customers are identical, most of the results in this
chapter (except Theorem 2.5.1) continue to hold if Vt and () are dierent for the social
and individual customers. To capture the market size dynamics, we notice that, due
to demand uncertainty and limited inventory availability, not all customers request a
product can get one in the current period. We assume that the social customers who
purchase but not get the product still join the network. It is commonly observed in
practice that customers exert network externalities upon future potential buyers before
receiving the product. For example, before obtaining the pre-ordered product, a customer
may comment on her excitement in waiting for and expecting the product on Facebook,
thus exerting network externalities upon potential buyers. Moreover, by Theorem 2.4.1(c)
below, if the rm adopts the optimal pricing and inventory policy, all backlogged demand
will be fullled in the next period, so the backlogged social customers will get the product
and join the network shortly. For simplicity, we ignore the dierences in the timing of
joining the network between the customers who get the product upon request and those
who are backlogged to the next period. Therefore, given Nt, the network size at the
beginning of period t  1 is given by:
Nt 1 = Nt + Dt(pt; Nt) + t; (2.1)
where t is the additive random shock in the network size dynamics not explicitly captured
in our model. We assume that t is independent of the price pt and the network size Nt
with E[t] = 0. Moreover, ft : t = T; T   1;    ; 1g are i:i:d: continuously distributed
random variables.
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If the associated network is a service network, the rm can generate prots via this
network by charging service/subscription fees. For example, Microsoft charges an annual
subscription fee of $59:99 for the Xbox Live Gold membership, whereas Apple takes 30%
of all revenues generated through apps in the App Store. For any network size N  0, let
rn(N)  0 denote the per-period prot the rm earns from the network. Without loss of
generality, we assume that rn() is a concavely increasing and continuously dierentiable
function with rn(0) = 0. To focus on the rm's pricing and inventory policy of its product,
we do not explicitly model the rm's price decision of its network service. Hence, the
per-period prot function of the network, rn(), is assumed to be exogenously given.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the service fees are paid at the end of each
period. Hence, the total expected prot the rm obtains from the associated network
in period t is given by: E[rn(Nt + Dt(pt; Nt) + t)]. If the associated network is a
social communication network where the social customers share their purchasing and
consumption experiences, the rm obtains no prot from this network, i.e., rn()  0.
The state of the inventory system is given by (It; Nt) 2 R R+, where
It =the starting inventory level before replenishment in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1;
Nt =the starting network size of the product in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
The decisions of the rm is given by (xt; pt) 2 F(It) := [It;+1) [p; p], where
xt =the inventory level after replenishment in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1;
pt =the sales price charged in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
In each period, the sequence of events unfolds as follows: At the beginning of period
t, after observing the inventory level It and the network size Nt, the rm simultaneously
chooses the inventory stocking level xt  It and the sales price pt, and pays the ordering
cost c(xt   It). The inventory procurement leadtime is assumed to be zero, so that
the replenished inventory is received immediately. The demand Dt(pt; Nt) then realizes.
The revenue from selling the product, ptE[Dt(pt; Nt)], and the prot from the associated
network, E[rn(Nt + Dt(pt; Nt) + t)], are collected. Unmet demand is fully backlogged.
At the end of period t, the holding and backlogging costs are paid, the net inventory is
carried over to the next period, and the network size is updated according to the network
size dynamics (2.1).
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We introduce the following model primitives:
 = discount factor of revenues and costs in future periods, 0 <   1;
c = inventory purchasing cost per unit ordered;
b = backlogging cost per unit backlogged at the end of a period;
h = holding cost per unit stocked at the end of a period:
Without loss of generality, we make the following assumptions on the model primitives:
b > (1  )c : the backlogging penalty is higher than the saving from delaying
an order to the next period, so that the rm will not backlog all of
its demand;
p > b+ c : positive margin for backlogged demand.
The above assumptions are common in the joint pricing and inventory management lit-
erature (see, e.g., [189]).
For technical tractability, we make the following assumption throughout our analysis.
Assumption 2.3.1 For each period t, Rt(; ) is jointly concave in (pt; Nt) 2 [p; p] 
[0;+1), where
Rt(pt; Nt) := (pt   b  c)( Vt   pt + (Nt)): (2.2)
Given the sales price, pt, and the network size, Nt, of period t, Rt(pt; Nt) is the
expected dierence between the revenue and the total cost, which consists of ordering
and backlogging costs, to satisfy the current demand in the next period. Hence, the
joint concavity of Rt(; ) implies that such dierence has decreasing marginal values with
respect to the current sales price and network size. We remark that Rt(; Nt) is strictly
concave in pt for any given Nt. Moreover, the monotonicity of () suggests that Rt(; ) is
supermodular in (pt; Nt). The following lemma gives the necessary and sucient condition
for Assumption 2.3.1.
Lemma 1 Assumption 2.3.1 holds for period t, if and only if, for all Nt  0,
 2(p  c  b)00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2: (2.3)
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Based on Lemma 1, we give more specic conditions on the network externalities
function () for Assumption 2.3.1 to hold in Appendix A.2. In a nutshell, Assumption
2.3.1 holds when (a) the curvature of the network externalities function () is not too
small in the region network externalities exist (i.e., 0() > 0), and (b) the price elasticity
of demand (i.e., j( dE[Dt(pt; Nt)]=E[Dt(pt; Nt)])=( dpt=pt)j) is suciently big relative to
the network size elasticity of demand (i.e., j( dE[Dt(pt; Nt)]=E[Dt(pt; Nt)])=( dNt=Nt)j).
2.4 Analysis of the Base Model
In this section, we analyze the base model suitable for the usual sales season of the
network product, when the rm charges a single regular price for all customers with-
out any promotional campaigns. In Section 2.5, we introduce price discrimination and
network expanding promotion strategies, and analyze their eectiveness in leveraging
network externalities.
We rst characterize the structure of the optimal pricing and inventory policy in our
model. Then, we show that the state space dimension of the dynamic program for the
joint pricing and inventory replenishment problem can be reduced to 1. Finally, we study
the managerial implications of network externalities.
2.4.1 Optimal Policy
We now formulate the planning problem as a dynamic program. Dene
vt(It; Nt) := the maximum expected discounted prots in periods t; t  1;    ; 1, when
starting period t with an inventory level It and network size Nt.
Without loss of generality, we assume that, in the last period (period 1), the excess
inventory is salvaged with unit value c, and the backlogged demand is lled with ordering
cost c, i.e., v0(I0; N0) = cI0 for any (I0; N0). The optimal value function vt(It; Nt) satises
the following recursive scheme:
vt(It; Nt) = cIt + max
(xt;pt)2F(It)
Jt(xt; pt; Nt); (2.4)
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where F(It) := [It;+1) [p; p] denotes the set of feasible decisions and,
Jt(xt; pt; Nt) =  cIt + EfptDt(pt; Nt)  c(xt   It)  h(xt  Dt(pt; Nt))+
 b(xt  Dt(pt; Nt))  + rn(Dt(pt; Nt) + Nt + t)
+vt 1(xt  Dt(pt; Nt); Dt(pt; Nt) + Nt + t)jNtg;
= (pt   c  b)( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + (b  (1  )c)xt
+Efrn(( Vt   pt + (Nt) + t) + Nt + t)
 (h+ b)(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  t)+
+[vt 1(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  t; ( Vt   pt + (Nt) + t) + Nt + t)
 c(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  t)]jNtg
= Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt))
+	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt); (2.5)
with 	t(x; y) := Efrn(y + t + t) + [vt 1(x  t; y + t + t)  cx]g;
(x) := Ef (b+ h)(x  t)+g;
 := b  (1  )c = the monetary benet of ordering one unit of inventory.
Hence, for each period t, the rm selects
(xt (It; Nt); p

t (It; Nt)) := argmax(xt;pt)2F(It)Jt(xt; pt; Nt) (2.6)
as the optimal price and inventory policy contingent on the state variable (It; Nt).
We begin our analysis by characterizing the preliminary concavity and dierentiability
properties of the value and objective functions in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For each t = T; T   1;    ; 1, the following statements hold:
(a) 	t(; ) is jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (x; y). Moreover, 	t(x; y)
is decreasing in x and increasing in y.
(b) Jt(; ; ) is jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (xt; pt; Nt).
(c) vt(; ) is jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (It; Nt). Moreover,
vt(It; Nt) is increasing in Nt, and vt(It; Nt)  cIt is decreasing in It.
Lemma 2 proves that, in each period t, the objective function is concave and con-
tinuously dierentiable, and the value function is jointly concave and continuously dif-
ferentiable. Moreover, the normalized value function vt(It; Nt)   cIt is decreasing in the
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inventory level It and increasing in the network size Nt. Lemma 2 is a standard result in
the joint pricing and inventory management literature (see, e.g., Theorem 1 in [70]). The
concavity and continuous dierentiability of Jt(; ; ) ensure that, the optimal price and
inventory policy, (xt (It; Nt); p

t (It; Nt)), is well-dened and can be obtained via rst-order
conditions. Moreover, we can dene the inventory-independent optimizer (xt(Nt); pt(Nt))
as follows:
(xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) := argmaxxt2R;pt2[p;p]Jt(xt; pt; Nt): (2.7)
In case of multiple optimizers, we select the lexicographically smallest one. We dene
yt(Nt) := Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt) as the optimal inventory-independent expected demand of
period t. With Lemma 2, we characterize the optimal pricing and inventory policy in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.1 For any t, the following statements hold:
(a) If It  xt(Nt), (xt (It; Nt); pt (It; Nt)) = (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)):
(b) If It > xt(Nt), x

t (It; Nt) = It and p

t (It; Nt) = argmaxpt2[p;p]Jt(It; pt; Nt):
(c) For any It 2 R and Nt  0, xt (It; Nt) > 0.
Theorem 2.4.1 shows that the optimal policy in the base model is a network-size-
dependent base-stock/list-price policy. If the starting inventory level It is below the
network-size-dependent base-stock level xt(Nt), it is optimal to order up to this base-stock
level, and charge the network-size-dependent list-price pt(Nt). If the starting inventory
level is above the network-size-dependent base-stock level, it is optimal not to order
anything, and charge an inventory-dependent sales price pt (It; Nt). Moreover, as shown
in Theorem 2.4.1(c), the optimal order-up-to level xt (It; Nt) is always positive for any
inventory level It and network size Nt. This implies that, under the optimal policy, all
backlogged demand in any period t will be satised in the next period (i.e., period t  1).
2.4.2 State Space Dimension Reduction
The original dynamic program to characterize the optimal pricing and inventory policy
(2.4) has a state space of two dimensions (inventory level It and network size Nt). Hence,
it is dicult to work with (2.4) directly. In this subsection, we demonstrate that the
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dynamic program (2.4) can be reduced to a much simpler one with a single-dimensional
state space (network size Nt). Moreover, with probability 1, the optimal policy in each
period t, (xt (It; Nt); p

t (It; Nt)), is independent of the dynamics of inventory level fIs :
s = T; T 1;    ; tg, as long as the initial inventory level IT is below the optimal period-T
base-stock level xT (NT ). The state space dimension reduction, as we will show in Section
2.4.3 and Section 2.5, enables us to deliver sharper insights on the managerial implications
of network externalities and the eective strategies to exploit network externalities.
To begin with, we employ the sample path analysis approach to characterize the
behavior of the inventory level dynamics under the optimal pricing and inventory policy.
Lemma 3 For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) For all network sizes Nt and Nt 1, we have
P[xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt)  xt 1(Nt 1)] = 1:
(b) For all Nt  0, xt(Nt) =  + yt(Nt), where  := argmaxf+ ()g.
Lemma 3(a) shows that, if the rm adopts the optimal policy and the starting in-
ventory level in period t, It, is below the period-t base-stock level xt(Nt), the starting
inventory level in period t  1, It 1 = xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt), is below the period-(t  1)
base-stock level, xt 1(Nt 1), with probability 1. Lemma 3(a) also implies that once the
starting inventory level falls below the optimal base-stock level of one period, the rm
should replenish in each period thereafter throughout the planning horizon with proba-
bility 1. Since our model best ts the network product that is either a new product (e.g.,
the rst-generation iPhone) or a new generation of an existing product (e.g., Xbox One),
zero inventory is stocked at the beginning of the sales season, i.e., IT = 0. Therefore,
Theorem 2.4.1(c) and Lemma 3(a) imply that It  xt(Nt) with probability 1 for each
period t. As a corollary of Lemma 3(a), Lemma 3(b) shows that, if the starting inventory
is below the optimal base-stock level (i.e., It  xt(Nt)), the optimal safety-stock  is
invariant with respect to the period t and the network size Nt, and can be obtained by
solving a one-dimensional convex optimization.
Based on Lemma 3, we now show that the bivariate value functions of the dynamic
program (2.4), fvt(; ) : t = T; T 1;    ; 1g, can be transformed into a univariate function
t() of the current network size Nt by normalizing the value of the starting inventory cIt.
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Moreover, the normalized value function t() is concavely increasing and continuously
dierentiable in Nt.
Lemma 4 There exists a sequence of functions ft() : 1  t  Tg, such that, (i)
t(Nt) = maxfJt(xt; pt; Nt) : xt  0; ; pt 2 [p; p]g for all Nt  0; (ii) for each t, t() is
concavely increasing and continuously dierentiable in Nt; (iii) vt(It; Nt) = cIt + t(Nt)
for all Nt  0 and It  xt(Nt); (iv) for all Nt  0,
Jt(xt; pt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt)+xt+(xt  Vt+pt (Nt))+Gt(( Vt pt+(Nt))+Nt); (2.8)
where Gt(y) := E[rn(y + t + t) + t 1(y + t + t)] and xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  ;
and (v) (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) maximizes the right-hand side of equation (2.8).
Lemma 4 enables us to reduce the original dynamic program (2.4), which has a two-
dimension state-space, to one with a single-dimension state space. More specically,
Lemma 4 implies that the optimal network-size-dependent base-stock level and list-price
in each period t, (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)), can be recursively determined by solving the following
dynamic program with a single dimensional state-space of network size Nt:
t(Nt) = max
xt0;pt2[p;p]
Jt(xt; pt; Nt); (2.9)
where Jt(xt; pt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt))
+Gt(( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt);
with Gt(y) := Efrn(y + t + t) + t 1(y + t + t)g; and 0()  0;
Summarizing Theorem 2.4.1, Lemma 3, and Lemma 4, we have the following sharper
characterization of the optimal policy in each period.
Theorem 2.4.2 Assume that IT  xT (NT ). In each period t and for each It and Nt,
(xt (It; Nt); p

t (It; Nt)) = (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) with probability 1. Moreover, f(xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) :
t = T; T   1;    ; 1g is the solution to the Bellman equation (2.9).
Theorem 2.4.2 shows that, as long as the planning horizon starts with an inven-
tory level below the optimal period-T base-stock level (i.e., IT  xT (NT )), the optimal
pricing and inventory policy in each period t, (xt (It; Nt); p

t (It; Nt)), is identical to the
optimal base-stock level and list-price, (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)), with probability 1. Although the
rm holds inventory throughout the sales horizon, the optimal policy is independent of
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the inventory dynamics if the initial inventory level IT is suciently low. As discussed
above, in most applications, the rm holds zero initial inventory at the beginning of the
sales season, i.e., IT = 0. Hence, (x

t (It; Nt); p

t (It; Nt)) = (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) for all (It; Nt)
with probability 1. Therefore, we will focus on analyzing the properties of the optimal
inventory-independent base-stock level and list-price (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) for the rest of this
section.
2.4.3 Managerial Implications of Network Externalities
This subsection studies the impact of network externalities upon the rm's optimal
price and inventory decisions in each period. Specically, we strive to answer the following
questions: (a) How should the rm adjust its price and inventory policy in response
to the network size evolution? (b) How do network externalities directly impact the
optimal policy of the rm? (c) How should the rm adjust its price and inventory policy
intertemporally throughout the sales season? And (d) how to balance earning prots
directly from selling the product and from the service fees of the network? The answers
to these questions shed lights on the managerial implications of network externalities.
To begin with, we characterize the impact of network size upon the rm's optimal
pricing and inventory policy in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.3 For each period t, assume that N^t > Nt. We have: (a) pt(N^t)  pt(Nt);
(b) if It  xt(Nt), E[Nt 1jN^t]  E[Nt 1jNt]; (c) if (N^t) = (Nt), then yt(N^t)  yt(Nt)
and xt(N^t)  xt(Nt); and (d) if  = 0, then yt(N^t)  yt(Nt) and xt(N^t)  xt(Nt).
Theorem 2.4.3 characterizes how the current network size inuences the optimal
joint pricing and inventory policy, the optimal expected current-period demand, and
the optimal expected next-period network size. More specically, we show that the
optimal list-price, pt(Nt), and the optimal expected network size in the next period,
E[Nt 1jNt] = yt(Nt) + Nt, are increasing in the current network size Nt. The opti-
mal expected demand yt(Nt), and the optimal base-stock level xt(Nt), however, may not
necessarily be increasing or decreasing in Nt (see Theorem 2.4.3(c,d)). Under network
externalities, a larger current network size Nt gives rise to a higher potential demand,
so the rm charges a higher price to exploit the better market condition. Hence, with
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a larger current network size, the combination of a better market condition and an in-
creased sales price may drive the resulting optimal expected demand and the optimal
base-stock level either higher or lower.
In the joint pricing and inventory management model without network externalities
(e.g., [70]), the optimal policy in each period is independent of either past demands
or past decisions. Since the current network size Nt is positively correlated with past
demands, Theorem 2.4.3 implies that network externalities create intertemporal correla-
tions between demands and optimal decisions throughout the planning horizon. Hence,
the rm can employ the current price and inventory decisions to control future demands.
Therefore, the rm needs to dynamically balance the tradeo between generating current
prots and inducing future demands through network externalities.
Theorems 2.4.1-2.4.3 are silent on the properties of the optimal policy when the start-
ing inventory exceeds the optimal base-stock level (i.e., It > xt(Nt)). Though this sce-
nario occurs with probability 0 as long as IT  xT (NT ) (see Theorem 2.4.2), we give the
following theorem that characterizes the structure of the optimal policy therein.
Theorem 2.4.4 Assume that  = 0. For each period t, the following statements hold,
(a) vt(It; Nt) is supermodular in (It; Nt).
(b) xt (It; Nt) is continuously increasing in It and Nt.
(c) pt (It; Nt) is continuously decreasing in It, and continuously increasing in Nt.
(d) The optimal expected demand yt (It; Nt) := Vt   pt (It; Nt) + (Nt) is continuously
increasing in It and Nt. Hence, E[Nt 1jNt] = yt (It; Nt) is continuously increasing
in It and Nt.
(e) The optimal safety-stock t (It; Nt) := x

t (It; Nt)  Vt+ pt (It; Nt)  (Nt) is contin-
uously increasing in It and continuously decreasing in Nt.
Theorem 2.4.4 generalizes Theorems 2.4.1 and 2.4.3 to the setting with high starting
inventory (i.e., It > xt(Nt)). More specically, Theorem 2.4.4(a) shows that if  = 0 (i.e.,
all customers who are in the network will leave in the next period), the value function
in each period t, vt(It; Nt) is supermodular in (It; Nt). This is because, a larger network
size leads to a larger potential demand and, thus, a higher marginal value of inventory.
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Analogously, the optimal expected demand, yt (It; Nt), and the optimal expected network
size in the next period are all increasing in the network size Nt for all (It; Nt). As
a consequence, if the network size is larger, the rm increases the order-up-to level,
xt (It; Nt), to match demand with supply, and charges a higher sales price, p

t (It; Nt), to
exploit the better market condition. Since the expected demand is higher with a larger
network size, the optimal safety-stock t (It; Nt) is decreasing in Nt. Theorem 2.4.4 also
yields how the starting inventory level It inuences the optimal policy when it is above
the base-stock level. We show that, in this case, a higher starting inventory level prompts
the rm to increase the safety stock and, to match supply with demand, charge a lower
sales price.
Theorem 2.4.3 shows that network externalities impact the optimal joint pricing and
inventory policy of the rm through the current size of the associated network. We
proceed to directly analyze the impact of network externalities by comparing the optimal
policy in an inventory system with network externalities with that in an inventory system
without.
Theorem 2.4.5 Assume that two inventory systems are identical except that one with
network externalities function () and the other with ^(), where (0) = ^(0) = 0
and ^(Nt)  (Nt)  0 for all Nt  0, i.e., the inventory system with function ()
exhibits no network externalities. Moreover, let r^n(n) = rn(n) = rn for some constant
r  0. For each period t and each network size Nt  0, the following statements hold:
(a) y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt); (b) x^t(Nt)  xt(Nt); (c) There exists a threshold Nt  0, such that
p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) for Nt  Nt, whereas p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) for Nt  Nt.
Network externalities lead to a higher potential demand for the inventory system,
because social customers in the network can attract new potential customers to buy the
product. Hence, as shown in Theorem 2.4.5(a,b), the presence of network externalities
gives rise to a higher expected demand and, thus, drives the rm to increase the base-
stock level in each period t (i.e., y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt) and x^t(Nt)  xt(Nt)). Theorem 2.4.5(c)
characterizes the impact of network externalities upon the rm's pricing policy: The
optimal list-price with network externalities, p^t(Nt), may be either higher or lower than
that without, pt(Nt). More specically, if the network size is suciently small (i.e., below
the threshold Nt), p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt). Otherwise, the network size is suciently large
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(i.e., above the threshold Nt) and p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt). Under network externalities, the
rm faces the tradeo between decreasing the sales price to induce high future demands
and increasing the sales price to exploit the better market condition. When the current
network size is small (Nt  Nt), the rm should put higher weight on inducing future
demands, so the optimal price is lower with network externalities. Otherwise, Nt  Nt,
generating current prots outweighs inducing future demands, and, hence, the optimal
price is higher with network externalities. In short, Theorem 2.4.5(c) reveals that, because
of the tradeo between generating current prots and inducing future demands, network
externalities can have some subtle implications on the pricing policy of the rm.
We now characterize the evolution of the optimal price and inventory decisions over
the planning horizon. As shown in the following theorem, when the market is stationary,
network externalities motivate the rm to set lower sales prices and higher base-stock
levels at the beginning of the planning horizon.
Theorem 2.4.6 Assume that Vt = Vt 1 for all t. For each t = T; T   1;    ; 2 and
any network size N  0, we have (a) xt(N)  xt 1(N), (b) yt(N)  yt 1(N), and (c)
pt(N)  pt 1(N).
When the willingness-to-pay of the customers is stationary, Theorem 2.4.6 charac-
terizes the evolutions of the optimal base-stock level, expected demand, and sales price
under network externalities. More specically, we show that, with the same network size
Nt (and, thus, the same potential market size), the optimal expected demand, yt(Nt),
and the optimal base-stock level, xt(Nt), is decreasing over the planning horizon, whereas
the optimal sales price, pt(Nt), is increasing throughout the planning horizon. Under
network externalities, the rm should put more weight on inducing future demands at
the beginning of the planning horizon and turn to generating the current prots as the
sales season approaches the end. Hence, it is optimal for the rm to oer discounts and
attract more customers to purchase the product and join the network at the early stage
of a sales season, and to charge a higher price to exploit the current market towards the
end of the planning horizon. To match demand with supply, with the same potential
market size, the optimal base-stock level is decreasing over the planning horizon. Theo-
rem 2.4.6 is consistent with the commonly used introductory price strategy under which
price discounts are oered at the introductory stage of a product. For example, when
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Microsoft introduced the 500 GB Xbox 360 into the India video game market, it charged
a surprisingly low introductory price of $313.9 (see, e.g., [108]). When the customer val-
uation is not stationary (i.e., Vt is not equal to Vt 1), the introductory price strategy may
not necessarily be optimal. This is because, if the customer valuation is higher at the
beginning of the sales season, the rm may charge a higher price to exploit the customer
preference as opposed to oering discounts to induce future demands.
In our joint pricing and inventory management model with network externalities, the
rm has two sources of prots: (i) selling the product, and (ii) the service fees collected
from the associated network. A natural question to ask is how should the rm balance
these two prot-generating sources? The following theorem addresses this question by
characterizing how the marginal prot from the associated network inuence the optimal
policy.
Theorem 2.4.7 Assume that two inventory systems are identical except that one with
network prot function r^n(), and the other with rn(), where r^0n(N)  r0n(N) for all N 
0. For each period t and any Nt  0, we have: (a) x^t(Nt)  xt(Nt), (b) p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt),
and (c) y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt).
Theorem 2.4.7 sheds lights on how dierent rms should balance the two prot sources.
More specically, Theorem 2.4.7 shows that if the associated network has a higher prot
margin (i.e., r0n() is larger), the network externalities of the product are stronger and, as
a consequence, the rm should price down and increase the potential demand to exploit
the more intensive network externalities. To match demand with supply, the rm also
increases the base-stock level with a higher prot margin of the associated network.
Theorem 2.4.7 implies that for a product with high intrinsic customer valuations and a
low margin of the associated network (e.g., iPhone), the rm charges a premium price
for the product; whereas if the product has low intrinsic valuations from the customers
due to, e.g., erce market competition, but the margin of the associated network is high
(e.g., Xbox), the rm charges a price with a low margin for the product so as to exploit
network externalities.
In summary, network externalities have several important managerial implications
upon the joint pricing and inventory policy of the rm. Most importantly, network exter-
nalities create another layer of complexity in balancing the tradeo between generating
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current prot and inducing future demands. To exploit network externalities, the rm
should dynamically adjust its price increasing in the current network size. Moreover,
network externalities give rise to higher expected demand and, hence, drive the rm to
increase the base-stock level in each period. Since network externalities create the tension
between generating current prots and inducing future demands, the optimal sales price
with network externalities is lower than that without when the network size is small (to
induce high future demands), and is higher than that without when the network size
is big (to generate high current prots). From the intertemporal perspective, the rm
should put more weight on inducing future demands at the early stage of a sales season
than at later stages. Thus, if the customer valuation is stationary, the rm should employ
the introductory price strategy that oers early purchase discounts to induce high future
demands. Finally, the rm needs to trade o between generating prots from the product
and from the associated network as well. With higher marginal prots of the associated
network, the rm should decrease the sales price to exploit the more intensive network
externalities.
2.5 Eective Strategies to Exploit Network Externalities
In this section, we study two eective strategies to exploit network externalities: (a)
the price discrimination strategy and (b) the network expanding promotion strategy.
Both strategies adopt the uniform idea that, the rm employs an additional leverage
(price or promotion) to separate generating current prots and inducing future demands
through network externalities.
2.5.1 Price Discrimination
In this subsection, we study the price discrimination strategy that is commonly used
in practice under network externalities. More specically, since only social customers will
join the associated network of the product and exert network externalities over potential
buyers in the future, the rm can better exploit network externalities by price discrim-
inating dierent customer segments in favor of social customers. For example, in 2015,
Microsoft oered price discounts for Xbox One buyers who commit to signing up for the
Xbox Live Gold membership for at least one year (see, e.g., [85]).
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In period t, in stead of announcing a single price pt, the rm under the price dis-
crimination strategy oers a price menu to customers: (pst ; p
i
t) 2 [p; p]  [p; p], where
pst is the unit price of the product with the network sign-up commitment, and p
i
t is
the unit price of the product without any network service subscription commitment. If
pst > p
i
t, all customers will take the price p
i
t and the model is reduced to the based model
studied in Section 2.4. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that pst  pit. In
this case, social customers will take the price pst and, as committed, join the associated
network, whereas individual customers will take the price pit without joining the asso-
ciated network. Thus, in period t, the demand from the social customers is given by
Dst (p
s
t ; Nt) := ( Vt   pst + (Nt) + t), and that from the individual customers is given by
Dit(p
i
t; Nt) := (1   )( Vt   pit + (Nt) + t). The network size at the beginning of period
t  1 is, thus, given by Nt 1 = Dst (pst ; Nt) + Nt + t.
We dene
vdt (It; Nt) := the maximum expected discounted prots with price discrimination in
periods t;    ; 1, when starting period t with an inventory level It
and network size Nt;
and (xdt (It; Nt); p
s
t (It; Nt); p
i
t (It; Nt)) as the optimal pricing and inventory policy. As
in the base model, we assume that, in the last period (period 1), the excess inventory
is salvaged with unit value c, and the backlogged demand is lled with ordering cost
c, i.e., vd0(I0; N0) = cI0 for any (I0; N0). Employing similar dynamic programming and
sample path analysis methods, we characterize the optimal policy in the model with price
discrimination in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Dene a sequence of functions fdt (Nt) : t = T; T   1;    ; 1g and a sequence
of pricing and inventory policies f(xdt (Nt); pst(Nt); pit(Nt)) : t = T; T 1;    ; 1g as follows:
dt (Nt) = max
(xt;pst ;p
i
t)2Fd
Jdt (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt); (2.10)
where Jdt (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt) = Rt(p
s
t ; Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit; Nt)
+(xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt))
+xt +G
d
t (( Vt   pst + (Nt)) + Nt);
with Gdt (y) := Efrn(y + t + t) + dt 1(y + t)g; d0()  0;
and (xdt (Nt); p
s
t(Nt); p
i
t(Nt)) := argmax(xt;pst ;pit)2FdJ
d
t (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt):
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(a) dt () is concave, continuously dierentiable, and increasing in Nt. Jdt (; ; ; ) is
jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt).
(b) If It  xdt (Nt), (xdt (It; Nt); pst (It; Nt); pit (It; Nt)) = (xdt (Nt); pst(Nt); pit(Nt)) and
vdt (It; Nt) = cIt + 
d
t (Nt); otherwise, x
d
t (It; Nt) = It. If IT  xdT (NT ),
(xdt (It; Nt); p
s
t (It; Nt); p
i
t (It; Nt)) = (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t(Nt); p
i
t(Nt)) for all t and (It; Nt)
with probability 1.
Lemma 5 demonstrates that a network-size-dependent base-stock/list-prices policy is
optimal in the model with price discrimination. As in the base model, after normalizing
the value of current inventory, the state space dimension of the dynamic program can
be reduced to 1. Moreover, with probability 1, the optimal policy is independent of the
starting inventory level in each period, as long as the initial inventory level IT is below
the optimal period-T base-stock level xdT (NT ).
We remark that Theorems 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.6 and 2.4.7 can be generalized to the model
with price discrimination. Hence, the impact of network externalities upon the optimal
pricing and inventory policy is similar in the model with price discrimination to that
in the base model. To characterize the impact of the price discrimination strategy, we
directly compare the optimal policy and prot in the model with price discrimination
with that in the base model.
Theorem 2.5.1 Assume that two inventory systems are identical except that one with
the price discrimination strategy and the other without. For each period t, we have (a)
if 0() > 0 and pit(Nt) > p, pst(Nt) < pit(Nt); (b) pt(Nt)  pit(Nt) for all Nt; and (c)
dt (Nt)  t(Nt) for all Nt, where the inequality is strict if pit(Nt) > pst(Nt). Moreover, if
()  0, dt (Nt) = t(Nt) and pit(Nt) = pst(Nt) = pt(Nt) for all Nt.
Theorem 2.5.1 sheds lights on the impact of the price discrimination strategy upon the
rm's optimal pricing policy and the optimal prot. More specically, Theorem 2.5.1(a)
shows that, as long as network externalities are prevalent in the market (i.e., 0() > 0)
and the optimal price for individual customers is not binding from below (i.e., pit(Nt) > p),
the rm should charge a strictly lower price for the social customers than that for the
individual customers. Under the price discrimination strategy, the rm can induce high
future demands by charging a low price for the social customers, and generate current
prots by a high price for the individual customers. Theorem 2.5.1(b) shows that, in each
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period t, the optimal price for customers without price discrimination is dominated by
that for the individual customers with price discrimination. Without price discrimination,
the rm should both generate the current prots and induce the future demands with
the single price charged to all customers, so this price is lower than that for individual
customers with price discrimination, which has the sole role of generating the current
prots. In Theorem 2.5.1(c), we demonstrate that the price discrimination strategy is
benecial to the rm with network externalities. Without network externalities, however,
the rm should charge a single price to all customers in each period. An important
implication of Theorem 2.5.1 is that, under the price discrimination strategy, the rm
earns a higher prot because it can (partially) separate generating current prots and
inducing future demands, the former with the price for the individual customers and the
latter with the price for the social customers.
2.5.2 Network Expanding Promotion
Since the willingness-to-pay of the customers in each period is increasing in the size
of the associated network, the rm may launch network expanding promotion campaigns
to enlarge the network size and, hence, increase its protability. The network expanding
promotion strategy is commonly used in practice for products with network externali-
ties. For example, in February 2015, Microsoft discounted the 12-month Xbox Live Gold
membership by 33 percent to both expand the size of Xbox Live and promote the sales
of Xbox One (see, e.g., [153]). In the case where the associated network is an online
communication network (i.e., rn()  0), network expanding promotion is the eort and
investment the rm makes in social media marketing to attract customers to create and
share the messages about the product in the network (i.e., through the electronic word-
of-mouth). As an example, in October 2014, Apple bought Twitter's Promoted Trend at
a daily cost of $200,000 to engage Twitter users for the new iPad Air 2 launch (see, e.g.,
[93]).
To model the network expanding promotion of the rm, let nt be the number of
customers who join the associated service network in period t in addition to the social
customers who purchase the product. The total cost of attracting nt customers into the
network is cn(nt), where cn() is a continuously dierentiable and convexly increasing
function of nt with cn(0) = 0. Note that the network expanding promotion do not change
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the inventory dynamics of the rm, but they do have some impacts on the network size
dynamics. More specically, with network expanding promotion, the network size at the
beginning of period t  1 is given by: Nt 1 = Dt(pt; Nt) + Nt + nt + t.
We dene
vpt (It; Nt) := the maximum expected discounted prots with network expanding
promotion in periods t; t  1;    ; 1, when starting period t with
an inventory level It and network size Nt;
and (xpt (It; Nt); p
p
t (It; Nt); n

t (It; Nt)) as the optimal pricing and inventory policy. As in
the base model, we assume that, in the last period (period 1), the excess inventory is
salvaged with unit value c, and the backlogged demand is lled with ordering cost c, i.e.,
vp0(I0; N0) = cI0 for any (I0; N0). Employing similar dynamic programming and sample
path analysis methods, we characterize the optimal policy in the model with network
expanding promotion in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Dene a sequence of functions fpt (Nt) : t = T; T   1;    ; 1g and a sequence
of pricing and inventory policies f(xpt (Nt); ppt (Nt); nt(Nt)) : t = T; T 1;    ; 1g as follows:
pt (Nt) = max
(xt;pt;nt)2Fp
Jpt (xt; pt; nt; Nt); (2.11)
where Jpt (xt; pt; nt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt))  cn(nt)
+Gpt (( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt + nt);
with Gpt (y) := Efrn(y + t + t) + pt 1(y + t)g; p0()  0;
and (xpt (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt)) := argmax(xt;pt;nt)2FpJ
p
t (xt; pt; nt; Nt):
(a) pt () is concave, continuously dierentiable, and increasing in Nt. Jpt (; ; ; ) is
jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (xt; pt; nt).
(b) If It  xpt (Nt), (xpt (It; Nt); ppt (It; Nt); nt (It; Nt)) = (xpt (Nt); ppt (Nt); nt(Nt)) and
vpt (It; Nt) = cIt + 
p
t (Nt); otherwise, x
p
t (It; Nt) = It. If IT  xpT (NT ),
(xpt (It; Nt); p
p
t (It; Nt); n

t (It; Nt)) = (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt)) for all t and (It; Nt)
with probability 1.
Lemma 6 demonstrates that a network-size-dependent base-stock/list-price/promotion
policy is optimal in the model with price discrimination. By normalizing the value of cur-
rent inventory, we can reduce the state space dimension of the dynamic program to 1.
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With probability 1, the optimal policy is independent of the starting inventory level
in each period, as long as the initial inventory level IT is below the optimal period-T
base-stock level in the rst period xpT (NT ).
As in the model with price discrimination, Theorems 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, and 2.4.7 can
be generalized to the model with network expanding promotion. We now demonstrate the
eectiveness [ineectiveness] of network expanding promotion in the model with [without]
network externalities.
Theorem 2.5.2 (a) Let 0 <  < 1, and S(N) := supf : P(Nt 1  jNt = N)  g.
If
(1  )[r0n( S(N)) + (p  c)0( S(N))] > c0n(0); (2.12)
then nt (It; N) > 0 for all It. Moreover, S(N) is continuously increasing in N
and, for each 0 <  < 1, there exists an N()  0, such that (2.12) holds for all
N < N().
(b) If ()  0 and (
Pt 1
=0()
 )r0n(0)  c0n(0), nt (It; Nt)  0 for all It and Nt  0.
Theorem 2.5.2 characterizes the dichotomy on when the rm should oer network
expanding promotion. More specically, Theorem 2.5.2(a) shows that, when either (i)
the intensity of network externalities is suciently strong or (ii) the associated service
network is suciently protable (as characterized by inequality (2.12)), it is optimal
for the rm to oer network expanding promotion to customers as long as the current
network size is suciently low (i.e., nt (It; Nt) > 0 if Nt  N()). The intuition behind
Theorem 2.5.2(a) is that, if a lower bound of the marginal value of oering network
expanding promotion, (1  )[r0n( S(N)) +(p  c)0( S(N))], dominates its marginal cost
c0n(0), the rm should oer network expanding promotion to customers. Here, S(N)
can be interpreted as the threshold such that, conditioned on Nt = N , the probability
that the network size in period t   1 exceeds S(N) is smaller than , regardless of the
pricing strategy the rm employs. Hence, network expanding promotion are eective in
exploiting network externalities, especially when Nt and, thus, the potential demand is
low. On the other hand, Theorem 2.5.2(b) shows that if network externalities do not
exist (i.e., ()  0) and the associated service network is not suciently protable (i.e.,
(
Pt 1
=0()
 )r0n(0)  c0n(0)), it is optimal for the rm not to oer any network expanding
promotion.
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Next, we study the impact of network expanding promotion upon the rm's optimal
policy.
Theorem 2.5.3 Assume that two inventory systems are identical except that one with
network expanding promotion and the other without. For each period t and each network
size Nt  0, the following statements hold: (a) ppt (Nt)  pt(Nt); (b) ypt (Nt)  yt(Nt); (c)
xpt (Nt)  xt(Nt); and (d) pt (Nt)  t(Nt), where the inequality is strict if nt(Nt) > 0.
Theorem 2.5.3 highlights how the rm should adjust its price and inventory policy with
network expanding promotion. More specically, we show in Theorem 2.5.3(a) that, with
the same network size (and, hence, the same potential market size), the rm should charge
a higher sales price with network expanding promotion. Since both the sales price and
the network expanding promotion helps induce future demands via network externalities,
the adoption of network expanding promotion allows the rm to increase the sales price
to generate higher prot in the current period. As a result, the optimal expected demand
and the optimal base-stock level are lower with market expanding promotion. In Theorem
2.5.3(d), we show that network expanding promotion can improve the protability of the
rm.
To summarize, network expanding promotion helps the rm exploit network exter-
nalities by boosting the network size in each period. In particular, network expanding
promotion facilitates the rm to induce future demands with network expanding promo-
tion, while generating higher current prots with a higher sales price. The rm should
oer network expanding promotion when the intensity of network externalities is su-
ciently strong or the associated service network is suciently protable.
2.6 Numerical Studies
This section reports a set of numerical studies that quantify the prot loss of ig-
noring network externalities. We also propose and quantitatively evaluate some easy-
to-implement heuristics in the presence of network externalities. Our numerical results
demonstrate that (1) ignoring network externalities and, thus, employing a myopic pric-
ing and inventory policy leads to staggering prot losses when the network externalities
intensity, the social customer proportion, or the carry-through rate of network size is high;
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and (2) the rm can achieve low optimality gaps and eectively exploit network external-
ities with heuristic policies that take into account the demand induction opportunities in
the near future only.
Throughout our numerical studies, we assume that the maximum intrinsic valuation
Vt is stationary and equals 30 for each period t. The planning horizon length is T = 20.
The network externalities function is (Nt) = kNt (k  0). The parameter k measures the
network externalities intensity. The larger the k, the more intensive network externalities
the rm faces. Hence, the demand in each period t is Dt(pt; Nt) = 30 + kNt   pt + t,
where ftgTt=1 follow i:i:d: normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation  = 2.
Note that with the linear network externalities function (), Assumption 2.3.1 does not
hold. This slight deviation from our analytical model, however, does not inuence the
insights obtained in this section. For simplicity, we assume the random perturbation in
the market size dynamics t is degenerate, i.e., t = 0 with probability 1. We set the
discount factor  = 0:99, the unit procurement cost c = 8, the unit holding cost h = 1,
the unit backlogging cost b = 10, and the feasible price range [p; p] = [0; 34]. In the
evaluation of the expected prots, we take It = 0 as the reference initial inventory level
and Nt = 0 as the reference initial network size.
2.6.1 Impact of Network Externalities
This subsection numerically studies the impact of network externalities upon the rm's
protability under dierent values of network externalities intensity k, social customer
proportion , and carry-through rate of network size . We evaluate the prot of the
rm which ignores the tradeo between generating current prots and inducing future
demands in the presence of network externalities. More specically, we assume that the
rm adopts the myopic policy in each period t, i.e., it adopts the pricing and inventory
policy that maximizes the expected current-period prot without taking into account
future demand-inducing opportunities. Equivalently, the rm employs the optimal nal-
period policy, (x1(; ); p1(; )), throughout the planning horizon. Let Vm be the expected
prot under the myopic policy, and V  be optimal expected prot. Thus, the metric of
interest is
m :=
V    Vm
V 
100%; which evaluates the prot loss of ignoring network externalities.
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We conduct the numerical experiments under the parameters t = 5; 10; 15; 20, k =
0:2; 0:5; 0:8,  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8, and  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8.
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Figure 2.1. Value of m:  = 0:5,  = 0:5
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Figure 2.2. Value of m: k = 0:5,  = 0:5
Figures 2.1 - 2.3 summarize the results of our numerical study on the impact of
ignoring network externalities upon the rm's protability. Our results reveal that, when
the future demand-inducing opportunity of network externalities is ignored, the rm
incurs a signicant prot loss, which is at least 4:90% and can be as high as 36:60%, as
long as the network externalities intensity k, the proportion of social customers , and the
network size carry-through rate  are not too low (greater than 0:2 in our numerical case).
If k, , and  are higher, the current operations decisions have greater impact upon future
network sizes, thus leading to more intensive tradeo between generating current prots
and inducing future demands. Therefore, adopting the myopic policy results in signicant
losses if k, , and  are not too low. Another important implication of Figures 2.1 - 2.3
is that, if k, , and  are not too low, the prot loss of ignoring network externalities
may be signicant even when the planning horizon length is short (i.e., t = 5). This calls
for caution that the rm under network externalities should not overlook the tradeo
between generating current prots and inducing future demands even for a short sales
horizon.
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2.6.2 Eective Heuristic Policies under Network Externalities
In this subsection, we propose some easy-to-implement heuristic policies and explore
when these heuristics eectively leverage network externalities. As shown in Section
2.6.1, the myopic policy may have a poor performance because it ignores the opportunity
of inducing future demands via network externalities. Thus, we consider the heuristic
policies that balance generating current prots and inducing demands in the near future
(within 5 periods) through network externalities. More specically, in each period t,
the rm dynamically maximizes the expected total discounted prot in the moving time
window from period t to period t+i (i = 1; 3; 5). We call the heuristic policy to maximize
the prot in the moving time window of length i as the i heuristic (i = 1; 3; 5). Clearly,
obtaining the i heuristic (i = 1; 3; 5) only involves solving a dynamic program with
planing horizon length i+ 1, and is, thus, computationally light. Hence, the i heuristic
policy (i = 1; 3; 5) is easy to implement. Let V ih be the expected total prot under the
i heuristic policy. We have V   V 5h  V 3h  V 1h  Vm. The metric of interest is
ih :=
V    V ih
V 
 100% which measures the optimality gap of the i heuristic policy
(i = 1; 3; 5). We conduct the numerical experiments under the parameters t = 20,
k = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8,  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8, and  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8.
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Figures 2.4 - 2.6 summarize the results of our numerical study on the performance
of i heuritic policies (i = 1; 3; 5). The results show that, compared with the myopic
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policy that completely ignores the future demand-inducing opportunities, the i heuristics
(i = 1; 3; 5) signicantly improve the protability of the rm in the presence of network
externalities. In particular, the 5 heuristic leads a very low prot loss compared with
the optimal policy (no more than 2%, in contrast to the more-than-30% optimality gap
of the myopic policy). Therefore, the rm can eectively exploit network externalities
by slightly looking into the future and balancing the tradeo between generating current
prots and inducing near future demands. Moreover, as shown in Figures 2.4 - 2.6, if the
network externalities intensity k, the social customer proportion , or the carry-through
rate of network size  is higher, the i heuristic policies are more valuable relative to the
myopic policy. As k, , or  increases, the tradeo between generating current prots
and inducing future demands becomes more intensive, and, thus, the forward-looking
i heuristics can deliver higher values to the rm compared with the myopic policy. We
have also performed numerical analysis for the i heuristic policies with i > 5. These more
forward-looking heuristic policies cannot generate signicantly better performances over
the 5 heuristic policy. This further demonstrates that, to exploit network externalities,
it suces for the rm to balance generating current prots and inducing demands in
the near future. Finally, we remark that our numerical results are robust and continue
to hold in the settings where the planning horizon length T is greater than 20 and/or
the market non-stationary (i.e., the maximum intrinsic valuation Vt varies with time t).
For concision, we only present the results for the case where T = 20 and the market is
stationary in this chapter.
2.7 Summary
This is the rst paper in the literature to study the joint pricing and inventory man-
agement model under network externalities. To model network externalities, we assume
that there is an online service or communication network associated with the product,
and the customers' willingness-to-pay is increasing in the size of this network. Moreover,
in each period, a fraction of the customers (i.e., the social customers) who purchase the
product would join the network and exert network externalities over potential customers
in the future. The rm may directly generate prots from the network via, e.g., ser-
vice subscription fees. Therefore, in each period, the rm faces the tradeo between
generating current prots and inducing future demands via network externalities.
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We show that the optimal policy is a network-size-dependent base-stock/list-price
policy. Moreover, we demonstrate that, with probability 1, the inventory dynamics do
not inuence the optimal policy of the rm. As a consequence, the state space dimension
of the dynamic program can be reduced to one by normalizing the current inventory
value. Such state space dimension reduction greatly facilitates the analysis and enables
us to deliver sharper insights from our model. Our analysis reveals that the rm needs
to balance the tradeo between generating current prots and inducing future demands
through network externalities. Under network externalities, since the current demand
is stochastically increasing in the network size, the optimal base-stock level and the
optimal sales price are increasing in the network size as well. Network externalities lead
to higher potential demands and, thus, higher base-stock levels. The optimal sales price,
however, may not necessarily increase with the presence of network externalities. This
is because, with network externalities, the rm should decrease the sales price to exploit
the increased network externalities when the network size is small, and increase the sales
price to exploit the better market condition when the network size is large. From the
intertemporal perspective, the rm should put more weight on inducing future demands
at the early stage of a sales season than at later stages. Thus, when the market is
stationary, the rm employs the introductory price strategy that oers early purchase
discounts to induce high future demands at the beginning of the sale season. Moreover,
the rm needs to trade o between generating prot from the product and from the
associated network. With a higher marginal prot of the associated network, the rm
should decrease the sales price to exploit the more intensive network externalities.
Our analysis demonstrates the eectiveness of the price discrimination strategy and
the network expanding promotion strategy in exploiting network externalities. Both
strategies facilitate the rm to (partially) separate generating current prots and induc-
ing future demands through network externalities with an additional leverage (price or
promotion). Under the price discrimination strategy, the rm generates a higher current
prot with a higher price for individual customers, and induces higher future demands
with a lower price for social customers. Network expanding promotion should be em-
ployed when the intensity of network externalities is suciently strong or the associated
service network is suciently protable. Moreover, the rm oers network expanding
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promotion to induce future demands through network externalities, while generating a
higher current prot with an increased price of the product.
We perform extensive numerical studies to characterize (a) the impact of ignoring
network externalities, and (b) the value of some easy-to-implement heuristic policies to
exploit network externalities. Our numerical results show that the prot loss of ignoring
network externalities is signicant, especially when the network externalities intensity,
the social customer proportion, or the network size carry-through rate is high. In this
scenario, the tradeo between generating current prots and inducing future demands is
most intensive, so the rm should by no means myopically optimize its current prot.
On the other hand, the heuristic policies that dynamically maximize the expected prot
in a moving time window of no more than 5 periods achieve low prot losses relative to
the optimal policy. Hence, to leverage network externalities, it suces for the rm to
balance generating current prots and inducing demands in the near future.
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3. Operations Impact of Network Externalities: Dynamic
Competition Setting
3.1 Introduction
1In today's competitive and unstable market environment, it is prevalent that modern
rms compete not only on generating current prots, but also on winning future market
shares (see, e.g., [106]). The current decisions of all competing rms in the market
not only determine their respective current prots, but also signicantly inuence their
future demands. We refer to such inter-temporal dependence of future demands on the
current decisions as market size dynamics. Under market size dynamics, myopically
optimizing the current prot may lead to signicant loss of future demands, and hurt the
rm's prot in the long run. Therefore, the competing rms face an important tradeo
between generating current prots and inducing future demands, which we refer to as the
exploitation-induction tradeo.
Among others, we focus on two main drivers of the aforementioned exploitation-
induction tradeo: (a) The future demand is positively correlated with the current service
level, which we refer to as the service eect; and (b) the future demand is positively
correlated with the current demand, which we refer to as the network eect.
The service eect is driven by the well-recognized phenomenon that the past service
experience of a customer signicantly impacts his/her future purchasing decisions (see,
e.g., [29, 2]). A poor service (e.g., a low ll rate of a customer's orders) generally dimin-
ishes the goodwill of a customer, thus leading to lower future orders from this customer
([1]). Moreover, it is widely observed in practice that stockouts can adversely impact fu-
ture demands (see, e.g., [11, 84]). In the face of a stockout experience, a natural reaction
of a customer is to order fewer items and/or switch the seller in a subsequent purchasing
execution (see, e.g., [77, 131]). Therefore, good [poor] past services of a rm are likely to
induce high [low] demands in the future.
1This chapter is based on the author's earlier work [191].
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The network eect, also known as network externalities, refers to the general phe-
nomenon that a customer's utility of purchasing a product is increasing in the number
of other customers buying the same product (see, e.g., [66]). Under the network eect, a
higher current demand of a rm leads to more adoptions of its product, thus increasing
the utility of purchasing its product for future customers and boosting future demands.
There are three major mechanisms that give rise to the network eect: (a) the direct
eect, under which an increase in the adoption of a product leads to a direct increase in
the value of this product for other users (see, e.g., [102]); (b) the indirect eect, under
which an increase in the adoption of a product enhances the value of its complementary
products or services, which in turn increases the value of the original product (see, e.g.,
[37]); and (c) the social eect, under which the value of a product is inuenced by the
social interactions of its customers with their peers (see, e.g., [36]).
In the highly inter-correlated and competitive market of the current era, the service
eect and the network eect reinforce each other. This is because the fast development
of information technology enables customers to easily learn the information (on, e.g.,
quality, service, popularity, etc.) of any product through communications with their
friends and/or the customer reviews on online reviewing platforms and social media.
Thus, the higher the current demand of a rm, the more information about its service
quality will be released to the public, and, hence, the higher impact its service quality
will have upon future demands. Moreover, the current service level of a rm impacts
the future demands of itself as well as its competitors, because customers are likely to
patronage the rms with good past service and abandon those with poor past service
based on either their own purchasing experience or the social learning process.
The primary goal of this chapter is to develop a model that can provide insights on how
the exploitation-induction tradeo impacts the equilibrium market behavior under both
the service eect and network eect. To this end, we study a periodic-review dynamic
competition model, in which rms in a retail market compete under a Markov game over a
nite planning horizon. The random demand of each rm in each period is determined by
its market size and the current sales prices and promotional eorts of all competing rms.
The promotional eort (e.g., advertising, product innovation, and/or after sales service)
of a rm boosts the current demand of itself and diminishes that of its competitors. The
key feature of our model is that the market sizes of the competing rms are stochastically
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evolving throughout the planning horizon, and their evolutions are driven by the service
eect and the network eect. More specically, to capture the market size dynamics, we
assume that the future market size of each rm is stochastically increasing in its current
service level and demand, and stochastically decreasing in the current service levels of its
competitors. Taking the market size dynamics into consideration, each rm chooses its
promotional eort, sales price, and inventory stocking quantity in each decision period,
with an attempt to balance generating current prots and inducing future demands in
the dynamic and competitive market. We study two competitions: (a) the simultaneous
competition, under which the rms simultaneously make their promotion, price, and
inventory decisions in each period; and (b) the promotion-rst competition, under which
the rms rst make their promotional eorts and, after observing the promotion decisions
in the market, choose their sales prices and inventory levels in each period.
Conducting a dynamic game analysis, we make two main contributions in this chapter:
(a) We study a dynamic competition model with the inter-temporal inuences of current
decisions over future demands, and characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equi-
librium under both the simultaneous competition and the promotion-rst competition;
(b) we identify several important managerial implications of the exploitation-induction
tradeo upon the equilibrium market behavior of the dynamic competition under the
service eect and the network eect.
We use the Markov perfect equilibrium paradigm to analyze our dynamic competition
model, because the competing rms need to adaptively adjust their strategies based on
their inventory levels and market sizes in each period. The analytical characterization of
Markov perfect equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly with planning horizon length greater
than two is, in general, prohibitively dicult (see, e.g., [132]). To characterize the equi-
librium market outcome in our model, we employ the linear separability approach (see,
e.g., [131]) and show that, under both the simultaneous competition and the promotion-
rst competition, the equilibrium prot of each rm in each period is linearly separable
in its own inventory level and market size. Such linear separability greatly facilitates
the analysis and enables us to characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium
under both competitions. Moreover, under both competitions, the pure strategy Markov
perfect equilibrium has the nice feature that the equilibrium strategy of each rm only
depends on the private information (i.e., inventory level and market size) of itself, but
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not on that of its competitors. Under the simultaneous competition, the subgame played
by the competing rms in each period can be decomposed into a two-stage competition,
in which the rms compete jointly on promotional eort and sales price in the rst stage,
and on service level in the second. Under the promotion-rst competition, the subgame
in each period can be decomposed into a three-stage competition, in which the rms com-
pete on promotional eort in the rst stage, on sales price in the second, and on service
level in the third. Under both competitions, each stage of the subgame in each period has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, thus ensuring the existence of a pure strategy Markov
perfect equilibrium in the Markov game. We also provide mild sucient conditions under
which the Markov perfect equilibrium is unique under each competition.
Under both the simultaneous and the promotion-rst competitions, the market size
dynamics signicantly impact the equilibrium behaviors of the competing rms via the
exploitation-induction tradeo. This tradeo is quantied by the linear coecient of
market size for each rm in each period. The higher the market size coecient, the
more intensive the exploitation-induction tradeo for the respective rm in the previous
period. We identify three eective strategies under the service eect and the network
eect: (a) improving promotional eorts, (b) oering price discounts, and (c) elevating
service levels. These strategies are grounded on the uniform idea that, to balance the
exploitation-induction tradeo, the competing rms can induce higher future demands
at the cost of reduced current margins. Our analysis demonstrates how the strength
of the service eect and network eect impacts the equilibrium market outcome. Under
stronger service and network eects, the exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive,
so the competing rms make more promotional eorts, oer heavier price discounts,
and maintain higher service levels. When the market is stationary, the intensity of the
exploitation-induction tradeo decreases over the sales season under both competitions.
Hence, the equilibrium sales prices are increasing, whereas the equilibrium promotional
eorts and service levels are decreasing, over the planning horizon.
Our analysis reveals two interesting dierences between the simultaneous competition
and the promotion-rst competition under market size dynamics. First, under the si-
multaneous competition, the competing rms need to balance the exploitation-induction
tradeo inter-temporally, whereas, under the promotion-rst competition, they have to
balance this tradeo both inter-temporally and intra-temporally. Second, we identify a
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new driving force for the \fat-cat" eect (i.e., in each period, the equilibrium promo-
tional eorts may be higher under the promotion-rst competition than those under the
simultaneous competition): The exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive in the
promotion-rst competition than in the simultaneous competition, thus prompting the
rms to make more promotional eorts under the promotion-rst competition.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. We position this chapter in the
related literature in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 introduces the model setup. We analyze
the simultaneous competition model in Section 3.4, and the promotion-rst competition
model in Section 3.5. We compare the equilibrium outcomes in these two competitions
in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes this chapter. All proofs are relegated to Appendix
B.1.
3.2 Related Research
Our work is related to several streams of research in the literature. The literature
on the phenomenon that the current service level impacts future demands is rich. For
example, [147, 148] rst studies the inventory management model, in which future de-
mands are adversely aected by current poor service levels. [1] consider the dynamic
capacity allocation problem of a supplier, whose customers remember past service. [2]
propose a dynamic behavioral model to study the retention and service relationship man-
agement with the eect of past service experiences on future service quality expectations.
The impact of current service on future demands has also been analyzed in a competi-
tive environment. [92] investigate a dynamic customer service competition, in which the
duopoly rms compete by investing in capacity with a xed total number of customers.
[114] study a dynamic inventory duopoly model, in which inventory is perishable and
customers may defect to a competitor. [131] generalize this model to the setting with
non-perishable inventory and the setting in which the rms may attract dissatised cus-
tomers from the competition. [82] investigates the supplier competition model, in which
each customer switches among suppliers based on her past service quality experience.
[84] study an inventory competition, in which each customer learns about a rm's service
level from her previous shopping experience, and makes her potential patronage decision
among dierent rms accordingly. The contribution of this chapter to this literature is
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that we characterize the equilibrium market behavior in the joint promotional eort, sales
price, and service level competition under the service eect.
The optimal pricing strategy under network externalities has received considerable
attention in the economics and marketing literature. [61] characterize the optimal non-
linear pricing strategy for a network product with heterogenous customers. [188] examine
the equilibrium dynamic pricing strategies of an incumbent and a later entrant under net-
work externalities. [19] consider the optimal dynamic monopoly pricing under network
externalities and show that the equilibrium prices increase as time passes. [28] study the
optimal pricing strategy in a network with a given network structure and characterize
the relationship between optimal prices and consumers' centrality. We contribute to this
stream of literature by analyzing the impact of network externalities upon the competing
rms' operations decisions (i.e., the inventory policies) in a dynamic competition.
This chapter is also related to the extensive literature on dynamic pricing and inven-
tory management. This literature diverges into two lines of research: (i) the monopoly
model, in which a single rm maximizes its total expected prot over a nite or innite
planning horizon, and (ii) the competition model, in which multiple rms play a nonco-
operative game to maximize their respective expected per-period prots over an innite
planning horizon. The literature on the monopoly model of joint pricing and inventory
management is very rich. [70] give a general treatment of this problem and show the
optimality of the base-stock list-price policy. [47, 48, 49] study the joint pricing and
inventory management problem with xed ordering costs for the nite horizon, innite
horizon, and continuous review models. [52] characterize the optimal policy in the joint
pricing and inventory control model with xed ordering costs and lost sales. [96] identify
a general condition under which (s; S)-type policies are optimal for a stationary joint pric-
ing and inventory control model with xed ordering costs. [112] study the joint pricing
and inventory management problem with the random yield risk, and show that such risk
drives the rm to charge a higher price in each period. The joint pricing and inventory
control problem with periodic review and positive leadtime is extremely dicult. For
this problem, [136] and [46] characterize the monotonicity properties of the optimal price
and inventory policy for nonperishable and perishable products, respectively. We refer
interested readers to [50] for a comprehensive review on the monopoly models of joint
pricing and inventory management.
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The research on the competition model of dynamic pricing and inventory manage-
ment is also abundant. Under deterministic demands, [21] study the EOQ model of a
two-echelon distribution system, characterize the equilibrium pricing and replenishment
strategies of the competing retailers under both Bertrand and Cournot competitions,
and identify the perfect coordination mechanisms therein. [22] address innite-horizon
models for oligopolies with competing retailers under price-sensitive uncertain demand.
[23] develop a stochastic general equilibrium inventory model, in which retailers compete
on both sales price and service level throughout an innite horizon. [25] generalize this
model to a decentralized supply chain setting, and characterize the perfect coordinating
mechanisms under price and service competition. Our work diers from this line of liter-
ature in that we study the exploitation-induction tradeo with the service eect and the
network eect in a dynamic and competitive market. To this end, we adopt the Markov
perfect equilibrium (i.e., the closed-loop equilibrium) in a nite-horizon model as opposed
to the commonly used stationary strategy equilibrium (i.e., the open-loop equilibrium)
in an innite-horizon model.
Finally, from the methodological perspective, our work is related to the literature
on the analysis of Markov perfect equilibrium in dynamic competition models. Markov
perfect equilibrium is prevalent in the economics literature on dynamic oligopoly mod-
els (see, e.g, [122, 69, 57]). In the operations management literature, this equilibrium
concept has been widely adopted to study the equilibrium behaviors in dynamic games.
Employing the linear separability approach, [92, 114, 131] characterize the Markov perfect
equilibrium in dynamic duopoly models with market size dynamics, and [5] analyze the
structure of the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria in a dynamic inventory competi-
tion with subscriptions. A similar approach based on the separability of player decisions
and probability transition functions has been used by [6] to study a joint pricing and ad-
vertising competition, and by [130] to study a multi-period inventory competition. Due to
limited technical tractability, the analysis of Markov perfect equilibrium in nonlinear and
nonseparable dynamic games is scarce. [120] characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium
price strategy in a nite-horizon dynamic Bertrand competition with xed capacities.
[117] numerically compute the Markov perfect equilibrium in an innite-horizon model,
in which a supplier allocates its limited capacity to competing retailers. [132] give con-
ditions under which the stationary innite-horizon equilibrium is also a Markov perfect
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equilibrium in the context of inventory duopolies. This chapter adopts the linear separa-
bility approach to characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic
joint promotion, price, and inventory competition under both the service eect and the
network eect, and analyze the exploitation-induction tradeo therein.
3.3 Model
Consider an industry with N competing retail rms, which serve the market with
partially substitutable products over a T period planning horizon, labeled backwards as
fT; T   1;    ; 1g. In each period t, each rm i selects a promotional eort i;t 2 [0; i;t],
which represents the eort the rm makes in advertising, product innovation, and/or
after-sales service to promote the demand of its product in the current period. We assume
that, in any period t, the total promotional investment cost of each rm i is proportional to
its realized demand in period t, Di;t, and given by i;t(i;t)Di;t. The per-unit demand cost
rate, i;t(), is a non-negative, convexly increasing, and twice continuously dierentiable
function of the promotional eort i;t, with i;t(0) = 0. Before the demand is realized in
period t, each rm i selects a sales price pi;t 2 [pi;t; pi;t] and adjusts its inventory level to
xi;t. We assume that the excess demand of each rm is fully backlogged. In summary,
each rm i makes three decisions at the beginning of any period t: (i) the promotional
eort i;t, (ii) the sales price pi;t, and (iii) the inventory level xi;t.
The demand of each rm i in any period t depends on the entire vector of pro-
motional eorts t := (1;t; 2;t;    ; N;t) and the entire vector of sales prices pt :=
(p1;t; p2;t;    ; pN;t) in period t. We denote the demand of rm i as Di;t(t; pt). More
specically, we base our analysis on the following multiplicative form of Di;t(; ):
Di;t(t; pt) = i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t; (3.1)
where i;t > 0 is the market size of rm i in period t, di;t(t; pt) > 0 captures the impact of
t and pt on rm i's demand in period t, and i;t is a positive continuous random variable
with a connected support. Let Fi;t() be the c:d:f: and Fi;t() be the c:c:d:f: of i;t. The
market size i;t is observable by rm i at the beginning of period t through the pre-order
sign-ups and/or subscriptions before the release of its product in period t. The random
perturbation term i;t is independent of the market size vector t := (1;t;2;t;    ;N;t),
the sales price vector pt, and the promotional eort vector t. Moreover, fi;t : t =
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T; T   1;    ; 1g are independently distributed for each i. Without loss of generality, we
normalize E[i;t] = 1 for each i and any t, i.e., E[Di;t(t; pt)] = i;tdi;t(t; pt). Therefore,
di;t(t; pt) can be viewed as the normalized expected demand of rm i in period t.
We assume that di;t(; ) is twice continuously dierentiable on [0; 1;t] [0; 2;t]  
[0; N;t] [p1;t; p1;t] [p2;t; p2;t]     [pN;t; pN;t], and satises the following monotonicity
properties:
@di;t(t; pt)
@i;t
> 0;
@di;t(t; pt)
@j;t
< 0;
@di;t(t; pt)
@pi;t
< 0; and
@di;t(t; pt)
@pj;t
> 0; for all j 6= i:
(3.2)
In other words, an increase in a rm's promotional eort increases the current-period
demand of itself, and decreases the demands of its competitors. On the other hand, an
increase in a rm's sales price decreases the demand of itself, and increases the demands
of its competitors. Moreover, we assume that di;t(; ) is log-separable, i.e., di;t(t; pt) =
 i;t(t)i;t(pt), where  i;t() and i;t() are positive and twice-continuously dierentiable.
Inequalities (3.2) imply that
@ i;t(t)
@i;t
> 0;
@ i;t(t)
@j;t
< 0;
@i;t(pt)
@pi;t
< 0; and
@i;t(pt)
@pj;t
> 0; for all j 6= i:
For technical tractability, we assume that  i;t() and i;t() satisfy the log increasing
dierences and the diagonal dominance conditions, i.e., for any t, all i and j 6= i,
@2 log i;t(t)
@2i;t
< 0;
@2 log i;t(t)
@i;t@j;t
 0, and j@
2 log i;t(t)
@2i;t
j >
X
j 6=i
@2 log i;t(t)
@i;t@j;t
; (3.3)
@2 log i;t(pt)
@p2i;t
< 0;
@2 log i;t(pt)
@pi;t@pj;t
 0; and j@
2 log i;t(pt)
@p2i;t
j >
X
j 6=i
@2 log i;t(pt)
@pi;t@pj;t
: (3.4)
The log increasing dierences and the diagonal dominance assumptions are not restric-
tive, and can be satised by a large set of commonly used demand models in the economics
and operations management literature, such as the linear, logit, Cobb-Douglas, and CES
demand functions (see, e.g., [124, 22, 23]).
The expected ll rate of rm i in period t, zi;t, is given by
zi;t =
E[x+i;t ^Di;t(t; pt)]
E[Di;t(t; pt)]
=
E[(i;tdi;t(t; pt)yi;t)+ ^ (i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t)]
i;tdi;t(t; pt)
= E(y+i;t ^ i;t);
where yi;t :=
xi;t
i;tdi;t(t;pt)
and a ^ b := minfa; bg for any a; b 2 R. Thus, zi;t is concavely
increasing in yi;t for all yi;t  0. Moreover, zi;t = 0 if yi;t  0, and zi;t " 1, if yi;t ! +1.
The key feature of our model is that current promotion, pricing, and inventory deci-
sions impact upon future demands via the service eect and the network eect. To model
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these two eects, we assume that the market size of each rm in the next period is given
by the following functional form:
i;t 1 = i;t(zt; Di;t;i;t;i;t) = i;t1i;t + i;t(zt)Di;t
2
i;t; (3.5)
where 1i;t is a positive random variable representing the market size changes driven
by exogenous factors such as economic environment. Let i;t := E[1i;t] > 0. The term
i;t(zt)Di;t
2
i;t summarizes the service eect and the network eect. Specically, i;t()  0
is a continuously dierentiable function with
@i;t(zt)
@zi;t
 0; and @i;t(zt)
@zj;t
 0; for all j 6= i;
and 2i;t is a nonnegative random variable with E[2i;t] = 1. 2i;t captures the random
perturbations in the market size changes driven by the service eect and the network
eect. We refer to fi;t() : 1  i  N; T  t  1g as the market size evolution functions.
Moreover, for technical tractability, we assume that i;t() is additively separable, i.e.,
i;t(zt) = ii;t(zi;t) 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(zj;t);
where ii;t() > 0 is concave, increasing and continuously dierentiable in zi;t, and
ij;t()  0 is continuously increasing in zj;t for all j 6= i. Since i;t()  0 for all zt,
ii;t(0)  
P
j 6=i ij;t(1)  0. Let t(; ; ; ) := (1;t(; ; ; ); 2;t(; ; ; );    ; N;t(; ; ; ))
denote the market size vector in the next period.
The evolution of the market sizes, (3.5), has several important implications. First,
the future market size of each rm depends on its current market size in a Markovian
fashion. Thus, the dynamic competition model in this chapter falls into the regime
of Markov games. Second, although the service level of each rm does not inuence the
current demand of any rm due to the unobservability of the rms' inventory information
to customers, it will impact the rms' future demands. This phenomenon is driven by
the service eect. The higher the service level of a rm, the better service experience
the customers have with this rm in the current period, and the more customers will
patronage this rm in the future. Analogously, if the service levels of a rm's competitors
increase, customers will be more likely to purchase from its competitors in the future.
Therefore, the future demand of each rm is stochastically increasing in the current service
level of this rm and stochastically decreasing in the current service level of any of its
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competitors. Hence, the inventory decision of each rm has the demand-inducing value
driven by the service eect. Third, the future demand of each rm is positively correlated
with the current demand of this rm. This phenomenon is driven by the network eect.
If the realized current demand of a rm is higher, potential customers can get higher
utilities if purchasing from this rm, thus giving rise to higher future demand. Because
of the network eect, the sales price and promotional eort not only aect the current
demand, but also inuence future demands. Fourth, the service eect and the network
eect reinforce each other. More specically, the impact of current service levels upon
future market sizes is higher with higher realized current demands. With the explosive
growth of online social media, customers could easily learn the service qualities of all
rms through social learning. As a consequence, higher current demands lead to more
intensive social interactions among customers, and, hence, magnify the impact of current
service levels on future demands.
We introduce the following model primitives:
i = discount factor of rm i for revenues and costs in future periods, 0 < i  1,
wi;t = per-unit wholesales price paid by rm i in period t,
bi;t = per-unit backlogging cost paid by rm i in period t,
hi;t = per-unit holding cost paid by rm i in period t.
Without loss of generality, we assume the following inequalities hold for each i and t:
bi;t > wi;t   iwi;t 1 : the backlogging penalty is higher than the saving
from delaying an order to the next period for each
rm in any period, so that no rm will backlog
all of its demand,
hi;t > iwi;t 1   wi;t : the holding cost is suciently high so that no rm
will place a speculative order.
pi;t > iwi;t 1 + bi;t + i;t(i;t) : positive margin for backlogged demand with highest
price and promotional eort.
We dene the normalized expected holding and backlogging cost function for rm i in
period t:
Li;t(yi;t) := Efhi;t(yi;t   i;t)+ + bi;t(yi;t   i;t) g; where yi;t 2 R: (3.6)
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The state of the Markov game is given by:
It = (I1;t; I2;t;    ; IN;t) = the vector for the starting inventories of all rms in period t,
t = (1;t;2;t;    ;N;t) = the vector for the market sizes of all rms in period t.
We use S := RNRN+ to denote the state space of each rm i in the dynamic competition.
To characterize how the market size dynamics (i.e., the service eect and the network
eect) impact the equilibrium market outcome, we consider the Markov perfect equilib-
rium (MPE) in our dynamic competition model. An MPE satises two conditions: (a)
in each period t, each rm i's promotion, price, and inventory strategy depends on the
history of the game only through the current period state variables (It;t), and (b) in
each period t, the strategy prole generates a Nash equilibrium in the associated proper
subgame. In other words, MPE is a closed-loop equilibrium that satises subgame per-
fection in each period. Because of its simplicity and consistency with rationality, MPE is
widely used in dynamic competition models in the economics (e.g., [122]) and operations
management (e.g., [131]) literature.
A major technical challenge to characterize the MPE in a dynamic inventory com-
petition model is that when the starting inventories are higher than the equilibrium
order-up-to levels, the model becomes illy behaved and analytically intractable (see, e.g.,
[132]). This issue is worsened under endogenous pricing decisions [25]. To overcome this
technical challenge, we make the following assumption throughout our analysis.
Assumption 3.3.1 At the beginning of each period t, each rm i is allowed to sell (poten-
tially part of) its onhand inventory to its supplier at the current-period per-unit wholesale
price wi;t.
Assumption 3.3.1 is imposed to circumvent the aforementioned technical challenge.
As will be clear by our subsequent analysis, with this assumption, the equilibrium prot
of each rm i in each period t is linearly separable in its starting inventory level Ii;t
and market size i;t. Assumption 3.3.1 enables us to eliminate the inuence of current
inventory decision of any rm upon the future equilibrium behavior of the market, so
as to single out and highlight the exploitation-induction tradeo with the service eect
and the network eect. Assumption 3.3.1 applies when the retail rms have such great
market power that they can reach an agreement with their respective suppliers on the
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return policy with full price refund. [25], among others, also make this assumption to
characterize the MPE in an innite-horizon joint price and service level competition
model. With Assumption 3.3.1, we can dene the action space of each rm i in each
period t: Ai;t(Ii;t) := [0; i;t] [pi;t; pi;t] [minf0; Ii;tg;+1).
3.4 Simultaneous Competition
In this section, we study the simultaneous competition (SC) model where each rm
i simultaneously chooses a combined promotion, price, and inventory strategy in any
period t. This model applies to the scenarios where the market expanding eorts (e.g.,
advertising, trade-in programs, etc.) take eect instantaneously, so, in essence, the pro-
motional eort and sales price decisions are made simultaneously in each period. Our
analysis in this section focuses on characterizing the pure strategy MPE and providing
insights on the impact of the exploitation-induction tradeo in the SC model.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
In this subsection, we show that the simultaneous competition model has a pure
strategy MPE. Moreover, we characterize a sucient condition on the per-unit demand
cost rate of promotional eort, i;t(), under which the MPE is unique. Without loss of
generality, we assume that, at the end of the planning horizon, each rm i salvages all the
on-hand inventory and fullls all the backlogged demand at unit wholesale price wi;0  0.
The payo function of each rm i is given by:
Ef
TX
t=1
T ti [pi;tDi;t(t; pt)  wi;t(xi;t   Ii;t)  hi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))+
 bi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))    i;t(i;t)Di;t(t; pt)] + Ti wi;0Ii;0jIT ;Tg; (3.7)
s.t. Ii;t 1 = xi;t  Di;t(t; pt) for each t;
and i;t 1 = i;t1i;t + i;t(zt)Di;t(t; pt)
2
i;t for each t:
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Under an MPE, each rm i should try to maximize its expected payo in each subgame
(i.e., in each period t) conditioned on the realized inventory levels and market sizes in
period t, (It;t):
Ef
tX
=1
t i [pi;Di; ( ; p )  wi; (xi;   Ii; )  hi; (xi;  Di; ( ; p ))+
 bi; (xi;  Di; ( ; p ))    i; (i; )Di; ( ; p )] + tiwi;0Ii;0jIt;tg; (3.8)
s.t. Ii; 1 = xi;  Di; ( ; p ) for each  , t    1;
and i; 1 = i;1i; + i; (z )Di; ( ; p )
2
i; for each  , t    1:
A (pure) Markov strategy prole in the SC model sc := fsci;t(; ) : 1  i  N; T 
t  1g prescribes each rm i's combined promotion, price, and inventory strategy in each
period t, where sci;t(; ) := (sci;t(; ); psci;t(; ); xsci;t(; )) is a Borel measurable mapping from
S to Ai;t(Ii;t). We use sct := fsci;t(; ) : 1  i  N; T  t  1g to denote the pure
strategy prole in the induced subgame in period t, which prescribes each rm i's (pure)
strategy from period t till the end of the planning horizon.
To evaluate the expected payo of each rm i in each period t for any given Markov
strategy prole sc in the simultaneous competition, let
Vi;t(It;tjsct ) = the total expected discounted prot of rm i in periods t; t  1;    ; 1; 0,
when starting period t with the state variable (It;t) and the rms play
strategy sct in periods t; t  1;    ; 1.
Thus, by backward induction, Vi;t(; jsct ) satises the following recursive scheme for each
rm i in each period t:
Vi;t(It;tjsct ) = Ji;t(sct (It;t); psct (It;t); xsct (It;t); It;tjsct 1);
where sct (; ) = (sc1;t(; ); sc2;t(; );    ; scN;t(; )) is the period t promotional eort vector
prescribed by sc, psct (; ) = (psc1;t(; ); psc2;t(; );    ; pscN;t(; )) is the period t sales price
vector prescribed by sc, xsct (; ) = (xsc1;t(; ); xsc2;t(; );    ; xscN;t(; )) is the period t post-
delivery inventory vector prescribed by sc,
Ji;t(t; pt; xt; It;tjsct 1) =Efpi;tDi;t(t; pt)  wi;t(xi;t   Ii;t)  hi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))+
  bi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))    i;t(i;t)Di;t(t; pt)
+ iVi;t 1(xt  Dt(t; pt); t(zt; Dt(t; pt);t;t)jsct 1)jIt;tg;
(3.9)
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and Vi;0(It;t) = wi;0Ii;0. We now formally dene the pure strategy MPE in the SC
model.
Denition 3.4.1 A (pure) Markov strategy sc = f(sci;t (; ); psci;t (; ); xsci;t (; )) : 1 
i  N; T  t  1g is a pure strategy MPE in the SC model if and only if, for each rm
i, each period t, and each state variable (It;t),
(sci;t (It;t); p
sc
i;t (It;t); x
sc
i;t (It;t))
=argmax(i;t;pi;t;xi;t)2Ai;t(Ii;t)fJi;t([i;t; sc i;t(It;t)]; [pi;t; psc i;t(It;t)];
[xi;t; x
sc
 i;t(It;t)]; It;tjsct 1)g:
(3.10)
By Denition 3.4.1, a (pure) Markov strategy prole in the SC model is a pure strategy
MPE if it satises subgame perfection in each period t. Denition 3.4.1 does not guarantee
the existence of an MPE, sc, in the SC model. In Theorem 3.4.1, below, we will show
a pure strategy MPE always exists in the SC model. Moreover, under a mild additional
assumption on i;t(), the SC model has a unique pure strategy MPE. By Denition 3.4.1,
the equilibrium strategy for rm i in period t, (sci;t (; ); psci;t (; ); xsci;t (; )), may depend
on the state vector of its competitors (I i;t; i;t). In practice, however, each rm i's
starting inventory level Ii;t and market size i;t are generally its private information that
is not accessible by its competitors in the market. We will show that the equilibrium
strategy prole of each rm i in each period t is only contingent on its own realized state
variables (Ii;t;i;t), but independent of its competitors' private information (I i;t; i;t).
The following theorem characterizes the existence and the uniqueness of MPE in the SC
model.
Theorem 3.4.1 The following statements hold for the SC model:
(a) There exists a pure strategy MPE sc = f(sci;t (; ); psci;t (; ); xsci;t (; )) : 1  i 
N; T  t  1g.
(b) For each pure strategy MPE, sc, there exists a series of vectors fsct : T  t  1g,
where sct = (
sc
1;t; 
sc
2;t;    ; scN;t) with sci;t > 0 for each i and t, such that
Vi;t(It;tjsct ) = wi;tIi;t + sci;ti;t; for each rm i and each period t. (3.11)
(c) If the following two conditions simultaneously hold for each i and t:
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(i)  0i;t()  1 for all i;t 2 [0; i;t]; and
(ii)  00i;t(i;t)(pi;t wi;t 1 i;t(i;t)+ci;t)+[ 0i;t(i;t)]2   0i;t(i;t) for all pi;t 2 [pi;t; pi;t]
and i;t 2 [0; i;t], where
ci;t := maxf(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) : yi;t  0g;
sc is the unique MPE in the SC model. In particular, if i;t(i;t) = i;t, conditions
(i) and (ii) are satised.
Theorem 3.4.1(a) demonstrates the existence of a pure strategy MPE in the simulta-
neous competition model. Moreover, in Theorem 3.4.1(b), we show that, for each pure
strategy MPE sc, the corresponding prot function of each rm i in each period t is
linearly separable in its starting inventory level Ii;t and market size i;t. We refer to
the constant sci;t as the SC market size coecient of rm i in period t. As we will show
later, the SC market size coecient measures the intensity of the exploitation-induction
tradeo. The larger the sci;t, the more intensive the exploitation-induction tradeo for
rm i in the previous period t + 1. Theorem 3.4.1(b) also implies that the equilibrium
prot of each rm i in each period t only depends on the state variables of itself (Ii;t;i;t),
but not on those of its competitors (I i;t; i;t). Theorem 3.4.1(c) characterizes a suf-
cient condition for the uniqueness of an MPE in the SC model. In particular, if the
promotional eort i;t refers to the actual monetary payment of promotional investment
per-unit demand for each rm i in each period t (i.e., i;t(i;t) = i;t for each i and t),
there exists a unique MPE in the SC model. For the rest of this chapter, we assume that
conditions (i) and (ii) are satised for each i and t and, hence, the SC model has a unique
pure strategy MPE sc.
The linear separability of Vi;t(; jsct ) (i.e., Theorem 3.4.1(b)) enables us to charac-
terize the MPE in the SC model. Plugging (3.11) into the objective function of rm i in
period t, by xi;t = i;tdi;t(t; pt)yi;t and zi;t = E(y+i;t ^ i;t), we have:
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Ji;t(t; pt; xt; It;tjsct 1) =Efpi;tDi;t(t; pt)  wi;t(xi;t   Ii;t)  hi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))+
  bi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))    i;t(i;t)Di;t(t; pt)
+ iVi;t 1(xt  Dt(t; pt); t(zt; Dt(t; pt);t;t)jsct 1)jIt;tg
=Efpi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t   wi;t(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)  Ii;t)
  hi;t(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)  i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t)+
  bi;t(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)  i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t) 
  i;t(i;t)i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t + iwi;t 1(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)
  i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t)
+ i
sc
i;t 1(i;t
1
i;t + i;t(zt)i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t
2
i;t)jIt;tg
=wi;tIi;t + i;tfisci;t 1i;t
+  i;t(t)i;t(pt)[pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t(yt)]g;
where sci;t(yt) =(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + isci;t 1(ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])
 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t]));
and sci;0 :=0 for each i.
(3.12)
We observe from (3.12) that the payo function of each rm i in the subgame of period
t has a nested structure. Hence, the subgame of period t can be decomposed into two
stages, where the rms compete jointly on promotion and price in the rst stage, and on
inventory in the second stage. Since the service level of each rm i, as measured by the
expected ll rate zi;t, is increasing in the inventory decision yi;t, we refer to the second-
stage competition as the service level competition hereafter. By backward induction,
we rst study the second-stage service level competition. Let Gsc;2t be the N player
noncooperative game that represents the second-stage service level competition in period
t, where player i has payo function sci;t() and feasible action set R. The following
proposition characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the game Gsc;2t .
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Proposition 3.4.1 For each period t, the second-stage service level competition Gsc;2t has
a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium ysct . Moreover, for each i, y
sc
i;t > 0 is the unique
solution to the following equation:
(iwi;t 1   wi;t)  L0i;t(ysci;t ) + isci;t 1 Fi;t(ysci;t )0ii;t(E(ysci;t ^ i;t)) = 0: (3.13)
Proposition 3.4.1 demonstrates the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the second-stage service level competition. Moreover, ysci;t can be obtained
by solving the rst-order condition @yi;t
sc
i;t(y
sc
t ) = 0. Let 
sc
t := (
sc
1;t ; 
sc
2;t ;    ; scN;t) be
the equilibrium payo vector of the second-stage service level competition in period t,
where sci;t = 
sc
i;t(y
sc
t ). For each i and t, let
sci;t(t; pt) :=  i;t(t)i;t(pt)[pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t ]: (3.14)
We dene an N player noncooperative game Gsc;1t to represent the rst-stage joint pro-
motion and price competition in period t, where player i has payo function sci;t(; ) and
feasible action set [0; i;t]  [pi;t; pi;t]. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game
Gsc;1t in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.2 For each period t, following statements hold:
(a) The rst-stage joint promotion and price competition, Gsc;1t , is a log-supermodular
game.
(b) The game Gsc;1t has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (sct ; psct ), which is the
unique serially undominated strategy of Gsc;1t .
(c) The Nash equilibrium of Gsc;1t is the unique solution to the following system of
equations: For each i
@i;t i;t(
sc
t )
 i;t(sct )
  
0
i;t(
sc
i;t )
psci;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(sci;t ) + sci;t
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 0; if sci;t = 0,
= 0; if sci;t 2 (0; i;t),
 0 if sci;t = i;t;
and,
@pi;ti;t(p
sc
t )
i;t(psct )
+
1
psci;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(sci;t ) + sci;t
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 0; if psci;t = pi;t,
= 0; if psci;t 2 (pi;t; pi;t),
 0 if psci;t = pi;t.
(3.15)
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(d) Let sct := (
sc
1;t ;
sc
2;t ;    ;scN;t) be the equilibrium payo vector of the rst-stage
joint promotion and price competition in period t, where sci;t = 
sc
i;t(
sc
t ; p
sc
t ). We
have sci;t > 0 for all i.
Proposition 3.4.2 shows that the rst-stage joint promotion and price competition Gsc;1t
is a log-supermodular game, and has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (sct ; p
sc
t ).
The unique Nash equilibrium, (sct ; p
sc
t ), is determined by (i) the serial elimination of
strictly dominated strategies, or (ii) the system of rst-order conditions (3.15). Under
equilibrium, by Proposition 3.4.2(d) and the objective function of period t, (3.12), each
rm i earns a positive normalized expected total discounted prot, i;t(i
sc
i;t 1i;t +
sci;t ), in the subgame of period t. Summarizing Theorem 3.4.1, Proposition 3.4.1 and
Proposition 3.4.2, we have the following theorem that sharpens the characterization of
the MPE in the SC model.
Theorem 3.4.2 For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) For each i, sci;t = i
sc
i;t 1i;t +
sc
i;t .
(b) Under the unique (pure strategy) MPE sc, the policy of rm i is given by
(sci;t (It;t); p
sc
i;t (It;t); x
sc
i;t (It;t)) = (
sc
i;t ; p
sc
i;t ;i;ty
sc
i;t i;t(p
sc
t ) i;t(
sc
t )): (3.16)
Theorem 3.4.2(a) recursively computes the SC market size coecient vectors fsct :
T  t  1g. Theorem 3.4.2(b) demonstrates that, under the MPE sc, each rm i's
joint promotion, price, and inventory policy in each period t only depends on its own
state variables (Ii;t;i;t), but not on those of its competitors (I i;t; i;t), which are not
accessible to rm i in general. Thus, for each rm i in each period t, its equilibrium
strategy has the attractive feature that the strategy depends on its accessible information
only.
In some of our analysis below, we will consider a special case of the SC model, where
the market is symmetric, i.e., all competing rms have identical characteristics. We use
the subscript \s" to denote the case of symmetric market. In this case, for all i, j, and
t, let s;t() := i;t(),  s;t() :=  i;t(), s;t() := i;t(), s;t() := i;t(), sa;t() := ii;t(),
sb;t() := ij;t(), ws;t := wi;t, hs;t := hi;t, bs;t := bi;t, s;t := i;t, and s := i. Thus, let
Ls;t() := Li;t() for each i. As shown in Theorem 3.4.1, there exists a unique pure strategy
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MPE in the symmetric SC model, which we denote as scs . The following proposition is
a corollary of Theorems 3.4.1-3.4.2.
Proposition 3.4.3 The following statements hold for the symmetric SC model:
(a) For each t = T; T   1;    ; 1, there exists a constant scs;t > 0, such that
Vi;t(It;tjscs;t ) = ws;tIi;t + scs;ti;t; for all i:
(b) In each period t, the second-stage service level competition Gsc;2s;t is symmetric, with
the payo function for each rm i given by
sci;t(yt) =(sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + sscs;t 1(sa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])
 
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t])):
Moreover, Gsc;2s;t has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is symmetric, so
we use yscs;t [
sc
s;t ] to denote the equilibrium strategy [payo] of each rm in Gsc;2s;t .
(c) In each period t, the rst-stage joint promotion and price competition Gsc;1s;t is sym-
metric, with the payo function for each rm i given by
sci;t(t; pt) =  s;t(t)s;t(pt)[pi;t   sws;t 1   s;t(i;t) + scs;t ]:
Moreover, Gsc;1s;t has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (scss;t; pscss;t) which is
symmetric (i.e., scss;t = (
sc
s;t ; 
sc
s;t ;    ; scs;t ) for some scs;t and
pscss;t = (p
sc
s;t ; p
sc
s;t ;    ; pscs;t ) for some pscs;t ).
(d) Under the unique pure strategy MPE, scs , the policy of rm i in period t is
(sci;t (It;t); p
sc
i;t (It;t); x
sc
i;t (It;t)) = (
sc
s;t ; p
sc
s;t ;i;ty
sc
s;t s;t(p
sc
ss;t) s;t(
sc
ss;t));
for each (It;t).
Proposition 3.4.3 characterizes the MPE, scs , and the market size coecients, fscs;t :
T  t  1g, in the symmetric SC model. Proposition 3.4.3 shows that, in the symmetric
SC model, all competing rms set the same promotional eort, sales price, and service
level in each period under equilibrium, whereas the equilibrium market outcome may
vary in dierent periods.
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3.4.2 Exploitation-Induction Tradeo
In this subsection, we study how the market size dynamics (i.e., the service eect and
the network eect) inuence the equilibrium market outcome in the SC model. We focus
on the managerial implications of the exploitation-induction tradeo in a dynamic and
competitive market.
To begin with, we characterize the impact of the market size coecient vectors fsct :
T  t  1g upon the equilibrium market outcome. The following theorem serves as the
building block of our subsequent analysis of the exploitation-induction tradeo in the SC
model.
Theorem 3.4.3 For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) For each i and j 6= i, ysci;t is continuously increasing in sci;t 1 and independent of
scj;t 1.
(b) For each i and j 6= i, sci;t is continuously increasing in sci;t 1 and continuously
decreasing in scj;t 1.
(c) If the SC model is symmetric, scs;t is continuously increasing in 
sc
s;t , whereas p
sc
s;t
is continuously decreasing in scs;t .
(d) If the SC model is symmetric and  s;t() and s;t() satisfy the following monotonic-
ity condition
NX
i=1
@ s;t(t)
@i;t
> 0; for all t, and
NX
i=1
@s;t(pt)
@pi;t
< 0; for all pt, (3.17)
scs;t is continuously increasing in 
sc
s;t .
(e) If the SC model is symmetric and scs;t is increasing in 
sc
s;t 1, 
sc
s;t is continuously
increasing in scs;t 1, whereas p
sc
s;t is continuously decreasing in 
sc
s;t 1.
(f) In the symmetric SC model, if the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds and scs;t is
increasing in scs;t 1, 
sc
s;t is continuously increasing in 
sc
s;t 1.
Theorem 3.4.3 shows that the market size coecients fsci;t : 1  i  N; T  t  1g
quantify the intensity of the exploitation-induction tradeo in the SC model. More
specically, if sci;t 1 is larger, rm i faces stronger exploitation-induction tradeo in period
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t. Therefore, to balance this strengthened tradeo and to induce high future demands,
each rm should improve service quality, decrease sales price, and increase promotional
eort, as shown in parts (a) and (e) of Theorem 3.4.3. Moreover, Theorem 3.4.3(f)
characterizes the relationship between the exploitation-induction tradeos in dierent
periods, demonstrating that if the exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive in
the next period, it is also stronger in the current period under a mild condition. The
monotonicity condition (3.17) implies that a uniform increase of all N rms' promotional
eorts leads to an increase in the demand of each rm, and a uniform price increase by all
N rms gives rise to a decrease in the demand of each rm. This condition is commonly
used in the literature (see, e.g., [23, 9]), and often referred to as the \dominant diagonal"
condition for linear demand models. The assumption that scs;t is increasing in 
sc
s;t 1 is
not restrictive either. In Lemma 26 in Appendix B.2, we give some sucient conditions
for this assumption. More specically, Lemma 26 implies that scs;t is increasing in 
sc
s;t 1
if one of the following conditions holds: (i) The adverse eect of a rm's competitors'
service upon its future market size is not strong; (ii) the network eect is suciently
strong; or (iii) both the service eect and the network eect are suciently strong.
Now we consider a benchmark case without the service eect and the network eect.
We use \ ~ " to denote this model. Thus, in the benchmark model, the market size
evolution function ~i;t()  0 for each rm i and each period t. Without the service eect
and the network eect, the current promotion, price, and service level decisions of any
rm will not inuence the future demands. Therefore, the competing rms can focus on
generating current prots in each period without considering inducing future demands,
i.e., the exploitation-induction tradeo is absent in this benchmark case. To characterize
the impact of the service eect and the network eect upon the equilibrium outcome, the
following theorem compares the Nash equilibria in Gsc;2t and ~Gsc;2t , and the Nash equilibria
in Gsc;1t and ~Gsc;1t .
Theorem 3.4.4 (a) For each rm i and each period t , ysci;t  ~ysci;t , zsci;t  ~zsci;t , and
sci;t  ~sci;t .
(b) Consider the symmetric SC model. For each period t, the following statements hold:
(i) scs;t  ~scs;t and, thus, sci;t (It;t)  ~sci;t (It;t) for all i and all (It;t).
(ii) pscs;t  ~pscs;t and, thus, psci;t (It;t)  ~psci;t (It;t) for all i and all (It;t).
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(iii) If the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, we have xsci;t (It;t)  ~xsci;t (It;t)
for all i and all (It;t).
Theorem 3.4.4 highlights the impact of market size dynamics upon the equilibrium
market outcome. Specically, Theorem 3.4.4(a) shows that, under the service eect and
the network eect, each rm i should set a higher service level in each period t. In
the symmetric SC model, Theorem 3.4.4(b-i) shows that each rm should increase its
promotional eort in each period under the service eect and the network eect, in order
to induce higher future demands. Analogously, Theorem 3.4.4(b-ii) shows that the service
eect and the network eect give rise to lower equilibrium sales price of each rm in each
period. Under the monotonicity condition (3.17), Theorem 3.4.4(b-i,ii) implies that the
equilibrium expected demand of each rm in each period is higher under the service eect
and the network eect. As a consequence, to match supply with the current demand and
to induce future demands with the service eect, each rm should increase its base stock
level in each period under the service eect and the network eect, as shown in Theorem
3.4.4(b-iii).
Theorem 3.4.4 identies eective strategies for rms to balance the exploitation-
induction tradeo under both the service eect and the network eect. In this case, the
competing rms have to tradeo generating current prots and inducing future demands.
To balance the exploitation-induction trade-o, the rms can employ three strategies to
exploit the service eect and the network eect: (a) elevating service levels, (b) oering
price discounts, and (c) improving promotional eorts. Elevating service levels does not
lead to a higher current demand, but helps the rm induce higher future demands via the
service eect. Oering price discounts and improving promotional eorts do not increase
the current prots but give rise to higher current demands and, thus, induce higher future
demands via the network eect. In a nutshell, the uniform idea of all three strategies
is that, to balance the exploitation-induction tradeo under the service eect and the
network eect, the competing rms should induce higher future demands at the cost of
reduced current margins.
To deliver sharper insights on the managerial implications of the exploitation-induction
tradeo, we conne ourselves to the symmetric SC model for the rest of this section. The
following theorem characterizes how the intensities of the service eect and the network
eect inuence the equilibrium market outcome in the symmetric SC model.
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Theorem 3.4.5 Let two symmetric SC models be identical except that one with market
size evolution functions f^s;t()gTt1 and the other with fs;t()gTt1. Assume that,
for each period t, (i) the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, and (ii) sb;t()  0sb;t for
some constant 0sb;t.
(a) If ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for each period t and each zt, we have, for each period t, ^scs;t 
scs;t, ^
sc
s;t  scs;t , and p^scs;t  pscs;t . Thus, for each period t, ^sci;t (It;t)  sci;t (It;t)
and p^sci;t (It;t)  psci;t (It;t) for all i and all (It;t) 2 S.
(b) If, for each period t, ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt and ^0sa;t(zi;t)  0sa;t(zi;t)  0 for all
zi;t, we have, for each period t, ^
sc
s;t  scs;t, ^scs;t  scs;t , p^scs;t  pscs;t , and y^scs;t  yscs;t .
Thus, for each period t, ^sci;t (It;t)  sci;t (It;t), p^sci;t (It;t)  psci;t (It;t), and
x^sci;t (It;t)  xsci;t (It;t) for all i and all (It;t) 2 S.
Theorem 3.4.5 sharpens Theorem 3.4.4 by showing that if the intensities of the network
eect and the service eect (captured by the magnitudes of s;t() and 0sa;t(), respec-
tively) are higher, the exploitation-induction tradeo becomes stronger. To balance the
strengthened exploitation-induction tradeo, each rm should increase its promotional
eort, decrease its sales price, and improve its service level in each period. More specif-
ically, Theorem 3.4.5(a) shows that a higher intensity of the network eect (i.e., larger
s;t()) drives all the rms to make more promotional eorts and charge lower sales prices.
Theorem 3.4.5(b) further suggests that higher intensities of both the network eect and
the service eect (i.e., larger s;t() and 0sa;t()) prompt all the rms to make more pro-
motional eorts, charge lower sales prices, and maintain higher service levels. Stronger
service eect and network eect intensify the exploitation-induction tradeo, thus driving
the rms to put more weight on inducing future demands than on exploiting the current
market. Therefore, to eectively balance the exploitation-induction tradeo, all the rms
should carefully examine the intensities of the service eect and the network eect.
Next, we analyze the exploitation-induction tradeo from an inter-temporal perspec-
tive. Under the service eect and the network eect, how should the competing rms
adjust their promotion, price, and service strategies throughout the sales season to bal-
ance the exploitation-induction tradeo? To address this question, we characterize the
evolution of the equilibrium market outcome in the stationary and symmetric SC model.
In this model, the model primitives, demand functions, and market size evolution func-
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tions are identical for all rms throughout the planning horizon. In addition, the random
perturbations in market demands and market size evolution are i:i:d: throughout the
planning horizon. The following theorem characterizes the evolution of the equilibrium
promotion, price, and service strategy in the stationary and symmetric SC model.
Theorem 3.4.6 Consider the stationary and symmetric SC model. Assume that, for
each period t, (i) the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, and (ii) scs;t is increasing in
scs;t 1. For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) scs;t  scs;t 1, scs;t  scs;t 1, pscs;t  pscs;t 1, and yscs;t  yscs;t 1.
(b) sci;t (I;)  sci;t 1(I;), psci;t (I;)  psci;t 1(I;), and xsci;t (I;)  xsci;t 1(I;) for
each i and each (I;) 2 S.
Theorem 3.4.6 sheds light on how to balance the exploitation-induction tradeo from
an inter-temporal perspective. More specically, we show that, if the market is sym-
metric and stationary, the exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive (i.e., scs;t is
larger) at the early stage of the sales season. Moreover, the equilibrium sales price is
increasing, whereas the equilibrium promotional eort and service level are decreasing,
over the planning horizon. The service eect and the network eect have greater impacts
upon future demands (and, hence, future prots) when the remaining planning horizon is
longer. Therefore, to adaptively balance the exploitation-induction tradeo throughout
the sales season, all the rms increase their sales prices and decrease their promotional
eorts and service levels towards the end of the sales season. Our analysis justies the
widely used introductory price and promotion strategy with which rms oer discounts
and launch promotional campaigns at the beginning of a sales season to attract more
early purchases (see, e.g., [38, 134, 65]).
To summarize, under the service eect and the network eect, the competing rms
have to trade o between generating current prots and inducing future demands. To
eectively balance the exploitation-induction tradeo, the rms should (a) increase pro-
motional eorts, (b) oer price discounts, and (c) improve service levels. Moreover, the
exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive (a) with stronger service eect and net-
work eect, or (b) at the early stage of the sales season.
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3.5 Promotion-First Competition
In this section, we consider the promotion-rst competition (PF) model, i.e., in each
period t, each rm i rst selects its promotional eort and then, after observing the
current-period promotional eorts of all rms, chooses a combined sales price and service
level strategy. This model is suitable for the scenario in which the stickiness of market
expanding choices is much higher than that of sales price and service level choices. For
example, due to the long leadtime for technology development, decisions on research
and development eort are usually made well in advance of sales price and service level
decisions.
Employing the linear separability approach, we will show that, in the PF model, the
rms engage in a three-stage competition in each period, the rst stage on promotional
eort, the second on sales price, and the last on service level. We will also demonstrate
that the exploitation-induction tradeo has more involved managerial implications in the
PF model than its implications in the SC model. In the SC model, the competing rms
balance the exploitation-induction tradeo inter-temporally, whereas the rms in the PF
model balance this tradeo both inter-temporally and intra-temporally.
For tractability, we make the following additional assumption throughout this section:
i;t(pt) = i;t   ii;tpi;t +
X
j 6=i
ij;tpj;t; for each i and t; (3.18)
where i;t; ii;t > 0 and ij;t  0 for each i, j, and t. Moreover, we assume that the
diagonal dominance conditions hold for each i;t(), i.e., for each i and t, ii;t >
P
j 6=i ij;t
and ii;t >
P
j 6=i ji;t. In addition, we make the same assumption as [9] as follows:
Assumption 3.5.1 For each i and t, the minimum [maximum] allowable price p
i;t
[pi;t]
is suciently low [high] so that it will have no impact on the equilibrium market behavior.
We will give a sucient condition for Assumption 3.5.1 in the discussion after Proposition
3.5.2.
3.5.1 Equilibrium Analysis
In this subsection, we use the linear separability approach to characterize the pure
strategy MPE in the PF model. In this model, a (pure) Markov strategy prole of rm i in
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period t is given by pfi;t = (
pf
i;t (; ); ppfi;t (; ; ); xpfi;t (; ; )), where pfi;t (It;t) prescribes the
promotional eort given the state variable (It;t), and (p
pf
i;t (It;t; t); x
pf
i;t (It;t; t)) pre-
scribes the sales price and the post-delivery inventory level, given the state variable (It;t)
and the current period promotional eort vector t. Let 
pf
t (; ) := (pf1;t(; );    ; pfN;t(; )),
ppft (; ; ) := (ppf1;t(; ; );    ; ppfN;t(; ; )), and xpft (; ; ) := (xpf1;t(; ; );    ; xpfN;t(; ; )). We
use pft to denote the (pure) strategy prole of all rms in the subgame of period t, which
prescribes their (pure) strategies from period t to the end of the planning horizon.
To evaluate the expected payo of each rm i in each period t for any given Markov
strategy prole pf in the PF model, let
Vi;t(It;tjpft ) = the total expected discounted prot of rm i in periods t;    ; 0,
when starting period t with the state variable (It;t) and the rms play
strategy pft in periods t; t  1;    ; 1.
Thus, by backward induction, Vi;t(; jpft ) satises the following recursive scheme for each
rm i and each period t:
Vi;t(It;tjpft ) = Ji;t(pft (It;t); ppft (It;t; pft (It;t)); xpft (It;t; pft (It;t)); It;tjpft 1);
where
Ji;t(t; pt; xt; It;tjpft 1) =Efpi;tDi;t(t; pt)  wi;t(xi;t   Ii;t)  hi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))+
  bi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))    i;t(i;t)Di;t(t; pt)
+ iVi;t 1(xt  Dt(t; pt); t(zt; Dt(t; pt);t;t)jpft 1)jIt;tg;
(3.19)
and Vi;0(It;t) = wi;0Ii;0. We now dene the pure strategy MPE in the PF model.
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Denition 3.5.1 A (pure) Markov strategy pf = f(pfi;t (; ); ppfi;t (; ; ); xpfi;t (; ; )) :
1  i  N; T  t  1g is a pure strategy MPE in the PF model if and only if, for each
rm i, period t, and state variable (It;t) 2 S,
(ppfi;t (It;t; t); x
pf
i;t (It;t; t))
=argmaxpi;t2[pi;t;pi;t];xi;tminf0;Ii;tg[Ji;t(t; [pi;t; p
pf
 i;t(It;t; t)]; [xi;t; x
pf
 i;t(It;t; t)]; It;tjpft 1)];
for all t; and
pfi;t (It;t)
=argmaxi;t [Ji;t([i;t; 
pf
 i;t(It;t)]; p
pf
t (It;t; [i;t; 
pf
 i;t(It;t)]);
xpft (It;t; [i;t; 
pf
 i;t(It;t)]); It;tjpft 1)]:
(3.20)
Denition 3.5.1 suggests that a pure strategy MPE in the PF model is a (pure) Markov
strategy prole that satises subgame perfection in each stage of the competition in each
period t. The following theorem shows that there exists a pure strategy MPE in the PF
model.
Theorem 3.5.1 The following statements hold for the PF model:
(a) There exists a pure strategy MPE pf = f(pfi;t (; ); ppfi;t (; ; ); xpfi;t (; ; )) : 1 
i  N; T  t  1g.
(b) For each pure strategy MPE pf, there exists a series of vectors fpft : T  t  1g,
where pft = (
pf
1;t; 
pf
2;t;    ; pfN;t) with pfi;t > 0 for each i and t, such that
Vi;t(It;tjpft ) = wi;tIi;t + pfi;ti;t; for each i, t, and (It;t) 2 S. (3.21)
(c) If i;t(i;t) = i;t for each i and t, 
pf is the unique MPE in the PF model.
Theorem 3.5.1 demonstrates the existence of a pure strategy MPE in the PF model.
As in the SC model, in Theorem 3.5.1(b), we show that, for each pure strategy MPE
pf, the associated prot function of each rm i in each period t is linearly separable
in its own starting inventory level Ii;t and market size i;t. We refer to the constant 
pf
i;t
as the PF market size coecient of rm i in period t, which measures the exploitation-
induction tradeo intensity in the PF model. Theorem 3.5.1(c) shows that the MPE in
the PF model is unique if i;t(i;t) = i;t, i.e., the promotional eort i;t is the actual
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per-unit demand market expanding expenditure of rm i in period t. For the rest of this
section, we assume that i;t(i;t) = i;t for each i and t, and, hence, 
pf is the unique
pure strategy MPE in the PF model. We use fpft : T  t  1g to denote the PF market
size coecient associated with pf hereafter.
The linear separability of Vi;t(; jpft ) enables us to have a sharper characterization
of MPE in the PF model. As in the SC model, we can rewrite the objective function of
rm i in period t as follows.
Ji;t(t; pt; xt; It;tjpft 1) =Efpi;tDi;t(t; pt)  wi;t(xi;t   Ii;t)  hi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))+
  bi;t(xi;t  Di;t(t; pt))    i;t(i;t)Di;t(t; pt)
+ iVi;t 1(xt  Dt(t; pt); t(zt; Dt(t; pt);t;t)jpft 1)jIt;tg
=Efpi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t   wi;t(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)  Ii;t)
  hi;t(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)  i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t)+
  bi;t(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)  i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t) 
  i;t(i;t)i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t + iwi;t 1(yi;ti;tdi;t(t; pt)
  i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t)
+ i
pf
i;t 1(i;t
1
i;t + i;t(zt)i;tdi;t(t; pt)i;t
2
i;t)jIt;tg
=wi;tIi;t + i;tfipfi;t 1i;t
+  i;t(t)i;t(pt)[pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t (yt)]g;
where pfi;t (yt) =(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + ipfi;t 1(ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])
 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t]));
and pfi;0 :=0 for each i.
(3.22)
We observe from (3.22) that, in the PF model, the payo function of each rm i in each
period t has a nested structure. Hence, the competition in each period t can be decom-
posed into three stages: In the rst stage, the rms compete on promotional eort; in
the second stage, they compete on sales price; in the third stage, they compete on service
level. By backward induction, we start the equilibrium analysis with the third-stage ser-
vice level competition. Let Gpf;3t be the N player noncooperative game that represents
the third-stage service level competition in period t, where player i has the payo function
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pfi;t () and the feasible action set R. The following proposition characterizes the Nash
equilibrium of the game Gpf;3t .
Proposition 3.5.1 For each period t, the third-stage service level competition Gpf;3t has
a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium ypft . Moreover, for each i, y
pf
i;t > 0 is the unique
solution to the following equation:
(iwi;t 1   wi;t)  L0i;t(ypfi;t ) + ipfi;t 1 Fi;t(ypfi;t )0ii;t(E(ypfi;t ^ i;t)) = 0: (3.23)
Proposition 3.5.1 characterizes the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the third-
stage service level competition. Moreover, ypfi;t is the solution to the rst-order condition
@yi;t
pf
i;t (y
pf
t ) = 0. Let 
pf
t := (
pf
1;t ; 
pf
2;t ;    ; pfN;t ) be the equilibrium payo vector of
the third-stage service level competition in period t, where pfi;t = 
pf
i;t (y
pf
t ). For each i
and t, let
pf;2i;t (ptjt) := i;t(pt)(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t ): (3.24)
Therefore, given the outcome of the rst-stage promotion competition, t, we can dene
an N player noncooperative game Gpf;2t (t) to represent the second-stage price competi-
tion in period t, where player i has the payo function pf;2i;t (jt) and the feasible action
set [p
i;t
; pi;t]. We dene At as an N N matrix with entries dened by Aii;t := 2ii;t and
Aij;t :=  ij;t where i 6= j. By Lemma 24(a) in Appendix B.1, At is invertible. Let ft(t)
be an N dimensional vector with fi;t(t) := i;t + ii;t(iwi;t 1 + i;t(i;t)   pfi;t ). We
characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game Gpf;2t (t) in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.2 For each period t and any given t, the following statements hold:
(a) The second-stage price competition Gpf;2t (t) has a unique pure strategy Nash equi-
librium ppft (t).
(b) ppft (t) = A
 1
t ft(t). Moreover, p
pf
i;t (t) is continuously increasing in j;t for each
i and j.
(c) Let pf;2t (t) := (
pf;2
1;t (t);
pf;2
2;t (t);    ;pf;2N;t (t)) be the equilibrium payo vec-
tor of the second-stage price competition in period t, where
pf;2i;t (t) = 
pf;2
i;t (p
pf
t (t)jt). We have pf;2i;t (t) = ii;t(ppfi;t (t)   iwi;t 1  
i;t(i;t) + 
pf
i;t )
2 > 0 for all i.
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Proposition 3.5.2 shows that, for any given promotional eort vector t, the second-
stage price competition Gpf;2t (t) has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium ppft (t) =
A 1t ft(t). By Proposition 3.5.2(b), we have p
pf
i;t (0)  ppfi;t (t)  ppfi;t (t) for each
i and t, where 0 is an N -dimensional vector with each entry equal to 0 and t :=
(1;t; 2;t;    ; N;t). Thus, a sucient condition for Assumption 3.5.1 is that pi;t  p
pf
i;t (0)
and pi;t  ppfi;t (t) for all i and t.
Now we study the rst-stage promotion competition in period t. Let
pf;1i;t (t) := 
pf;2
i;t (t) i;t(t) = ii;t(p
pf
i;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2 i;t(t): (3.25)
Thus, we can dene an N player noncooperative game Gpf;1t to represent the rst-stage
promotion competition in period t, where player i has the payo function pf;1i;t () and
the feasible action set [0; i;t]. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game Gpf;1t in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.3 For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) The rst-stage promotion competition Gpf;1t is a log-supermodular game.
(b) There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Gpf;1t , which is the
unique serially undominated strategy of Gpf;1t .
(c) The unique Nash equilibrium of Gpf;1t , pft , is the solution to the following system
of equations: for each i,
@i;t i;t(
pf
t )
 i;t(
pf
t )
  2(1  ii;t(A
 1
t )ii)
0
i;t(
pf
i;t )
ppfi;t (
pf
t )  iwi;t 1   i;t(pfi;t ) + pfi;t
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 0; if pfi;t = 0,
= 0; if pfi;t 2 (0; i;t),
 0 if pfi;t = i;t.
(3.26)
(d) Let pf;1t := (
pf;1
1;t ;
pf;1
2;t ;    ;pf;1N;t ) be the equilibrium payo vector associated
with pft , i.e., 
pf;1
i;t = 
pf;1
i;t (
pf
t ) for each i. We have 
pf;1
i;t > 0 for all i.
As shown in Proposition 3.5.3, in the PF model, the rst-stage promotion competition
in period t is a log-supermodular game and has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, the unique Nash equilibrium promotional eort vector pft can be determined
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by (i) the serial elimination of strictly dominated strategies, or (ii) the system of rst-
order conditions (3.26).
The following theorem summarizes Theorem 3.5.1 and Propositions 3.5.1-3.5.3, and
characterizes the MPE in the PF model.
Theorem 3.5.2 For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) For each i, pfi;t = i
pf
i;t 1i;t +
pf;1
i;t .
(b) Under the unique pure strategy MPE pf, the policy of rm i in period t is given
by
(pfi;t (It;t); p
pf
i;t (It;t; t); x
pf
i;t (It;t; t))
=(pfi;t ; p
pf
i;t (t);i;ty
pf
i;t i;t(p
pf
t (t)) i;t(t)):
(3.27)
In particular, for any (It;t), the associated (pure strategy) equilibrium price and
inventory decisions of rm i are ppfi;t (
pf
t ) and i;ty
pf
i;t i;t(p
pf
t (
pf
t )) i;t(
pf
t ), re-
spectively.
Theorem 3.5.2(a) recursively determines the PF market size coecient vectors, fpft :
T  t  1g, associated with the unique pure strategy MPE pf. Theorem 3.5.2(b)
demonstrates that, under the unique pure strategy MPE pf, each rm i's promotion,
price, and inventory decisions in each period t depend on its private information (i.e.,
(Ii;t;i;t)) only, but not on that of its competitors (i.e., (I i;t; i;t)). Hence, the unique
pure strategy MPE in the PF model has the attractive feature that the strategy of each
rm is contingent on its accessible information only.
As in the SC model, we will perform some of our analysis below with the symmetric PF
model, where all rms have identical characteristics. We use the subscript \s" to denote
the case of symmetric market in the PF model. In this case, s;t(pt) = s;t   sa;tpi;t +P
j 6=i sb;tpj;t for some nonnegative constants s;t, sa;t, and sb;t, where sa;t > (N 1)sb;t.
We use pfs to denote the unique pure strategy MPE in the symmetric PF model. The
following proposition characterizes pfs in the PF model.
Proposition 3.5.4 The following statements hold for the symmetric PF model.
(a) For each t = T; T   1;    ; 1, there exists a constant pfs;t > 0, such that
Vi;t(It;tjpfs;t ) = ws;tIi;t + pfs;ti;t; for all i.
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(b) In each period t, the third-stage service level competition Gpf;3s;t is symmetric, with
the payo function for each rm i given by
pfi;t (yt) =(sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + spfs;t 1(sa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])
 
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t])):
Moreover, Gpf;3s;t has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric,
so we use ypfs;t [
pf
s;t ] to denote the equilibrium strategy [payo] of each rm in Gpf;3s;t .
(c) In each period t, the second-stage price competition Gpf;2s;t (t) is symmetric if i;t =
j;t for all 1  i; j  N . In this case, Gpf;2s;t (t) has a unique pure strategy Nash equi-
librium ppfss;t(t), which is symmetric (i.e., p
pf
ss;t(t) = (p
pf
s;t (t); p
pf
s;t (t);    ; ppfs;t (t))
for some ppfs;t (t) 2 [ps;t; ps;t]).
(d) In each period t, the rst-stage promotion competition Gpf;1s;t is symmetric. Moreover,
Gpf;1s;t has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium pfss;t , which is symmetric (i.e.,
pfss;t = (
pf
s;t ; 
pf
s;t ;    ; pfs;t ) for some pfs;t 2 [0; s;t]).
(e) Under the unique pure strategy MPE pfs , the policy of rm i in period t is
(pfi;t (It;t); p
pf
i;t (It;t; t); x
pf
i;t (It;t; t))
=(scs;t ; p
pf
i;t (t);i;ty
pf
s;t s;t(p
pf
t (t)) s;t(t));
for all (It;t) and t. In particular, for each rm i and any (It;t), the equilibrium
price is ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t), and the equilibrium post-delivery inventory level is
i;ty
pf
s;t s;t(p
pf
ss;t(
pf
ss;t)) s;t(
pf
ss;t).
Proposition 3.5.4 shows that, in the symmetric PF model, all competing rms make
the same promotional eort, charge the same sales price, and maintain the same service
level in each period. The PF market size coecient is also identical for all rms in each
period.
3.5.2 Exploitation-Induction Tradeo
In this subsection, we study how the exploitation-induction tradeo impacts the equi-
librium market outcome in the PF model. As in the SC model, we rst characterize the
impact of the PF market size coecient vectors, fpft : T  t  1g.
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Theorem 3.5.3 For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) For each i and j 6= i, ypfi;t is continuously increasing in pfi;t 1 and independent of
pfj;t 1.
(b) For each i and j 6= i, pfi;t is continuously increasing in pfi;t 1 and continuously
decreasing in pfj;t 1.
(c) For each i, j, and t , p
pf
i;t (t) is continuously decreasing in 
pf
j;t .
(d) If the PF model is symmetric, pfs;t is continuously increasing in 
pf
s;t . If, in ad-
dition, the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, pfs;t is continuously increasing in
pfs;t as well.
(e) If the PF model is symmetric and pfs;t is increasing in 
pf
s;t 1, 
pf
s;t is continuously
increasing in pfs;t 1, whereas p
pf
i;t (t) is continuously decreasing in 
pf
s;t 1. If, in
addition, the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, pfs;t is continuously increasing in
pfs;t 1 as well.
Theorem 3.5.3 demonstrates that the market size coecients fpfi;t : 1  i  N; T 
t  1g quantify the intensity of the exploitation-induction tradeo in the PF model.
More specically, a larger pfi;t 1 implies more intensive exploitation-induction tradeo of
rm i in period t.
As in the SC model, we use \~" to denote the benchmark case without the service
eect and the network eect, where the market size evolution function ~i;t()  0 for
each rm i and each period t. Thus, the exploitation-induction tradeo is absent in this
benchmark model, and it suces for the rms to myopically maximize their current-
period prots. The following theorem characterizes the impact of the service eect and
the network eect in the PF model.
Theorem 3.5.4 (a) For each rm i and each period t, ypfi;t  ~ypfi;t , zpfi;t  ~zpfi;t , and
pfi;t  ~pfi;t .
(b) For each rm i and each period t, ppfi;t (t)  ~ppfi;t (t) for all t. Moreover, if the
PF model is symmetric and (3.17) holds, xpfi;t (It;t; t)  ~xpfi;t (It;t; t) for all i,
t, (It;t) 2 S, and t 2 [0; s;t]N .
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(c) Consider the symmetric PF model. For each period t, pfs;t  ~pfs;t . Thus,
pfi;t (It;t)  ~pfi;t (It;t) for all i and all (It;t) 2 S.
Consistent with Theorem 3.4.4(a), Theorem 3.5.4(a) shows that, the service eect
and the network eect drive the competing rms to maintain higher service levels in the
PF model. Theorem 3.5.4(b) reveals the impact of the exploitation-induction tradeo
upon the competing rms' price and inventory strategy in the PF model. Specically,
given any outcome of the rst-stage promotion competition t, in the second-stage price
competition, each rm i should charge a lower sales price under the service eect and
the network eect, so as to exploit the network eect and induce higher future demands.
Moreover, in each period t, the equilibrium post-delivery inventory levels contingent on
any realized promotional eort vector t are also higher in the PF model under the service
eect and the network eect. Theorem 3.5.4(c) sheds light on how the exploitation-
induction tradeo inuences the equilibrium promotion strategies under the service eect
and the network eect. In the symmetric PF model, the equilibrium promotional eort
of each rm i in each period t is higher under the service eect and the network eect.
Note that, in the PF model, the equilibrium price and inventory outcomes under the
service eect and the network eect, ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t) and x
pf
i;t (It;t; 
pf
ss;t), may be either higher
or lower than those without market size dynamics, ~ppfss;t(~
pf
s;t ) and ~x
pf
i;t (It;t; ~
pf
ss;t). This
phenomenon contrasts with the equilibrium market outcomes in the SC model, where
the equilibrium sales price [post-delivery inventory level] of each rm in each period is
lower [higher] under the service eect and the network eect (i.e., Theorem 3.4.4(b-i,iii)).
This discrepancy is driven by the fact that, in the PF model, each rm observes the
promotion decisions of its competitors before making its pricing decision. Hence, under
the service eect and the network eect, the competing rms may either decrease the
sales prices to induce future demands or increase the sales prices to exploit the better
market condition from the increased promotional eorts (recall that pfs;t  ~pfs;t ). In
general, either eect may dominate, so we do not have a general monotonicity relationship
between either the equilibrium price outcomes (i.e., ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t) and ~p
pf
s;t (~
pf
ss;t)) or the
equilibrium inventory outcomes (i.e., xpfi;t (It;t; 
pf
ss;t) and ~x
pf
i;t (It;t; ~
pf
ss;t)). Therefore,
the exploitation-induction tradeo in the PF model is more involved than that in the SC
model. The competing rms only need to trade o between generating current prots
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and inducing future demands intertemporally in the SC model, whereas they need to
balance this tradeo both inter-temporally and intra-temporally in the PF model.
To deliver sharper insights on the managerial implications of the exploitation-induction
tradeo, we conne ourselves to the symmetric PF model for the rest of this section.
Theorem 3.5.5 Let two symmetric PF models be identical except that one with market
size evolution functions f^s;t()gTt1 and the other with fs;t()gTt1. Assume that,
for each period t, (i) the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, and (ii) sb;t()  0sb;t for
some constant 0sb;t.
(a) If ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for each period t and all zt, we have, for each period t, ^pfs;t 
pfs;t, p^
pf
i;t (t)  ppfi;t (t) for all i and t 2 [0; s;t]N , and ^pfs;t  pfs;t . Thus, for
each period t, p^pfi;t (It;t; t)  ppfi;t (It;t; t) and ^pfi;t (It;t)  pfi;t (It;t) for all
i, (It;t) 2 S, and t 2 [0; s;t]N .
(b) If, for each period t, ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt and ^0sa;t(zi;t)  0sa;t(zi;t) 
0 for all zi;t, we have, for each period t, ^
pf
s;t  pfs;t, y^pfs;t  ypfs;t , p^pfi;t (t) 
ppfi;t (t), and ^
pf
s;t  pfs;t . Thus, for each period t, p^pfi;t (It;t; t)  ppfi;t (It;t; t),
x^pfi;t (It;t; t)  xpfi;t (It;t; t), ^pfi;t (It;t)  pfi;t (It;t) for all i, (It;t) 2 S, and
t 2 [0; s;t]N .
Theorem 3.5.5(a) shows that, in the symmetric PF model, higher intensity of the
network eect (i.e., larger s;t()) drives all the competing rms to make more promotional
eorts and charge lower sales prices for each observed promotion vector. Moreover, if the
intensities of both the network eect and the service eect (i.e., the magnitudes of s;t()
and 0sa;t()) are higher, Theorem 3.5.5(b) demonstrates that all the competing rms are
prompted to maintain higher service levels as well. Therefore, in the PF model, the
exploitation-induction tradeo is stronger with more intensive service eect and network
eect.
Theorem 3.5.6 Consider the stationary symmetric PF model. Assume that, for each
period t, (i) the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, and (ii) pfs;t is increasing in 
pf
s;t 1.
For each period t, the following statements hold:
(a) pfs;t  pfs;t 1, ypfs;t  ypfs;t 1, ppfs;t ()  ppfs;t 1() for each  2 [0; s]N , and pfs;t 
pfs;t 1.
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(b) ppfi;t (I;; )  ppfi;t 1(I;; ), xpfi;t (I;; )  xpfi;t 1(I;; ), and pfi;t (I;)  pfi;t 1(I;)
for each i, (I;) 2 S, and  2 [0; s;t]N .
Analogous to Theorem 3.4.6, Theorem 3.5.6 justies the widely used introductory
price and promotion strategy. More specically, this result shows that if the market is
stationary and symmetric in the PF model, the competing rms should decrease the
promotional eorts (i.e., pfs;t ) and service levels (i.e., y
pf
s;t ), and increase the sales prices
contingent on any realized promotional eorts (i.e., ppfs;t (t)), over the planning horizon.
Hence, Theorem 3.5.6 suggests that, in the PF model, the exploitation-induction tradeo
is more intensive at the early stage of the sales season than at later stages.
To conclude this section, we remark that, because of the aforementioned intra-temporal
exploitation-induction tradeo under the promotion-rst competition, Theorems 3.5.5-
3.5.6 cannot give the monotone relationships on the equilibrium outcomes of each rm i's
sales price (i.e., ppfi;t (It;t; 
pf
ss;t)) and post-deliver inventory level (i.e., x
pf
i;t (It;t; 
pf
ss;t)).
3.6 Comparison of the Two Competition Models
As demonstrated above, the exploitation-induction tradeo is more involved in the
PF model than that in the SC model. In this section, we compare the unique MPE in the
SC model and that in the PF model, and discuss how the exploitation-induction tradeo
impacts the equilibrium market outcomes under dierent competitions.
Theorem 3.6.1 Consider the symmetric SC and PF models. Assume that, for each
period t, (i) the demand function i;t() is linear and given by (3.18), (ii) i;t(i;t) = i;t,
(iii) the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, (iv) Assumption 3.5.1 holds, (v) scs;t is
increasing in scs;t 1, and (vi) 
pf
s;t is increasing in 
pf
s;t 1. The following statements hold:
(a) If pfs;t 1  scs;t 1, ypfs;t  yscs;t and pfs;t  scs;t .
(b) For each period t, there exists an t 2 [0; 1N 1 ], such that, if sb;t  tsa;t, we have
(i) pfs;t  scs;t and, thus, Vi;t(It;tjpft )  Vi;t(It;tjsct ) for each rm i and all
(It;t) 2 S;
(ii) ypfs;t  yscs;t ;
(iii) pfs;t  scs;t .
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Theorem 3.6.1 shows that, if the product dierentiation is suciently high (as cap-
tured by the condition that sb;t  tsa;t), the PF competition leads to stronger exploitation-
induction tradeo (i.e., pfs;t  scs;t). As a consequence, the competing rms should set
higher service levels and promotional eorts in the PF model. Compared with the si-
multaneous competition, the promotion-rst competition enables the rm to responsively
adjust their sales prices in accordance to the market condition and their competitors' pro-
motion strategies. If the product dierentiation is suciently high, such pricing exibility
gives rise to higher expected prots of all rms and more intensive exploitation-induction
tradeo in the PF model.
Theorem 3.6.1 also reveals the \fat-cat" eect in our dynamic competition model:
When the price decisions are made after observing the promotional eorts in each period,
the rms tend to \overinvest" in promotional eorts. As shown in the literature (e.g.,
[78, 9]), one driving force for this phenomenon is that, under the PF competition, the rms
can charge higher prices in the subsequent price competition with increased promotional
eorts in each period. Theorem 3.6.1 identies a new driving force for the \fat-cat" eect:
The rms under the PF competition make more promotional eorts to balance the more
intensive exploitation-induction tradeo therein. Therefore, our analysis delivers a new
insight to the literature that the exploitation-induction tradeo may give rise to the
\fat-cat" eect in dynamic competition.
3.7 Summary
This chapter studies a dynamic joint promotion, price, and service competition model,
in which current decisions inuence future demands through the service eect and the
network eect. Our model highlights an important tradeo in a dynamic and competitive
market: the tradeo between generating current prots and inducing future demands
(i.e., the exploitation-induction tradeo). We characterize the impact of the exploitation-
induction tradeo upon the equilibrium market outcome under the service eect and the
network eect, and identify the eective strategies to balance this tradeo under dynamic
competition.
We employ the linear separability approach to characterize the pure strategy MPE
both in the SC model and in the PF model. An important feature of the MPE in both
models is that the equilibrium strategy of each rm in each period only depends on the
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private inventory and market size information of itself, but not on that of its competitors.
Moreover, the exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive if the service eect and
the network eect are stronger; and this trade-o decreases over the planning horizon.
The exploitation-induction tradeo is more involved in the PF model than in the SC
model. This is because the competing rms need to balance this tradeo both inter-
temporally and intra-temporally in the PF model, whereas they only need to balance
it inter-temporally in the SC model. More specically, in the SC model, to eectively
balance the exploitation-induction tradeo, the rms should (a) increase promotional
eorts, (b) oer price discounts, and (c) improve service levels. In the PF model, the rms
should increase promotional eorts under the service eect and the network eect. Given
the same promotional eort in the rst stage competition, the rms need to decrease their
sales prices under the network eect. However, with an increased promotional eort in
the rst stage competition, the equilibrium sales prices in the second stage competition
may either decrease to increase. Analogously, the equilibrium post-delivery inventory
levels may either decrease or increase in the PF model under the service eect and
the network eect. Finally, we identify the \fat-cat" eect in our dynamic competition
model: If the product dierentiation is suciently high, under the MPE, the rms make
more promotional eorts in the PF model than in the SC model. The driving force of
this phenomenon is that the exploitation-induction tradeo is more intensive under the
promotion-rst competition than under the simultaneous competition.
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4. Trade-in Remanufacturing, Strategic Customer Behavior and
Government Subsidies
4.1 Introduction
1It is a common practice for rms to oer trade-in rebates to recycle used products. For
example, Apple oers both in-store and online trade-in programs, which allow customers
to exchange their used iPhones, iPads, and Macs for credits to purchase new ones ([13]).
Analogously, Amazon allows Kindle owners to trade in their old products for newer
versions at a discount price ([55]). More examples on the adoption of trade-in rebates to
collect cores for remanufacturing have been reported in industries like furniture, carpets,
and power tools, etc. (see [142]).
Recycling used products through trade-in rebates has been lauded for its various
benets. From the economic perspective, the return product ow from trade-in rebates
serves as an important source for generating revenue and reducing costs. With the re-
cycled products, rms can recover the residual values by either remanufacturing them
into new ones or reusing their components and materials. Following the literature (e.g.,
[142]), throughout the chapter we use the term remanufacturing to represent the general
revenue-generating process through recycling and recovering used products. In practice,
the revenue-generating/cost-saving eect of trade-in based remanufacturing could be sig-
nicant. Xerox, which partly bases its remanufacturing on trade-in returns, has saved
several hundred million dollars each year, which accounts for 40%-65% of the company's
manufacturing costs ([146]). From the strategic perspective, trade-in rebates may improve
rm protability by elevating customer switching costs ([105]), discouraging second-hand
markets ([109]), increasing purchase frequency ([166]), and reducing ineciencies arising
from the lemon problem ([141]). From the environmental perspective, trade-in rebates
encourage customers to return used products, thus generating less waste and disposals.
In particular, the electronics market is featured with frequent product introductions and
generates more than one million tons of so-called e-wastes each year ([140]). Using trade-
1This chapter is based on the author's earlier work [193].
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in rebates, Apple collected more than 40,000 tons of e-wastes in 2014, which account for
more than 75 percent of the products they sold seven years earlier (see [12]).
It has been empirically veried that customers exhibit forward-looking behaviors in
the electronics market due to frequent product introductions ([140]). In particular, when
the rm oers trade-in rebates, strategic customer behavior naturally arises, because
customers can anticipate a possible price discount in the future if making a purchase
now ([166, 80, 141]). Moreover, advances in information technology enable customers
to easily obtain product and price information. For example, Kayak launched the price
forecast service to help customers decide when to book a ight ([68]). As a consequence,
strategic customer behavior has become more prevalent in today's business world. Al-
though strategic customer behavior has been widely acknowledged in the literature, it
is not clear how such behavior would aect the economic and environmental benets of
trade-in remanufacturing.
Governments around the world have made tremendous eorts to promote recycling
and remanufacturing used products. One commonly used strategy is to provide subsidies
for remanufacturing. For instance, in January 2015, the Chinese government released a
policy to subsidize the use of remanufactured vehicle engines and transmissions ([44]).
Analogously, the Chinese government established a special fund in 2011 to provide sub-
sidies to companies engaged in the recycling and recovering of waste electrical and elec-
tronic products (e.g., [174]). As another example, a recent report backed by the Scottish
government and Zero Waste Scotland (ZWS) concluded that Scotland was in a unique
position to develop a circular economy and called for government subsidies to help boost
closed loop recycling, reuse, bio-rening, and remanufacturing ([161]). In the literature,
the eects of government subsidies for remanufacturing/trade-in remanufacturing have
been studied in settings without explicitly modeling customer behaviors (e.g., [128, 118]).
Despite its importance, the question of how the government should design the subsidiza-
tion policy under strategic customer behavior to induce the social optimum has not been
thoroughly explored.
The primary goal of this chapter is to analyze how strategic customer behavior inu-
ences the value of trade-in remanufacturing from the perspectives of the rm, the environ-
ment, and the government. For this purpose, we develop a two-period model in which a
prot-maximizing rm sells two generations of a product in an ex-ante uncertain market.
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To highlight the impact of strategic customer behavior, we consider two scenarios, one
with strategic customers and the other with myopic customers. Strategic customers make
their purchasing decisions based on both current and anticipated future utilities, whereas
myopic customers make decisions based on current utilities only. In the rst period, the
rm sells the rst-generation product in the market. In the second period, the rm sells
the second-generation product to new customers (who have not purchased in the rst
period); meanwhile the rm oers trade-in rebates through which repeat customers (who
have purchased in the rst period) exchange used products for new second-generation
ones at a discounted price. The rm generates revenue by remanufacturing the recycled
products. This remanufacturing process also reduces the (negative) environmental im-
pact of the business, because it decreases energy and raw material consumption, as well
as waste disposal. We model the government as a policy-maker whose subsidy/tax policy
may aect the rm's pricing and production strategy as well as the customers' purchasing
decisions. The objective of the government is to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum
of rm prot and customer surplus less environmental impact.
We nd that strategic customer behavior has important implications on the prac-
tice of trade-in remanufacturing. First, under trade-in remanufacturing, the rm can
earn a higher prot with strategic customers than with myopic customers if the revenue-
generating eect of remanufacturing is suciently strong. In other words, strategic cus-
tomer behavior may improve rm prot, which is in contrast with the commonly believed
notion that strategic customer behavior hurts rm prot. When the rm employs trade-
in remanufacturing, strategic customers will anticipate the future trade-in rebate (i.e.,
price discount) in the second period, which depends on the additional value generated by
remanufacturing. Note that a deeper discount in the second period will induce a higher
willingness-to-pay in the rst period. Thus, strategic customers may be willing to pay a
higher rst-period price than myopic customers if the revenue-generating eect of reman-
ufacturing is strong enough, which allows the rm to extract a higher prot. This implies
that when early purchases (of strategic customers) can be induced by the additional
benets (i.e., the trade-in option and the deep discount brought by remanufacturing), a
rm may benet from strategic customer behavior. Without trade-in remanufacturing,
however, strategic customer behavior always hurts the rm's prot, as reported in the
literature.
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Second, with strategic customers, the adoption of trade-in remanufacturing may cre-
ate a tension between rm protability and environmental sustainability. Trade-in re-
bate essentially oers an early purchase reward and thus can deliver additional value
by exploiting the forward-looking behavior of strategic customers. As a result, trade-in
remanufacturing is more valuable to the rm with strategic customers than with myopic
customers. However, the early-purchase inducing eect of trade-in remanufacturing also
prompts the rm to increase production quantities signicantly under strategic customer
behavior. The increased production quantities may outweigh the environmental advan-
tage of remanufacturing unless the unit environmental benet of remanufacturing is very
high. Hence, trade-in remanufacturing generally hurts the environment with strategic
customers. Moreover, we nd that trade-in remanufacturing decreases customer surplus,
and consequently, the social welfare may decrease as well. Therefore, our results call for
caution on the adoption of trade-in remanufacturing under strategic customer behavior,
because it is likely to be severely detrimental to the environment and the society.
With myopic customers, however, trade-in manufacturing generally benets the envi-
ronment. The price discrimination eect of trade-in rebates increases the expected unit
prot from new customers in the second period. This eect drives the rm to decrease
the rst-period production quantity and thus increase the potential second-period mar-
ket size of new customers. As long as the unit environmental benet of remanufacturing
is not too low, trade-in remanufacturing induces lower production quantities and, thus,
benets the environment. Therefore, for the scenario with myopic customers, the tension
between rm and environment does not exist in general.
The tension between rm protability and environmental sustainability under strate-
gic customer behavior motivates us to study how government intervention can achieve the
socially optimal outcome. Specically, we focus on the subsidization policy the govern-
ment can use to promote the activities of used products recycling (e.g., trade-in rebates,
remanufacturing, and take-backs; see [128, 170, 161]). An intuitive policy observed in
practice is to subsidize the rm/customers for selling/purchasing remanufactured prod-
ucts. However, we nd that subsidizing remanufactured products alone actually hurts
the environment and is not sucient to achieve the social optimum. This cautions the
policy-makers about how to promote remanufacturing through subsidization. With either
strategic or myopic customers, in order to induce the social optimum, it suces for the
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government to use a simple linear subsidy/tax scheme for the sales of both product gen-
erations and remanufacturing. In addition, if the total unit economic and environmental
value of remanufacturing is low, the government should provide more subsidies to the
rm with strategic customers than with myopic customers, and vice versa.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we position this chapter
in the related literature. The base model and the equilibrium analysis are presented in
Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we analyze the impact of trade-in remanufacturing upon the
rm and the environment. In Section 4.5, we characterize the government policy that
can induce the social optimum. This chapter concludes with Section 4.6. All proofs are
given in Appendix C.2.
4.2 Related Research
This chapter builds upon two streams of research in the literature: (1) remanufactur-
ing and closed-loop supply chain management, and (2) strategic customer behavior.
There is a rapidly growing stream of literature on remanufacturing and closed-loop
supply chain management. Comprehensive reviews of this literature are given by [91]
and [154]. Several papers study the optimal inventory policy with return ows of used
products; see, e.g., [167, 163], and [87]. These papers focus on characterizing the cost-
minimizing inventory policy in a system with exogenously given demand rate, price, and
remanufacturability. More recently, researchers start to explicitly model some strategic
issues related to remanufacturing, such as used product acquisition, demand segmenta-
tion, product cannibalization, and competition. [146] study the optimal reverse channel
structure for the collection of used products from customers. [74] analyze the compe-
tition between new and remanufactured products (i.e., the cannibalization eect) and
characterize the optimal recovery strategy. When remanufacturability is an endogenous
decision, [59] investigate a joint pricing and production technology selection problem of
a manufacturer who sells a remanufacturable product to heterogeneous customers. Un-
der the cannibalization eect of remanufactured products, [75] study the competition
between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent operator who
only sells remanufactured products. [14] show that remanufacturing could serve as a
marketing strategy to target the customers in the green segment and, hence, enhance
the protability of the OEM. [133] characterize the optimal relicensing strategy of an
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OEM to mitigate the cannibalization eect in the secondary market. [81] study how the
rate of product innovation aects the rm's reuse and remanufacturing decisions. [90]
investigate the quality design and environmental consequences of green consumerism with
remanufacturing. There are papers that address behaviorial issues related to remanufac-
turing such as how the remanufactured products aect the customer valuation of new
products ([3]). Government regulations on remanufacturing have also been studied in the
literature; see, e.g., [118]. [56] study the impact of demand uncertainty on government
subsidies for green technology adoption. The impact of trade-in rebates has also received
some attention in the remanufacturing literature. For example, [142] examine the value of
price discrimination for new and repeat customers with dierentiated ages (and qualities)
of the returned products.
The impact of strategic customer behavior has received an increasing amount of at-
tention in the operations management literature. [149] provide a comprehensive review
on customer behavior models in revenue management and auctions. [20] show that ra-
tional customers drive a monopolist rm to charge a lower price for any given state in
each period. [157] characterizes the optimal pricing strategy with a heterogenous group
of strategic customers. When customers are forward-looking, [17] study the optimal sin-
gle mark-down timing with nite inventories. In a newsvendor model where customers
anticipate the likelihood of stockout before deciding whether to make a purchase, [58] and
[159, 160] study the impact of strategic customer behavior on newsvendor prot, supply
chain performance, and the role of product availability in inducing demand, respectively.
[115] propose the eective capacity rationing strategy to induce early purchases with
strategic customers. [40, 41] and [176] demonstrate how quick response can be employed
to mitigate strategic customer behavior. [99] study opaque selling and last-minute selling
with strategic customers in a revenue management framework. In a cheap talk framework,
[8] show that, though nonveriable, the availability information improves the prot of a
service rm and the expected utility of its customers. [7] further demonstrate that a single
retailer providing availability information on its own cannot create any credibility with
homogeneous customers. [54] investigate the integrated information and pricing strat-
egy with strategic customers and the customer preorders before product release. [135]
demonstrates how vertical product dierentiability helps mitigate strategic customer be-
havior. Recently, there are papers addressing the optimal strategy with multiple product
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introductions and strategic customer behavior. For example, in the presence of strategic
consumers, [113] characterize the optimal product rollover strategies, whereas [116] study
the new product launch strategy.
There are a few papers that investigate trade-in rebates with forward-looking cus-
tomers. [166] show that, under strategic customer behavior, trade-ins can serve as a
mechanism to achieve price commitment. [80] study the monopoly pricing of overlap-
ping generations of a durable good with and without a second-hand market. In an
innite-horizon model setting, [141] demonstrate that trade-in rebates can alleviate the
ineciencies arising from the lemon problem.
This chapter contributes to the aforementioned streams of research by studying the
interaction between trade-in remanufacturing and strategic customer behavior, and how
such interaction aects the economic and environmental values of trade-in remanufactur-
ing. We demonstrate that strategic customer behavior may benet the rm, but give rise
to a tension between rm protability and environmental sustainability under trade-in
remanufacturing. In addition, we characterize how the government can achieve the so-
cial optimum, using a simple linear subsidy/tax scheme with either strategic or myopic
customers.
4.3 Model and Equilibrium Analysis
4.3.1 Model Setup
We consider a monopoly rm (he) in the market who sells a product to customers
(she) in a two-period sales horizon. In the rst period, the rm produces the rst-
generation product at a unit production cost c1. The potential market size X, which
is the total number of potential customers, is ex-ante uncertain. The customers are
innitesimal, each requesting at most one unit of the product in any period. Demand
uncertainty is a common feature with new product introduction, but the rm can obtain
more accurate demand information as the market matures. Hence, in the second period,
the market uncertainty is resolved so the realized market size X becomes known to the
rm. Without loss of generality, we assume that X > 0, with a distribution function F ()
and density function f() = F 0().
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A customer's valuation V for the rst-generation product is independently drawn from
a continuous distribution with a distribution functionG() supported on [v; v] (0  v < v).
We call the customer with product valuation V the type-V customer. At the beginning
of the sales horizon, each customer only knows the distribution of her own valuation G(),
but not the realization V . This assumption captures the customers' uncertainties about
the quality, and ts the situation where the product is brand new. In the second period,
all customers observe their own type V . For the customers who purchased the product in
period 1, they learn their type V by consuming the product. For the customers who did
not purchase the product in period 1, they learn its quality and t (thus, their type V )
through social learning platforms (e.g., Facebook and Amazon customer review systems).
Hence, the customers are homogeneous ex ante (i.e., at the beginning of period 1), but
heterogeneous ex post (i.e., at the beginning of period 2). This is a common setting in the
models concerning strategic customer behavior (see, e.g., [175, 158]). We assume that the
valuation distribution G() has an increasing failure rate, i.e., g(v)= G(v) is increasing in v,
where g() = G0() is the density function and G() = 1 G(). This is a mild assumption
and can be satised by most commonly used distributions. Let  := E(V ) > c1, i.e., in
expectation, a customer's valuation exceeds the production cost.
The rm oers an upgraded version of the product in period 2. This is a customary
practice for product categories like consumer electronics, home appliances, and furniture.
A type-V customer has a valuation of (1 + )V for the upgraded second-generation
product, where   0 is exogenously given and captures the innovation level (e.g., the
improved features) of the upgraded product. Accordingly, let the production cost of
the second-generation product be c2. To model the product depreciation, we take the
approach of [166]: If a type-V customer has already bought the product in period 1, her
valuation of consuming the used product in period 2 is (1 k)V , where k 2 [0; 1] refers to
the depreciation factor. Specically, if k = 0, the product is completely durable; if k = 1,
the product is completely useless after the rst period (either the product is worn out
or the technology is obsolete). Therefore, the willingness-to-pay of a type-V customer in
period 2 is (1+)V if she did not purchase the product in period 1 (i.e., a new customer),
and is (1 + )V   (1  k)V = (k + )V if she purchased the product in period 1 (i.e., a
repeat customer).
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As widely recognized in the literature, the rm can generate revenue from remanufac-
turing by reusing the materials and components of the recycled products (see [146, 142]).
We now model the revenue-generating eect of remanufacturing. There are two types
of remanufacturing in our model. First, the rm recycles the unsold rst-generation
products at the end of period 1. The recycled leftover inventory in the rst period is
remanufactured and can generate a net per-unit revenue r1 (r1 < c1) for the rm. That
is, in the base model we assume no excess inventory is carried over to the second period.
This assumption applies when the inventory holding cost is suciently high or the rm
does not want to dilute the sales of the newer generation product, which is usually the case
in the electronics market. Moreover, this assumption facilitates the technical tractability
of our model. Our results can be extended to the setting wherein the rm may hold
leftover inventory and oer both product generations in the second period. The second
type of remanufacturing is by using the returned products in period 2, i.e., customers
who bought the product in period 1 can trade the old product for a second-generation
one at a discounted price in period 2. The net revenue of remanufacturing from a used
product in period 2 is r2 (r2 < c2). Following [146], we assume that all remanufactured
products are upgraded to the quality standards of new ones, so that consumers cannot
distinguish them from newly made products. Relaxing this assumption will not aect
our qualitative results.
The environmental impact of the product is the aggregate (negative) lifetime impact
of the product on the environment. The total environmental impact is the production
quantity of the product multiplied by the per-unit impact (see, e.g., [162, 4]). Let 1 > 0
denote the unit environmental impact of the rst-generation product. Analogously, we
denote 2 > 0 as the unit environmental impact of the second-generation product. Such
impact may refer to the use of natural resources, emission of harmful gases, and generation
of solid wastes. Moreover, 1 and 2 can be estimated by the conventional life-cycle
analysis (see, e.g., [4]). To model the environmental benet of remanufacturing, let 1
(1 < 1) be the unit environmental benet of recycling the rst-period leftover inventory,
and 2 (2 < 2) be that of recycling the used products through trade-in rebates. Here, 1
and 2 refer to the reductions in both the production environmental impact in period 2 and
the end-of-use and end-of-life product disposal, by recycling and reusing the materials and
components of the rst-generation products. To capture the environmental advantage
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of the second-generation product, we assume that 1   t  2 (t = 1; 2), i.e., the
total environmental impact of the rst-generation product dominates that of the second-
generation product even if the end-of-use/end-of-life rst-generation products are recycled
and remanufactured.
The sequence of events unfolds as follows. At the beginning of period 1, the rm
announces the price p1 and decides the production quantity Q1. Each customer observes
p1, but not Q1, and makes her decision whether to order the product or to wait until
period 2. The rst-period demand X1  X is then realized, the rm collects his rst-
period revenue, and all customers stay in the market. Note that X1 is determined by the
collective eect of all customers' purchasing behaviors. If X1  Q1, any customer who
requests a product can get one in period 1. Otherwise, X1 > Q1, then the Q1 products are
randomly allocated to the demand, and X1 Q1 customers have to wait due to the limited
availability. At the end of period 1, the rm recycles and remanufactures the leftover
inventory. At the beginning of period 2, the rm learns the realized total market size X,
and each individual customer learns her type V . The rm then announces the price pn2 for
new customers as well as the trade-in price pr2  pn2 (pn2 pr2 is the trade-in rebate); all new
customers decide whether to purchase the second-generation product, whereas all repeat
customers decide whether to trade their used products in for new second-generation ones.
Finally, the rm produces the second-generation products, recycles and remanufactures
the used products from repeat customers, and collects the second-period revenue.
For notational convenience, we will use E[] to denote the expectation operation, x^y
to denote the minimum of two numbers x and y, and 1
d
= 2 to denote that two random
variables 1 and 2 follow the same distribution. The scenario with myopic customers will
be denoted with \~".
4.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We consider two scenarios, one with strategic customers and the other with myopic
customers. Strategic customers maximize their total expected surplus over the two-period
horizon, whereas myopic customers maximize their expected current-period surplus in
each period. In both scenarios, the rm seeks to maximize his total expected prot over
the entire horizon. For expositional convenience, we assume there is a common discount
factor for the rm and the customers in period 2, denoted by  2 (0; 1]. To highlight
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the impact of strategic customer behavior upon the economic and environmental values
of trade-in remanufacturing, we assume that the customers are either purely strategic or
completely myopic. In reality, the actual customer behavior may take a form between
these two extremes. Our model can be easily adapted to capture this situation by xing
the discount factor of the rm at , and allowing the discount factor of the customers
c to vary in the interval [0; ]. The higher the c, the greater the customers' concern
about future utilities, and thus the more strategic they are. In particular, c =  (c = 0)
corresponds to the scenario with purely strategic (myopic) customers.
To characterize the game outcome, we adopt the rational expectation (RE) equilibrium
concept. The RE equilibrium was proposed by [129] and has been widely used in the
operations management literature (e.g., [159, 160, 40, 41]). Using backward induction,
we start with the decisions of the two parties in period 2. There are Xn2 = X  (X1^Q1)
new customers and Xr2 = X1^Q1 repeat customers in the market. Note that, since period
2 is the nal period, strategic and myopic customers exhibit the same purchasing behavior
therein. Hence, regardless of customer behavior, the rm should adopt the same pricing
strategy in period 2 as well. Given (Xn2 ; X
r
2), let p
n
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2) and Q
n
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2) be the
equilibrium price and production quantity for new customers in period 2. Analogously,
pr2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) andQ
r
2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) are the equilibrium trade-in price and production quantity for
repeat customers, respectively. Correspondingly, we denote 2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) as the equilibrium
second-period prot of the rm.
Lemma 7 (a) For any (Xn2 ; X
r
2), p
n
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2)  pn2 and pr2(Xn2 ; Xr2)  pr2 , where
pn2 = argmaxpn20(p
n
2 c2) G

pn2
1 + 

and pr2 = argmaxpr20(p
r
2 c2+r2) G

pr2
k + 

:
Moreover, pr2 < p
n
2 if and only if k < 1 or r2 > 0.
(b) For any (Xn2 ; X
r
2), Q
n
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2) = G

pn2
1+

Xn2 , and Q
r
2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) = G

pr2
k+

Xr2 .
(c) There exist two positive constants n and 

r , such that 2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) = 

nX
n
2 +

rX
r
2
for all (Xn2 ; X
r
2), where
n = max
pn20
(pn2   c2) G

pn2
1 + 

and r = max
pr20
(pr2   c2 + r2) G

pr2
k + 

:
Lemma 7 characterizes the equilibrium pricing and production strategy of the rm
in period 2. Specically, both the equilibrium price for new customers and the equilib-
rium trade-in price are independent of the realized market size (Xn2 ; X
r
2). Hence, the
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equilibrium production quantity for new (repeat) customers is a xed fraction of the
corresponding market size Xn2 (X
r
2) in period 2. As long as the used product is not
completely useless to customers in period 2 (i.e., k < 1) or remanufacturing generates
a positive revenue (i.e., r2 > 0), the rm oers positive trade-in rebates to repeat cus-
tomers. Moreover, the equilibrium prot of the rm in period 2, 2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2), is linearly
separable in Xn2 and X
r
2 .
We now analyze the rm's and the customers' decisions in period 1. We begin with
the customers' purchasing behavior. A strategic customer forms beliefs about the rst-
period product availability probability a, the second-period price for new customers pn2 ,
and the second-period trade-in price pr2, where a, p
n
2 , and p
r
2 are all nonnegative random
variables. Based on the belief vector (a; pn2 ; p
r
2) and the observed rst-period price p1,
she computes the expected utility of making an immediate purchase, Up := a(E[V ] +
E[(k+)V  pr2]+ p1)+ (1 a)E[(1+)V  pn2 ]+, and the expected utility of waiting,
Uw := E[(1+)V  pn2 ]+. Hence, the rst-period reservation price of a strategic customer,
r, is given by r := maxfp1 : Up  Uwg, and she will make a purchase in period 1 if and
only if p1  r. The decision-making process of a myopic customer is simpler because
she does not form beliefs about the rst-period availability and second-period prices,
but bases her purchasing decision on the current utility only. Hence, the rst-period
reservation price for a myopic customer equals her expected valuation of the product,
i.e., ~r = E[V ] = . Following the standard approach in the marketing ([175]) and the
strategic customer behavior ([159, 41]) literature with homogeneous customers, we assume
that all customers will make a purchase in period 1 if p1 equals their reservation prices
(r for strategic customers and ~r for myopic customers). Thus, with strategic (myopic)
customers, the rst-period demand, X1, is given by X1 = X 1fp1rg (X1 = X 1fp1~rg).
Next, we consider the rm's problem in period 1. The rm does not know the exact
reservation price of strategic (myopic) customers r (~r), but forms a belief r1 (~r1) about
it. To maximize his expected prot, the rm sets the rst-period price p1 (~p1) equal to the
expected reservation price r1 (~r1), which is the highest price (the rm believes) strategic
(myopic) customers are willing to pay in the rst period. Thus, the rm believes that the
rst-period demand X1 = X. Thus, the second-period market size of new customers is
Xn2 = (X Q1)+, and that of repeat customers isXr2 = X^Q1. Moreover, the rm sets the
rst-period production quantity Q1 to maximize the total expected prot with strategic
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(myopic) customers f (Q1) (~f (Q1)), where f (Q1) = Efp1(X ^Q1)  c1Q1 + r1(Q1  
X)++ 2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2)g and ~f (Q1) = Ef~p1(X ^Q1)  c1Q1+ r1(Q1 X)++ 2(Xn2 ; Xr2)g,
with p1 = r1, ~p1 = ~r1, X
n
2 = (X   Q1)+, and Xr2 = X ^ Q1. Finally, under the RE
equilibrium, all beliefs are rationally formulated and thus consistent with the actual
outcomes.
Let (p1; Q

1; 

r ; r
; a; pn2 ; p
r
2 ) and (~p

1; ~Q

1;
~r ;~r
) be the RE equilibria in the market
with strategic and myopic customers, respectively. For concision, the formal denitions
of the RE equilibria in both scenarios are given in Appendix C.1. To characterize the
RE equilibrium, we dene two auxiliary variables m1 :=  + [

r   n + E((k + )V  
pr)
+   E((1 + )V   pn)+] and ~m1 := + (r   n). As will be clear in our subsequent
analysis, m1 ( ~m

1) is the rst-period eective marginal revenue with strategic (myopic)
customers, which summarizes the impact of the second-period decisions on the rst-period
rm prot. Based on Lemma 7, we can characterize the RE equilibrium market outcome
in the scenario with either strategic or myopic customers.
Theorem 4.3.1 (a) With strategic customers, an RE equilibrium
(p1; Q

1; 

r ; r
; pn2 ; p
r
2 ; a
) exists with (i) p1 =  + [E((k + )V   pr2 )+   E((1 +
)V   pn2 )+]; and (ii) Q1 = F 1( c1 r1m1 r1 ). Moreover, all RE equilibria give rise to
the identical expected total prot of the rm, f = (m

1   r1)E(X ^ Q1)   (c1  
r1)Q

1 + 

nE(X):
(b) With myopic customers, an RE equilibrium (~p1; ~Q

1;
~r ;~r
) exists with (i) ~p1 = ;
and (ii) ~Q1 = F
 1( c1 r1
~m1 r1 ). Moreover, all RE equilibria give rise to the identical
expected total prot of the rm, ~f = ( ~m

1  r1)E(X ^ ~Q1)  (c1  r1) ~Q1+ nE(X):
Theorem 4.3.1(a) and (b) characterize the RE equilibrium market outcomes in the
scenarios with strategic and myopic customers, respectively. In each scenario, the rst-
period price equals the corresponding expected reservation price of the customers, and
the rst-period production quantity can be determined by the solution of a correspond-
ing newsvendor problem. In equilibrium, the total environmental impact should be the
dierence between the total environmental impact of production/disposal and the total
environmental benet of remanufacturing. Hence, the equilibrium environmental impact
with strategic customers is Ie = Ef1Q1 + 2(Qn2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) +Qr2(Xn2 ; Xr2 ))  1(Q1  
X)+  2Qr2(Xn2 ; Xr2 )g, where Xn2 = (X  Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^Q1; whereas that with
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myopic customers is ~Ie = Ef1 ~Q1+ 2(Qn2 ( ~Xn2 ; ~Xr2 ) +Qr2( ~Xn2 ; ~Xr2 ))  1( ~Q1 X)+ 
2Q
r
2( ~X
n
2 ;
~Xr2 )g, where ~Xn2 = (X   ~Q1)+ and ~Xr2 = X ^ ~Q1.
4.4 Impact of Trade-in Remanufacturing
In this section, we analyze the impact of trade-in remanufacturing on the rm and the
environment under dierent customer behaviors (i.e., strategic or myopic customers). Our
focus is on how strategic customer behavior inuences the economic and environmental
values of trade-in remanufacturing.
To facilitate our comparison, we rst introduce a benchmark model where the rm
does not oer trade-in rebates to customers. As a consequence, the rm cannot recycle
used products for remanufacturing in period 2. We call this the No Trade-in Reman-
ufacturing (NTR) model, which is denoted by the superscript \u" hereafter. We use
pu2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) to denote the equilibrium second-period pricing strategy of the rm in the
NTR model, which does not depend on customer behavior. As in the base model, the
rm forms a belief about the customers' expected willingness-to-pay in the rst period,
and bases his price and production decisions on this belief. The customers, on the other
hand, form beliefs about the product availability and the second-period price, and time
their purchases. Again, the formal denitions of the RE equilibrium in the NTR model
are given in Appendix C.1. By the same argument in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, we can
show that an RE equilibrium exists with either strategic or myopic customers in the NTR
model. Let (pu1 ; Q
u
1 ) denote the equilibrium rst-period price and production decisions
of the rm with strategic customers, and (~pu1 ; ~Q
u
1 ) denote those with myopic customers
in the NTR model. Accordingly, the associated equilibrium expected prot of the rm
(environmental impact) is denoted by uf (I
u
e ) in the scenario with strategic customers,
and by ~uf (~I
u
e ) in the scenario with myopic customers.
Let uf (Q1) (
~uf (Q1)) be the expected prot of the rm with strategic (myopic) cus-
tomers to produce Q1 products in the period 1 in the NTR model. We characterize the
objective functions f (), ~f (), uf (), and ~uf () in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The objective functions are given by f (Q1) = (m

1   r1)E(X ^ Q1)   (c1  
r1)Q1 + 
n
2 E(X), ~f (Q1) = ( ~m1   r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + n2 E(X),
uf (Q1) = (m
u
1(Q1) r1)E(X^Q1) (c1 r1)Q1+Ef(pu2(Xn2 ; Xr2) c2) G

pu2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2)
1 + 

Xg;
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and
~uf (Q1) = ( ~m
u
1(Q1) r1)E(X^Q1) (c1 r1)Q1+Ef(pu2(Xn2 ; Xr2) c2) G

pu2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2)
1 + 

Xg;
where Xn2 = (X  Q1)+, Xr2 = X ^Q1. The expressions of mu1() and ~mu1() are given in
Appendix C.2.
Lemma 8 implies that, in the NTR model, the eective rst-period marginal revenue
is production-quantity-dependent, and given by mu1() in the scenario with strategic cus-
tomers and by ~mu1() with myopic customers. The economic interpretation of mu1(Q1)
( ~mu1(Q1)) is that, when the rst-period production quantity is Q1, it measures the ad-
ditional expected marginal revenue to sell the product in period 1 over that in period 2
with strategic (myopic) customers. Hence, the higher the mu1(Q1) and ~m
u
1(Q1), the more
protable it is for the rm to sell the rst-generation product in the NTR model with
strategic and myopic customers, respectively. In other words, mu1() and ~mu1() capture
the willingness-to-produce of the rm in period 1. Without loss of generality, we focus on
the case where mu1() > 0 and ~mu1() > 0 for all Q1  0, i.e., the rm can gain a positive
revenue to sell the rst-generation product. Otherwise, the rm will not produce or sell
anything in period 1.
4.4.1 Impact on Firm Prot
This subsection investigates the value of trade-in remanufacturing to the rm. To
begin with, we characterize the role of strategic customer behavior, depending on whether
the rm adopts trade-in remanufacturing or not.
Theorem 4.4.1 (a) Under trade-in remanufacturing, let e := E((k + )V   pr2 )+  
E((1+)V  pn2 )+. Then, we have (i) p1 > ~p1 if and only if e > 0, (ii) Q1 > ~Q1 if
and only if e > 0, and (iii) f > ~

f if and only if e
 > 0. Moreover, there exists
a threshold r  1 k
1+
c2, such that e
 > 0 if and only if r2 > r.
(b) Under no trade-in remanufacturing, we have (i) pu1  ~pu1 , where the inequality is
strict if k < 1, (ii) Qu1  ~Qu1 , and (iii) uf  ~uf , where the inequality is strict if
k < 1 and ~Qu1 > 0.
Under trade-in remanufacturing, Theorem 4.4.1(a) compares the equilibrium out-
comes with dierent customer behaviors. We nd that the key to this comparison is the
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dierence between the expected surplus of a repeat customer and that of a new customer
in period 2 (i.e., e). With strategic customers, the rm charges a higher rst-period
price, sets a higher rst-period production level, and earns a higher total expected prot,
if and only if the expected second-period surplus of a repeat customer is higher than
that of a new customer (i.e, e > 0). In particular, the presence of strategic customer
behavior benets the rm if the revenue-generating eect of remanufacturing is strong
enough (i.e., r2 > r). This result is in sharp contrast with the well-established notion
in the literature that strategic customer behavior hurts a rm's prot (e.g., [17, 159]).
Trade-in remanufacturing leads to a price discount for repeat customers in period 2,
which can be perceived by strategic customers when deciding whether to make a pur-
chase in period 1. This discount outweighs the benet of strategic waiting if the revenue
generated from remanufacturing is suciently high (i.e., r2 > r). In this case, the pres-
ence of forward-looking behavior will enable the rm to charge a higher price, produce
more, and thus earn a higher prot. We emphasize that both the trade-in option and
the revenue-generating eect of remanufacturing are essential for the rm to benet from
strategic customer behavior: The former induces strategic customers to anticipate the
price discount for repeat customers, whereas the latter brings in the additional benet
that guarantees a deep discount so that strategic customers are willing to pay an even
higher rst-period price than myopic customers. In contrast, Theorem 4.4.1(b) shows
that, without trade-in remanufacturing, the rm always suers from strategic customer
behavior, as reported in the existing literature.
Theorem 4.4.1 suggests that the presence of strategic customer behavior will make
trade-in remanufacturing more attractive to the rm. Next, we study how trade-in re-
manufacturing inuences the prot and the pricing strategy of the rm under dierent
customer behaviors. The following theorem compares the equilibrium prices and prots
in the NTR model and those in the base model with either strategic or myopic customers.
Theorem 4.4.2 (a) In period 2, pu2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) is increasing in X
n
2 and decreasing in
Xr2 . Moreover, for any (X
n
2 ; X
r
2), p
r
2  pu2(Xn2 ; Xr2)  pn2 , where the inequalities
are strict if k < 1 and Xn2 ; X
r
2 > 0.
(b) With strategic customers, we have (i) pu1  p1, where the inequality is strict if
pr2 < p
n
2 ; and (ii) 
u
f  f , where the inequality is strict if pr2 < pn2 and Q1 > 0.
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(c) With myopic customers, we have (i) ~pu1 = ~p

1; and (ii) ~
u
f  ~f , where the
inequality is strict if pr2 < p
n
2 and ~Q
u
1 > 0.
Theorem 4.4.2 shows that the equilibrium second-period price without trade-in reman-
ufacturing, pu2(; ), is bounded from below by the equilibrium second-period trade-in price
pr2 , and from above by the equilibrium second-period price for new customers p
n
2 . Hence,
under trade-in remanufacturing, the expected utility of strategic customers to make a pur-
chase in the rst period increases (i.e., E[(k+)V  pr2 ]+  E[(k+)V  pu2(Xn2 ; Xr2)]+),
whereas the benet of waiting decreases decreases (i.e., E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+  E[(1 +
)V   pu2(Xn2 ; Xr2)]+. This implies that trade-in remanufacturing makes strategic cus-
tomers more willing to purchase immediately than to wait until period 2. Therefore,
trade-in remanufacturing enables the rm to exploit the forward-looking behavior of
strategic customers and thus induces early purchases from them. With myopic cus-
tomers, however, trade-in remanufacturing does not have an early-purchase inducing ef-
fect because myopic customers do not care about their future surplus. This result is also
consistent with the nding in the durable product literature that the secondary market
gives rise to greater resale value of a durable product and thus can increase the sales of
the new product upfront (see, e.g., [94, 169]).
From Theorem 4.4.2, we can see there are three benecial eects of trade-in remanu-
facturing that may improve rm prot: (a) the revenue-generating eect of remanufac-
turing, (b) the price discrimination eect of trade-in rebates, i.e., the dierentiated prices
for new and repeat customers helps the rm exploit the customer segmentation in period
2, and (c) the early-purchase inducing eect of trade-in rebates, i.e., the price discount
to repeat customers enables the rm to exploit the forward-looking behavior of strate-
gic customers by oering early-purchase rewards. The rst two eects benet the rm
with either strategic or myopic customers, whereas the third eect improves the rm's
prot with strategic customers only. In the following, we conduct extensive numerical
experiments to quantify the third eect, and deliver insights on how strategic customer
behavior inuences the value of trade-in remanufacturing to the rm.
The design of the numerical study is as follows. Let the customer valuation V follow
a uniform distribution on [0; 1] ( = E(V ) = 0:5). The discount factor is  = 0:95,
the unit environmental impact of the rst-generation product is 1 = 1, and the unit
environmental impact of the second-generation product is 2 = 0:75. To focus on the
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impact of customer behaviors, we set r1 = r2 = 0 (i.e., there is no revenue-generating
eect associated with remanufacturing), and the unit environmental benets of recy-
cling/remanufacturing to be 1 = 0 and 2 = 0:3 (these two values will be useful when
studying the environmental impact in Section 4.2). The unit production cost of the
rst-generation product is c1 2 f0:05; 0:1; 0:15; 0:2; 0:25g. The innovation level of the
second-generation product is  2 f0; 0:05; 0:1; 0:15; 0:2g, and the unit production cost
of the second-generation product is c2 = 0:25(1 + ) 2 f0:25; 0:2625; 0:275; 0:2875; 0:3g.
We consider the depreciation factor k 2 f0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7g. The demand X follows a
gamma distribution with mean 100 and coecient of variation CV (X) taking values from
the set f0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9g. Thus, we have a total of 625 parameter combinations that
cover a wide range of reasonable problem scenarios. The above problem scenarios form a
subset of the extensive experiments we have conducted. Our numerical ndings are very
robust. For concision, we will only present the results for the parameter combinations
listed above.
We calculate the expected prot for each scenario with either strategic or myopic
customers both in the base model, (f , ~

f ) and in the NTR model, (
u
f ,
~uf ). The
two metrics of interest are: s := (

f  uf )=uf  100%; and m := (~f   ~uf )=~uf 
100%; i.e., s (m) refers to the relative prot improvement of trade-in remanufacturing
with strategic (myopic) customers. We evaluate s and m under the 625 parameter
combinations and report that, under each combination, s is signicantly higher than
m. More specically, s is at least 5:8% and can be as high as 61:6%, with an average of
30:2%; whereas m ranges from 0:008% to 11:7%, with an average of 3:1%. We give the
summary statistics of s and m in Table 4.1.
Min 5th percentile Median 95th percentile Max Mean Stan. Dev.
s 5.8 11.3 28.3 55.8 61.6 30.2 13.1
m 0.008 0.22 2.5 8.1 11.7 3.1 2.5
Table 4.1
Summary Statistics: Firm Prot (%)
Our numerical results deliver an important message on the economic value of trade-in
remanufacturing: Trade-in remanufacturing delivers a much higher value to the rm with
strategic customers than with myopic customers (s is signicantly higher than m for each
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problem instance). Recall that, with myopic customers, trade-in remanufacturing only
has the benets of revenue-generating and price discrimination, whereas, with strategic
customers, this strategy has the additional value of inducing early purchases. Therefore,
these results indicate that the value of trade-in remanufacturing to the rm mainly comes
from the early-purchase inducing eect of trade-in rebates to exploit strategic customer
behavior, rather than from the revenue-generating eect of remanufacturing or the price
discrimination eect of trade-in rebates to exploit customer segmentation.
4.4.2 Impact on Environment and Customer Surplus
Our next goal is to examine the environmental value of trade-in remanufacturing
under dierent customer behaviors. We rst characterize how trade-in remanufacturing
inuences the eective rst-period marginal revenue and production quantities of the
rm.
Theorem 4.4.3 Assume k < 1.
(a) With strategic customers, we have (i) mu1(Q1) is decreasing in Q1; (ii) m
u
1(Q1) < m

1
for all Q1; (iii) Q
u
1  Q1, where the inequality is strict if Q1 > 0.
(b) With myopic customers, we have (i) ~mu1(Q1) is increasing in Q1; (ii) for each
r2 < r2
2, there exists a threshold Q(r2) increasing in r2, such that ~m
u
1(Q1)  ~m1 for
all Q1  Q(r2), and ~mu1(Q1) > ~m1 for all Q1 > Q(r2); (iii) for each r2 < r2, there
exists a threshold c1(r2) > 0, such that Q
u
1 > Q

1 if c1  c1(r2).
Theorem 4.4.3 provides an interesting comparison between the scenarios of strate-
gic and myopic customers: With strategic customers, trade-in remanufacturing always
increases the rst-period production quantity of the rm, whereas it may prompt the
rm to produce less with myopic customers. More specically, Theorem 4.4.3(a) shows
that, under strategic customer behavior, the eective marginal revenue with trade-in
remanufacturing always dominates that without (i.e., mu1() < m1). As a result, the
rm produces more in period 1 under trade-in remanufacturing. Theorem 4.4.3(b), how-
ever, suggests that, with myopic customers, trade-in remanufacturing may give rise to
a lower rst-period eective marginal revenue if the production quantity is large (i.e.,
2The expression of r2 is given in Appendix C.2.
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~mu1(Q1) > ~m

1 if Q1 > Q(r2)), thus driving the rm to lower the rst-period production
quantity if the rst-period unit production cost is low (i.e., c1  c1(r2)). Recall from
Theorem 4.4.2 that trade-in remanufacturing increases the rst-period willingness-to-pay
of strategic customers, which, in turn, drives the rm to produce more in period 1. Such
early-purchase and, thus, early-production inducing eects of trade-in remanufacturing,
however, are absent with myopic customers. In the scenario of myopic customers, on the
other hand, the price discrimination eect of trade-in remanufacturing improves the unit
prot generated from the new customers in period 2, thus leading to a lower eective
rst-period marginal revenue if the revenue-generating eect of remanufacturing is not
too strong (i.e., r2 < r2). As a consequence, the rm decreases the rst-period production
quantity to increase the second-period market size of new customers.
Theorem 4.4.3 demonstrates the contrasting eects of trade-in remanufacturing on
production quantities under dierent customer behaviors. How does trade-in remanufac-
turing aect the environment? The answer is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4.4 (a) With strategic customers, there exists a threshold u2 > 0, such
that Ie  Iue if 2  u2 .
(b) Assume that r2 < r2 and c1  c1(r2). With myopic customers, there exists a
threshold ~u2 < 2, such that ~I
u
e  ~Ie if 2  ~u2 .
When customers are strategic, trade-in rebates encourage them to recycle the used
rst-generation products more frequently, so they also purchase the product more fre-
quently. In this scenario, trade-in remanufacturing leads to a worsened outcome for the
environment if the unit environmental benet of remanufacturing is not high enough to
justify the early-production inducing eect (i.e., 2  u2 in Theorem 4.4.4(a)). When the
customers are myopic and the unit production cost is suciently low, trade-in remanu-
facturing motivates the rm to produce less in period 1 (see Theorem 4.4.3(b)). Hence,
trade-in remanufacturing helps improve the environment as long as the unit environmen-
tal benet of remanufacturing is not too low (i.e., 2  ~u2 in Theorem 5(b)). Theorem
4.4.4 reveals the signicant impact of customer behavior on the environmental value of
trade-in remanufacturing. With strategic customers, the adoption of trade-in remanufac-
turing is likely to be detrimental to the environment, whereas, with myopic customers,
adopting trade-in remanufacturing may benet both the rm and the environment. Some
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papers in the literature (e.g., [59, 81, 90]) have also established that remanufacturing may
increase the production quantity and thus environmental impact. Our work, however,
demonstrates that the environmental impact of trade-in remanufacturing depends criti-
cally on customer behavior.
We now numerically illustrate the environmental value of trade-in remanufacturing.
We employ the same numerical setup as Section 4.4.1. Recall that Ie (~I

e ) is the expected
environmental impact for the scenario with strategic (myopic) customers in the base
model, and Iue (~I
u
e ) is that in the NTR model. We are interested in the following
two metrics: s := (I

e   Iue )=Iue  100%; and m := (~Ie   ~Iue )=~Iue  100%; i.e., s
(m) refers to the relative change of the environmental impact when adopting trade-in
remanufacturing with strategic (myopic) customers.
We evaluate s and m under the 625 parameter combinations and obtain the following
numerical ndings: (i) Under each parameter combination, s is signicantly higher than
m; and (ii) For most of the parameter combinations, s > 0 but m < 0. Specically,
s takes values from -1.2% to 171.9%, with an average of 49:2%; whereas m ranges from
 10:2% to 4:5%, with an average of  5:0%. Moreover, s < 0 (i.e., trade-in remanufac-
turing benets the environment with strategic customers) for 10 out of the 625 (i.e., 1.6%)
problem instances we examine, whereas m < 0 (i.e., trade-in remanufacturing benets
the environment with myopic customers) for 585 out of the 625 (i.e., 93.6%) problem
instances. Table 4.2 summarizes the statistics of s and m.
Min 5th percentile Median 95th percentile Max Mean Stan. Dev.
s -1.2 2.0 37.8 117.8 171.9 49.2 41.4
m -10.2 -8.5 -5.5 0.51 4.5 -5.0 2.7
Table 4.2
Summary Statistics: Environmental Impact (%)
Table 2 conrms that trade-in remanufacturing generally leads to much higher envi-
ronmental impact with strategic customers than with myopic customers (s is signicantly
higher than m). Though benecial to the rm (see Table 4.1), the early-purchase in-
ducing eect of trade-in remanufacturing gives rise to much higher production quantities
under strategic customer behavior, and thus leads to a much worse outcome from the
environmental perspective. Therefore, strategic customer behavior has opposing eects
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on the value of trade-in remanufacturing to the rm and the environment: It makes this
strategy more attractive to the rm, but less desirable to the environment.
The above results suggest that trade-in remanufacturing may create a tension between
rm protability and environmental sustainability with strategic customers, but benets
both the rm and the environment with myopic customers. Since s is signicantly larger
than zero for most of the numerical cases we examine, trade-in remanufacturing is detri-
mental to the environment for a large set of reasonable problem instances under strategic
customer behavior. Hence, in general, the early-purchase inducing eect dominates the
environmental benet of remanufacturing with strategic customers. Under strategic cus-
tomer behavior, the rm signicantly benets from trade-in remanufacturing, but the
environment signicantly suers from this strategy (i.e., s > 0 and, in general, s > 0).
With myopic customers, however, both the rm and the environment would benet from
the adoption of trade-in remanufacturing (i.e., m > 0 and, in general, m < 0).
Although an increased production quantity means more pressure on the environment,
it also increases the consumption level of the product. To conclude this section, we
explore how trade-in remanufacturing impacts the total customer surplus under dierent
customer behaviors. We use Sc ( ~S

c ) and S
u
c ( ~S
u
c ) to denote the equilibrium total
customer surplus for the scenarios with strategic (myopic) customers in the base model
and the NTR model, respectively.
Theorem 4.4.5 (a) In the base model, we have Sc = E[((1 + )V   pn2 )+X] and
~Sc = E[((1 + )V   pn2 )+(X   ~Q1)+] + E[((k + )V   pr2 )+(X ^ ~Q1)].
(b) In the NTR model, we have Suc = E[((1 + )V   pu2 )+X] and ~Suc = E[((1 +
)V   pu2 )+(X   ~Qu1 )+] + E[((k + )V   pu2 )+(X ^ ~Qu1 )].
(c) We have the following relationship on the customer surpluses of strategic customers:
Sc  Suc , where the inequality is strict if k < 1 and Qu1 > 0.
Theorem 4.4.5(a) and (b) compute the total customer surpluses in the base model
and the NTR model. Moreover, in Theorem 4.4.5(c), we demonstrate that, with strate-
gic customers, the total customer surplus always decreases with the adoption of trade-in
remanufacturing. This is because, with strategic customers, the total customer surplus
only depends on the (perceived) price for new customers in period 2, which is higher
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under the adoption of trade-in remanufacturing (see Theorem 4.4.2(a)). By Theorem
4.4.3(a), one may argue that, under strategic customer behavior, trade-in remanufactur-
ing increases production quantities and thus increases the customer surplus. Theorem
4.4.5(c), however, shows that the total customer surplus actually decreases in this sce-
nario. Hence, under strategic customer behavior, trade-in remanufacturing gives rise to
higher production quantities without improving the customer surplus. Further, the social
welfare (i.e., rm prot plus customer surplus less environmental impact) is likely to de-
crease under trade-in remanufacturing as well. This has been conrmed in the numerical
study we explored in this section.
To summarize, customer behavior plays an important role in the economic and en-
vironmental values of trade-in remanufacturing. With myopic customers, trade-in re-
manufacturing benets both the rm and the environment. With strategic customers,
trade-in remanufacturing would be even more benecial to the rm; however, meanwhile
it may hurt the environment, decrease customer surplus, and possibly lower social welfare.
Therefore, it is important for rms and policy-makers to understand customer behavior
when making decisions related to trade-in remanufacturing.
4.5 Social Optimum and Government Intervention
As shown in Section 4.4, adopting trade-in remanufacturing may create a tension
between rm protability and environmental sustainability under strategic customer be-
havior. In this section, we analyze how a policy-maker (e.g., the government) can design
the public policy to resolve this tension and maximize the social welfare under dierent
customer behaviors.
To characterize the socially optimal outcome, we assume that the government can set
the prices and production levels, with an objective to maximize the social welfare. Let
Ws denote the social welfare, which is dened by the expected prot of the rm f , plus
the expected customer surplus Sc, net the expected environmental impact Ie, i.e.,
Ws = f + Sc   Ie:
By backward induction, we start with the second-period pricing and production prob-
lem. As in the base model, strategic and myopic customers exhibit the same purchasing
behavior in period 2. For any given realized market size in period 2 (Xn2 ; X
r
2), we use
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(pns;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2); p
r
s;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2)) to denote the equilibrium pricing strategy, and
(Qns;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2); Q
r
s;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2)) to denote the equilibrium production strategy. Correspond-
ingly, we denote w2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) as the equilibrium second-period social welfare.
Lemma 9 (a) For any (Xn2 ; X
r
2), p
n
s;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2)  pns;2 and prs;2(Xn2 ; Xr2)  prs;2, where
pns;2 = c2 + 2 and p
r
s;2 = c2   r2 + 2   2. Hence, pns;2 > prs;2 if and only if r2 > 0
or 2 > 0.
(b) For any (Xn2 ; X
r
2), Q
n
s;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) = G

pns;2
1+

Xn2 , and Q
r
s;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) = G

prs;2
k+

Xr2 .
(c) There exist two positive constants s;n and 

s;r, such that w2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) = 

s;nX
n
2 +
s;rX
r
2 for all (X
n
2 ; X
r
2), where 

s;n = E[(1 + )V   pns;2]+ and s;r = E[(k + )V  
prs;2]
+.
Lemma 9 implies that, with either strategic or myopic customers, the socially optimal
second-period pricing strategy takes the form that the prices for new and repeat customers
are equal to the respective net unit production cost plus the net unit environmental impact
(i.e., pns;2 = c2 + 2 and p
r
s;2 = c2  r2 + 2  2). Moreover, the equilibrium social welfare
is linear in the realized market size (Xn2 ; X
r
2).
In period 1, strategic customers base their purchasing decisions on their rational
expectations, whereas myopic customers decide whether to make a purchase by comparing
the current price and the expected valuation. Let (ps;1; Q

s;1) denote the equilibrium rst-
period price and production quantity with strategic customers, and (~ps;1; ~Q

s;1) denote
those with myopic customers. As in the base model and the NTR model, we introduce the
rst-period eective marginal welfare with either strategic or myopic customers, ms;1 =
~ms;1 := +[

s;r s;n]. The following lemma characterizes the social welfare maximizing
equilibrium outcomes.
Lemma 10 (a) With strategic customers, we have (i) ps;1 = m

s;1;
(ii) Qs;1 = F
 1( c1+1 r1 1
ms;1 r1 1 ); and (iii) the equilibrium expected social welfare is
W s = (m

s;1   r1   1)E(X ^Qs;1)  (c1 + 1   r1   1)Qs;1 + s;nE[X].
(b) With myopic customers, we have (i) ~ps;1 = ; (ii) ~Q

1 = F
 1( c1+1 r1 1
~ms;1 r1 1 ); and (iii)
the equilibrium expected social welfare is ~W s = ( ~m

s;1   r1   1)E(X ^ ~Qs;1)  (c1 +
1   r1   1) ~Qs;1 + s;nE[X].
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(c) Let es := 

s;r   s;n. Then, we have (i) ps;1  ~ps;1 if and only if es  0; (ii)
Qs;1 = ~Q

s;1; and (iii) W

s = ~W

s .
Since the social planner needs to balance rm prot, customer surplus, and envi-
ronmental impact, whereas the rm maximizes its own prot only, the social-welfare-
maximizing equilibrium outcome may be quite dierent from the prot-maximizing one,
as shown by comparing Lemma 10 with Theorem 4.3.1. In particular, if the unit en-
vironmental impacts, 1 and 2, are suciently large, the social planner will set lower
production quantities than the rm will do to limit the total environmental impacts.
Lemma 10(c) characterizes how dierent customer behaviors inuence the social-welfare-
maximizing RE equilibrium outcome. Specically, we show that the expected optimal
social welfare with strategic customers is the same as that with myopic customers, and
so is the optimal rst-period production quantity. The equilibrium rst-period price,
however, depends on customer behavior. If the expected surplus of a repeat customer
dominates that of a new customer (i.e., es  0), the equilibrium rst-period price is
higher with strategic customers. Otherwise, es < 0, the equilibrium rst-period price is
higher with myopic customers. We notice that es is the counterpart of e
 (see Theorem
4.4.1), both of which characterize the additional expected utility of a repeat customer
over a new one in period 2.
We now analyze how the government, whose objective is to maximize the expected
social welfareWs, could induce the rm, whose objective is to maximize his expected prot
f , to set the socially optimal prices and production quantities under dierent customer
behaviors. A commonly-observed government subsidization policy is to subsidize the
rm or customers for the remanufactured products (see, e.g., [128, 44]). To model this
subsidization policy, we assume that the government oers the rm a per-unit subsidy
sr for remanufacturing leftover inventory and used products. The per-unit subsidy to
the rm is without loss of generality, because all results and qualitative insights in this
section continue to hold with the per-unit subsidy to customers, and the proportional
subsidy3 to either the rm or the customers. For expositional ease, we take the approach
of per-unit subsidy to the rm.
3The proportional subsidy refers to the government subsidization scheme under which the unit subsidy
is proportional to (e.g., 10% of) the sales price/trade-in price.
104
We rst study how the government subsidization policy for remanufactured products
would inuence the equilibrium outcome in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5.1 (a) For any (Xn2 ; X
r
2), we have (i) p
r
2 is decreasing in sr; and (ii)
Qr2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2) is increasing in sr.
(b) With strategic customers, we have (i) p1 is increasing in sr; (ii) Q

1 is increasing in
sr; (iii) 

f is increasing in sr; and (iv) I

e is increasing in sr.
(c) With myopic customers, we have (i) ~p1 is independent of sr; (ii) ~Q

1 is increasing
in sr; (iii) ~

f is increasing in sr; and (iv)
~Ie is increasing in sr.
One of the main goals for the government to subsidize remanufacturing is to improve
the environment (see [44, 161]). Theorem 4.5.1(b,c), however, suggests that if the govern-
ment only subsidizes for remanufacturing (i.e., sr > 0), the environment actually suers
from this subsidization policy with either strategic or myopic customers (i.e., Ie and ~I

e
are increasing in sr). This result follows from the rationale that subsidizing remanufac-
tured products not only promotes the adoption of remanufacturing, but also increases
the production levels of the rst-generation product, which is the least environmentally
friendly product version. The environment thus suers from the increased production lev-
els under the subsidization for remanufacturing alone. Therefore, the government should
be careful about designing the subsidization policy, because haphazard subsidization for
remanufacturing may result in an undesired outcome.
Motivated by the discrepancy between the intention and outcome of a commonly used
government subsidization policy for remanufacturing, we consider an alternative more
general government policy that subsidizes for/taxes on the production of both genera-
tion products and remanufacturing. Some other comprehensive government subsidization
policies on production, recycling, remanufacturing, and trade-in rebates are discussed in,
e.g., [186, 118], and [170]. The goal of such government subsidization programs is to
promote the development of remanufacturing, curb pollution, and stimulate consump-
tion. We assume that government subsidies (taxes) are provided (charged) for the sales
of both generation products, and recycling/remanufacturing the leftover inventory and
used products. Specically, let sg := (s1; s2; sr) denote the subsidy/tax scheme the gov-
ernment adopts. The government oers the rm a per-unit subsidy s1 for sales of the
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rst-generation product, a per-unit subsidy s2 for sales of the second-generation product,
and a per-unit subsidy sr for remanufacturing. If si < 0 (i = 1; 2; r), the rm taxes
on the sales of the product or remanufacturing leftover inventory and used products. In
particular, we remark that the aforementioned most common government subsidization
policy for remanufacturing alone is a special case of this general subsidy/tax scheme with
s1 = 0, s2 = 0, and sr > 0.
We now analyze how the government should design the linear subsidy/tax scheme to
induce the socially optimal outcome under dierent customer behaviors.
Theorem 4.5.2 (a) With strategic customers, there exists a unique linear subsidy/tax
scheme sg = (s

1; s

2; s

r), under which the socially optimal RE equilibrium outcome is
achieved. Moreover, we have (i) s2 is the unique solution to p
n
s;2 = argmaxpn20f(pn2+
s2  c2) G( p
n
2
1+
)g; (ii) sr is the unique solution to prs;2 = argmaxpr20f(pr2 + sr + s2  
c2 + r2) G(
pr2
k+
)g; (iii) s1 is the unique solution to c1+1 r1 1 s

r
ms;1 r1 sr =
c1 r1
ms1(s1) r1 , where
ms1(s1) := s1 + m

s;1 + [(2 + s

2 + s

r   2) G( p
r
s;2
k+
)   (2 + s2) G( p
n
s;2
1+
)]; (iv) s1 is
decreasing in 1, s

2 is decreasing in 2, and s

r is increasing in 2; and (v) there
exists a threshold vector (s1; 
s
2; 
s
2), such that s

1  0 if and only if 1  s1, s2  0
if and only if 2  s2, and sr  0 if and only if 2  s2.
(b) With myopic customers, there exists a unique linear subsidy/tax scheme ~sg =
(~s1; ~s

2; ~s

r), under which the socially optimal RE equilibrium outcome is achieved.
Moreover, we have (i) ~s2 = s

2; (ii) ~s

r = s

r; (iii) ~s

1 is the unique solution to
c1+1 r1 1 sr
~ms;1 r1 sr =
c1 r1
~ms1(s1) r1 , where ~m
s
1(s1) := s1 +  + [(2 + s

2 + s

r   2) G( p
r
s;2
k+
) 
(2 + s

2) G(
pns;2
1+
)]; (iv) ~s1 is decreasing in 1; and (v) there exists a threshold ~
s
1,
such that ~s1  0 if and only if 1  ~s1.
(c) We have (i) s1  ~s1 if and only if es  0; and (ii) s1  ~s1 if and only if es  0,
where es is dened in Lemma 10(c).
Theorem 4.5.2 demonstrates that the government can use a simple linear subsidy/tax
scheme to induce the socially optimal outcome in the scenarios with either strategic or
myopic customers. The linear subsidy/tax policy sg helps control the margin of the rm
and the willingness-to-pay of the customers. Hence, the government can use this incentive
scheme to regulate the market and ensure the rm sets the socially optimal prices and
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production quantities with either strategic or myopic customers. More specically, in both
scenarios, the government should provide a combined subsidy/tax scheme for the sales of
both product generations and the recycle of leftover inventory and used products. Since
some components in sg and ~s

g may be negative, it is possible that the government taxes
the rm on some product versions to discourage their sales. This phenomenon results from
the government's goal of balancing the tradeo between rm prot, customer surplus,
and environmental impact. In particular, with either strategic or myopic customers, the
government subsidizes more for (taxes less on) the sales of one product version if its
unit environmental impact increases. Analogously, more subsidies (less taxes) should be
provided for (charged on) remanufacturing if its unit environmental benet is higher.
Comparing the scenarios with strategic and myopic customers (i.e., Theorem 4.5.2(c))
sheds light on how dierent customer behaviors inuence the optimal government subsidy
policy. We nd that the optimal subsidy/tax rates for the second-generation product and
remanufacturing are independent of whether the customers are strategic or myopic (i.e.,
~s2 = s

2 and ~s

r = s

r). The optimal subsidy/tax rate for the rst-generation product,
however, is sensitive to customer behavior. The government should provide a higher
subsidy/lower tax for sales of the rst-generation product with strategic customers than
with myopic customers (i.e., s1  ~s1) if and only if, in period 2, the expected surplus of
a new customer dominates that of a repeat customer (i.e., es  0). If es  0, strategic
customers are reluctant to make an immediate purchase, so, to regulate the market with
strategic customers, the government should provide more subsidies for the sales of the
rst-generation product to induce early purchases. On the other hand, if es > 0, a
repeat customer has higher expected surplus in period 2, and thus strategic customers
are more willing to purchase the product immediately in period 1. In this case, to
discourage strategic customers from overconsumption in period 1, the government oers
less subsidies for the sales of the rst-generation product with strategic customers than it
does with myopic customers. The rationale behind the dichotomy in Theorem 4.5.2(c) is
that, with the adoption of trade-in remanufacturing, strategic customers anticipate both
the purchasing option as a new customer and the trade-in option as a repeat customer.
Depending on which option has a higher expected utility, a strategic customer may have a
higher or lower willingness-to-pay than a myopic customer does. Hence, the government
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may provide higher or lower incentives in period 1 to encourage or discourage the early
purchases of strategic customers accordingly.
Based on Theorem 4.5.2, we now compare the total government costs of the optimal
subsidy/tax scheme under dierent customer behaviors. For any subsidy/tax scheme sg,
we denote Cg(sg) ( ~Cg(sg)) as the associated expected total government cost under RE
equilibrium with strategic (myopic) customers. Dene Cg := Cg(s

g) and ~C

g := ~Cg(~s

g)
as the social-welfare-maximizing government costs with strategic and myopic customers,
respectively.
Theorem 4.5.3 (a) Cg   ~Cg = (s1   ~s1)E(X ^Qs;1).
(b) Cg  ~Cg if and only if es  0. Moreover, there exists a threshold V2 > 0, such that
es  0, if and only if r2 + 2  V2.
Theorem 4.5.3 compares the social-welfare-maximizing government costs in scenarios
with strategic and myopic customers. Specically, we show that the total cost to regulate
a market with strategic customers is higher than with myopic customers whenever the
socially optimal subsidy for the rst-generation product with strategic customers dom-
inates that with myopic customers (i.e., s1  ~s1). Equivalently, according to Theorem
4.5.3(b), it costs the government more to regulate a market with strategic customers if
the expected surplus of a new customer dominates that of a repeat customer in period
2 (i.e., es  0). In this case, more subsidies should be provided to incentivise the more
reluctant strategic customers to make an early purchase in period 1. Another implication
of Theorem 4.5.3(b) is that if the total unit economic and environmental value of reman-
ufacturing, r2 + 2, is suciently low (i.e., below the threshold V2), the total government
cost is lower with strategic customers. Therefore, our analysis delivers the new insight
to the literature that strategic customer behavior has a negative (positive) impact upon
the government if the total economic and environmental value of remanufacturing is low
(high).
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we develop an analytical model to study how dierent customer behav-
iors inuence the economic and environmental values of trade-in remanufacturing. From
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the rm's perspective, we show that trade-in remanufacturing is generally much more
valuable with strategic customers than with myopic customers. This is because a trade-
in rebate essentially oers an early purchase reward and thus can deliver additional value
by exploiting the forward-looking behavior of strategic customers. In particular, with the
adoption of trade-in remanufacturing, strategic customer behavior may help increase the
rm's prot, which contrasts the common belief in the literature that strategic customer
behavior hurts rm prot. In the trade-in remanufacturing setting, the price discount
in the second period increases with the revenue generated from remanufacturing; thus
when the revenue-generating eect is strong enough, the willingness-to-pay of strategic
customers in the rst period could be even higher than that of myopic customers, which
allows the rm to extract more prot with strategic customers.
From the environmental perspective, trade-in remanufacturing decreases the unit en-
vironmental impact, but increases the production quantities through the early-purchase
inducing eect with strategic customers. Moreover, under strategic customer behavior,
adopting trade-in remanufacturing may decrease the customer surplus and social welfare.
Hence, with strategic customers, caution is needed on the adoption of trade-in remanufac-
turing, because it could be detrimental to the environment and the society. With myopic
customers, however, trade-in remanufacturing leads to a lower rst-period production
quantity in general. Our results indicate that customer behavior plays an important role
in the value of trade-in remanufacturing. Specically, with strategic customers, trade-
in remanufacturing may create a tension between rm protability and environmental
sustainability; but, with myopic customers, it generally benets both the rm and the
environment.
To resolve the above tension caused by trade-in remanufacturing, we also study how
the government should design a regulatory policy to balance rm prot, customer surplus,
and environmental impact. A commonly observed policy is to subsidize the remanufac-
tured products. However, we nd that despite its intention to protect the environment,
such a policy fails to achieve the social optimum and is actually harmful to the environ-
ment. To achieve the socially optimal outcome, we show that it suces for the government
to employ a simple linear incentive scheme. This scheme imposes either subsidy or tax on
the sales of both product generations as well as the remanufactured products: A subsidy
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(tax) should be applied if the environmental impact of the product is suciently low
(high).
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5. Pricing and Inventory Management under the Scarcity
Eect of Inventory
5.1 Introduction
1In the operations management literature, joint pricing and inventory management
has received extensive attention. A key assumption in the existing models in this stream
of literature is that demand, though random, is independent of inventory (e.g., [70]), so
that sales and, hence, revenue link to inventory only through the stockout eect.
In quite a few industries (e.g., automobile, electronics and luxury products, etc.),
however, we have observed strong empirical and anecdotal evidence that demand may be
correlated with the amount of inventory carried by retailers. A high inventory level some-
times promotes sales because it creates a strong visual impact (the billboard eect) and
signals abundant potential availability, both of which can make the item more desirable
and increase the chance of customer purchase. On the other hand, it is also commonly
observed in practice that an ample inventory conveys to the customers the message that
the item is of low popularity and quality, thus inducing low demand.
The negative correlations between demand and inventory are well supported by psy-
chological and economic theories as well as rich anecdotal observations and empirical
data. The phenomena that a low inventory level may increase and a high inventory level
may decrease demand are often referred to as the \scarcity eect" of inventory. Three
major mechanisms drive the scarcity eect of inventory: (1) inventory level signals the
quality and popularity of a product; (2) inventory level implies the stockout risk of a
product; and (3) inventory level reveals the pricing strategy the retailer will employ. We
now discuss these three mechanisms in detail.
First, it has been well established in psychological commodity theory that supply
scarcity increases the attractiveness of a product to customers ([30]). This notion has
been tested and rened by various experiments with respect to a large scope of product
categories (e.g., food, wine and book) by, e.g., [187], [182] and [178]. The desirability
1This chapter is based on the author's earlier work [189]
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of the product is enhanced by scarce inventory, because customers are likely to infer
product quality and popularity from its inventory level. A lower inventory level signals
more consumption by other customers and, hence, the product is more popular and of
higher quality. On the other hand, observing a high inventory, a customer naturally
believes that the item has many units because no one wants to buy it. Some recent
marketing (e.g., [156]) and operations management (e.g., [180]) papers employ game
theoretic models to demonstrate that the scarcity strategy can eectively signal to the
customers the high quality of a product, thus creating a \hot product". Empirical results
regarding the scarcity eect of inventory upon demand in automobile industry can also
be found in, e.g., [33] and [39].
Second, a low inventory level spreads a sense of urgency among customers that soon
the product will be sold out and potential buyers will be put on a wait-list. Such back-
logging risk motivates customers to make an immediate purchase instead of searching for
better options. A high inventory, however, grants customers the luxury of waiting and
searching, thus lowering the current demand. Similar mechanism also drives the search
behavior that a low inventory of one product type discourages a customer to search for
better types ([42]). Knowingly limiting the availability of a product, the retailer can
induce \buying frenzies" among uninformed customers and set a higher price ([60]).
Third, as shown in pricing and revenue management literature (e.g., [70], [83]), re-
tailers increase their sales prices when inventories are low. Therefore, customers infer
from a low inventory level that it is unreasonable to expect a lower price and would like
to purchase the item immediately (see, e.g., [17]). On the other hand, a high inventory
level suggests that the sales price will be more likely to decrease and, hence, encourages
customers to wait before buying. Carefully making use of this mechanism, the retailer
can enjoy the benets of inducing customers to purchase early at high prices ([115]). A
similar idea has also been adopted in the advance selling literature (e.g., [175]), which
shows that rms may limit its capacity for advance selling to credibly signal its pricing
strategy to customers.
Along with the rich theoretical and empirical justications of the scarcity eect of
inventory, practitioners have extensively adopted this idea in their marketing strategies.
[64] and [31] document that the \scarcity strategy", in which the supply of products is
deliberately limited, has already become a basic tactic for marketers to promote their
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sales. An increasing number of automobile manufacturers create signicant levels of
scarcity and make a long list of hard-to-get car models over years (see [33]). Albeit facing
thousands of customers who had signed up in the wait-lists, none of the manufacturers
rushed to accelerate its production ([184]). Likewise, [123] documents that the BMWMini
Cooper promotes its line by limiting its supply and letting the potential owners wait for,
on average, two and half months before they own their new cars. The limited distribution
strategy has helped the demand of Mini Cooper take o since its reintroduction in the US
market. Similar promotional strategy also appears in the electronics market, especially
at the introduction stage of a new product generation. Fans have been excited by the
long wait to get Sony Play Stations ([184]), Nintendo Game Boys ([183]) and Apple iPads
2 ([150]).
In this chapter, we study the dynamic pricing and inventory management model
under the scarcity eect of inventory. The stochastic demand is modeled as a decreasing
function of the sales price and the customer-accessible inventory level at the beginning
of each decision epoch. Unmet demand is fully backlogged to the next period. The wait-
lists observed or spread through \word-of-mouth" successfully signal the high quality
and popularity of the product and attract more customers (see, e.g., [31] and [64]).
From the strategic perspective, joint pricing and inventory decisions eectively deliver
the information regarding the quality and popularity of the product. Specically, pricing
exibility induces more strategic behavior of customers (e.g., waiting for potential price
discount), which further strengthens the scarcity eect of inventory, because customers
may anticipate the price changes based on current inventory (see, e.g., [115]).
We develop a unied joint price and inventory management model that incorporates
both inventory withholding and inventory disposal to deal with the scarcity eect. Un-
der the inventory withholding policy, the rm displays only part of its inventory and
withholds the rest in a warehouse not observable by customers, so as to induce higher
potential demand. Analogously, with inventory disposal, the rm can dispose its unneces-
sary excess inventory with some salvage value. Both inventory withholding and disposal
may incur a cost. We show that a customer-accessible-inventory-dependent order-up-
to/dispose-down-to/display-up-to list-price policy is optimal. Moreover, the order-up-
to/display-up-to and list-price levels are decreasing in the customer-accessible inventory
level. When the scarcity eect of inventory is suciently strong, the rm should display
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no positive inventory so that every customer must wait before getting the product. In
this case, the strong scarcity eect creates more opportunities than risks, so the rm can
proactively take advantage of it and induce more demand by making customers wait (e.g.,
the marketing strategy of BMW).
When it is too costly to withhold or dispose inventory, the unied model is reduced to
the model without inventory withholding or the model without inventory disposal, both
of which deliver sharper insights. In the model without inventory withholding/disposal,
we show that the inventory-dependent demand increases the overstocking risk and, thus,
lowers the optimal sales prices and order-up-to levels. With higher operational exibility
(a higher salvage value or the inventory withholding opportunity), however, the rm deals
with the scarcity eect of inventory more eectively and, hence, increases its sales prices
and order-up-to/display-up-to levels. In short, inventory disposal/withholding benets
the rm by enhancing its operational exibility and agility.
We also generalize the unied model by incorporating responsive inventory realloca-
tion, which allows the rm to reallocate (with a cost) its inventory between display and
warehouse after demand realizes. In this case, the rm can keep a low inventory and
better hedge against risks of the demand uncertainty and the scarcity eect of inventory.
We perform extensive numerical studies to demonstrate (a) the robustness of our
analytical results, (b) the impact of the scarcity eect upon the protability of the rm,
and (c) the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect of inventory. Our numerical
results show that the analytical characterizations of the optimal policies in our model are
robust and hold in all of our numerical experiments. Both the prot loss of ignoring the
scarcity eect and the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect are signicant,
and increase in the intensity of the scarcity eect and/or demand variability. This is
because: (1) the scarcity eect decreases the future demand and magnies future demand
variability; and (2) dynamic pricing facilitates the rm to induce higher future demand
and dampen future demand variability. In addition, a longer planning horizon increases
the impact of the scarcity eect, and decreases the value of dynamic pricing.
To conclude this section, we summarize our main contributions as follows: (1) To
the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to study the joint pricing and inventory
management under the scarcity eect of inventory. We characterize the optimal policy in
a general unied model and generalize our results to the model with responsive inventory
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reallocation. (2) We analyze how the scarcity eect of inventory impacts the rm's
optimal price and inventory policies and study the eect of operational exibilities on
the rm's optimal decisions under the scarcity eect. (3) We identify the rationale of
the phenomenon that rms with intense scarcity eect deliberately make their customers
wait before getting the product. (4) We numerically study the prot loss of ignoring the
scarcity eect and the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we position this
chapter in the related literature. Section 5.3 presents the basic formulation, notations
and assumptions of our model. In Section 5.4, we propose and analyze the unied model.
Section 5.5 discusses the additional results and insights in two important special cases (the
model without inventory withholding and the model without inventory disposal). Section
5.6 generalizes the unied model to the model with responsive reallocation. Section 5.7
reports our numerical ndings. We conclude this chapter by summarizing our ndings
and discussing a possible extension in Section 5.8. All proofs are relegated to Appendix
D.1.
5.2 Related Research
This chapter is mainly related to two lines of research in the literature: (1) inven-
tory management with inventory-dependent demand and (2) optimal joint pricing and
inventory policy.
There is a large body of literature on inventory-dependent demand. We refer in-
terested readers to [177] for a comprehensive review. The dependence of demand on
inventory is usually modeled in two ways in the literature: (1) potential demand is in-
creasing in the inventory level after replenishment; and (2) potential demand is decreasing
in the inventory level before replenishment (leftover inventory from the previous period).
The rst approach to model inventory-dependent demand assumes that demand in-
creases with inventory (the billboard eect). [86] study a periodic review inventory model,
in which the random demand in each period is increasing in the inventory level after re-
plenishment. [58] consider a single-period newsvendor model where demand is decreasing
in price and positively correlated with inventory level. Several other operations man-
agement and marketing papers also assume that demand depends on the instantaneous
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(after replenishment) inventory level, in particular via the shelf-space eect. We refer
interested readers to, e.g., [171, 172], [34, 35], [119], [18] and [53].
The other eect of inventory upon demand, as discussed in Section 5.1, is the scarcity
eect. That is, high leftover inventory (i.e., inventory at the beginning of the period
before replenishment) negatively inuences the potential demand. In the psychological
commodity theory literature, [30] argues that supply scarcity increases the attractiveness
of a product, which has been tested by numerous experiments in, e.g., [187, 178]. [156, 180]
use game theoretic models to show that the rm can use the scarcity strategy to signal
the high quality of a product. [17], among others, demonstrate that customers may
strategically wait for price discounts when observing a high inventory. [115] propose an
eective pricing scheme to induce customers to make early purchases under a revenue
management framework. The idea that supply condition can signal the potential pricing
strategy and the product quality has also been adopted in the advance selling literature
(e.g., [175]). [33, 39] conduct empirical studies to show that the scarcity eect of inventory
upon demand prevails in automobile industry.
To the best of our knowledge, [145] is the only paper in inventory management lit-
erature that incorporates the scarcity eect of inventory (called \wait-list eect" in that
paper) and assumes that potential demand is a decreasing function of leftover inventory.
They show the optimality of understocking and propose the inventory withholding strat-
egy. This chapter generalizes [145] in the following aspects. (1) We introduce a unied
model that encompasses dynamic pricing, inventory withholding and inventory disposal,
and explicitly captures the interaction between price, inventory and demand. In par-
ticular, we analytically show the impact of inventory-dependent demand on the rm's
pricing policy, whereas [145] do not allow price adjustment during planning horizon and
numerically test the improvement of inventory-withholding policy under dierent price
elasticities of demand. We also numerically show that the value of dynamic pricing under
the scarcity eect of inventory is signicant and increases with the scarcity eect intensity
and/or demand variability. (2) Because of the endogenous pricing decision introduced to
the dynamic program, the analysis of our model is more involved and requires a dierent
approach. (3) Two special cases of our unied model (i.e., the model without inven-
tory withholding and the model without inventory disposal) demonstrate that inventory
withholding and inventory disposal help mitigate the overage risk of inventory-dependent
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demand. (4) In addition to the understocking and inventory withholding policy pro-
posed in [145], our model suggests three other strategies to dampen the negative eect
of inventory-dependent demand: (a) price reduction, (b) inventory disposal, and (c) re-
sponsive inventory reallocation. (5) We show that when the scarcity eect of inventory is
suciently strong, the rm should display no positive inventory and let every customer
wait. To sum up, this chapter generalizes the model in [145] and strengthens its results
and insights.
There is an extensive literature on dynamic pricing and inventory control under gen-
eral stochastic demand. [70] study the inventory system in a periodic review model, where
the rm faces price-dependent demand in each decision period and unsatised demand
is fully backlogged. A list-price order-up-to policy is shown to be optimal. This line
of literature has grown rapidly since [70]. For example, [47, 48, 49] analyze the joint
pricing and inventory control problem with xed ordering cost and show the optimality
of (s; S; p) policy for nite horizon, innite horizon and continuous review models. [52]
study the joint pricing and inventory control problem under lost sales. In the case of a
single unreliable supplier, [112, 73] show that supply uncertainty drives the rm to charge
higher prices under random yield and random capacity, respectively. [51] take into con-
sideration costly price adjustments in joint pricing and inventory management. When
the replenishment leadtime is positive, the joint pricing and inventory control problem
under periodic review is extremely dicult, and [136] partially characterize the structure
of the optimal policy. We refer interested readers to [50] for a comprehensive survey on
joint pricing and inventory control models. The major dierence of this chapter from this
stream of research is that we take into account inventory-dependent demand and show
that the scarcity eect of inventory drives the rm to order less/dispose more/withhold
inventory and charge a lower sales price. To the best of our knowledge, only [58, 35] have
studied the joint pricing and inventory control problem with inventory-dependent de-
mand. However, both papers consider a single period model where demand is increasing
in the available inventory after replenishment.
5.3 Model Formulation
We specify our unied model, notations and assumptions in this section. Consider a
rm which faces random demand and periodically makes pricing and inventory decisions
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in a T period planning horizon, labeled backwards as fT; T   1;    ; 1g. The rm stores
its on-hand inventory in two locations, one with customer-accessible inventory to satisfy
and stimulate demand, and the other as a warehouse to withhold inventory that is unob-
servable to customers. The rm can either replenish or dispose inventory, and it can also
reallocate its on-hand inventory between the customer-accessible storage and the ware-
house. If the rm places an order, the replenished inventory is delivered to the warehouse,
after which the rm decides how much inventory to reallocate to the customer-accessible
storage. On the other hand, if the rm disposes its on-hand inventory, it rst ships in-
ventory, if any, from the customer-accessible storage to the warehouse, and then chooses
the disposal quantity.
In each period, the sequence of events unfolds as follows: At the beginning of each
period, the rm reviews its total and customer-accessible leftover inventories from last
period, simultaneously chooses the order/disposal and reallocation quantities and the
sales price, pays the ordering and reallocation costs, and receives the disposal salvages.
The ordering and reallocation lead times are assumed to be zero so that the replenished
and reallocated inventories are received immediately. Inventory disposal is also executed
at once. The demand then realizes and the revenue is collected. At the end of the decision
period, the holding and backlogging costs are paid, and the total and customer-accessible
inventories are carried over to the beginning of the next period.
The state of the system is given by:
Iat = the starting customer-accessible inventory level before replenishment/disposal
/reallocation in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1, where the superscript `a' refers to
\customer-accessible";
It = the starting total inventory level before replenishment/disposal/reallocation in
period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
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Note that, the amount of inventory the rm withholds in the warehouse is It   Iat  0.
We introduce the following notation to denote the decisions of the rm:
pt = the sales price charged in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1;
xat = the customer-accessible inventory level after replenishment/disposal/reallocation
but before demand realizes in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1;
xt = the total inventory level after replenishment/disposal/reallocation but before
demand realizes in period t, t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
We assume that the price pt is bounded from above by the maximum allowable price
p and from below by the minimum allowable price p. Without loss of generality, we also
assume that the customer-accessible inventory storage capacity of the rm is Ka (0 <
Ka  +1), whereas the warehouse capacity is innite. In other words, the customer-
accessible inventory level after replenishment/disposal/reallocation cannot exceed Ka in
each period, i.e., xat  Ka for all t = T; T   1;    ; 1. Following the \no-articial wait-
list" notion (see [145]), we assume that the rm cannot decrease its customer-accessible-
inventory level if a wait-list already exists, i.e., xt  xat  minfIat ; 0g.
We introduce the following model primitives:
 = discount factor of revenues and costs in future periods, 0 <   1;
c = purchasing cost per unit ordered;
s = salvage value per unit disposed;
b = backlogging cost per unit backlogged at the end of a period;
ha = holding cost per unit stocked and accessible to customers at the end of a period;
hw = holding cost per unit stocked in the warehouse at the end of a period;
rd = unit reallocation fee from the warehouse to the customer-accessible storage;
rw = unit reallocation fee from the customer-accessible storage to the warehouse.
Without loss of generality, we assume the following inequalities hold:
b > (1  )(rd + c) : the backlogging penalty is higher than the saving from delaying an
order to the next period, so that the rm will not backlog all of
its demand;
c > s : unit procurement cost dominates the unit salvage value;
p > (c+ rd) + b : positive margin for backlogged demand.
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Note that although we assume that the parameters and demand are stationary through-
out the planning horizon, the structural results in this chapter remain valid when the
parameters and demand distributions are time-dependent.
As discussed in Section 5.1, we assume that demand in period t,Dt, depends negatively
on the prevailing price and customer-accessible inventory level at the beginning of this
period according to a general stochastic functional form: Dt = (pt; I
a
t ; t); where t is a
random term with a known continuous distribution and a connected support. (; ; t) is
a twice continuously dierentiable function strictly decreasing in pt and decreasing in I
a
t
for any t. We base our analysis of the problem on the following demand form:
(pt; It; t) = (d(pt) + (I
a
t ))
m
t + 
a
t ; where Efat g = 0 and Efmt g = 1: (5.1)
We assume that t's are i:i:d: random vectors with 
a
t supported on [a; a] and 
m
t supported
on [m;m] (m  0). At least one of the two random variables (at and mt ) follows a contin-
uous distribution (i.e., a 6= a or m 6= m), which ensures that Dt follows a non-degenerate
continuous distribution supported on the interval: [(d(pt)+(I
a
t ))m+a; (d(pt)+(I
a
t ))m+
a], for any (pt; I
a
t ). Note that the above demand model is quite general and includes as
special cases several demand models from the existing literature. For example, when
mt = 1 with probability 1, the demand model is reduced to the additive demand model;
if at = 0 with probability 1, it is reduced to the multiplicative demand model (as a gener-
alized version of the one proposed in [145]); and if ()  0, the demand model is reduced
to the standard price-dependent demand model (as the one proposed in [47]). The term
d(pt) summarizes the impact of price on demand in period t. As assumed above, d() is
strictly decreasing in pt. In some market where competition is erce and the rm has
no pricing power, the price is exogenously xed at p0 and the price induced demand is
xed at d0 = d(p0). The term (I
a
t ), which is a decreasing function of I
a
t , captures the
scarcity eect of inventory on demand. Hereafter, we refer to () as the scarcity function,
and 0() as the intensity of scarcity eect. The dependence of demand on inventory is
measured by 0(). i.e., the smaller the 0(), the more intensive the potential demand
depends on the customer-accessible inventory level. When demand is independent of in-
ventory, (Iat )  0 for all customer-accessible inventory level Iat . Note that our demand
model generalizes the one in [145] in the sense that our model also captures the impact
of endogenous sales price on demand.
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Since d() is strictly decreasing in pt, we assume p(dt) be its strictly decreasing inverse.
For the convenience of our analysis, we change the decision variable from pt to dt 2 [d; d],
where d = d(p) and d = d(p). To avoid the unrealistic case where demand becomes
negative, we assume that d + (Ka)  0 to ensure that EfDtg = dt + (Iat )  0 for
any dt 2 [d; d] and Iat  Ka. We impose the following three assumptions throughout our
analysis.
Assumption 5.3.1 p() is twice continuously dierentiable and concavely decreasing in
dt, with p
0(dt) < 0 for dt 2 [d; d]. In addition, p(dt)dt is concave in dt.
The concavity of p(dt)dt in dt suggests the decreasing marginal revenue with respect
to demand, which is a standard assumption in joint pricing and inventory management
literature, see, e.g., [47, 112, 136]. For a more comprehensive discussion on decreasing
marginal revenue assumptions, see [196]. The concavity of p() implies that the demand
is more price-sensitive when sales prices are higher. This is also a common assumption
in the literature, see, e.g., [70].
As [145], we also assume that demand is concavely decreasing in the customer-
accessible leftover inventory:
Assumption 5.3.2 () is concavely decreasing and twice continuously dierentiable. In
addition,
lim
Iat! 1
0(Iat ) = 0 and lim
Iat! 1
(Iat ) = 0:
The concavity of () refers to the phenomenon that a higher customer-accessible
leftover inventory level has a greater marginal eect on potential demand. However,
when the backlogged demand is very high, its value of stimulating high potential demand
is limited, because () is bounded from above. In other words, the impact of inventory on
demand is small under a large backorder volume so demand does not increase to innity.
Therefore, the rm cannot induce arbitrarily high demand by creating an arbitrarily long
wait-list. The underlying intuition of the boundedness of () is that the high demand
induced by a long wait-list is canceled out by the impatience it arouses.
Assumption 5.3.3 Let
R(dt; I
a
t ) := (p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))(dt + (Iat )): (5.2)
R(dt; I
a
t ) is jointly concave in (dt; I
a
t ) on its domain.
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Assumption 5.3.3 is imposed mainly for technical tractability, because it is required
to establish the joint concavity of the objective and value functions in each period (see
the discussions after Lemma 14). Note that R(dt; I
a
t ) is the expected dierence between
the revenue and the total cost (i.e., the procuring, displaying and backlogging costs) to
satisfy the current demand in the next period, when the rm holds a customer-accessible
inventory Iat and charges a sales price p(dt). The joint concavity of R(; ) implies that the
expected dierence between the revenue and the total cost to meet the current demand
in the next period has decreasing marginal values with respect to both the expected
price-induced demand and customer-accessible inventory level. The joint concavity of
R(; ) is stronger than the concavity of expected revenue (Assumption 5.3.1), because
it also captures the impact of inventory-dependent demand upon revenue, procurement
cost, reallocation cost and backlogging cost. We discuss this assumption in detail in the
following subsection.
5.3.1 Discussions on Assumption 5.3.3
Assumption 5.3.3 is essential to show the analytical results in this chapter. We rst
characterize the necessary and sucient condition for Assumption 5.3.3:
Lemma 11 R(dt; I
a
t ) is jointly concave in (dt; I
a
t ) on its domain if and only if
(p00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt))(p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))00(Iat )  (p0(dt)0(Iat ))2; (5.3)
for all dt 2 [d; d] and Iat  Ka.
Condition (5.3) is complicated and somewhat dicult to understand. Hence, we give
the following simpler necessary condition for Assumption 5.3.3 to hold.
Lemma 12 If R(; ) is jointly concave on its domain, then we have:
(a) For any Iat such that 
00(Iat ) = 0, 
0(Iat ) = 0 as well. Therefore, there exists
a threshold I  Ka (I may be  1), such that 0(Iat )
8><>:< 0; if I
a
t > I
,
= 0; otherwise;
and
00(Iat )
8><>:< 0; if I
a
t > I
,
= 0; otherwise:
122
(b) There exists an 0 < M < +1, such that, for any Iat  Ka, (0(Iat ))2   M00(Iat ).
Lemma 12(a) shows that, if Assumption 5.3.3 is satised, there exists a threshold
inventory level I, such that there is no scarcity eect for all customer accessible inventory
level below this threshold and the scarcity function is strictly decreasing and strictly
concave for all customer accessible inventory level above this threshold. Lemma 12(b)
proves that R(; ) is jointly concave only if, for all Iat , compared with j0(Iat )j, j00(Iat )j
is suciently big. In other words, in the region where the scarcity eect exists (i.e.,
0(Iat ) < 0), the curvature of the function () should be suciently big. This condition
is not restrictive and, for example, can be satised by the commonly used power or
exponential families of scarcity functions. We remark that, mathematically, Lemma 12(a)
is a corollary of Lemma 12(b). Next, we show that the necessary condition characterized
in Lemma 12(b) is also sucient to some extent.
Lemma 13 If there exists an 0 < M < +1, such that, for any Iat  Ka, (0(Iat ))2 
 M00(Iat ), the following statements hold:
(a) For any inverse demand curve p(), there exists a threshold  < +1, such that, for
any   , with p^() := p() + , R^(dt; Iat ) := (p^(dt)  b  (c+ rd))(dt + (Iat ))
is jointly concave in (dt; I
a
t ) for dt 2 [d; d] and Iat  Ka.
(b) Suppose that p00() 6= 0 for any dt 2 [d; d]. For any scarcity function (), there
exists a threshold & < +1, such that, for any &  &, with ^&() := () + &,
R^&(dt; I
a
t ) := (p(dt)   b   (c + rd))(dt + ^&(Iat )) is jointly concave in (dt; Iat ) for
dt 2 [d; d] and Iat  Ka.
Lemma 13 demonstrates that, as long as the condition characterized in Lemma 12(b)
on the scarcity function, (), is satised, R(; ) is jointly concave on its domain if (a) the
sales price of the product, p(), is suciently high relative to the inverse of price sensitivity,
jp0()j; or (b) the price is not linear in demand, and the scarcity eect driven demand, (),
is suciently high relative to the scarcity intensity, j0()j. These sucient conditions have
a clear economic interpretation: the price elasticity of demand (i.e., j ddt=dt
dpt=pt
j) is suciently
high relative to the inventory elasticity of demand (dened as j d=
dIat =I
a
t
j). In practice, this
condition is not restrictive. Compared with the primary demand leverage (i.e., the sales
price), the customer accessible inventory (through the scarcity eect) has less impact
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upon the potential demand, because not every customer cares about the backlogging risk
of a product, but everyone cares about its price. Therefore, Assumption 5.3.3 can be
satised under a mild condition with economic interpretation.
Finally, when Assumption 5.3.3 does not hold (i.e., R(; ) is not jointly concave), we
have conducted extensive numerical experiments to test the robustness of our analytical
results. Our numerical results verify that the analytical characterizations of the optimal
policies in our model are robust and hold for non-concaveR(; )'s in all of our experiments.
In particular, Lemma 12 implies that when the scarcity function () contains a linear
and strictly decreasing piece, R(; ) is not jointly concave. We present our numerical
experiments for this case in Section 5.7.1.
5.4 Unied Model
In this section, we propose a unied model to analyze the joint pricing and inventory
replenishment/disposal/reallocation problem when the rm faces random demand which
is negatively correlated with the customer-accessible leftover inventory. We characterize
the structure of the optimal pricing and inventory policy and give sucient conditions
under which the rm does not (a) dispose its on-hand inventory, (b) withhold any inven-
tory, (c) reallocate its customer-accessible inventory to the warehouse, or (d) display any
positive inventory to customers.
This model is suitable for the case where the rm can both withhold its on-hand
inventory in its private warehouse not observable by customers (e.g., clothing and elec-
tronics markets) and dispose it (e.g., in the hi-tech industry, the evolution of product
generation is so fast that the retailers/manufacturers have to sell excess old versions at
a signicantly discounted price). When potential demand is negatively correlated with
the customer-accessible leftover inventory, the rm faces greater overage risk, because a
high customer-accessible leftover inventory not only incurs a high holding cost but also
suppresses potential demand. Both inventory withholding and inventory disposal poli-
cies enable the rm to strategically keep a low customer-accessible inventory, so as to
induce high potential demand and mitigate the overstocking risk. Hence, we incorporate
inventory withholding and inventory disposal into our unied model.
The unied model is quite general and can be reduced to several specic models that
are of interest on their own. For example, we show that if the warehouse holding cost hw is
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suciently large, the unied model is reduced to the one without inventory withholding,
which is discussed in detail in Section 5.5.1. Besides, if the disposal salvage value s is
suciently low, the unied model is reduced to the one without inventory disposal, which
is discussed in detail in Section 5.5.2.
To formulate the planning problem as a dynamic program, let:
Vt(I
a
t ; It) = the maximum expected discounted prots in periods t; t  1;    ; 1, when
starting period t with a customer-accessible inventory level Iat and a total
inventory level It.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the excess inventory in the last period (period
1) is discarded without any salvage value, i.e., V0(I
a
0 ; I0) = 0, for any (I
a
0 ; I0).
The optimal value functions satisfy the following recursive scheme:
Vt(I
a
t ; It) = rdI
a
t + cIt + max
(xat ;xt;dt)2F (Iat )
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It); (5.4)
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where F (Iat ) := f(xat ; xt; dt) : xat 2 [minfIat ; 0g; Ka]; xt  xat ; dt 2 [d; d]g denotes the set of
feasible inventory and pricing decisions, and
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) =  rdIat   cIt + p(dt)E[(p(dt); Iat ; t)]  c(xt   It)+ + s(xt   It) 
 rd(xat   Iat )+   rw(xat   Iat )    hw(xt   xat )
 Efha(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))+ + b(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t)) g
+EfVt 1(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt   (p(dt); Iat ; t))g
= p(dt)(dt + (I
a
t ))  (c  s)(xt   It)    (hw + c)xt
 (rd + rw)(xat   Iat )  + (hw   rd)xat
+E[(b+ rd)(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
+c(xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )]
+Ef[Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
 rd(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )  c(xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )]
 (b+ ha)(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )+g
= (p(dt)  (c+ rd)  b)(dt + (Iat ))  (c  s)(xt   It) 
 (rd + rw)(xat   Iat )    (hw + (1  )c)xt
+(hw + b  (1  )rd)xat
+Ef (ha + b)(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )+
+[Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
 rd(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )  c(xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )]g
= R(dt; I
a
t )  (xt   It)    (rd + rw)(xat   Iat )     xt + xat
+EfGt(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )g;(5.5)
where Gt(x; y) :=  (b+ ha)x+ + (Vt 1(x; y)  rdx  cy);
 := c  s = the unit loss of inventory disposal; (5.6)
 := hw + (1  )c
= the unit cost of replenishing and holding inventory in the
warehouse,
 := hw + b  (1  )rd
= the unit saving of reallocating warehouse inventory to the
customer-accessible storage:
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We use (xat (I
a
t ; It); x

t (I
a
t ; It); d

t (I
a
t ; It)) to denote the maximizer in (5.4), which stands
for the optimal policy in period t, with customer-accessible inventory level Iat and to-
tal inventory level It. To characterize the structure of the optimal inventory replen-
ishment/disposal/reallocation and pricing policies, we dene the following optimizers:
(xat (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t )) and (~x
a
t (I
a
t ); ~xt(I
a
t );
~dt(I
a
t )). Let
(xat (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t )) := argmaxxat2[minfIat ;0g;Ka];dt2[d; d]R(dt; I
a
t ) + x
a
t
+E[Gt(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))];
(5.7)
where  := b  (1  )(c+ rd) > 0: (5.8)
xat (I
a
t ) is the optimal order-up-to inventory level, if the rm procures positive inventory
and displays all of its on-hand inventory to customers, whereas dt(I
a
t ) is the optimal
expected price-induced demand in this case. Let
(~xat (I
a
t ); ~xt(I
a
t );
~dt(I
a
t ))
:=argmax(xat ;xt;dt)2F (Iat )fR(dt; Iat ) + (    )xt   (rd + rw)(xat   Iat )  + xat
+ EfGt(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt   (p(dt); Iat ; t))gg:
(5.9)
When the rm disposes its on-hand inventory, ~xat (I
a
t ) is the optimal display-up-to inven-
tory level and ~xt(I
a
t ) is the optimal dispose-down-to inventory level, whereas
~dt(I
a
t ) is the
optimal expected price-induced demand. The following lemma establishes the properties
of the two optimizers:
Lemma 14 For each t = T; T   1;    ; 1, the following statements hold:
(a) Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) is jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in
(xat ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) except for a set of measure zero; for any xed (I
a
t ; It), Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It)
is strictly jointly concave in (xat ; xt; dt).
(b) Vt(I
a
t ; It) is jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (I
a
t ; It),
whereas Vt(I
a
t ; It)  rdIat   cIt is decreasing in Iat and It.
Lemma 14 proves that the objective function in each period is jointly concave and al-
most everywhere dierentiable and the value function is jointly concave and continuously
dierentiable. Moreover, the second half of Lemma 14(b) implies that the normalized
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value function, Vt(I
a
t ; It)   rdIat   cIt, is decreasing in both the customer-accessible in-
ventory level Iat and the total inventory level It, which generalizes Proposition 5.1 in
[145]. We remark that the joint concavity of R(; ) on its entire domain is necessary
to prove that the objective functions Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It) and the value functions Vt(; ) are
jointly concave, which is essential to analytically establish other structural results in this
chapter. We can easily nd examples in which R(; ) fails to be jointly concave (e.g., ()
contains a linear and strictly decreasing piece) and leads to non-concave Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It)'s
and Vt(; )'s. In this case, we are unable to analytically show the structural results in
this chapter (e.g., Theorem 5.4.1 and Theorem 5.5.1). In Section 5.7.1, we numerically
test whether the structure of the optimal policy characterized in our theoretical model
still holds. With the help of Lemma 14, we characterize the structural properties of the
optimal policy in the unied model as follows:
Theorem 5.4.1 For t = T; T   1;    ; 1, the following statements hold:
(a) xat (I
a
t )  ~xt(Iat ). Moreover, let qt (Iat ; It) := xt (Iat ; It)   It denote the optimal or-
der/disposal quantity and we have:
qt (I
a
t ; It)
8>>>>><>>>>>:
> 0 if It < x
a
t (I
a
t );
= 0 if xat (I
a
t )  It  ~xt(Iat );
< 0 otherwise;
i.e., it is optimal to order if and only if It < x
a
t (I
a
t ) and to dispose if and only if
It > ~xt(I
a
t ).
(b) If It < x
a
t (I
a
t ), x
a
t (I
a
t ; It) = x

t (I
a
t ; It) = x
a
t (I
a
t ), d

t (I
a
t ; It) = dt(I
a
t ), i.e., it is optimal
to order and display up to xat (I
a
t ) and charge a list-price p(dt(I
a
t )).
(c) If It > ~xt(I
a
t ), (x
a
t (I
a
t ; It); x

t (I
a
t ; It); d

t (I
a
t ; It)) = (~x
a
t (I
a
t ); ~xt(I
a
t );
~dt(I
a
t )), i.e., it
is optimal to dispose the total inventory level down to ~xt(I
a
t ), display ~x
a
t (I
a
t ), and
charge a list-price p( ~dt(I
a
t )).
(d) If It 2 [xat (Iat ); ~xt(Iat )], xt (Iat ; It) = It, i.e., it is optimal to keep the total inventory
level.
(e) xat (I
a
t ) is continuously decreasing in I
a
t , whereas dt(I
a
t ) is continuously increasing in
Iat .
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Theorem 5.4.1 generalizes Proposition 5 in [145] by characterizing the structure of
the optimal policy in our unied model. We show that a customer-accessible-inventory-
dependent order-up-to/dispose-down-to/display-up-to list-price policy is optimal. The
optimal policy is characterized by two thresholds: the ordering threshold xat (I
a
t ) and the
disposal threshold ~xt(I
a
t ), both of which depend on the customer-accessible inventory
level, Iat . If the total inventory level, It, is below the ordering threshold, i.e., It < x
a
t (I
a
t ),
the rm should order-up-to this threshold, display all of its on-hand inventory to cus-
tomers, and charge a customer-accessible-inventory-dependent list-price p(dt(I
a
t )). If the
total inventory level is higher than the disposal threshold, i.e., It > ~xt(I
a
t ), the rm
should dispose-down-to this threshold, display part of its on-hand inventory, ~xat (I
a
t ), to
customers, and charge a customer-accessible-inventory-dependent list-price p( ~dt(I
a
t )). If
the total inventory level is between the above two thresholds, i.e., It 2 [xat (Iat ); ~xt(Iat )],
the rm should keep its total net inventory and display part of it to customers. In partic-
ular, Theorem 5.4.1(b) implies that if it is optimal to order, the rm should not withhold
anything. Order-and-withhold policy is dominated by displaying the same amount of in-
ventory to customers but not ordering the inventory that will be withheld (so no inventory
will be withheld). This is intuitive, because the marginal cost of order-and-withhold is
at least c+hw (procurement cost and holding cost in the warehouse), while the marginal
benet of inventory withholding is at most c (saving from the purchasing cost in the next
period). Moreover, part (e) of Theorem 5.4.1 demonstrates that as the excess customer-
accessible inventory level increases, lower demand is induced and the rm has a greater
incentive to turn it over, both of which give rise to lower optimal order-up-to levels and
optimal sales prices.
The excess inventory of the rm generally has three impacts on the performance of
the system: (1) satisfying future demand, (2) incurring holding costs and (3) induc-
ing/suppressing potential demand, the rst with positive marginal value and the other
two with negative marginal values. Hence, after normalizing the rst eect (Vt(I
a
t ; It) 
rdI
a
t   cIt), the value-to-go function of the rm is decreasing in its customer-accessible
inventory level and total inventory level. To better deal with the intertwined tradeo be-
tween these three eects, the rm can adopt dynamic pricing, inventory withholding and
inventory disposal strategies. As suggested in Theorem 5.4.1, the rm needs to price the
product in accordance to the customer-accessible inventory level so as to better control
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the scarcity eect of demand. Theorem 5.4.1 also shows that when the total inventory
is high, the rm should withhold and dispose its on-hand inventory, which saves holding
costs and mitigates the risk of suppressing potential demand. On the other hand, the
opportunity to redisplay the withheld inventory in the warehouse enables the rm to
satisfy potential demand without discouraging it. In short, combining dynamic pricing,
inventory withholding and inventory disposal policies helps the rm better match supply
and demand and greatly enhances its protability.
We proceed to analyze how the model primitives inuence the rm's optimal opera-
tional decisions, such as inventory disposal, inventory withholding, and inventory display.
Theorem 5.4.2 The following statements hold:
(a) If hw  c  s, ~xt(Iat ) = ~xat (Iat ) for any t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
(b) There exists an s < c, such that, if s  s, ~xt(Iat ) = +1 for any Iat  Ka and
t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
(c) If infIat <Ka 
0(Iat )   M , for some M < +1, there exists an r < +1, such that, if
rw  r, ~xat (Iat )  Iat , for any Iat  Ka and t = T; T   1;    ; 1. On the other hand,
if infIat <Ka 
0(Iat ) =  1, for any rw > 0, there exists a threshold It (rw) < Ka, such
that, if Iat  It (rw), ~xat (Iat ) < Iat , for any t = T; T   1;    ; 2.
(d) Let  < 1, and D := supf : P (Dt  )  g, i.e., the probability that the demand
in period t exceeds D is smaller than , regardless of the policy the rm employs. If
(p  b  (c+ rd) +m)(1  )0(  D) + (rd + rw + )  0; (5.10)
then xat (I
a
t ; It)  0 for any Iat  Ka, It, and t = T; T   1;    ; 1.
Theorem 5.4.2(a) shows that, when the warehouse holding cost is suciently high
(hw  c  s), the rm should display all of its on-hand inventory to customers. Part (b)
demonstrates that, when inventory disposal is suciently costly (s  s), the rm would
rather not dispose any of its inventory, regardless of its total inventory level. When
the condition in part (a) [part (b)] holds, the unied model is reduced to the model
without inventory withholding [inventory disposal], which generates additional insights
and is thoroughly discussed in Section 5.5.1 [Section 5.5.2]. Theorem 5.4.2(c) reveals
that the optimal inventory reallocation balances the tradeo between saving the current
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reallocation cost and stimulating future demand. More specically, if the intensity of
scarcity eect is bounded, the rm should not reallocate its inventory from the customer-
accessible storage to the warehouse, as long as the reallocation fee is suciently high.
Otherwise (i.e., the intensity of scarcity eect is unbounded), the rm should always
withhold part of its inventory in the warehouse, if the excess customer-accessible inventory
level is high enough.
Theorem 5.4.2(d) shows that when the demand-stimulating eect/scarcity eect of
inventory is suciently strong (characterized by (5.10)), the backlogging cost incurred
by the wait-list is dominated by the revenue generated by the scarcity eect. Therefore,
the rm should not display any positive inventory, and every customer has to join a wait-
list before receiving the product. This analytical result justies the marketing strategy
adopted by, e.g., BMW, in which the availability of Mini Cooper is intentionally limited
and more customers are attracted by its wait-list.
5.5 Additional Results in Two Special Cases
In this section, we study two important special cases of our unied model that are of
interest on their own: the model without inventory withholding and the model without
inventory disposal. As shown in Theorem 5.4.2, when it is too expensive to withhold
[dispose] inventory, it is optimal for the rm not to withhold [dispose] any inventory.
These two special cases deliver new results and sharper insights on the impact of the
inventory-dependent demand upon the rm's pricing and inventory decisions. We also
characterize how the operational exibilities (e.g., an increase in the salvage value and the
inventory withholding opportunity) facilitate the rm to mitigate the additional overage
risk caused by inventory-dependent demand.
5.5.1 Without Inventory Withholding
In some circumstances, the rm cannot store its inventory in the warehouse, due to,
e.g., too costly withholding or too inconvenient transportation. For instance, car dealers
usually display all of its automobiles in the store, because withholding and redisplaying
the inventory is too costly and inconvenient. In this subsection, we conne our analysis to
the model without inventory withholding. In this model, since no inventory is stored in
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the warehouse, the state space dimension is reduced to one, and such reduction oers new
results and sharper insights on how the inventory-dependent demand inuences the rm's
optimal decisions. More specically, we demonstrate that the scarcity eect of inventory
increases the overstocking risk and, thus, drives the rm to set a lower order-up-to level
and charge a lower sales price. On the other hand, when the rm is blessed with a higher
disposal exibility (i.e., a higher salvage value), it has more capacity to mitigate such
overage risk by getting rid of its surplus inventory. We show that the rm with a higher
salvage value sets higher order-up-to levels and sales prices.
To formulate the planning problem as a dynamic program, let:
V st (I
a
t ) = the maximum expected discounted prots in periods t; t  1;    ; 1, when
starting period t with a customer-accessible inventory level Iat .
Since no inventory is withheld in the warehouse in this model, Iat = It, and we
don't need to record the total inventory level It. Therefore, the state space dimension is
reduced to one. Similarly, we will not incur the warehouse inventory holding cost (hw),
the redisplay cost (rd), and the withholding cost (rw) in this model. The superscript `s'
refers to \single location storage".
Without loss of generality, we assume the excess inventory in the last period (period
1) is discarded without any salvage value, i.e., V s0 (I
a
0 ) = 0, for any I
a
0  Ka. The value
functions satisfy the following recursive scheme:
V st (I
a
t ) = cI
a
t + max
(xat ;dt)2F s(Iat )
Jst (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t );
where F s(Iat ) := [minf0; Iat g; Ka] [d; d] denotes the set of feasible order-up-to/dispose-
down-to levels and expected price-induced demand, and
Jst (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) =p(dt)E[(p(dt); Iat ; t)] + s(xat   Iat )    c(xat   Iat )+   cIat
  E[b(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))  + ha(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))+]
+ E[V st 1(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))]:
Following the algebraic manipulation similar to that in (5.5), we obtain:
Jst (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) =R
s(dt; I
a
t ) + 
sxat   (xat   Iat )  + E[Gst(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))];
where Rs(dt; I
a
t ) :=(p(dt)  b  c)(dt + (Iat ));
Gst(y) :=  (b+ ha)y+ + [V st 1(y)  cy];
s :=b  (1  )c;
(5.11)
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and  is dened in (5.6). Note that, under Assumption 5.3.3, Rs(dt; I
a
t ) = R(dt; I
a
t ) +
rd(dt + (I
a
t )) is jointly concave on its domain.
As a corollary of Theorem 5.4.1, the optimal policy in the model without inventory
withholding is an inventory-dependent order-up-to/dispose-down-to list-price policy, as
shown below:
Theorem 5.5.1 Consider a model without inventory withholding. For each t = T; T  
1;    ; 1, the following statements hold:
(a) gst (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := E[Gst(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))] is jointly concave and continuously dif-
ferentiable in (xat ; dt; I
a
t ) if x
a
t 6= Iat ; for any xed Iat , gst (; ; Iat ) is strictly concave.
(b) V st (I
a
t ) is concave in I
a
t . V
s
t (I
a
t )  cIat is decreasing and continuously dierentiable
in Iat .
(c) Jst (; ; Iat ) is strictly concave for any xed Iat , and there exists a unique
(xst (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t )) such that
(xst (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t )) = argmax(xt;dt)2F s(Iat )J
s
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ):
(d) Let qst (I
a
t ) = x
s
t (I
a
t )   Iat denote the optimal order/disposal quantity. There exist
two threshold inventory levels IHt and I
L
t (I
L
t < I
H
t ), such that,
qst (I
a
t )
8>>>>><>>>>>:
> 0 if Iat < I
L
t ,
= 0 if ILt  Iat  IHt ,
< 0 otherwise,
i.e., the rm should order if its inventory level Iat is less than the lower threshold
ILt , dispose if it is more than the higher threshold I
H
t , and not order or dispose if it
is between the two thresholds.
(e) If Iat < I
L
t or I
a
t > I
H
t , the optimal order-up-to/dispose-down-to level x
s
t (I
a
t ) is de-
creasing in Iat . If I
L
t  Iat  IHt , the optimal inventory after replenishment/disposal
is increasing in Iat .
(f) The optimal price-induced-demand dst (I
a
t ) is increasing in I
a
t .
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Theorem 5.5.1 implies that, when the rm cannot withhold its on-hand inventory,
the optimal policy is to order when the customer-accessible inventory level is low (below
ILt ), to dispose when it is high (above I
H
t ), and not to adjust when it is between the two
thresholds. The optimal order-up-to/dispose-down-to and list-price levels are customer-
accessible-inventory-dependent. As shown in Theorem 5.5.1, when the customer-accessible
inventory level is higher, both order-up-to/dispose-down-to levels and sales prices are
lower, because a high customer-accessible inventory level suppresses potential demand
and the rm has a strong incentive to turn it over.
We proceed to analyze how the scarcity eect of inventory impacts the optimal pricing
and inventory policies. Compared with the model in which demand is independent of in-
ventory, when potential demand is negatively correlated with customer-accessible leftover
inventory levels, the marginal value of on-hand inventory decreases and the rm suers
from the demand reduction caused by a high inventory level. As a result, the rm should
order less/dispose more to mitigate the additional overstocking risk caused by the scarcity
eect of inventory. At the same time, to better catch the sales opportunity, it is optimal
to underprice the product so as to attract more customers. Moreover, in a market where
the rm has little power to set the sales price, we are able to prove a sharper result that
with a more intensive scarcity eect, the rm should keep a lower inventory level after
replenishment/disposal. The following theorem formalizes these intuitions.
Theorem 5.5.2 Consider a model without inventory withholding. Assume
Dt = (dt; I
a
t ; t) and D^t = ^(dt; I
a
t ; t) with inventory dependent term (I
a
t ) and ^(I
a
t ),
respectively. We also assume that the demand is of additive form (i.e., mt = 1 with
probability 1). The following statements hold:
(a) Assume that ^(Iat ) = 0 = limx! 1 (x) for all I
a
t  Ka, i.e., D^t does not depend
on the customer-accessible inventory level. We have that ILt  I^Lt , IHt  I^Ht ,
xst (I
a
t )  x^st (Iat ) and dst (Iat )  d^st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka.
(b) Assume that 0(Iat )  ^0(Iat ) for all Iat  Ka and that
lim
Iat! 1
(Iat ) = lim
Iat! 1
^(Iat ) = 0:
Let p = p = p0 and d0 = d(p0). We have I
L
t  I^Lt , IHt  I^Ht and xst (Iat )  x^st (Iat )
for all Iat  Ka.
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As a generalization of Theorem 3.2 in [145] to the model with dynamic pricing and
inventory disposal, Theorem 5.5.2 shows that the rm should understock and underprice
the product under the scarcity eect of inventory. In Theorem 5.5.2, we need the additive
demand assumption, i.e., mt = 1 almost surely. The additive demand model is widely
applied in the joint pricing and inventory control literature (see, e.g., [112, 73, 136]),
mostly because it enhances the technical tractability and facilitates the analysis. To
show Theorem 5.5.2 and other comparisons between the optimizers in dierent models
(Theorems 5.5.3 - 5.5.5 below), we need to iteratively establish the comparisons between
the derivatives of value functions. The additive demand form is necessary to link the
monotonicity relationship between optimizers and that between derivatives. All results
in this chapter, except Theorems 5.5.2 - 5.5.5, hold for the more general demand form
introduced in (5.1).
Eciently disposing surplus inventory protects the rm from the demand-suppressing
eect of inventory. As the salvage value increases, the cost of inventory disposal decreases,
and the rm has greater disposal exibility. We characterize how the salvage value
impacts the optimal pricing and inventory decisions in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.5.3 Consider a model without inventory withholding. For any t = T; T  
1;    ; 1, assume that the demand is of additive form (i.e., mt = 1 with probability 1),
and s < s^.
(a) @Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat ).
(b) I^Lt  ILt .
(c) x^st (I
a
t )  xst (Iat ) and, hence, q^st (Iat )  qst (Iat ) for all Iat  I^Ht .
(d) d^st (I
a
t )  dst (Iat ).
Theorem 5.5.3(a) shows that the marginal value of on-hand inventory increases in the
salvage value. Parts (b) - (d) demonstrate that with a higher salvage value, the rm
should set higher ordering thresholds, order-up-to levels, and sales prices. On one hand,
recall from Theorem 5.5.2 that the inventory-dependent demand strengthens overstocking
risk by suppressing potential demand so that both optimal order-up-to/disposal-down-to
levels and optimal sales prices are lower in the model with inventory-dependent demand
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than those in the model with inventory-independent demand. On the other hand, how-
ever, Theorem 5.5.3 demonstrates that increased operational exibility (i.e., a higher
salvage value) mitigates the demand loss driven by a high customer-accessible inventory
level and, hence, with higher disposal exibility, the rm is able to set higher order-up-to
levels and sales prices to win more prot.
5.5.2 Without Inventory Disposal
The model without inventory disposal applies to the cases where the inventory is
either too expensive or too inconvenient to dispose. For example, in the automobile
industry, the unsold cars of the last year model is too costly to dispose. In other industries
like chemical engineering, products are often so environmentally unfriendly that they
cannot be disposed arbitrarily. The model without inventory disposal has a simpler
optimal policy structure (customer-accessible-inventory-dependent order-up-to/display-
up-to list-price policy) and, like the model without inventory withholding, delivers sharper
insights regarding the impacts of inventory-dependent demand and inventory withholding
policy. More specically, we show that inventory-dependent demand motivates the rm
to order less and charge a lower sales price, whereas the inventory withholding policy
helps mitigate the overage risk and increases the optimal order-up-to levels and sales
prices.
As a counterpart of Theorem 5.5.2, the following theorem shows that inventory-
dependent demand drives down the optimal order-up-to levels and sales prices in the
model without inventory disposal:
Theorem 5.5.4 Consider a model without inventory disposal. For any t = T; T  
1;    ; 1, assume that rd = rw = 0, and hw  ha, i.e., reallocation is costless and it is more
costly to store the inventory in the warehouse. In addition, assume that Dt = (dt; I
a
t ; t)
and D^t = ^(dt; I
a
t ; t) with inventory dependent term (I
a
t ) and ^(I
a
t ), respectively, where
^(Iat ) = 0 = limx! 1 (x) for all I
a
t  Ka, i.e., D^t does not depend on the customer-
accessible inventory level. Further assume that, the demand is of additive form (i.e.,
mt = 1 with probability 1). We have:
(a) The rm in the system with demand D^t should not withhold any inventory.
(b) xat (I
a
t )  x^st (Iat ) and dt(Iat )  d^st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka.
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Inventory withholding policy enables the rm to better control demand by intention-
ally making part of its inventory unavailable to its customers. Hence, inventory withhold-
ing policy can stabilize the demand process and increase the optimal order-up-to levels
and sales prices, as shown below:
Theorem 5.5.5 Consider a model without inventory disposal. For any t = T; T  
1;    ; 1, assume that the demand is of additive form (i.e., mt = 1 with probability 1),
rd = rw = 0 (i.e., reallocation is costless). If It = I
a
t , we have x
a
t (I
a
t )  xst (Iat ) for
Iat  maxfIat : xat (Iat )  Iat g, and dt (Iat ; It)  dst (Iat ) for Iat  Ka.
Note that, Theorem 6 needs the assumption that inventory reallocation is costless
(rd = rw = 0), because this assumption is necessary to reduce the state space dimension
in its proof. We also assume rd = rw = 0 for Theorem 7, mainly for expositional
convenience and the results still hold under the general condition that rd; rw  0.
To summarize, inventory withholding and inventory disposal have similar strategic im-
plications in dealing with inventory-dependent demand. The rm employs these strategies
to hedge against the overage risk caused by the scarcity eect of inventory and stimulate
more potential demand.
5.6 Responsive Inventory Reallocation
In our previous analysis, we assume that the rm can withhold and redisplay inventory
only at the beginning of the decision epoch before the demand realizes. In this subsection,
we relax this assumption by allowing the rm to responsively reallocate its on-hand
inventory after the demand realization. The responsive inventory reallocation enables
the rm to optimize its inventory policy after the demand uncertainty realizes, so that
the supply and demand are better matched and the tradeo between meeting current
and inducing potential demand is better balanced. Note that when responsive inventory
reallocation is allowed, the rm should not reallocate its inventory before the demand
realizes.
At the beginning of each period, the rm chooses its inventory replenishment/disposal
quantity and the sales price. The demand then realizes, after which the rm decides
the inventory reallocation quantities between the warehouse and the customer-accessible
storage.
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To formulate the planning problem as a dynamic program, let
V rt (I
a
t ; It) = the maximum expected discounted prots in periods t; t  1;    ; 1, when
starting period t with a customer-accessible inventory level Iat and a total
inventory level It,
where the superscript `r' refers to \responsive inventory reallocation". Without loss of
generality, we assume the excess inventory in the last period (period 1) is discarded
without any salvage value, i.e., V r0 (I
a
0 ; I0) = 0, for any (I
a
0 ; I0).
We rst analyze the optimal reallocation policy in period t. Assume that the order-
up-to/dispose-down-to level set by the rm before the demand realization is xt and the
realized demand is Dt. The optimal display-up-to level, x
ra
t (I
a
t ; xt; Dt), after inventory
reallocation, is given by:
xrat (I
a
t ; xt; Dt)
= argmaxminf0;Iat  Dtgxatxt Dtf rd(xat   Iat +Dt)+   rw(xat   Iat +Dt)    bxa t
  haxa+t   hw(xt   xat  Dt) + V rt 1(xat ; xt  Dt)g
Hence, the optimal value functions satisfy the following recursive scheme:
V rt (I
a
t ; It) = max
(xt;dt)2F r(Iat )
fp(dt)Ef(p(dt); Iat ; t)g   c(xt   It)+ + s(xt   It) 
+ EDtf max
minf0;Iat  DtgxatminfKa;xt Dtg
f rd(xat   Iat +Dt)+   rw(xat   Iat +Dt) 
  bxa t   haxa+t   hw(xt   xat  Dt) + V rt 1(xat ; xt  Dt)ggg;
where F r(Iat ) := f(xt; dt) : xt  minfIat ; 0g; dt 2 [d; d]g. Following the algebraic manipu-
lation similar to that in Equation (5.5), we have:
V rt (I
a
t ; It) =rdI
a
t + cIt + max
(xt;dt)2F r(Iat )
fR(dt; Iat ) + rd(dt + (Iat ))  (xt   It)     xt
+ EDtf max
minfDt;Iat gyatminfxt;Ka+Dtg
f (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat
+Grt (y
a
t  Dt; xt  Dt)ggg;
with Grt (x; y) :=  (ha + b)x+ + [V rt 1(x; y)  rdx  cy]:
(5.12)
Comparing the value functions (5.12) and (5.4), it is immediate that by postponing
the reallocation decision till after demand realization, the rm achieves a higher expected
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total prot. In the following theorem, we characterize the optimal inventory replenish-
ment/disposal/reallocation and pricing policy in the model with responsive inventory
reallocation:
Theorem 5.6.1 The following statements hold for t = T; T   1;    ; 1:
(a) V rt (I
a
t ; It) is jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (I
a
t ; It), whereas the
normalized value function V rt (I
a
t ; It)  rdIat   cIt is decreasing in Iat and It.
(b) For any given xt and realized Dt, v
r
t (y
a
t jIat ; xt; Dt) :=  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +
Grt (y
a
t  Dt; xt  Dt) is concave in yat . Therefore, the optimal customer-accessible-
inventory level is:
xrat (I
a
t ; xt; Dt) = argmaxminfDt;Iat gyatminfxt;Ka+Dtgfvrt (yat jIat ; xt; Dt)g  Dt:
(c) There exist two customer-accessible-inventory-level-dependent thresholds, xrt (I
a
t ) and
~xrt (I
a
t ) (x
r
t (I
a
t )  ~xrt (Iat )), such that it is optimal to order up to xrt (Iat ) if and only
if It < x
r
t (I
a
t ), to dispose down to ~x
r
t (I
a
t ), if and only if It > ~x
r
t (I
a
t ), and to keep
the total inventory level otherwise. Moreover, there exist two customer-accessible-
inventory-level-dependent sales prices p(drt (I
a
t )) and p(
~drt (I
a
t )), such that it is op-
timal to charge a sales price p(drt (I
a
t )) if It  xrt (Iat ), and to charge a sales price
p( ~drt (I
a
t )) if It  ~xrt (Iat ).
Theorem 5.6.1(a) proves the joint concavity and continuous dierentiability of the
optimal value functions. Part (b) shows that, in each period, the optimal reallocation
policy is obtained by solving a one-dimensional convex optimization after the demand
realizes. Consistent with Theorem 5.4.1, part (c) of Theorem 5.6.1 proves that it is
optimal to order if the total inventory level is low (It < x
r
t (I
a
t )), and to dispose if it
is high (It > ~x
r
t (I
a
t )), and to keep the starting inventory level otherwise. Compared
with Theorem 5.4.1, which characterizes optimal policy in the unied model, Theorem
5.6.1 demonstrates that it is possible that the rm order-and-withholds some inventory
under the optimal responsive inventory reallocation policy, because, in this case, the
rm is blessed with the exibility to reallocate inventory after the demand uncertainty is
resolved.
As in Theorem 5.4.2, we can show that if the warehouse holding cost, hw, is high
enough, it is optimal not to hold any inventory in the warehouse; if the salvage value,
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s, is low enough, it is optimal not to dispose anything; and if the reallocation fee to
withhold inventory, rw, is high enough, it is optimal to not reallocate any customer-
accessible inventory to the warehouse.
5.7 Numerical Studies
This section reports a set of numerical studies that (a) verify the robustness of our
analytical results when Assumption 5.3.3 does not hold; (b) quantify the prot loss of
ignoring the scarcity eect of inventory when making the pricing and inventory decisions;
and (c) quantitatively evaluate the benet of dynamic pricing in the presence of the
scarcity eect. Our numerical results demonstrate that (1) the structural results devel-
oped in our theoretical model are robust and hold for a large set of non-concave R(; )
functions; (2) the impact of the scarcity eect is signicant and it is higher when the
scarcity intensity, demand variability, and/or planning horizon length increase; and (3)
the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect is signicant and it is higher under
higher scarcity intensity, demand variability and/or shorter planning horizon.
Throughout our numerical studies, we assume that the rm can neither withhold
nor dispose its on-hand inventory for two reasons: (a) to have a clear illustration of the
optimal policy structure in a model where Assumption 5.3.3 does not hold; and (b) to
single out and highlight the impact of the focal operational elements (i.e., the scarcity
eect of inventory and the dynamic pricing strategy). We also assume that the demand
in each period is of the additive form, i.e., mt = 1 almost surely and Dt = dt+(I
a
t )+ 
a
t .
Let fat gTt=1 follow i:i:d: normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation . The
inverse demand function is linear with slope  1, i.e., p(dt) = p0 dt. We set the discount
factor  = 0:95, the unit holding cost h = 1, and the unit backlogging cost b = 10.
5.7.1 Optimal Policy Structure with Non-concave R(; ) Functions
In this subsection, we numerically examine whether the structural results in our the-
oretical model are robust when Assumption 5.3.3 does not hold, i.e., R(; ) is not jointly
concave. We have performed extensive numerical experiments to test the robustness of
our analytical results. In all our numerical experiments, although Assumption 5.3.3 is
violated, the characterizations of the optimal policy by our theoretical analysis (i.e., The-
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orem 5.4.1, Theorem 5.5.1, and Theorem 5.5.2) continue to hold. More specically, our
numerical results verify that (a) the inventory-dependent order-up-to/list-price policy is
optimal and the order-up-to level is decreasing in the starting inventory level; (b) the
optimal sales price [price-induced demand] is decreasing [increasing] in the starting in-
ventory level; and (c) compared with an inventory system without the scarcity eect, the
rm with the scarcity eect sets lower order-up-to levels and lower sales prices. Therefore,
the structural results of our theoretical model are robust and hold for non-concave R(; )
functions in all our numerical experiments.
Note that from Lemma 12(a) that if the scarcity function () contains a linear and
strictly decreasing piece, R(; ) is not jointly concave. Hence, we report our numerical
results for the case where (Iat ) =
8><>:0   exp(I
a
t ); for I
a
t  0,
0   1  Iat ; for 0 < Iat  Ka,
with  > 0. It's
clear that () is concavely decreasing and continuously dierentiable in Iat for all Iat  Ka,
but R(; ) is not jointly concave in the region f(dt; Iat ) : dt 2 [d; d]; Iat 2 [0; Ka]g. We have
performed extensive numerical experiments which test many combinations of dierent
values of p0, 0, c, , , d, d, Ka, and t. In all the scenarios we examine, the predictions
of the optimal policy by our theoretical analysis (i.e., Theorem 5.4.1, Theorem 5.5.1, and
Theorem 5.5.2) continue to hold without Assumption 5.3.3. Figures 5.1 - 5.2 illustrate the
optimal order-up-to level and price-induced demand with the parameter values p0 = 30,
0 = 9, c = 8,  = 0:5,  = 2, [d; d] = [6; 12], Ka = 18, and t = 20.
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5.7.2 Impact of Scarcity Eect
This subsection numerically studies the impact of the scarcity eect of inventory upon
the rm's protability by quantifying the prot loss of ignoring this eect under dierent
levels of scarcity eect intensity, demand variability and planning horizon length. As in
Section 5.7.1, we assume that (Iat ) =
8><>:0   exp(I
a
t ); for I
a
t  0,
0   1  Iat ; for 0 < Iat  Ka,
where  > 0.
Note that  represents the scarcity eect intensity of the inventory system: the larger the
, the more intense the scarcity eect. We need to evaluate the prot of a rm which
ignores the scarcity eect, ~V . To compute ~V , we rst numerically obtain the optimal
policy in an inventory system without the scarcity eect and then evaluate the total
prots of this policy in an inventory system with the scarcity eect. We also evaluate the
optimal prot of a rm under the scarcity eect, V . In the evaluation of V  and ~V , we
take Iat = 0 as the reference customer-accessible inventory level. The metric of interest is
scarcity :=
V    ~V
V 
; under dierent values of ,  and t.
Our numerical experiments are conducted under the following values of parameters: p0 =
21, 0 = 4, c = 4,  = 0:35; 0:4; 0:45; 0:5; 0:55,  = 1; 2; 3, [d; d] = [6; 12], Ka = 18, and
t = 5; 10.
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Figure 5.3. Value of scarcity: t = 5
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Figure 5.4. Value of scarcity: t = 10
Figures 5.3 - 5.4 summarize the results of our numerical study on the impact of the
scarcity eect upon the rm's protability. Our results reveal that, when the scarcity
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eect is ignored, all numerical experiments exhibit a signicant prot loss, which is at
least 16:41% and can be as high as 64:52%. Moreover, the impact of scarcity eect
is increasing in the scarcity intensity, demand variability, and planning horizon length.
The scarcity eect has two eects upon the rm's protability: (a) it decreases future
demand, and (b) it increases demand variability, because the variability of potential
demand is intensied by that of the past demand via the scarcity eect. Hence, with
higher scarcity intensity [demand variability], the rst [second] eect lowers more prot
of the rm. The comparison between Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 implies that the impact of
the scarcity eect accumulates over time, so the prot loss of ignoring the scarcity eect is
higher under a longer planning horizon. In short, the scarcity eect of inventory matters
signicantly to the rm's protability when the scarcity eect intensity and demand
variability is high, and the planning horizon is long. Our numerical nding conrms the
result in [145] that the prot loss is increasing in the scarcity eect intensity. On the
other hand, our numerical nding on the impact of demand variability contrasts that
in [145], which shows that the prot loss of ignoring the scarcity eect is decreasing in
demand variability. In their experiments, the potential demand is convexly decreasing in
the leftover inventory level, so higher demand variability increases the expected potential
demand and, thus, the rm's protability under the scarcity eect.
5.7.3 Value of Dynamic Pricing
In this subsection, we numerically explore the value of dynamic pricing under the
scarcity eect of inventory with dierent levels of scarcity eect intensity, demand vari-
ability and planning horizon length. As in Sections 5.7.1 - 5.7.2, we assume that (Iat ) =8><>:0   exp(I
a
t ); for I
a
t  0,
0   1  Iat ; for 0 < Iat  Ka,
where  > 0. We need to evaluate the prot of a
rm, which adopts the optimal static pricing strategy, V^ . To compute V^ , we rst eval-
uate the total prot of an inventory system for any xed price pt in each t, and then
maximize over pt to select the optimal static price. Consistent with V
, V^ is evaluated
at the reference customer-accessible inventory level Iat = 0. The metric of interest is
pricing :=
V    V^
V^
; under dierent values of ,  and t.
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Our numerical experiments are conducted under the following values of parameters: p0 =
21, 0 = 4, c = 4,  = 0:35; 0:4; 0:45; 0:5; 0:55,  = 1; 2; 3, [d; d] = [6; 12], Ka = 18, and
t = 5; 10.
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Figure 5.5. Value of pricing: t = 5
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Figure 5.6. Value of pricing: t = 10
Figures 5.5 - 5.6 summarize the results of our numerical study on the value of dynamic
pricing. The results show that the value of dynamic pricing is signicant in the presence of
the scarcity eect. Federgruen and Heching (1999) document that the prot improvement
of dynamic pricing in a 5-period model is between 0:46%  2:24%, when the coecient of
variation for demand varies between 0:7 and 1:4. The numerical experiments of Figure
5.5 report a much higher prot improvement (between 0:91% 9:78%) of dynamic pricing
in a 5-period model with the coecient of variation of demand between 0:11 and 0:33.
Thus, the scarcity eect of inventory gives rise to signicantly higher value of dynamic
pricing. The value of dynamic pricing is driven by the following three eects: (a) it
achieves better match between supply and demand; (b) it helps induce higher future
demand; and (c) it dampens future demand variability. While eect (a) also improves
the performance of an inventory system without the scarcity eect, eects (b) and (c) have
their impact only upon a rm with the scarcity eect. Therefore, the value of dynamic
pricing is signicantly increased by the scarcity eect. Moreover, with higher scarcity
eect intensity [demand variability], eect (b) [(c)] enhances the rm's protability more
signicantly. The comparison between Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 implies that the value of
dynamic pricing decreases over time. This is consistent with the ndings in Federgruen
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and Heching (1999) that the optimal dynamic pricing policy converges to the optimal
static pricing policy, as the planning horizon length goes to innity. In short, the value
of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect of inventory is most signicant when the
intensity of scarcity eect and demand variability is high, and the planning horizon length
is moderate.
To conclude this section, we remark that all the numerical results and insights in this
section are robust and hold for (a) the general demand form, Equation (5.1), and (b) a
large variety of dierent inverse demand functions (i.e., p()) and scarcity functions (i.e.,
()) that give rise to concave or non-concave R(; ) functions.
5.8 Summary and Extension
We conclude this chapter with a summary of the main results and managerial insights
derived from our model and some thoughts on a possible direction of future research.
This chapter is the rst in the literature to study the joint pricing and inventory man-
agement model under the scarcity eect of inventory. Demand is modeled as a decreasing
stochastic function of both price and customer-accessible inventory level. We propose
a unied model in which the rm has several operational exibilities to hedge against
the risk of the stochastic inventory-dependent demand: (a) dynamic pricing, through
which the rm can dynamically adjust its sales price; (b) inventory withholding, through
which the rm can withhold part of its inventory from customers; and (c) inventory dis-
posal, through which the rm can dispose part of its surplus inventory. We show that a
customer-accessible-inventory-dependent order-up-to/dispose-down-to/display-up-to list-
price policy is optimal. The order-up-to/display-up-to and list-price levels are decreasing
in the customer-accessible inventory level, because of the negative dependence of de-
mand on inventory. When the scarcity eect of inventory is suciently strong, the rm
can strategically benet from the scarcity eect by displaying no positive inventory and
making every customer wait, because the revenue generated by the strong scarcity eect
dominates the backlogging cost of the wait-list.
When the warehouse holding cost [salvage value] is suciently high [low], it is too
costly to withhold [dispose] inventory, and the unied model is reduced to the model
without inventory withholding [disposal]. The model without inventory withholding [dis-
posal] generates additional results and sharper insights. In the model without inventory
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withholding/disposal, we show that optimal sales prices and order-up-to levels are lower
under the scarcity eect of inventory than those under inventory-independent demand.
Higher operational exibility (a higher salvage value or the inventory withholding oppor-
tunity), however, helps the rm hedge against the overstocking risk and, hence, drives
the rm to set higher order-up-to/display-up-to levels and sales prices.
In addition, responsive inventory reallocation is another eective way to deal with the
scarcity eect of inventory. The reallocation exibility after demand realization enables
the rm to better hedge against the demand uncertainty and balance the tradeo between
meeting current demand and inducing potential demand. In this case, since the rm can
reallocate its on-hand inventory after demand realizes, it may be optimal to order-and-
withhold when the realized demand is small.
We perform extensive numerical studies to demonstrate (a) the robustness of our
analytical results, (b) the impact of the scarcity eect upon the prot of the rm, and
(c) the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity eect of inventory. Our numerical
results show that the analytical characterizations of the optimal policies in our model
are robust and hold for non-concave R(; ) functions in all our experiments. The impact
of scarcity eect upon the rm's prot is two-fold: (a) it decreases future demand, and
(b) it increases demand variability. Hence, the prot loss of ignoring the scarcity eect
is higher under higher scarcity intensity (via eect (a)), higher demand variability (via
eect (b)), and longer planning horizon (via both eects). The value of dynamic pricing
under the scarcity eect is three-fold: (a) it better matches supply and demand; (b) it
helps induce higher future demand; and (c) it dampens future demand variability. Eect
(b) [(c)] leads to higher value of dynamic pricing under higher scarcity intensity [demand
variability]. Moreover, the optimal dynamic pricing policy converges to the optimal static
pricing policy as the planning horizon length goes to innity, so the value of dynamic
pricing decreases over time.
Finally, we remark that all the analytical results in this chapter can be easily extended
to the innite horizon discounted model with the standard argument that demonstrates
the preservation of the structural properties as the planning horizon length goes to innity.
In this subsection, we propose a possible extension of our work: the analysis of the
model that encompasses both the scarcity eect and the promotional eect of inventory.
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As discussed in Section 5.2, the displayed inventory has both the service and the
promotional eects (see, e.g., [34, 35]), because a higher customer-accessible inventory
level creates a stronger visual impact and customers infer a greater chance to get the
product. In the literature, this phenomenon is also called the billboard eect and the
shelf-space eect (e.g. [39, 18, 53]).
It is interesting to analyze the model which incorporates both the scarcity eect of
pre-replenishment inventory and the promotional eect of post-replenishment inventory.
More specically, we assume that the demand in period t, Dt = (pt; I
a
t ; x
a
t ; t) = (d(pt)+
1(I
a
t )+2(x
a
t ))
m
t +
a
t , where 1() is a decreasing function of pre-replenishment customer-
accessible inventory level Iat , and 2() is an increasing function of post-replenishment
customer-accessible inventory level xat . As before, assume that d() is a strictly decreasing
function of sales price pt, Efmt g = 1 and Efat g = 0.
It is challenging to characterize the optimal joint pricing and inventory management
policy under this generalized inventory-dependent demand. In particular, the eect of
inventory on the rm's protability is more involved and it is unclear how to strike a
balance between the overage and underage risks in this model. We will explore this
problem in our future research.
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6. Comparative Statics Analysis Method for Joint Pricing and
Inventory Management Models
6.1 Introduction
1Comparative statics analysis is integral to studying an inventory management sys-
tem under dynamic pricing, because it delivers important insights regarding how the
system should optimally respond to changes in the exogenous market condition and/or
internal state over the planning horizon. For instance, a rm under an uncertain market
environment often faces the conundrum that whether it should increase or decrease the
sales price and order-up-to level under a higher procurement cost. Analogously, it is also
important to modify the price and inventory policies in accordance to rm-level strategic
changes like contracting with an additional supplier or expanding the target customer
segments. As an essential tool in economics, engineering and operations management,
comparative statics analysis oers a systematic method to study these challenges that
are both common and essential in inventory management models under dynamic pricing.
More specically, we consider the optimal pricing and replenishment policies in a gen-
eral periodic-review joint pricing and inventory management model with multiple cus-
tomer segments and supply channels under a uctuating market environment. The rm
replenishes its inventory from a portfolio of supply channels with dierent cost functions.
The cost function of each supply channel is determined by a supply-channel-dependent
reference procurement cost (e.g., the raw material procurement cost in each supply chan-
nel). The customer market is segmented into several independent classes with dierent
demand functions. The rm charges a sales price to each demand segment in each deci-
sion period. The demand function of each demand segment is determined by a demand-
segment-dependent market size. Both the reference procurement cost of each supply
channel and the market size of each demand segment evolve according to an underlying
exogenous Markov process. Hence, our joint pricing and inventory management model
captures three important features in today's competitive and unstable market: demand
1This chapter is based on the author's earlier work [192].
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segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment uctuation. In this quite
general dynamic pricing and inventory management model, comparative statics analysis
plays an essential role in the characterization of (a) the optimal pricing and inventory
policies, and (b) the impact of market environment uctuation, demand segmentation,
and supply diversication upon the optimal sales prices and order quantities.
There are two standard methods to perform comparative statics analysis in the eco-
nomics and operations management literature: (a) the implicit function theorem (IFT)
approach, and (b) the monotone comparative statics (MCS) approach.
The IFT approach characterizes the derivative of the optimizer with respect to the
parameters by applying the implicit function theorem to the rst-order condition. In order
to apply this approach, it is clear from the assumptions of the implicit function theorem
that (a) the objective function needs to be twice continuously dierentiable with respect
to the complete vector of decision variables and parameters, and (b) the Hessian of the
objective function with respect to the decision variables at the optimizer needs to be non-
degenerate. In our general joint pricing and inventory management model, as we will show
later, condition (a), in general, is not satised, whereas condition (b) is very dicult to
check. Moreover, the IFT approach is not scalable, i.e., the analytical characterization of
the derivatives via the implicit function theorem soon becomes intractable as the number
of demand segments and supply channels increases. See, e.g., [27, 168]. In short, the IFT
approach is not eective in performing comparative statics analysis in our model.
The MCS approach studies the impact of a parameter change on the marginal value
of decision variables for objective functions dened on lattices. The MCS approach is
very powerful in comparative statics analysis, because it does not require any regularity
assumption regarding the objective function. In order to apply the MCS approach, the
objective function needs to satisfy a certain form of complementarity conditions (e.g.,
joint supermodularity or, more generally, the single crossing property). Another feature
of the MCS approach is that, all of the optimal decision variables should be monotone (in
strong set order) in parameters. In our joint pricing and inventory management model,
either the joint supermodularity or the single crossing property is very dicult, if not
impossible, to establish in each decision epoch. Moreover, as we will show later, it is
possible in our model that only part of the optimal decision variables (i.e., sales prices
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and order quantities) are monotone in the market parameters. Hence, the MCS approach
does not apply to our model.
The limitations of the IFT and MCS approaches motivate us to develop a new method
for the comparative statics analysis of our general joint pricing and inventory manage-
ment model with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment
uctuation. The new method provides rigorous proofs of comparative statics analysis and
structural properties in our model. More specically, our method proves the desired com-
parative statics results by contradiction and carefully analyzes how changes in parameter
values impact the marginal value of each decision variable (i.e., the rst-order partial
derivative of the objective function). We identify a simple yet powerful lemma which
translates the monotonicity relationship between the optimizers into that between the
partial derivatives of the objective function under dierent parameter values. Our com-
parative statics method employs this lemma and some model-specic structural properties
(e.g., the concavity of the objective function and/or the supermodularity of the objective
function in one decision variable and one parameter) to construct a contradiction by it-
eratively linking the monotone relationship between the optimizers and that between the
partial derivatives of the objective function. Note that the structural properties needed
by our approach are weaker than those required by the IFT and MCS approaches (e.g.,
second-order continuous dierentiability and complementarity). The lemma also enables
us to make componentwise comparisons between the optimizers under dierent param-
eter values, because the monotonicity of the objective function's partial derivative with
respect to one decision variable at the optimizer of interest is independent of the values
of other decision variables. Hence, unlike the IFT approach, our new method is scalable;
and unlike the MCS approach, our new method enables us to perform comparative statics
analysis in a model where only part of the optimal decision variables are monotone in the
parameter.
To perform comparative statics analysis in each decision epoch of our general joint
pricing and inventory management model, we integrate our new method with the stan-
dard backward induction argument to iteratively link the comparison between optimizers
and that between partial derivatives of the value functions and objective functions. We
characterize the optimal joint pricing and ordering policy for an arbitrary number of
demand segments and supply channels as a threshold policy, under which there exists a
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market-environment-dependent threshold for each demand segment [supply channel] such
that it is optimal to sell to [order from] this segment [channel] if and only if the starting
inventory level is above [below] its corresponding threshold. Moreover, both the optimal
sales price for each demand segment and the optimal order quantity through each supply
channel are decreasing in the starting inventory level of the rm. We also show that the
optimal sales prices and order quantities are increasing in the market size. When the
reference procurement costs of some supply channels increase, the rm increases the sales
price in each demand segment, and the order quantities from the supply channels with
unchanged reference procurement costs. Each rm's optimal order quantity may not be
monotone in its own reference procurement cost. Serving a new demand segment drives
the rm to increase its sales prices and order quantities, whereas expanding the supply
pool has the opposite eect: it prompts the rm to decrease its sales prices and order
quantities.
Our method is robust and applicable to comparative statics analysis in some other
settings. For example, we consider joint price and eort competition games in which
an arbitrary number of rms compete on price and eort level. More specically, we
study two competition models: (a) the eort-level-rst competition where the rms rst
compete on eort and then on price, and (b) the simultaneous competition where the rms
simultaneously compete on price and eort. Each rm's demand is increasing in the total
eort level of all rms. As we will show later, the IFT approach is not scalable whereas
the complementarity conditions required by the MCS approach are not satised, so the
standard IFT and MCS approaches do not work in this model. Our new comparative
statics method enables us to prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the
eort-level-rst competition. In both competition models, we show that the equilibrium
total eort level, and the equilibrium sales price and demand volume of each rm are
increasing in the market index of any rm. We also identify the fat-cat eect in this
setting, i.e., the equilibrium total eort level and the equilibrium price and demand of
each rm in the eort-level-rst competition are higher than their counterparts in the
simultaneous competition.
To sum up, we propose a new method for comparative statics analysis in a general
joint pricing and inventory management model with demand segmentation, supply di-
versication, and market environment uctuation. This new comparative statics method
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requires less restrictive assumptions than the standard IFT and MCS approaches. More-
over, our method makes componentwise comparisons between optimizers with dierent
parameter values, so it is well scalabile, and is capable of performing comparative statics
analysis in a model where some of the optimal decision variables are not monotone in
the parameter. The proposed method also applies to the comparative statics analysis in
some other settings where the standard approaches do not work.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We position this chapter in the related
literature in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents our new method for comparative statics
analysis in joint pricing and inventory management models. In Section 6.4, we apply
the proposed method to study a general joint pricing and inventory management model
with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment uctuation.
Section 6.5 demonstrates the applicability of our method in competition games. We
conclude this chapter by summarizing our method and ndings in Section 6.6. Most of
the proofs are relegated to Appendix E.1. Throughout this chapter, we use @ to denote the
derivative operator of a single variable function, and @x to denote the partial derivative
operator of a multi-variable function with respect to variable x. For any multivariate
continuously dierentiable function f(x1; x2;    ; xn) and ~x := (~x1; ~x2;    ; ~xn) in f()'s
domain, we use @xif(~x1; ~x2;    ; ~xn) to denote @xif(x1; x2;    ; xn)jx=~x for any i. For any
two n-dimensional vectors v = (v1; v2;    ; vn) and v^ = (v^1; v^2;    ; v^n), we use v^ > v to
denote that v^i  vi for each 1  i  n, and v^ 6= v.
6.2 Related Research
This chapter is built upon two streams of literature: (a) the method and application
of comparative statics analysis, and (b) dynamic pricing and inventory management.
Comparative statics analysis is formalized in the economics literature by [95] and [144],
where the classical IFT approach is introduced. The MCS approach is rst established
by [164]. He shows that the maximizer of a supermodular function is increasing in
the parameters in the strong set order sense. [126] derive a necessary and sucient
condition (i.e., quasi-supermodularity and the single crossing property) for the solution
set of an optimization problem to be monotone in parameters. [15] generalizes this result
to stochastic optimization problems and characterizes necessary and sucient conditions,
based on the properties of utility functions and probability distributions, for comparative
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statics predictions to hold. [45] establish a new preservation property of supermodularity
in a class of two-dimensional parametric optimization problems, where the feasible sets
may not be lattices. Comparative statics analysis in game theoretic models has also been
extensively studied in the literature (e.g., [124, 125, 24]). This literature mainly focuses
on supermodular games. We refer interested readers to the monograph by [165] that
coherently synthesizes the theory and applications of the MCS approach.
There is extensive application of comparative statics analysis in the operations man-
agement literature. See, e.g., [151, 152, 98, 71, 111]. The majority of the papers in this
stream of research apply the IFT and MCS approaches to establish comparative statics
results and the structural properties of their models. [27] is a notable exception that de-
velops a novel analytical approach for the comparative statics analysis in multi-product,
multi-resource newsvendor networks with responsive pricing. In their setting, the IFT
approach is prohibitively dicult, whereas their new approach exploits the relationship
between convex stochastic orders and dual variables, and does not suer from the curse
of dimensionality. This chapter contributes to this line of research by developing a new
analytical method for comparative statics analysis in a general joint pricing and inventory
management model. The major strength of the proposed method lies in the following
three aspects: (a) it does not need the conditions required by the IFT and MCS ap-
proaches that are restrictive in dynamic pricing and inventory management models (e.g.,
second-order continuous dierentiability and complementarity); (b) it does not suer from
the curse of dimensionality; and (c) it is amenable for comparative statics analysis in a
model where only part of the optimal decision variables are monotone in the parameter.
This work is also related to the growing literature on the dynamic pricing and in-
ventory management problem under general stochastic demand. [70] provide a general
treatment of this problem, and show the optimality of a list-price/order-up-to policy.
This line of literature has grown rapidly since [70]. For example, [47, 48, 49] analyze the
joint pricing and inventory control problem with xed set-up cost, and show that (s; S; p)
policy is optimal for nite horizon, innite horizon and continuous review models. [52]
and [96] study the joint pricing and inventory control problem under lost sales. In the
case of a single unreliable supplier with random yield, [112] show that supply uncertainty
drives the rm to charge a higher price. When the replenishment leadtime is positive, the
joint pricing and inventory control problem under periodic review is extremely dicult.
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For this problem, [136] partially characterize the structure of the optimal policy, whereas
[26] develop a simple heuristic that resolves the computational complexity. Several papers
in this stream of literature also take into consideration consumer behaviors. [179] study
the joint pricing and inventory management model in which customers bid for units of
a rm's product over an innite horizon. [97] characterize the optimal pricing and pro-
duction policy under customer subscription and retention/attrition. [110] establish the
concavity of the objective function in the nested logit model, and apply this model to
analyze the joint pricing and inventory management problem with multiple products.
The literature on the joint pricing and inventory management problem under a uctuat-
ing market environment is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, [173] is the only paper
which studies the dynamic pricing and inventory management problem under uctuat-
ing procurement costs. We refer interested readers to [50] for a comprehensive survey
on joint pricing and inventory control models. This chapter contributes to this stream
of research by developing a new analytical method for the comparative statics analysis
in a general joint pricing and inventory management model with demand segmentation,
supply diversication, and market environment uctuation.
6.3 A New Comparative Statics Method
In this section, we rst give an example to illustrate why the IFT and MCS approaches
are not applicable for comparative statics analysis in our general joint pricing and inven-
tory management model. We then develop a new analytical method for comparative
statics analysis therein.
6.3.1 An Illustrative Example
In this subsection, we give an example that clearly illustrates why the IFT and MCS
approaches do not apply to the general joint pricing and inventory management model
with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment uctuation.
Let fi(yi) be a rst-order continuously dierentiable and strictly concave function on
Yi = [Ai; Bi] for i = 1; 2;    ; p, and gi(yij) be continuously dierentiable and strictly
concave in yi and submodular in (yi; ), where yi 2 Yi = [Ai; Bi] and  2    [; ], for
each i = p+1; p+2;    ; p+q. Moreover, assume that h(y0j) is continuously dierentiable
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and concave in y0 and supermodular in (y0; ), where y0 2 R and  2  . Let i be a
positive constant for any i = 1; 2;    ; p+q. Consider the following optimization problem:
(y1(); y

2();    ; yp(); yp+1();    ; yp+q()) =argmaxy2YF (yj);
s.t. F (yj) =
pX
i=1
fi(yi) +
p+qX
i=p+1
gi(yij) + h(
p+qX
i=1
iyij);
Y =Y1  Y2      Yp+q;  2  :
(6.1)
The objective function F (j) in the optimization problem (6.1) is strictly jointly concave
in y = (y1; y2;    ; yp+q). Hence, the optimizer y() = (y1(); y2();    ; yp+q()) is well
dened and unique. As we will show in Section 6.4, several optimization problems in
our general joint pricing and inventory management model can be reduced to a convex
program similar to (6.1). A natural question on (6.1) is: how does y() change with ?
We have the following lemma that addresses this question.
Lemma 15 For the optimization problem dened in (6.1), yi () is increasing in , for
all 1  i  p.
Lemma 15 characterizes the impact of the parameter  upon the optimizer fyi ()g1ip.
Note that Lemma 15 does not give any comparative statics result for fyi ()gp+1ip+q,
because it is easy to construct functions ffi(); gi(j); h(j)g and feasible set Y   , such
that yi () is not monotone in  for some p + 1  i  p + q. See Appendix E.2 for an
example. We also remark that the assumption that fi()'s and gi(j)'s are strictly concave
is mainly for expositional convenience. When this assumption is relaxed to that they are
weakly concave, the optimizers may not be unique and we select the lexicographically
smallest one. In this case, Lemma 15 still holds and our new comparative statics method
is also valid.
We now explain in detail why the IFT and MCS approaches cannot be used to prove
Lemma 15. The rst issue related to the IFT approach is that F (j) may not be twice
continuously dierentiable on its domain. For example, if   is nite, F (j) is not twice
continuously dierentiable. Now we assume that   is an interval and F (j) is twice
continuously dierentiable. For any optimizer y() that lies in the interior of Y  , the
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implicit function theorem implies that y() is continuously dierentiable in , and the
derivative is given by:
dy
d
=  
 1V; (6.2)
where 
 is a (p+ q) (p+ q) matrix with 
i;j = ij@2y0h(
Pp+q
l=1 ly

l ()j) for all i 6= j,

i;i = f
00
i (y

i ()) + (i)
2@2y0h(
Pp+q
l=1 ly

l ()j) for 1  i  p, and 
i;i = @2yigi(yi ()j) +
(i)
2@2y0h(
Pp+q
l=1 ly

l ()j) for p + 1  i  p + q, and V is a (p + q)-vector with Vi =
i@y0@h(
Pp+q
l=1 ly

l ()j) for 1  i  p, and
Vi = @yi@gi(y

i ()j) + i@y0@h(
Pp+q
l=1 ly

l ()j) for p + 1  i  p + q. As p and q
increase, however, computing 
 1 in (6.2) suers from the curse of dimensionality, and,
in general, we are unable to characterize the sign of dyi = d for each i. When y
()
is on the boundary of Y (i.e., some of the constraints are binding), the IFT approach
can be generalized to the perturbation analysis approach (see, e.g., [76]), which, again,
determines the sign of the derivative of y() with respect to  by characterizing the
inverse of Hessian, and, hence, suers from the curse of dimensionality. Thus, it is very
dicult, if not impossible, to perform comparative statics analysis in (6.1) by the IFT
approach.
The MCS approach also fails to conduct the comparative statics analysis in (6.1).
More specically, it's clear that F (j) is not jointly supermodular in (y; ), nor does
it satisfy the single crossing property in (y; ). By [126], in order to apply the MCS
approach, it is necessary that the objective function should satisfy the single crossing
property with respect to the decision vector and the parameter. Moreover, the MCS ap-
proach, when applicable, always gives a comparative statics prediction for all the decision
variables of an optimization problem (see, e.g., [165]). In our optimization problem (6.1),
however, it is easy to specify functions ffi(); gi(j); h(j)g and feasible set Y   , such
that yi () is not monotone in  for some p + 1  i  p + q, as shown by the example in
Appendix E.2. Therefore, the MCS approach does not apply to the comparative statics
analysis in (6.1).
6.3.2 Proof of Lemma 15 with Our New Method
Since the standard IFT and MCS approaches are not applicable to conducting com-
parative statics analysis in (6.1), we develop a new method to prove Lemma 15. Before
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presenting the proof of Lemma 15 and our new method in detail, we introduce a lemma
that plays a key role therein:
Lemma 16 Let Fi(z; Zi) be a rst-order dierentiable function in (z; Zi) for i = 1; 2,
where z 2 [z; z] (z and z might be innite) and Zi 2 Zi, where Zi is the feasible set of
Zi. For i = 1; 2, let
(zi ; Z

i ) := argmax(z;Zi)2[z;z]ZiFi(z; Zi);
be the optimizer of Fi(; ). If z1 < z2, we have: @zF1(z1 ; Z1)  @zF2(z2 ; Z2):
Proof. z1 < z

2 , so z  z1 < z2  z. Hence, @zF1(z1 ; Z1)
8><>:= 0 if z

1 > z,
 0 if z1 = z;
and
@zF2(z

2 ; Z

2)
8><>:= 0 if z

2 < z,
 0 if z2 = z,
i.e., @zF1(z

1 ; Z

1)  0  @zF2(z2 ; Z2): Q:E:D:
Lemma 16 is straightforward, but it is a powerful tool in our new comparative statics
method, as illustrated by the proof of Lemma 15:
Proof of Lemma 15. We show by contradiction, i.e., we derive a contradiction
under the assumption that yi () > y

i (^) for some 1  i  p and  < ^. Without loss of
generality, we choose i = 1, i.e.,
y1() > y

1(^): (6.3)
Denote y0() :=
Pp+q
j=1 jy

j () for all  2  . Lemma 16 implies that @y1F (y()j) 
@y1F (y
(^)j^), i.e.,
@y1f1(y

1()) + 1@y0h(y

0()j) = @y1F (y()j) @y1F (y(^)j^)
=@y1f1(y

1(^)) + 1@y0h(y

0(^)j^):
(6.4)
The strict concavity of f1() yields that @y1f1(y1()) < @y1f1(y1(^)). Hence,
@y0h(y

0()j) > @y0h(y0(^)j^): (6.5)
Since h(j) is supermodular in (y0; ) and concave in y0, y0() < y0(^). Therefore,
there exists a j, 2  j  p+ q, such that yj () < yj (^). (6.6)
If 2  j  p, we invoke Lemma 16 again, so yj () < yj (^) implies that @yjF (y()j) 
@yjF (y
(^)j^), i.e.,
@yjfj(y

j ()) + j@y0h(y

0()j) = @yjF (y()j) @yjF (y(^)j^)
=@yjfj(y

j (^)) + j@y0h(y

0(^)j^):
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Since @y0h(y

0()j) > @y0h(y0(^)j^) by (6.5), @yjfj(yj ()) < @yjfj(yj (^)). Since fj() is
strictly concave, yj () < y

j (^) implies that
@yjfj(y

j ()) > @yjfj(y

j (^)); which contradicts @yjfj(y

j ()) < @yjfj(y

j (^)). (6.7)
Analogously, if p + 1  j  p + q in (6.6), Lemma 16 implies that @yjF (y()j) 
@yjF (y
(^)j^), i.e.,
@yjgj(y

j ()j) + j@y0h(y0()j) = @yjF (y()j) @yjF (y(^)j^)
=@yjgj(y

j (^)j^) + j@y0h(y0(^)j^):
Since @y0h(y

0()j) > @y0h(y0(^)j^) by (6.5), @yjgj(yj ()j) < @yjgj(yj (^)j^). Since
gj(j) is submodular in (yj; ) and strictly concave in yj, yj () < yj (^) implies that
@yjgj(y

j ()j) > @yjgj(yj (^)j^); which contradicts @yjgj(yj ()j) < @yjgj(yj (^)j^).
(6.8)
Combining the contradictions of (6.7) and (6.8), we have y1()  y1(^). Repeat the
above argument for 1 < i  p, it follows that yi ()  yi (^) for all 1  i  p. Q:E:D:
As we can see from the proof of Lemma 15, our new method employs Lemma 16
to make componentwise comparisons between the optimizers under dierent parameter
values. More specically, the method consists of ve steps: Step (a). For each of the
focal decision variable with some potential comparative statics result, we rst assume, to
the contrary, that the comparative statics prediction of this decision variable is reversed
for some parameter values (e.g., inequality (6.3) in the proof of Lemma 15). Step (b).
We invoke Lemma 16 to characterize some monotone relationships of the partial deriva-
tives of the objective function with respect to this decision variable at these parameter
values (e.g., inequality (6.4) in the proof of Lemma 15). Step (c). Using some model
specic properties of the objective function (e.g., the supermodularity in one decision
variable and the parameter, componentwise concavity, and rst-order dierentiability),
such monotone relationships of the partial derivatives can be translated back into the
monotone relationship of another optimal decision variable at the given parameter values
(e.g., inequality (6.6) in the proof of Lemma 15). Step (d). Repeating steps (b) - (c),
we employ Lemma 16 to iteratively establish the monotone relationship of partial deriva-
tives and that of some other optimal decision variables at the given parameter values.
This iterative procedure is stopped when either (i) the desired comparative statics result
158
for the focal decision variable is proved by contradiction (e.g., inequalities (6.7) and (6.8)
in the proof of Lemma 15), or (ii) no further monotone relationship can be established
(e.g., the case in which we assume that yi () > y

i (^) or y

i () < y

i (^) for  < ^ and
p + 1  i  p + q, see Appendix E.2). Step (e). We repeat the same iterative pro-
cedure, i.e., steps (a) - (d), for each focal decision variable to obtain its corresponding
comparative statics result.
Note that there are two stopping conditions for the iterative procedure in Step (d).
When the stopping condition (ii) applies, by our experience, it is very likely that there
exist some model specications such that the desired comparative statics result for the
focal decision variable does not hold. For example, in the optimization problem (6.1),
no contradiction can be reached under any monotone comparative statics prediction of
yi () (p + 1  i  p + q) with respect to  for general ffi(); gi(j); h(j)g functions.
In Appendix E.2, we discuss in detail on how the iterative procedure in Step (d) is
stopped without reaching a contradiction in this case, and give an example in which
yi () (p + 1  i  p + q) is not monotone in . Hence, our new method not only helps
prove the comparative statics results when they exist, but also helps identify cases in
which comparative statics results do not hold for some decision variables.
Our method proves the desired comparative statics result by contradiction. The
essence is to construct a contradiction by iteratively linking the monotone relationship
between the optimizers and that between the partial derivatives. Though simple, Lemma
16 plays a crucial role in this process, because, in Step (b), it translates the monotonic-
ity of the focal decision variable (in the parameter) into that of the partial derivative
of the objective function with respect to this decision variable at the optimizing point.
Hence, in Step (d), Lemma 16 enables us to iteratively link the monotone relationship
of optimizers and that of partial derivatives, which is the key to establish a contradiction
in our method. The main benet of Lemma 16 is that the monotonicity of the partial
derivatives with respect to the focal decision variable is irrelevant to the values of other
decision variables at the optimizing point. This benet allows us to perform comparative
statics analysis componentwisely in Step (e). Hence, our method enables us to perform
comparative statics analysis in a model where only part of the optimal decision variables
are monotone in the parameter, and it is scalable. The componentwise comparison be-
tween the optimizers is also the key dierence between our method and the IFT and
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MCS approaches, both of which involve the analysis of some properties of the objective
function in terms of the whole decision vector (e.g., the Hessian and/or the joint super-
modularity of the objective function). Moreover, since the objective functions in Lemma
16, Fi(; ) (i = 1; 2), can be completely dierent, our method can be used to compare the
optimal decisions in dierent models. See, e.g., the proofs of Theorems 6.4.7, 6.4.8, and
6.5.5 in Appendix E.1.
Although our method is fundamentally dierent from the IFT and MCS approaches,
it shares some similarity with these two standard approaches. As the IFT approach, the
proposed method studies the rst-order (KKT) condition at the optimizer of interest.
Hence, the objective function needs to satisfy the rst-order continuous dierentiabil-
ity condition, but not necessarily the second-order continuous dierentiability condition.
Analogous to the MCS approach, our new method analyzes the impact of the parameter
upon the marginal value of each decision variable in detail, so that we can translate the
monotonicity of partial derivatives with respect to one decision variable back into the
monotonicity of another optimal decision variable. Thus, in order to obtain a contradic-
tion (and a comparative statics result), our method requires the objective function to be
supermodular in the parameter and each of the focal decision variables (e.g., F (yj) is
supermodular in (yi; ) for each 1  i  p in our example), but not necessarily jointly
supermodular or satisfying the single crossing property. The above two condition relax-
ations enhance the applicability of our method in the general joint pricing and inven-
tory management model with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market
environment uctuation, where the second-order continuous dierentiability and/or, in
particular, the joint supermodularity of the objective function in each decision epoch are
hard, if not impossible, to establish. In the next section, we discuss in detail how the
new method facilitates the comparative statics analysis in this model. We also demon-
strate the applicability of our method in game theoretic models of joint price and eort
competition in Section 6.5.
6.4 Application of the New Comparative Statics Method in a General Joint
Pricing and Inventory Management Model
In this section, we employ our new comparative statics method to study a general
joint pricing and inventory management model with demand segmentation, supply di-
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versication, and market environment uctuation. The comparative statics analysis is
essential to studying this model, because it enables us to characterize the optimal pricing
and replenishment policy, and the impact of demand segmentation, supply diversication,
and market environment uctuation therein. The analysis in this section demonstrates
the applicability of our new method in joint pricing and inventory management models.
6.4.1 Model
We consider a T -period joint pricing and inventory management model, in which a
rm replenishes inventory from a portfolio of supply channels and serves multiple demand
segments with endogenous sales prices. The rm maximizes its total discounted prot
over the planning horizon by optimizing its joint pricing and inventory policy in each
period. The periods are indexed backwards as fT; T   1;    ; 1g and the discount factor
is denoted as  2 (0; 1).
We assume that the customer market is completely segmented, i.e., each customer in
the market unambiguously belongs to a specic demand segment. Complete segmentation
applies to the settings where customers are classied based on the dierences in, e.g., (a)
geographic area, (b) the need for product feature, (c) socioeconomic attributes, and (d)
business sector (in B2B market) (see, e.g., [10, 139]). There are n demand segments in
the market, and we denote them as N := f1; 2;    ; ng. In period t, the rm selects a
vector of prices, pt = (p
1
t ; p
2
t ;    ; pnt ), for dierent demand segments. More specically,
for each i 2 N , pit 2 [pimin; pimax] is the sales price for customers in segment i, where
pimin > 0 [p
i
max  +1] is the minimum [maximum] allowable price for this segment. We
use it > 0 to denote the expected maximum demand (i.e., the market size) from segment
i in period t. Let t := (
1
t ;
2
t ;    ;nt ) be the market size vector. Since customers are
completely segmented, the demand from segment i is independent of the sales price in
segment j (i 6= j). Specically, we assume that, given the sales price pit and the market
size it, the demand from segment i in period t is given as follows:
Dit(p
i
t;
i
t) = 
i
td
i(pit)&t + 
i
t: (6.9)
In (6.9), di(pit) denotes the probability that an arriving customer in segment i will make
a purchase when facing a sales price pit, where d
i() is a strictly decreasing function of
pit. A typical example of this specication is the independent reservation price model
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(e.g., s[83]). &t is the demand-segment-independent multiplicative market size pertur-
bation, which represents the common demand shock (e.g., global economic changes)
on each segment. We assume that f&tg1t=T are i:i:d: positive random variables inde-
pendent of t with mean 1. The additive random perturbation term 
i
t captures all
other uncertainties not explicitly considered in this model. We assume that fitg1t=T
are i:i:d: continuous random variables independent of t and &t with mean 0. Hence,
Dit(p
i
t;
i
t) follows a continuous distribution for any given (p
i
t;
i
t) and i 2 N . We use
Dt(pt;t) = (D
1
t (p
1
t ;
1
t ); D
2
t (p
2
t ;
2
t );    ; Dnt (pnt ;nt )) to denote the demand vector for all
demand segments, with the sales price vector pt and the market size vector t in period
t. Given (pt;t), the accumulative demand from all segments in period t is given by:
Dat (pt;t) =
X
i2N
Dit(p
i
t;
i
t) = (
nX
i=1
itd
i(pit))&t + t; (6.10)
where the superscript `a' refers to \accumulative", and t :=
Pn
i=1 
i
t represents the
accumulative additive perturbation in period t.
For each i, since di(pit) is strictly decreasing, it has a strictly decreasing inverse
pi() that maps from [dimin; dimax] to [pimin; pimax], where dimin = di(pimax) = 0 and dimax =
di(pimin)  1. We view the purchasing probability vector dt := (d1t ; d2t ;    ; dnt ), instead of
the sales price vector pt, as the decision variable in each period. Without loss of generality,
we assume that dimax = dmax  1 for any i 2 N , i.e., the maximum expected purchasing
probability is the same for every demand segment. Since di(pimax) = 0, our model endog-
enizes the option that, for any i 2 N , the rm can choose not to sell to demand segment
i by charging a prohibitively high sales price pimax. We impose the following assumption
throughout our analysis:
Assumption 6.4.1 For each demand segment i 2 N , Ri(dit) := pi(dit)dit is continuously
dierentiable and concave in dit 2 [0; dmax].
Note that the strict monotonicity of pi(), together with the concavity of Ri(), suggests
that Ri() is strictly concave in dit for each i 2 N . We remark that, when there is only
one demand segment (n = 1), our demand model is reduced to the most commonly
studied demand model in the joint pricing and inventory management literature. See,
e.g., [47, 50, 189].
The rm sources from a portfolio of m supply channels, which is denoted as M =
f1; 2;    ;mg. In period t, the rm selects a vector of order quantities, qt = (q1t ; q2t ;    ; qmt ),
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from dierent supply channels. More specically, the rm orders qjt  0 from supply chan-
nel j and pays a cost Cj(qjt jcjt), where Cj(jcjt) is the cost function of supply channel j
when the reference procurement cost is cjt , and C
j(0jcjt) = 0 for all j 2M. The reference
procurement cost cjt is an index for the actual procurement cost of supply channel j,
which is independent of the rm's pricing and inventory policy. For example, cjt can be
viewed as the unit procurement cost of the raw material in supply channel j. Since an
increase in cjt increases the marginal cost of sourcing from supply channel j, we assume
that Cj(j) is supermodular in (qjt ; cjt) for any j 2 M. We use ct := (c1t ; c2t ;    ; cmt ) to
denote the reference procurement cost vector in period t. Moreover, we assume that there
exists diseconomy of scale to source from each supply channel, i.e., Cj(jcjt) is convexly
increasing in qjt for each j 2 M. In reality, this assumption applies when the supply
channel is capacitated, so that orders exceeding the standard capacity are charged a
higher rate for the additional outsourcing costs and/or overtime labor costs (see [155]).
The assumption of convex ordering cost is necessary to prove the convexity [concavity] of
the optimal cost [prot] function in a multi-period model, and common in the inventory
management literature (see, e.g., [181, 50]). Without loss of generality, we assume that
Cj(jcjt) is continuously dierentiable in qjt for any qjt  0. For expositional ease (i.e., to
ensure the uniqueness of the optimizer), we assume that Cj(jcjt) is strictly convex for
each j. This assumption is made without loss of generality. If we relax this assumption
to that Cj(jcjt)'s are weakly convex, all results in this section continue to hold with more
tedious proofs, as long as we select the lexicographically smallest optimizer in each deci-
sion epoch. Consistent with most of the joint pricing and inventory management models
in the literature, we assume that the replenishment leadtime to source from any supply
channel is 0. Finally, we remark that the rm employs the supply diversication strategy
to hedge against: (a) the procurement cost uctuation risk caused by the volatility of ct,
and (b) the diseconomy of scale for each supply channel.
The rm operates under a uctuating market environment with stochastically varying
market sizes t and reference procurement costs ct. Let the (n+m)-vector t := (t; ct)
be the state of the market environment in period t. We assume that t evolves ac-
cording to an exogenous Markov process throughout the planning horizon. Let  it :=
(1t ;    ;i 1t ;i+1t ;    ;nt ) and c jt := (c1t ;    ; cj 1t ; cj+1t ;    ; cmt ). We assume that, for
any i 2 N [j 2M], conditioned on it [cjt ], it 1 [cjt 1] is independent of ( it ; ct) [(t; c jt )],
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i.e., it [c
j
t ] is a sucient statistic for 
i
t 1 [c
j
t 1]. Hence, the dynamics of t can be repre-
sented as it 1 = 
;i
t (
i
t) and c
j
t 1 = 
c;j
t (c
j
t), where Ef;it (it)jtg;Efc;jt (cjt)jtg < +1.
We further assume that, if ^it > 
i
t [c^
j
t > c
j
t ], 
;i
t (^
i
t) s:d: ;it (it) [c;jt (c^jt) s:d: c;jt (cjt)],
where s:d: denotes the rst-order stochastic dominance. This is an intuitive assumption,
since a higher current market size is more likely to give rise to a higher market size in
the next period, and the same is true for the reference procurement cost. Moreover, we
assume that, for any given t, 
;i
t (
i
t) and 
c;j
t (c
j
t) are independent of t and &t.
The sequence of events in each period unfolds as follows. At the beginning of period t,
the rm reviews its inventory level It and the realized state of market environment t. The
rm then simultaneously decides the sales price for each demand segment and the order
quantity from each supply channel, and pays the total procurement cost
P
j2MC
j(qjt jcjt).
The orders are received immediately, after which the price-dependent stochastic demand
vector Dt(pt;t) realizes. The rm then collects revenue from the realized demand.
Unmet demand is fully backlogged and excess inventory is fully carried over to the next
period. Finally, the rm pays H(z) for the inventory holding and backlogging cost for
z units of ending net inventory, where H() is a convex function with H(0) = 0 and
H() > 0 otherwise. Moreover, we assume that H() satises the Lipchitz continuity with
the Lipchitz constant cH , i.e., for any z1; z2 2 R, jH(z1) H(z2)j  cH jz1 z2j. Note that
although the demand, cost, and inventory penalty functions are assumed to be stationary
for expositional convenience, the structural results in this section remain valid when they
are time-dependent.
To formulate the planning problem as a dynamic program, let
Vt(Itjt) = the maximum expected discounted total prot in periods t; t  1;    ; 0,
when the starting inventory level in period t is It and the realized market
environment state is t.
Without loss of generality, we assume that excess inventory at the end of the planning
horizon is discarded without any salvage value, i.e., V0(I0j0) = 0. The optimal value
functions satisfy the following recursive scheme:
Vt(Itjt) = max
(dt;qt)2F
Jt(dt; qt; Itjt); (6.11)
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where F := f(dt; qt) : 8i 2 N ; dit 2 [0; dmax];8j 2M; qjt  0g; and (6.12)
Jt(dt; qt; Itjt) := Ef
X
i2N
pi(dit)D
i
t(p
i
t(d
i
t);
i
t) 
X
j2M
Cj(qjt jcjt)
 H(It +
X
j2M
qjt  Dat (p(dt);t))
+Vt 1(It +
X
j2M
qjt  Dat (p(dt);t)jt 1)jtg
= (
X
i2N
itR
i(dit)) 
X
j2M
Cj(qjt jcjt)
+E&tf	t(It +
X
j2M
qjt   (
X
i2N
itd
i
t)&tjt)g; (6.13)
with 	t(zjt) := Et 1;tf H(z   t) + Vt 1(z   tjt 1)jtg: (6.14)
Therefore, for each period t, the rm's prot-maximizing problem is to select a joint
pricing and replenishment policy (dt (It; t); q

t (It; t)) 2 F to maximize Jt(dt; qt; Itjt),
with starting inventory level It and market environment state t. We use xt := It +P
j2M q
j
t to denote the total order-up-to level, and x

t (It; t) := It +
P
j2M q
j
t (It; t)
to denote the optimal total order-up-to level. Moreover, let N t (It; t) := fi 2 N :
dit (It; t) > 0g and Mt (It; t) := fj 2 N : qjt (It; t) > 0g, i.e., N t (It; t) is the optimal
set of active demand segments to which the rm sells, and Mt (It; t) is the optimal set
of active supply channels from which the rm orders.
To conclude this subsection, we characterize some preliminary concavity and dier-
entiability properties of the value and objective functions in the following lemma.
Lemma 17 For t = T; T   1;    ; 1 and any given (It; t), the following statements hold:
(a) 	t(jt) is concave and continuously dierentiable in z.
(b) Jt(; ; Itjt) is strictly jointly concave and continuously dierentiable in (dt; qt).
(a) Vt(jt) is concave and continuously dierentiable in It.
It follows immediately from Lemma 17 that the optimal joint pricing and ordering policy
(dt (It; t); q

t (It; t)) is well-dened and unique in the feasible set F .
6.4.2 Comparative Statics Analysis with Our New Method
First we observe that, by Equation (6.13), the objective function in each period
Jt(; ; Itjt) is of the similar form to our illustrative optimization problem (i.e., Equa-
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tion (6.1)) in Section 6.3. Therefore, following the same argument as the discussion in
Section 6.3.1, the standard IFT and MCS approaches are generally not applicable to com-
parative statics analysis in our general joint pricing and inventory management model
with demand segmentation, supply diversication and uctuating market environment.
Therefore, we employ our new comparative statics method to study this model. Moreover,
Lemma 15 applies to the proofs of several comparative statics results in this subsection,
including Theorem 6.4.1 and Theorems 6.4.4-6.4.6. To begin with, we apply our new
comparative statics method to characterize the optimal policy structure in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.4.1 (Optimal policy structure.) For t = T; T   1;    ; 1 and any
given t, the following statements hold:
(a) For each i 2 N , dit (It; t) is continuously increasing in It. Moreover, there exists
a threshold Id;it (t) < +1, such that it is optimal to serve demand segment i, if
and only if It > I
d;i
t (t), i.e., d
i
t (It; t)
8><>:> 0; It > I
d;i
t (t);
= 0; otherwise:
Moreover, N t (It; t) 
N t (I^t; t) for all It < I^t.
(b) For each j 2M, qjt (It; t) is continuously decreasing in It. Moreover, there exists a
threshold Iq;jt (t) < +1, such that it is optimal to order from supply channel j if and
only if It < I
q;j
t (t), i.e., q
j
t (It; t)
8><>:> 0; It < I
q;j
t (t);
= 0; otherwise:
Moreover, Mt (I^t; t) 
Mt (It; t) for all It < I^t.
(c) xt (It; t) is continuously increasing in It.
Theorem 6.4.1 shows that, in each period, the optimal policy is a state-dependent
threshold policy. More specically, for each demand segment i 2 N [supply channel
j 2 M], the rm should sell to this segment [order from this channel] if and only if the
starting inventory level It is above [below] the corresponding threshold I
d;i
t (t) [I
q;j
t (t)].
This optimal policy structure is characterized by employing our new method to establish
the monotonicity of the optimal sales price/order quantity with respect to the starting
inventory level. More specically, both the optimal sales price for each demand segment,
pi(dit (It; t)), and the optimal order quantity from each supply channel, q
j
t (It; t), are
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decreasing in the starting inventory level, whereas the optimal total order-up-to level
xt (It; t) is increasing in the starting inventory level. Consequently, the optimal set
of active demand segments, N t (It; t) [active supply channels, Mt (It; t)], is increasing
[decreasing], in the set inclusion order, in the starting inventory level. Theorem 6.4.1
generalizes the base-stock list-price policy in the joint pricing and inventory management
literature to the general setting with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and
market environment uctuation. Due to the diseconomy of scale and supply diversi-
cation, the order-up-to level and sales prices are inventory-dependent in this general
setting. Finally, we remark that if the multiplicative random perturbation in market size
is demand-segment-dependent (i.e., Dit(p
i
t;
i
t) = 
i
td
i(pit)&
i
t + 
i
t for i 2 N and & it 's are
independent for dierent i's), parts (b) and (c) of Theorem 6.4.1 still hold but part (a)
doesn't. It is well established in the inventory management literature that when there
exist multiple multiplicative random perturbations in the system, the optimal order quan-
tities and/or sales prices are, in general, not monotone in the starting inventory level (see
[72]).
A key question in this inventory system is, for a given starting inventory level and
market state, how to determine the optimal set of active demand segments, N t (It; t),
and the optimal set of active supply channels, Mt (It; t). The following theorem par-
tially addresses this issue by comparing the optimal purchasing probabilities for dierent
demand segments, and the optimal order quantities from dierent supply channels.
Theorem 6.4.2 For t = T; T  1;    ; 1 and any given t, the following statements hold:
(a) Given i; i^ 2 N , if @ditRi(z)  @di^tR
i^(z) for each z 2 [0; dmax], dit (It; t)  di^t (It; t),
and Id;it (t)  Id;^it (t) for any (It; t). In particular, if @d1tR1(z)  @d2tR2(z)     
@dnt R
n(z) for each z 2 [0; dmax], Id;1t (t)  Id;2t (t)      Id;nt (t) for any t, and
N t (It; t) = f1; 2; ;    ; ig, where i = maxfi : It > Id;it (t)g.
(b) Assume that ct is xed. Given j; j^ 2M, if @qjtC
j(zjcjt)  @qj^tC
j^(zjcj^t) for any z  0,
qjt (It; t)  qj^t (It; t) and Iq;jt (t)  Iq;j^t (t) for any It and t. In particular, if
@q1tC
1(zjc1t )  @q2tC2(zjc2t )      @qmt Cm(zjcmt ) for any z  0, I
q;1
t (t)  Iq;2t (t) 
    Iq;mt (t) for any t, andMt (It; t) = fj; j+1; ;    ;mg, where j = minfj :
It < I
q;j
t (t)g.
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In Theorem 6.4.2, we show that the rm sells more to a demand segment with higher
marginal revenue with respect to demand, and it orders more from a supply channel with
lower marginal procurement cost. Moreover, when the marginal revenues with respect
to demand [marginal procurement costs] for dierent demand segments [supply channels]
have the same order for all purchasing probabilities [order quantities], the optimal set of
active demand segments [supply channels], N t (It; t) [Mt (It; t)], is consecutive in the
marginal revenue with respect to demand [marginal procurement cost].
Next, we employ our new comparative statics method to study the impact of market
uctuation upon the rm's optimal pricing and ordering policy. In this application, we
integrate our new method with the standard backward induction argument to perform
comparative statics analysis in a dynamic program. More specically, by employing
Lemma 16, we iteratively link the comparison between optimizers and that between
partial derivatives of the value functions and objective functions by backward induction.
This treatment is necessary because the current market state also impacts future market
states and, thus, the value functions in the future. For the rest of this subsection, we
make the additional assumption that &t = 1 with probability 1 for all t, i.e., the demand
process follows an additive form. The additive demand assumption is commonly imposed
in the joint pricing and inventory management literature for tractability (see, e.g., [112,
136, 189]). In our model, this assumption enables us to iteratively link the monotone
relationship between the optimizers and that between the partial derivatives. For the
rest of this subsection, since &t = 1 with probability 1 for all t, we rewrite the objective
function in period t as
Jt(dt; qt; Itjt) = (
X
i2N
itR
i(dit)) 
X
j2M
Cj(qjt jcjt) + 	t(It +
X
j2M
qjt   (
X
i2N
itd
i
t)jt):
Moreover, we dene t (It; t) := x

t (It; t)   (
P
i2N 
i
td
i
t (It; t)) as the optimal safety
stock in period t with starting inventory level It and market state t. The following
theorem characterizes the impact of current market size on the optimal sales prices and
order quantities.
Theorem 6.4.3 (Impact of market size.) Assume that, for each t = T; T 1;    ; 1,
&t = 1 with probability 1. For any given t, let t = (t; ct) and ^t = (^t; ct) with ^t > t.
For any It, the following statements hold:
(a) @ItVt(Itj^t)  @ItVt(Itjt).
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(b) For each i 2 N , dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t), Id;it (^t)  Id;it (t), and, thus, N t (It; ^t) 
N t (It; t).
(c) For each j 2 M, qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t), Iq;jt (^t)  Iq;jt (t), and, thus, Mt (It; t) 
Mt (It; ^t).
(d) xt (It; ^t)  xt (It; t).
Theorem 6.4.3 proves that an increase in the current market size of any demand
segment has the following impacts: (a) it prompts the rm to increase the sales price
for each demand segment; (b) it drives the rm to order more from each supply channel;
and (c) it motivates the rm to set a higher total order-up-to level. As the market size
of one demand segment increases, the rm should increase its order quantities from all
the supply channels to match supply with demand, so the optimal set of active supply
channels is enlarged. At the same time, the rm should increase its sales prices in all
demand segments, and the optimal set of active demand segments is smaller. Moreover,
since the potential market size is more likely to become larger with a larger current market
size, it is optimal for the rm to keep a higher total order-up-to level.
The risks and opportunities of procurement cost uctuation have been extensively
studied in [173]. In a model with one demand segment and two supply channels, the
paper shows that inventory becomes more valuable under a higher current procurement
cost, and the optimal sales price is increasing in the current procurement cost so that
the rm should pass part of the cost uctuation risk to its customers. In Theorem 6.4.4
below, we generalize these results to our joint pricing and inventory management model
with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment uctuation.
More specically, we show that, with a higher reference procurement cost of any supply
channel, the marginal value of inventory is higher, and the rm charges a higher sales
price in each demand segment. As a result, the demand in each segment and the optimal
set of active segments are decreasing in the reference procurement cost of any supply
channel.
On the other hand, [173] show that the impact of cost on the rm's replenishment
policy is more involved, because the current procurement cost also summarizes the infor-
mation on future costs. When facing a higher current procurement cost, the rm faces
the tradeo between ordering less to save current cost and ordering more to speculate
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on higher future costs. Numerical studies in [173] demonstrate that the optimal order
quantities may not be monotone in the current procurement cost when the rm orders its
inventory either from a spot market or through a forward-buying contract. In our model,
the optimal order quantity from a supply channel continues to be non-monotone in its
own reference procurement cost. However, we are able to show, in the following theorem,
that as the reference procurement costs of one or more supply channels increase, the
optimal order quantities and ordering thresholds of the supply channels with unchanged
reference procurement costs increase as well.
Theorem 6.4.4 (Impact of current reference procurement cost.) Assume
that, for each t = T; T 1;    ; 1, &t = 1 with probability 1. For any given t, let t = (t; ct)
and ^t = (t; c^t) with c^t > ct. For any It, the following statements hold:
(a) @ItVt(Itj^t)  @ItVt(Itjt).
(b) For each i 2 N , dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t), Id;it (^t)  Id;it (t), and, thus, N t (It; ^t) 
N t (It; t).
(c) If c^jt = c
j
t , q
j
t (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) and Iq;jt (^t)  Iq;jt (t).
In addition to the current market condition, the rm should also take into account
the future market trend to achieve the long-run optimality. Our new comparative statics
method enables us to oer insights on the optimal responses of the rm to potential
changes in the future market condition. We rst study the impact of future market size
trend on the rm's optimal decisions.
Theorem 6.4.5 (Impact of market size trend.) Assume that, for each t = T; T  
1;    ; 1, &t = 1 with probability 1. Let the two systems be equivalent except that ^;it (it) s:d:
;it (
i
t) for any t, i 2 N , and t. For any t and (It; t), the following statements hold:
(a) @ItV^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt).
(b) For each i 2 N , d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t), I^d;it (t)  Id;it (t), and, thus, N^ t (It; t) 
N t (It; t).
(c) For each j 2 M, q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t), I^q;jt (t)  Iq;jt (t), and, thus, Mt (It; t) 
M^t (It; t).
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(d) x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t) and ^t (It; t)  t (It; t).
Theorem 6.4.5 shows that, under a higher market size trend for any demand segment,
it is optimal to charge higher sales prices to all demand segments and, thus, sell to a
smaller set of segments. On the other hand, a higher market size trend implies higher
future demand, so the rm should order more from all supply channels, expand the set
of active supply channels, and set a higher safety stock to hold more inventory for future
consumption.
As shown by [173], a higher procurement cost trend increases the marginal value of
inventory and prompts the rm to increase its order quantities both from the spot market
and through the forward-buying contract so as to save the future cost. A higher safety
stock should also be kept. In addition, the rm should raise its sales price to consume
its inventory in the most protable way. In our general model, we show that, when the
reference procurement cost trend in one system is higher than that in the other, all of
the comparative statics results in [173] continue to hold for each demand segment and
supply channel. In addition, with a higher cost trend, the optimal set of active demand
segments [supply channels] is smaller [larger].
Theorem 6.4.6 (Impact of cost trend.) Assume that, for each t = T; T  1;    ; 1,
&t = 1 with probability 1. Let the two systems be equivalent except that ^
c;j
t (c
j
t) s:d: c;jt (cjt)
for any t, j 2M and ct. For any t and (It; t), the following statements hold:
(a) @ItV^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt).
(b) For each i 2 N , d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t), I^d;it (t)  Id;it (t), and, thus, N^ t (It; t) 
N t (It; t).
(c) For each j 2 M, q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t), I^q;jt (t)  Iq;jt (t), and, thus, Mt (It; t) 
M^t (It; t).
(d) x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t) and ^t (It; t)  t (It; t).
In addition, our new method enables us to perform comparative statics analysis for the
optimal decisions in dierent models with non-parameterizable changes. More specically,
we employ our method to characterize the impact of sales and procurement exibilities
(i.e., additional demand segments and supply channels) upon the rm's optimal pricing
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and replenishment policy. When the rm is blessed with the opportunity to sell to
additional demand segments, the marginal value of inventory increases, and the rm
should charge higher prices in the original segments. Moreover, the rm should increase
its replenishment quantities from all supply channels and expand the set of active supply
channels, so as to match supply with the higher demand from a larger pool of segments.
These intuitions are formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4.7 (Impact of additional demand segments.) Assume that, for each
t = T; T   1;    ; 1, &t = 1 with probability 1. Let the two systems be equivalent except for
N  N^ . For t = T; T   1;    ; 1, and any (It; t), the following statements hold:
(a) @ItV^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt).
(b) For each i 2 N , d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t), I^d;it (t)  Id;it (t), and, thus, (N^ t (It; t) \
N )  N t (It; t).
(c) For each j 2 M, q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t), I^q;jt (t)  Iq;jt (t), and, thus, Mt (It; t) 
M^t (It; t).
(d) x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t).
On the other hand, the supply diversication strategy enables the rm to hedge against
the procurement cost uctuation risk and the diseconomy of scale of the supply channels.
By sourcing from a larger supply pool, the rm enjoys more procurement exibility, and
orders less from each of the original supply channels. Moreover, the marginal value of
inventory is smaller with a larger supply pool, and, to match supply with demand, the
rm should set lower sales prices in all demand segments and sell to more segments.
Theorem 6.4.8 (Impact of additional supply channels.) Assume that, for each
t = T; T   1;    ; 1, &t = 1 with probability 1. Let the two systems be equivalent except for
M M^. For t = T; T   1;    ; 1, and any (It; t), the following statements hold:
(a) @ItV^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt).
(b) For each i 2 N , d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t), I^d;it (t)  Id;it (t), and, thus, N t (It; t) 
N^ t (It; t).
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(c) For each j 2M, q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t), I^q;jt (t)  Iq;jt (t), and, thus, (M^t (It; t) \
M) Mt (It; t).
To sum up, comparative statics analysis is essential in our general joint pricing and
inventory management model with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and
market environment uctuation. Although the standard IFT and MCS approaches do
not apply to this complex model, our new comparative statics method enables us to
characterize its optimal policy as a state-dependent threshold policy, and to analyze the
impact of market uctuation and operational exibilities upon the optimal policy.
6.5 Application of the New Comparative Statics Method in a Competition
Model
In this section, we apply our new method to comparative statics analysis in a joint
price and eort competition model, which, as we will show, cannot be conducted with
the standard IFT and MCS approaches. We remark that the notations in this section are
independent of those in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
More specically, we consider an oligopoly industry of N competing rms. Each rm
oers a partially substitutable product with unit production cost ci > 0. Each rm i
selects a sales price pi 2 [pmini ; pmaxi ] and an eort level yi  0. We assume that, for each
i, pmini = ci. In addition, we make the same assumption as [9] that p
max
i is suciently large
so that it has no impact on the equilibrium behavior. Each rm i can exert eort yi (on,
e.g., R&D or advertising) to increase its demand. We use Y :=
PN
i=1 yi to denote the total
eort level. Let p := (p1; p2;    ; pN) be the vector of sales prices and y := (y1; y2;    ; yN)
be the vector of eort levels. For any decision vector (p; y), the demand for rm i is given
in the following quasi-separable form:
i(p; y; i) = (i + f(Y )  bipi +
X
j 6=i
ijpj)
+; (6.15)
where i 2 [min; max] is the rm-dependent market index, capturing other impact factors
on demand beyond price and eort (e.g., brand image). It is commonly assumed in
the R&D and research joint venture literature (e.g., [104]) that the total eort level in
the industry has an accumulative eect upon the demand of each rm. We model this
accumulative eect by f(Y ), and assume that f() is a strictly increasing, continuously
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dierentiable, and strictly concave function that is bounded from above by M < +1.
As [9], we assume that i(p; y; i) > 0 whenever pi = p
min
i = ci, i.e., each rm i can
have a positive demand under zero prot margin, regardless of the competing rms' price
decisions and all rms' eort decisions. We remark that although we do not assume
i(p; y; i) > 0 for all feasible (p; y), we will show that the equilibrium demand of each
rm is positive. We also make the standard assumption that bi; ij > 0 for all i; j, and
that the dominant diagonal condition holds, i.e., bi >
P
j 6=i ij > 0 and bi >
P
j 6=i ji > 0.
The interpretation of the dominant diagonal condition is that an uniform price increase
of all rms cannot result in a demand increase in any rm, and that a price increase of
any rm cannot result in an increase in the total demand of the industry (see, also, [9]).
Consistent with the standard assumption in the economics literature ([121]), we as-
sume that, for each rm i, the cost of exerting eort yi is Ci(yi), where Ci() is an
increasing, strictly convex, and continuously dierentiable function. Thus, the prot of
rm i in this joint price and eort competition is given by:
i(p; yj) = (pi   ci)i(p; y; i)  Ci(yi); (6.16)
where  := (1; 2;    ; N) represents the market index vector.
Depending on the industry dynamics, two competition models are considered: (a)
the eort-level-rst competition (EF), and (b) the simultaneous competition (SC). In the
eort-level-rst competition, the rms rst choose their eort levels (on, e.g., R&D or
advertising), and then select the sales prices in the second stage. In the simultaneous
competition, the rms make eort and price decisions simultaneously. In the next two
subsections, we employ our new comparative statics method to characterize the equilib-
rium in these two competition models, and study how the equilibrium prices and eort
levels change with the market index vector . Finally, in Section 6.5.3, we compare the
equilibrium decisions in these two competition models.
6.5.1 Eort-Level-First Competition
In this subsection, we study the eort-level-rst competition model. In this model,
the rms engage in a two-stage game, in which they compete on market expanding eort
in the rst stage and on sales price in the second stage. This model is suitable for
the scenario in which the stickiness of market expanding eort choices is much higher
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than that of sales price choices. For example, due to the long leadtime for technology
development, decisions on R&D eort are usually made well in advance of price decisions.
To analyze this two-stage game, we begin with the price competition in the second stage.
In this stage, the eort level in the rst stage y is observable by all rms. Let A be
an N  N matrix with Aii = 2bi, Aij =  ij for i 6= j, a(Y; ) be a column vector
with ai(Y; ) = i + f(Y ) = i + f(
PN
j=1 yj), and  be a column vector with i = bici.
Given any eort level y, the equilibrium price, p(y; ), in the second-stage competition
is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5.1 (Second-stage price competition.) For a given eort level vector
y, the following statements hold:
(a) The equilibrium in the second-stage price competition is unique and given by p(y; ) =
A 1(a(Y; )+), with pi (y; ) > p
min
i = ci. The unique equilibrium demand for rm
i is given by i (y; ) = bi(p

i (y; )  ci) > 0. Hence, for any i, pi (y; ) and i (y; )
depend on the eort level vector y only through the total eort level Y .
(b) pi (y; ) is strictly increasing in Y , with @yjp

i (y; ) = @Y p

i (y; ) = (
PN
l=1(A
 1)il)f 0(Y )
for each i and j. Hence, i (y; ) is strictly increasing in Y and, thus, yj for any i
and j.
Theorem 6.5.1 proves that, given any eort level vector in the rst-stage, the second-
stage price competition has a unique equilibrium. Moreover, under the equilibrium, each
rm achieves a positive prot margin and a positive demand. Both the equilibrium price
and demand of each rm are strictly increasing in the total eort level. Higher eort
level in the rst stage increases the market demand, and motivates each rm to charge a
higher sales price.
Based on Theorem 6.5.1, we study the rst-stage competition, in which the rms
choose their eort levels. Since p(y; ) depends on y only through the total eort
level Y , we use p(Y; ) to denote the equilibrium price in the second-stage competi-
tion. As a result, the equilibrium demand can be represented as (Y; ), with i (Y; ) =
bi(p

i (Y; )  ci). Plugging p(Y; ) and (Y; ) into (6.16), we obtain the objective func-
tions in the rst-stage game:
i(yj) = bi(pi (Y; )  ci)2   Ci(yi); for i = 1; 2;    ; N . (6.17)
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Following [104], we make the following assumption on f().
Assumption 6.5.1 (f(x)  f0)2 is concave in x for x  0, where f0 := f(0).
Assumption 6.5.1 guarantees the concavity of the objective functions in the rst-stage
eort competition and, thus, the existence of an equilibrium. This assumption is the
counterpart of Assumption 3 in [104]. With the help of Assumption 6.5.1, we characterize
the equilibrium of the rst-stage eort competition in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5.2 (Effort-level-first competition.) Under Assumption 6.5.1, the
following statements hold:
(a) Given any , the rst-stage eort competition has a unique equilibrium yEF ().
(b) Let Y EF () :=
PN
i=1 y

EF;i() be the equilibrium total eort level in the rst-stage
competition. p(Y EF (); ) is the unique associated equilibrium price vector and
(Y EF (); ) is the unique associated equilibrium demand vector in the second-stage
competition, where p(; ) and (; ) are given in Theorem 6.5.1(a).
Theorem 6.5.2 shows that the two-stage eort-level-rst competition has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. The proof of Theorem 6.5.2 heavily relies on our new
comparative statics method, which enables us to establish the monotone relationship that
the equilibrium eort level of each rm, yEF;i(), is decreasing in the equilibrium total
eort level Y EF (). Such monotonicity, together with the identity that
PN
i=1 y

EF;i() =
Y EF (), guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the rst-stage eort competition.
A natural question in this competition is how the market index  inuences the equi-
librium price p(Y EF (); ) and equilibrium eort y

EF (). Intuition suggests that, under a
better market condition, the rms should decrease their market expanding eorts to save
costs. The following theorem shows that this intuition is reversed in the eort-level-rst
competition.
Theorem 6.5.3 (Impact of market index.) Under Assumption 6.5.1, the following
statements hold:
(a) Y EF () is increasing in i for any i.
(b) pi (Y

EF (); ) and 

i (Y

EF (); ) are increasing in j for any i and j.
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Theorem 6.5.3 shows that the equilibrium total eort level Y EF () is increasing in
each market index, i. As a result, the equilibrium sales price and demand of each
rm are increasing in the market index of any rm. Note that Theorem 6.5.3 cannot
be proved by the standard IFT and MCS approaches. It is possible that f(), and
hence, the objective function i(j), are not twice continuously dierentiable. Even if
i(j) is twice continuously dierentiable in (y; ) for each i, calculating the inverse of
the Hessian in the rst-stage eort competition can be prohibitively dicult when N is
large. Therefore, the IFT approach has poor scalability, and it is very dicult, if not
impossible, to prove Theorem 6.5.3 by the IFT approach. On the other hand, although
i(j) is supermodular in yi and j for any i and j, it is not jointly supermodular in
(y; j). Hence, the complementarity conditions required in supermodular games (see
[124]) do not hold, and the MCS approach does not apply to this model. We employ our
new comparative statics method to prove Theorem 6.5.3(a). We assume, to the contrary,
that Y EF () is decreasing in i for some i, and construct a contradiction with the iterative
procedure in Section 6.3.2. This approach exploits the supermodularity of i(j) in yi
and j for any i and j, but does not require the joint supermodularity of i(j) in (y; j).
Part (b) of Theorem 6.5.3 follows directly from part (a).
6.5.2 Simultaneous Competition
In some scenarios, the market expanding eort (on, e.g., advertising) takes eect in-
stantaneously. Hence, decisions on eort can be made at the same time as price decisions.
In this scenario, the rms engage in a simultaneous price and eort competition. Specif-
ically, each rm i simultaneously selects (pi; yi) to maximize i(p; yj) dened by (6.16).
The next theorem characterizes the equilibrium and the impact of market index upon
the equilibrium in the simultaneous competition.
Theorem 6.5.4 (Simultaneous competition.) Under Assumption 6.5.1, the follow-
ing statements hold:
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(a) Given any , the simultaneous competition has a unique equilibrium (pSC(); y

SC()),
which satises the system of equations:
pSC() = p
(ySC(); )
= A 1(a(Y SC(); ) + ); (6.18)
(pSC;i()  ci)f 0(Y SC())  C 0i(ySC;i())
8><>:= 0; if y

SC;i() > 0,
 0; otherwise,
(6.19)
for all i = 1; 2;    ; N ,
where Y SC() =
PN
i=1 y

SC;i(). Conversely, the system of equations (6.18) and
(6.19) has a unique solution, which is the equilibrium of the simultaneous competi-
tion. The equilibrium demand is given by SC() = (

SC;1(); 

SC;2();    ; SC;N()),
where SC;i() = bi(p

SC;i()  ci). Moreover, for any i, pSC;i() > ci and SC;i() >
0.
(b) Y SC() is increasing in i for any i. Moreover, p

SC;i() and 

SC;i() are increasing
in j for any i and j.
Under Assumption 6.5.1, Theorem 6.5.4(a) proves the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium in the simultaneous price and eort competition. Moreover, we show that,
under the equilibrium, each rm earns a positive prot margin and a positive demand in
the simultaneous competition. Note that Assumption 6.5.1 does not guarantee the joint
concavity of i(p; yj) in (pi; yi). Hence, we cannot use the standard approach to prove
the existence of an equilibrium in the simultaneous competition. Instead, we show that
the system of equations (6.18) and (6.19) has a unique solution, which is an equilibrium
of the simultaneous competition. We prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium by showing
that any equilibrium of the simultaneous competition must satisfy the system of equations
(6.18) and (6.19).
In Theorem 6.5.4(b), we employ our new comparative statics method to show that,
in the simultaneous competition, the equilibrium total eort level, and the equilibrium
sales price and demand volume of each rm are increasing in the market index of any
rm. This result is consistent with its counterpart in the eort-level-rst competition
(i.e., Theorem 6.5.3).
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6.5.3 A Comparison of Equilibria in the Two Competition Models
In this subsection, we compare the equilibrium in the eort-level-rst competition
(characterized in Theorem 6.5.2) and that in the simultaneous competition (characterized
in Theorem 6.5.4). We summarize the comparison results in the following theorem:
Theorem 6.5.5 Under Assumption 6.5.1, the following statements hold:
(a) pi (y

EF (); )  pSC;i() for any i and .
(b) Y EF ()  Y SC() for any .
(c) i (Y

EF (); )  SC;i() for any i and .
Theorem 6.5.5 shows that, in the eort-level-rst competition, the rms exert higher
total market expanding eort to dampen the subsequent price competition, which re-
sults in higher equilibrium price and demand of each rm than their counterparts in
the simultaneous competition. This phenomenon (i.e., the \fat-cat eect", see [78]) has
also been identied by [9] in a joint price and service level competition setting. They
show that the equilibrium sales prices, demand volumes, and service levels are higher
in the service-level-rst competition model than those in the simultaneous competition
model. To prove this result, [9] inductively show that, for each k, the kth iteration of the
tato^nnement scheme for the service-level-rst competition model is higher, in price and
service level, than that for the simultaneous competition model. Since the joint price and
service competition games in [9] are supermodular, the tato^nnement scheme can generate
the minimum equilibria and, thus, their monotone relationship in the two competitions.
In our model, however, neither the eort-level-rst competition nor the simultaneous
competition is supermodular, so we employ our new comparative statics method to prove
Theorem 6.5.5. We rst prove part (b) by employing the iterative procedure in Section
6.3.2 to construct a contradiction under the (incorrect) assumption that Y EF () < Y

SC()
for some . Parts (a) and (c) follow directly from part (b) by Theorem 6.5.1 and Theorem
6.5.4.
To conclude this section, we remark that all of the comparative statics results on the
equilibrium total eort level in Theorems 6.5.3 - 6.5.5 cannot be generalized to ones on
the equilibrium eort level of each rm. This is because, in both competition models,
although the objective function of each rm i is supermodular in yi and j for any i
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and j, it is not jointly supermodular in (y; j). In other words, some rms may free-ride
on a higher eort level of their competitors, and thus, decrease their own eort levels.
When this eect dominates the eort-prompting eect of a better market condition, the
equilibrium eort levels of some rms may be decreasing in the market indices.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we consider a general joint pricing and inventory management model
with demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment uctuation.
In this model, comparative statics analysis is integral to characterizing its optimal pol-
icy and analyzing the impact of demand segmentation, supply diversication, and mar-
ket environment uctuation upon the optimal policy. The standard comparative statics
methods (i.e., the IFT and MCS approaches) do not apply, because (a) the second-order
continuous dierentiability and complementarity conditions are not satised in our model,
(b) the IFT approach is not scalable, and (c) some of the optimal decision variables are
not monotone in the parameter (i.e., the MCS approach does not work in this case).
Therefore, we develop a new comparative statics method. Our new method employs
a simple but powerful lemma (Lemma 16) and some model-specic properties (e.g., the
supermodularity in one decision variable and the parameter and the componentwise con-
cavity of the objective function) to iteratively link the comparison between optimizers
and that between the partial derivatives of objective functions, so as to construct contra-
dictions under the assumption that the desired comparative statics results are reversed.
Lemma 16 enables us to make componentwise comparisons of the optimal decision vari-
ables at dierent parameters, which is the essential dierence between our method and
the standard approaches. The componentwise comparison between optimizers facilitates
the scalability of our method and its application in a model where only part of the op-
timizers are monotone in the parameter. We remark that when a contradiction cannot
be reached using our new method, a counterexample of the original comparative statics
prediction, in general, can be found. Hence, the proposed method can also help identify
cases in which comparative statics results do not hold for some decision variables.
Though fundamentally dierent, our new method shares some similarity with the stan-
dard IFT and MCS approaches. Analogous to the IFT approach, the proposed method
studies the rst-order (KKT) condition at the optimizer of interest. Hence, our method
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requires the objective function be rst-order continuously dierentiable, but not neces-
sarily second-order continuously dierentiable. Following the idea of the MCS approach,
our method carefully examines the impact of the parameter upon the marginal values of
the decision variables, so that we can translate the monotonicity of partial derivatives
back into the monotonicity of another decision variable at the optimizer. Thus, to reach
a contradiction (and hence, a comparative statics result), our method requires the objec-
tive function be supermodular in the parameter and each of the focal decision variables,
but not necessarily jointly supermodular or satisfying the single crossing property. The
above two condition relaxations enhance the applicability of our method in the general
joint pricing and inventory management model, where the second-order continuous dif-
ferentiability and joint supermodularity of the objective function in each decision epoch
are hard, if not impossible, to establish.
We employ our new method to analyze the joint pricing and inventory management
model under demand segmentation, supply diversication, and market environment uc-
tuation. Our new comparative statics method enables us to characterize the optimal
joint pricing and ordering policy for an arbitrary number of demand segments and supply
channels as a threshold policy, under which there exists a market environment dependent
threshold for each demand segment [supply channel] such that it is optimal to sell to [or-
der from] this segment [channel] if and only if the starting inventory level is above [below]
its corresponding threshold. The optimal sales price for each demand segment and the
optimal order quantity from each supply channel are decreasing in the starting inventory
level of the rm, and increasing in the market size of any demand segment. When the
reference procurement costs of some supply channels increase, the rm increases the sales
price in each demand segment, and the order quantities from the supply channels with
unchanged reference procurement costs. Each rm's optimal order quantity may not be
monotone in its own reference procurement cost. Expanding the set of demand segments
drives the rm to increase its sales price in each demand segment and order quantity
from each supply channel, whereas expanding the supply pool decreases the optimal sales
prices and order quantities.
To demonstrate the applicability of our new comparative statics method in other
settings, we employ it to study joint price and eort competition games, in which the
total eort level has a positive impact upon each rm's demand. More specically, we
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consider two competition models: (a) the rms compete on eort in the rst stage and
on price in the second stage; and (b) the rms simultaneously compete on price and
eort. The standard IFT and MCS approaches are not amenable for the comparative
statics analysis in this setting, because the IFT approach has poor scalability, and the
complementarity conditions required by the MCS approach are not satised. We apply
our new method to show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the eort-level-
rst competition. We prove that, in both competition models, the equilibrium total eort
level, and the equilibrium price and demand of each rm are increasing in the market
index of any rm. We also demonstrate the fat-cat eect in this setting, i.e., the sequential
decision making gives rise to a higher total eort level and a higher price and demand of
each rm in the eort-level-rst competition than those in the simultaneous competition.
In summary, our new method enables us to perform comparative statics analysis in a
general joint pricing and inventory management model and a joint price and eort com-
petition model. Standard IFT and MCS approaches are not amenable for both settings.
Our new method makes componentwise comparisons between the focal decision variables
under dierent parameter values, so it is capable of performing comparative statics anal-
ysis in a model where some of the decision variables are non-monotone, and it is scalable.
Hence, our new method is promising for comparative statics analysis in other operations
management models.
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7. Concluding Remarks
This dissertation focuses on the impact of some new market trends (such as social net-
works, sustainability concerns, and customer behaviors) upon a rm's pricing and inven-
tory policies. Our results demonstrate that these emerging trends lead to interesting new
tradeos and, hence, would signicantly inuence a rm's operations decisions. On the
other hand, the rm can adopt innovative pricing and inventory strategies to exploit these
market trends and substantially improve its prot. To facilitate the analysis, we develop
an eective comparative statics analysis method for a general class of joint pricing and
inventory management models.
The combined pricing and inventory policy is inarguably a very important operations
decision for any rm that delivers physical products to customers. We believe there are
several promising avenues for future research related to this topic. Instead of digging into
the details, we focus on the high-level discussions of future research directions.
Multi-item inventory systems. The dissertation only studies the pricing and
inventory policy of a single-product model. While this setting is interesting and relevant
by itself, multi-item inventory models would better capture the situation of a retailer in
the e-commerce market. For a retailer on an online e-commerce platform like Amazon, it
generally holds and sells inventories of dierent products. So the retailer needs to jointly
manage the pricing, sourcing, storing, and delivery strategies of all its products. With
multiple products handled together, the key issue the rm faces is how to allocate the
capital, transportation, and human capacities among dierent products. Among others,
it is interesting to study how the dynamic pricing exibility would complement the rm's
capacity allocation strategy, and alleviate its capacity constraint pressure.
Information asymmetry. In this dissertation, we assume in our model that infor-
mation is symmetric to everyone. If the market exhibits information asymmetry between
the rm and the customers, we need to employ dynamic mechanism design techniques
to study the optimal pricing and inventory control policy therein. From the application
perspective, introducing information asymmetry well captures the current market trends
of, e.g., sharing economy, social networks, and online auctions. An enriched joint pricing
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and inventory management model with information asymmetry enables us to character-
ize the operational impact of these new marketplace innovations, and study the role of
information in market design issues.
Data-driven integrated pricing and inventory optimization. In this disserta-
tion, the decision maker (i.e., the rm) have full knowledge about the demand function
and demand distribution. In reality, however, this is not necessarily the case, since the
demand function and distribution may not be available to the rm. In this situation,
the rm should collect the previous demand data and employ some data-driven methods
to do the prediction and prescription simultaneously. It is interesting to develop some
data-driven algorithms to optimize the joint pricing and inventory control policy in an
online manner. The objective is to achieve the maximum expected prot under the full
demand information assumption asymptotically. The key issue without knowing the de-
mand distribution is to balance the well-known exploration-exploitation tradeo under
the integrated pricing and inventory management framework.
To sum up, the integrated pricing and inventory control problem is of both theoretical
interest and practical relevance. This dissertation's main contribution is to establish new
models and methods to study the impact of new market trends on the joint dynamic
pricing and inventory policy of a rm. We also hope the dissertation would help inspire
future research on this topic.
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APPENDICES
A. Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Statements
We use @ to denote the derivative operator of a single variable function, @x to denote the par-
tial derivative operator of a multi-variable function with respect to variable x, and 1fg to denote
the indicator function. For any multivariate continuously dierentiable function f(x1; x2;    ; xn) and
~x := (~x1; ~x2;    ; ~xn) in f()'s domain, 8i, we use @xif(~x1; ~x2;    ; ~xn) to denote @xif(x1; x2;    ; xn)jx=~x.
The following lemma is used throughout our proofs.
Lemma 18 Let Fi(z; Z) be a continuously dierentiable and jointly concave function in (z; Z) for
i = 1; 2, where z 2 [z; z] (z and z might be innite) and Z 2 Rn. For i = 1; 2, let (zi; Zi) :=
argmax(z;Z)Fi(z; Z) be the optimizers of Fi(; ). If z1 < z2, we have: @zF1(z1; Z1)  @zF2(z2; Z2):
Proof: z1 < z2, so z  z1 < z2  z. Hence, @zF1(z1; Z1)
8><>:= 0 if z1 > z, 0 if z1 = z; and
@zF2(z2; Z2)
8><>:= 0 if z2 < z, 0 if z2 = z, i.e., @zF1(z1; Z1)  0  @zF2(z2; Z2): Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 1: Since () is twice continuously dierentiable, Rt(; ) is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, and jointly concave in (pt; Nt) if and only if the Hessian of Rt(; ) is negative semi-denite,
i.e., @2ptRt(pt; Nt)  0, and @2ptRt(pt; Nt)@2NtRt(pt; Nt)  (@pt@NtRt(pt; Nt))2, where @2ptRt(pt; Nt) =  2,
@2NtRt(pt; Nt) = (pt   b   c)00(Nt), and @pt@NtRt(pt; Nt) = 0(Nt). Hence, Rt(; ) is jointly con-
cave on [p; p]  [0;+1) if and only if  2(pt   b   c)00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2 for all (pt; Nt). Since
 2(pt   b   c)00(Nt)   2(p   b   c)00(Nt),  2(pt   b   c)00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2 for all (pt; Nt)
if and only if  2(p  b  c)00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2 for all Nt  0. This proves Lemma 1. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 2: We prove parts (a) - (c) together by backward induction.
We rst show, by backward induction that if vt 1(It 1; Nt 1) cIt 1 is jointly concave in (It 1; Nt 1),
decreasing in It 1, and increasing in Nt 1, (i) 	t(; ) is jointly concave in (x; y), decreasing in x, and
increasing in y; (ii) Jt(; ; ) is jointly concave in (xt; pt; Nt); and (iii) vt(It; Nt)   cIt is jointly concave
in (It; Nt), decreasing in It, and increasing in Nt. It is clear that v0(I0; N0)  cI0 = 0 is jointly concave,
decreasing in I0, and increasing in N0. Hence, the initial condition holds.
Assume that vt 1(It 1; Nt 1)   cIt 1 is jointly concave in (It 1; Nt 1), decreasing in It 1, and
increasing in Nt 1. Because rn() is concavely increasing, E[rn(y + t + t)] is concavely increasing
in y. Since concavity and monotonicity are preserved under expectation, 	t(; ) is jointly concave in
(x; y), decreasing in x, and increasing in y. Analogously, (x) is concavely decreasing in x. We now
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verify that 	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt) is jointly concave in (xt; pt; Nt) and
increasing in Nt. Since () is increasing in Nt, whereas 	t(x; y) is decreasing in x and increasing in y,
	t(xt  Vt+pt (Nt); ( Vt pt+(Nt))+Nt) is increasing in Nt. Let  2 [0; 1], x = xt+(1 )x^t,
p = pt + (1  )p^t, and N = Nt + (1  )N^t, we have:
	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt)
+(1  )	t(x^t   Vt + p^t   (N^t); ( Vt   p^t + (N^t)) + N^t)
 	t(x   Vt + p   (Nt)  (1  )(N^t); ( Vt   p + (Nt) + (1  )(N^t)) + N)
 	t(x   Vt + p   (Nt ); ( Vt   p + (Nt ) + N);
where the rst inequality follows from the joint concavity of 	t(; ), and the second from the concavity of
(), and that 	t(; ) is decreasing in x and increasing in y. It's clear that (x) = Ef (h+ b)(x  t)+g
is concavely decreasing in x. Hence, similar argument to the case of 	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt +
(Nt)) + Nt) implies that (xt  Vt+ pt  (Nt)) is jointly concave in (xt; pt; Nt) and increasing in Nt.
By Assumption 2.3.1, Rt(pt; Nt) is jointly concave in (pt; Nt). Moreover, since () is increasing in Nt,
Rt(pt; Nt) is increasing in Nt as well. Hence, by (2.5),
Jt(xt; pt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt))
+	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt)
is jointly concave in (xt; pt; Nt) and increasing in Nt.
Since concavity is preserved under maximization (e.g., [32] Section 3.2.5), the joint concavity of
vt(; ) follows directly from that of Jt(; ; ). Note that for any I^t > It, F(I^t)  F(It). Thus,
vt(I^t; Nt)  cI^t = max
(xt;pt)2F(I^t)
Jt(xt; pt; Nt)
 max
(xt;pt)2F(It)
Jt(xt; pt; Nt)
= vt(It; Nt)  cIt:
Hence, vt(It; Nt)  cIt is decreasing in It. Since Jt(xt; pt; Nt) is increasing in Nt for any (xt; pt; Nt), for
any N^t > Nt,
vt(It; N^t)  cIt = max
(xt;pt)2F(It)
Jt(xt; pt; N^t)
 max
(xt;pt)2F(It)
Jt(xt; pt; Nt)
= vt(It; Nt)  cIt:
Thus, vt(It; Nt)  cIt is increasing in Nt.
Second, we show that by backward induction, that if vt 1(; ) is continuously dierentiable, 	t(; ),
Jt(; ; ), and vt(; ) are continuously dierentiable as well. For t = 0, v0(I0; N0) = cI0 is clearly
continuously dierentiable. Thus, the initial condition holds.
If vt 1(; ) is continuously dierentiable, 	t(; ) is continuously dierentiable with partial derivatives
given by
@x	t(x; y) = Ef[@Itvt 1(x  t; y + t + t)  c]g; (A.1)
@y	t(x; y) = Efr0n(y + t + t) + [@Nt 1vt 1(x  t; y + t + t)g; (A.2)
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where the exchangeability of dierentiation and expectation is easily justied using the canonical ar-
gument (see, e.g., Theorem A.5.1 in [63], the condition of which can be easily veried observing the
continuity of the partial derivatives of vt 1(; ), and that the distributions of t and t are continuous.).
Moreover, since t is continuously distributed, () is continuously dierentiable. Since Rt(; ) is con-
tinuously dierentiable, by (2.5), Jt(; ; ) is continuously dierentiable. If It 6= xt(Nt), the continuous
dierentiability of vt(; ) follows immediately from that of Jt(; ; ) and the envelope theorem. To com-
plete the proof, it suces to check that, for all Nt  0, the left and right partial derivatives of the rst
variable at (xt(Nt); Nt), @Itvt(xt(Nt) ; Nt) and @Itvt(xt(Nt)+; Nt) are equal. By the envelope theorem,8><>:@Itvt(xt(Nt) ; Nt) = c;@Itvt(xt(Nt)+; Nt) = c+  + @x(xt(Nt)  yt(Nt)) + @x	t(xt(Nt)  yt(Nt); yt(Nt) + Nt):
The rst-order condition with respect to xt implies that
 + @x(xt(Nt)  yt(Nt)) + @x	t(xt(Nt)  yt(Nt); yt(Nt) + Nt) = 0:
Therefore, @Itvt(xt(Nt) ; Nt) = @Itvt(xt(Nt)+; Nt) = c. This completes the induction and, thus, the
proof of Lemma 2. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1: Parts (a)-(b) follow immediately from the joint concavity of Jt(; ; Nt) in
(xt; pt) for any Nt  0.
We now show part (c) by backward induction. More specically, we prove that if xt 1(Nt 1) > 0
for all Nt 1  0, xt(Nt) > 0 for all Nt  0. Since v0(I0; N0) = cI0, 	1(x; y) = E[rn(y+1)]+Efv0(x 
1; y+ 1+ 1)  cxg = E[rn(y+ 1)]. Since D1  0 with probability 1, @x(  V1+ p1  (N1)) = 0 for
all p1 2 [p; p] and N1  0. Hence, for any p1 2 [p; p] and N1  0,
@x1J1(0; p1; N1) =    @x(  V1 + p1   (N1)) =  > 0:
Hence, x1(N1) > 0 for any N1  0. Thus, the initial condition is satised.
Now we assume that xt 1(Nt 1) > 0 for all Nt 1  0 and xt( ~Nt)  0 for some ~Nt  0. Thus, It 1 =
xt( ~Nt) Dt(pt( ~Nt); ~Nt)  0 < xt 1( ~Nt 1) almost surely, where ~Nt 1 = Dt(pt( ~Nt); ~Nt)+ ~Nt+t. Thus,
by part (a), @It 1vt 1(It 1; Nt 1) = c almost surely, when conditioned on Nt = ~Nt. Hence, conditioned
on Nt = ~Nt, @x	t(x; y) = Ef@It 1vt 1(It 1; ~Nt 1)   cjNt = ~Ntg = c   c = 0, when (xt; pt) lies in the
neighborhood of (xt( ~Nt); pt( ~Nt)). As discussed above, since xt( ~Nt)  0, @x(  Vt + pt   ( ~N1)) = 0 for
all pt 2 [p; p]. Hence, for any pt 2 [p; p],
@xtJt(0; pt;
~Nt) =    @x(  Vt + pt   ( ~N1)) =  > 0:
Hence, xt( ~Nt) > 0, which contradicts the assumption that xt( ~Nt)  0 is the optimizer of (2.7) when
Nt = ~Nt. Therefore, xt(Nt) > 0 for all Nt  0. This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of
part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 3: We show Parts (a)-(b) together by backward induction. We rst show that
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Parts (a)-(b) hold for t = 1. Since Part (a) automatically holds for t = 1, we only need to check
Part (b). Because v0(I0; N0) = cI0, 	1(x; y) = E[rn(y + t + t)]. Thus, taking the transformation
x1 = 1 + V1   p1 + (N1),
J1(x1; p1; N1) =R1(p1; N1) + x1 + (x1   V1 + p1   (N1)) + E[rn(( V1   p1 + (N1)) + N1)]
=(p1   b  c)( V1   p1 + (N1)) + (1 + V1   p1 + (N1)) + 1 + (1)
+ E[rn(( V1   p1 + (N1)) + N1)]
=(p1   c)( V1   p1 + (N1)) + 1 + (1) + E[rn(( V1   p1 + (N1)) + N1)]:
Therefore, the optimal joint price and safety-stock (p1(N1);1(N1)) can be determined by
p1(N1) = argmaxp12[p;p]f(p1   c)( V1   p1 + (N1)) + E[rn(( V1   p1 + (N1)) + N1)]g;
and
1(N1) = 
 = argmaxf+()g;
respectively. Hence, x1(N1) = 1(N1) + y1(N1) = 
 + y1(N1). We have thus shown Parts (a)-(b) for
t = 1.
We now show that if Parts (a)-(b) hold for period t   1, they also hold for period t. First, taking
the transformation xt = t + Vt   pt + (Nt),
Jt(xt; pt; Nt) =Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   V1 + pt   (Nt))
+ 	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt)
=Rt(pt; Nt) + (t + Vt   pt + (Nt)) + (t) + 	t(t; ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt)
=(pt   c)( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + t + (t) + 	t(t; ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt):
Let (pt(Nt);t(Nt)) be the optimal price and safety-stock with network size Nt. We now show that
t(Nt)  . If, to the contrary, t(Nt) > , Lemma 18 yields that
@[(pt(Nt)  c)( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + t(Nt) + (t(Nt))
+	t(t(Nt); ( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)]
 @[+()];
i.e.,
 + 0(t(Nt)) + @x	t(t(Nt); ( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)   + 0():
The concavity of () implies that 0(t(Nt))  0(). Moreover, since 	t(x; y) is decreasing in x,
@x	t(t(Nt); ( Vt pt(Nt)+(Nt))+Nt)  0. Therefore, 0(t(Nt)) = 0() and @x	t(t(Nt); ( Vt 
pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) = 0. Thus, by the rst-order condition with respect to t, (pt(Nt);
) is also
the optimal price and safety-stock level, which is strictly lexicographically smaller than (pt(Nt);t(Nt)).
This contradicts the assumption that we select the lexicographically smallest optimizer in each period.
Hence, t(Nt)   for all Nt  0.
204
We now show that P[xt(Nt)   Dt(pt(Nt); Nt)  xt 1(Nt 1)] = 1 for all Nt and Nt 1. Note that,
with probability 1,
xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt) = t(Nt)  t     t = xt 1(Nt 1)  yt 1(Nt 1)  t
= xt 1(Nt 1) Dt 1(pt 1(Nt 1); Nt 1);
where the inequality follows from   t(Nt), second equality from the hypothesis induction that
xt 1(Nt 1) = yt 1(Nt 1) +  for all Nt 1  0, and the last equality from t 1 d= t and the identity
thatDt 1(pt 1(Nt 1); Nt 1) = yt 1(Nt 1)+t 1. BecauseDt 1(pt 1(Nt 1); Nt 1)  0 with probability
1,
xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt)  xt 1(Nt 1) Dt 1(pt 1(Nt 1); Nt 1)  xt 1(Nt 1)
with probability 1, i.e., part (a) follows for period t.
Next, we show that t(Nt) = 
. Observe that P[xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt)  xt 1(Nt 1)] = 1 implies
that @x	t(t(Nt); ( Vt pt(Nt)+(Nt))+Nt) = 0 and, thus, @xtJt(+yt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = 0. Since
Jt(; ; Nt) is jointly concave, the rst-order condition with respect to xt yields that t(Nt) =  for all
Nt  0. This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Lemma 3. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 4:. By parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 2.4.1, if It  xt(Nt),
vt(It; Nt) = cIt + t(Nt);
where
t(Nt) := maxfJt(xt; pt; Nt) : xt  0; pt 2 [p; p]g:
By Lemma 2, t() is concavely increasing and continuously dierentiable in Nt.
By Lemma 3(a), for each Nt  0, xt(Nt)  Dt(pt(Nt); Nt)  xt 1(Nt 1) with probability 1. Since
vt 1(It 1; Nt 1) = cIt 1 + t 1(Nt 1) for all It 1  xt 1(Nt 1),
vt 1(xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt); Dt(pt(Nt); Nt) + Nt) =c[xt(Nt) Dt(pt(Nt); Nt)]
+ t 1(Dt(pt(Nt); Nt) + Nt)
with probability 1. Taking expectation with respect to t and t, we have, for all Nt  0 and xt  xt(Nt),
	t(xt   Vt + pt(Nt)  (Nt); ( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
=E[rn(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + t + t)] + E[t 1(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + t + t)]:
Therefore, for all Nt  0, if xt   + yt(Nt),
Jt(xt; pt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt)+ xt  qt+(xt  Vt+ pt(Nt)  (Nt))+Gt(( Vt  pt(Nt)+ (Nt))+ Nt);
where Gt(y) := E[rn(y + t + t)] + E[vt 1(y + t + t)].
Finally, it remains to show that (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) maximizes the right-hand side of (2.8). Note that
Theorem 2.4.1(c) and Lemma 3(a) imply that, if It  xt(Nt), with probability 1, I  x (N ) for all
 = t; t 1;    ; 1 and, hence, f(x (N ); p (N ))g=t;t 1; ;1 is the optimal policy in periods t; t 1;    ; 1.
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In particular, (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) maximizes the total expected discounted prot given that the rm adopts
f(x (N ); p (N ))g for  = t  1;    ; 1. It's straightforward to check that if the rm adopts the policy
f(x (N ); p (N ))g for  = t 1;    ; 1; and orders-up-to xt and charges pt in period t, the total expected
discounted prot of the rm in period t is given by the right-hand side of (2.8). Since (xt(Nt); pt(Nt))
maximizes the total expected discounted prot in period t, it also maximizes the right-hand side of (2.8)
for each t. This proves Lemma 4. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.2: By Theorem 2.4.1(c) and Lemma 3(a), if IT  xT (Nt), It  xt(Nt) for
all t = T; T   1;    ; 1 with probability 1. Therefore, by Theorem 2.4.1(a), (xt (It; Nt); pt (It; Nt)) =
(xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) with probability 1 if IT  xT (NT ). The characterization of (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) follows
immediately from Lemma 4 and its discussions. Q:E:D:
The following lemma is used throughout the rest of our proofs.
Lemma 19 For each period t and any network size Nt  0, the following statements hold.
(a) Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = Lt(pt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + (), where Lt(pt; Nt) := (pt   c)( Vt   pt +
(Nt))+Gt(( Vt  pt+ (Nt))+ Nt), and  is the optimal safety stock characterized in Lemma
3(b). Hence, pt(Nt) = argmaxpt2[p;p]Lt(pt; Nt).
(b) Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = Kt(yt(Nt); Nt)+
+(), where Kt(yt; Nt) := ( Vt+(Nt) yt c)yt+
Gt(yt + Nt). Hence, yt(Nt) = argmaxyt2[y
t
(Nt);yt(Nt)]Kt(yt; Nt), where yt(Nt) =
Vt + (Nt)  p
and yt(Nt) = Vt + (Nt)  p.
(c) Let mt(Nt) := yt(Nt) + Nt be the optimal expected network size in period t   1, given the
current network size Nt. We have Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) =Mt(mt(Nt); Nt)+ 
+(), where
Mt(mt; Nt) := ( Vt + (Nt)  mt Nt   c) (mt Nt) +Gt(mt). Hence,
mt(Nt) = argmaxmt2[mt(Nt); mt(Nt)]Mt(mt; Nt), where mt(Nt) = yt(Nt) + Nt and mt(Nt) =
yt(Nt) + Nt.
Proof of Lemma 19: Part (a). By Lemma 3(b), xt(Nt)   yt(Nt) =  for all Nt  0. By
Lemma 4, for all Nt,
Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) =Rt(pt(Nt); Nt) + xt(Nt) + (xt(Nt)  Vt + pt(Nt)  (Nt))
+Gt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt):
Therefore,
Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) =Rt(pt(Nt); Nt) + (
 + Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + ()
+Gt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
=(pt(Nt)  c)( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) +Gt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
+  + ()
=Lt(pt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + ();
(A.3)
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where Lt(pt; Nt) := (pt  c)( Vt pt+(Nt))+Gt(( Vt pt+(Nt))+Nt). Since (xt(Nt); pt(Nt))
maximizes Jt(; ; Nt), pt(Nt) = argmaxpt2[p;p]Lt(pt; Nt). This proves part (a).
Part (b). Since yt(Nt) = Vt pt(Nt)+(Nt), pt(Nt) = Vt yt(Nt)+(Nt). Plug this into (A.3),
we have
Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) =(pt(Nt)  c)( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) +Gt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
+  + ()
=( Vt   yt(Nt) + (Nt)  c)yt(Nt) +Gt(yt(Nt) + Nt) +  + ()
=Kt(yt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + ();
where Kt(yt; Nt) := ( Vt + (Nt)   yt   c)yt + Gt(yt + Nt). Since (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) maximizes
Jt(; ; Nt), yt(Nt) = argmaxyt2[y
t
(Nt);yt(Nt)]Kt(yt; Nt). The expressions of yt(Nt) and yt(Nt)
follow directly from the identity yt(Nt) = Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt) and pt 2 [p; p]. This proves part
(b).
Part (c). Observe that mt(Nt) = yt(Nt) + Nt and  > 0 imply that pt(Nt) = Vt   yt(Nt) +
(Nt) = Vt + (Nt)  mt(Nt) Nt . Plug this into (A.3), we have
Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) =(pt(Nt)  c)( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) +Gt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
+  + ()
=( Vt + (Nt)  mt(Nt)  Nt

  c)mt(Nt)  Nt

+Gt(mt(Nt)) + 

+ ()
=Mt(mt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + ();
whereMt(mt; Nt) := ( Vt+(Nt) mt Nt  c) (mt Nt) +Gt(mt). Since (xt(Nt); pt(Nt)) maximizes
Jt(; ; Nt), mt(Nt) = argmaxmt2[mt(Nt); mt(Nt)]Mt(mt; Nt). The expressions ofmt(Nt) and mt(Nt)
follow directly from the identity mt(Nt) = yt(Nt) + Nt and that yt 2 [yt(Nt); yt(Nt)]. This
establishes part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.3: Part (a). We rst show pt(N^t)  pt(Nt). By Lemma 19(a) pt(Nt) =
argmaxptLt(pt; Nt) and pt(N^t) = argmaxptLt(pt; N^t). Hence, it suces to show that Lt(; ) is super-
modular in (pt; Nt). Since @ptLt(pt; Nt) =
Vt + (Nt)  2pt + c  G0t(( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt), Since
Gt() is concave, @ptLt(pt; Nt) is increasing in Nt. Hence, Lt(; ) is supermodular in (pt; Nt) and, thus,
pt(N^t)  pt(Nt) for all N^t > Nt (See [165]).
Part (b). We now show that E[Nt 1jN^t] = mt(N^t) = yt(N^t) + N^t  E[Nt 1jNt] = mt(Nt) =
yt(Nt) + Nt. By Lemma 19(c), mt(N^t) = argmaxmtMt(mt(N^t); N^t) and
mt(Nt) = argmaxmtMt(mt(Nt); Nt). To show that mt(N^t)  mt(Nt), it suces to prove that Mt(; )
is supermodular in (mt; Nt) and the feasible set f(mt; Nt) : mt 2 [m(Nt); mt(Nt)]g is a lattice. Direct
computation yields that
@mtMt(mt; Nt) =
1

( Vt + (Nt)  mt   Nt

  c)  mt   Nt
2
+G0t(mt):
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Since  > 0, @mtMt(mt; Nt) is increasing in Nt. Thus, Mt(; ) is supermodular in (mt; Nt). Since mt(Nt)
and mt(Nt) are continuously increasing in Nt, the feasible set f(mt; Nt) : mt 2 [m(Nt); mt(Nt)]g is a
lattice. Hence, mt(N^t)  mt(Nt) for all N^t > Nt.
Part (c). Since (N^t) = (Nt), pt(N^t)  pt(Nt) implies that yt(N^t) = Vt   pt(N^t) + (N^t) 
Vt pt(Nt)+(Nt) = yt(Nt). Moreover, by Lemma 3(b), xt(N^t) = +yt(N^t)  +yt(Nt) = xt(Nt).
Part (d). Since  = 0 and mt(N^t)  mt(Nt), yt(N^t) = mt(N^t)  mt(Nt) = yt(Nt). By Lemma 3(b),
xt(N^t) = 
 + yt(N^t)   + yt(Nt) = xt(Nt). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.4: Part (a). We show part (a) by backward induction. More specically,
we show that if  = 0 and vt 1(; ) is supermodular in (It 1; Nt 1), vt(; ) is supermodular in (It; Nt).
Since v0(I0; N0) = cI0, the initial condition is satised.
Since supermodularity is preserved under expectation, 	t(x; y) = Efrn(y + t + t) + [vt 1(x  
t; y + t + t)  cx]g is supermodular in (x; y). Let yt = Vt   pt + (Nt). Observe that
Jt(xt; pt; Nt) =Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)) + 	t(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)))
=( Vt + (Nt)  yt   c  b)yt + xt + (xt   yt) + 	t(xt   yt; yt):
Hence,
vt(It; Nt) = cIt + max
(xt;yt)2F 0t(It;Nt)
f( Vt + (Nt)  yt   c  b)yt + xt + (xt   yt) + 	t(xt   yt; yt)g;
where F 0t(It; Nt) := f(xt; yt) : xt  It; yt 2 [ Vt + (Nt)   p; Vt + (Nt)   p]g. Because () is increasing
in Nt, () is concave, and 	t(; ) is concave and supermodular, ( Vt + (Nt)   yt   c   b)yt + xt +
(xt  yt) +	t(xt  yt; yt) is supermodular in (xt; yt; Nt). Moreover, it's straightforward to verify that
the feasible set f(xt; yt; It; Nt) : Nt  0; (xt; yt) 2 F 0t(It)g is a lattice in R4. Therefore, vt(It; Nt) is
supermodular in (It; Nt). This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of part (a).
Part (b). The continuity results in parts (b)-(e) all follow from the joint concavity and continuous
dierentiability of Jt(; ; ) in (xt; pt; Nt). Since xt (It; Nt) = maxfIt; xt(Nt)g, xt (It; Nt) is increasing in
It. Moreover, because the objective function ( Vt+(Nt) yt c b)yt+xt+(xt yt)+	t(xt yt; yt)
is supermodular in (xt; yt; Nt), x

t (It; Nt) is increasing in Nt as well. This proves part (b).
Part (c). If It  xt(Nt), pt (It; Nt) = pt(Nt), which is independent of It. If It > xt(Nt), xt (It; Nt) =
It and, thus,
Jt(x

t (It; Nt); pt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt)+It+(It  Vt+pt (Nt))+	t(It  Vt+pt (Nt); ( Vt pt+(Nt))):
(A.4)
Since () is concave and 	t(; ) is concave and supermodular, Jt(xt (It; Nt); pt; Nt) is submodular in
(It; pt). Hence, p

t (It; Nt) is decreasing in It for all (It; Nt). By Theorem 2.4.3(d), if It  xt(Nt),
pt (It; Nt) = pt(Nt) is increasing in Nt. If It > xt(Nt), we observe from (A.4) that Jt(x

t (It; Nt); pt; Nt)
is supermodular in (pt; Nt). Hence, p

t (It; Nt) is increasing in Nt for all (It; Nt). This proves part (c).
Part (d). If It  xt(Nt), yt (It; Nt) = yt(Nt), which is independent of It. If It > xt(Nt), xt (It; Nt) =
It and, thus,
Jt(x

t (It; Nt); pt; Nt) = ( Vt + (Nt)  yt   c  b)yt + It + (It   yt) + 	t(It   yt; yt):
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Since () is concave and 	t(; ) is concave and supermodular, Jt(xt (It; Nt); pt; Nt) is supermodular in
(It; yt) and its domain is a sublattice of R2. Hence, yt (It; Nt) is increasing in It for all (It; Nt). By
Theorem 2.4.3(d), if It  xt(Nt), yt (It; Nt) = yt(Nt) is increasing in Nt. If It > xt(Nt), xt (It; Nt) = It
and, thus, Jt(x

t (It; Nt); pt; Nt) = ( Vt + (Nt)  yt   c  b)yt + It +(It   yt) + 	t(It   yt; yt). The
supermodularity of Jt(x

t (It; Nt); pt; Nt) in (yt; Nt) follows directly from that () is increasing in Nt.
Moreover, the feasible set f(yt; Nt) : yt 2 [ Vt + (Nt)   p; Vt + (Nt)   p]g is clearly a sublattice of R2.
Therefore, yt (It; Nt) is increasing in Nt for all (It; Nt). This proves part (d).
Part (e). If It  xt(Nt), by Theorem 2.4.1(c), t (It; Nt) =  is independent of It and Nt. If
It > xt(Nt), since It  t = yt,
Jt(x

t (It; Nt); pt; Nt) = ( Vt + (Nt) + t   It   c  b)(It  t) + It + (t) + 	t(t; (It  t)):
Since 	t(; ) is concave and supermodular, Jt(xt (It; Nt); pt; Nt) is supermodular in (It;t). Moreover,
the feasible set f(It;t) : t 2 [It   Vt   (Nt) + p; It   Vt   (Nt) + p]g is clearly a sublattice of R2.
Hence, t (It; Nt) is increasing in It for all (It; Nt). Moreover, since 

t (It; Nt) = It  yt (It; Nt), by part
(d), t (It; Nt) is decreasing in Nt. This proves part (e). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.5: Part (a). Since ()  0 and r0n(n)  r, the optimal policy of the
rm (pt(); xt()) is independent of the current network size Nt. Hence, ^0t(Nt)  0t(Nt)  0 for all t and
Nt  0. We now show that y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt) for all Nt  0. Note that ^0t 1(Nt 1)  0t 1(Nt 1) for all
Nt 1  0 implies that
G^0t(y) = Efr0n(y + t + t) + ^0t 1(y + t + t)g  Efr0n(y + t + t) + 0t 1(y + t + t)g = G0t(y);
for all y. By Lemma 3(b), x^t(Nt) = y^t(Nt) + 
, xt(Nt) = yt(Nt) + , y^t(Nt) = Vt   p^t(Nt) + ^(Nt),
and yt(Nt) = Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt). By Lemma 19(b), we have J^t(x^t(Nt); p^t(Nt); Nt) = K^t(y^t(Nt); Nt) +
 + () and Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = Kt(yt(Nt); Nt) +  + ().
We now show y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt). Assume, to the contrary, that y^t(Nt) < yt(Nt). Lemma 18 yields
that @ytK^t(y^t(Nt); Nt)  @ytKt(yt(Nt); Nt), i.e.,
 2y^t(Nt) + ^(Nt) + G^0t(y^t(Nt) + Nt)   2yt(Nt) + (Nt) + G0t(yt(Nt) + Nt):
Because G^0t()  G0t() and y^t(Nt) < yt(Nt), the concavity of G^t() and Gt() implies that G^0t(y^t(Nt) +
Nt)  G0t(yt(Nt) + Nt). Since ^(Nt)  (Nt), we have  2y^t(Nt)   2yt(Nt), which contradicts the
assumption that y^t(Nt) < yt(Nt). Hence, y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt). This completes the proof of part (a).
Part (b). By Lemma 3(b) and part (a), x^t(Nt) = y^t(Nt) + 
  yt(Nt) +  = xt(Nt) for all
Nt  0. This proves part (b).
Part (c). We rst show that p^t(0)  pt(0). Observe that p^t(0) = Vt + ^(0)   y^t(0) and pt(0) =
Vt + (0)   yt(0). By part (a), y^t(0)  yt(0). Moreover, since ^(0) = (0) = 0, p^t(0)  pt(0). Since
()  0, pt(Nt)  pt(0). Moreover, Theorem 2.4.3(a) implies that p^t(Nt) is increasing in Nt. The joint
concavity of J^t(; ; ) implies that p^t(Nt) is continuously increasing in Nt. Thus, let Nt be the smallest
Nt such that p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) = pt(0). The monotonicity of p^t() then suggests that p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) if
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Nt  Nt, and p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) if Nt  Nt. This proves part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.6: We show Theorem 2.4.6 by backward induction. More specically, we
show that if Vt = Vt 1 and 0t 1(N)  0t 2(N) for all N  0, (i) yt(N)  yt 1(N) for all N  0, (ii)
pt(N)  pt 1(N) for all N  0, (iii) xt(N)  xt 1(N) for all N  0, and (iv) 0t(N)  0t 1(N) for all
N  0. Since 01(N)  00(N)  0 for all N , the initial condition is satised.
Note that 0t 1(N)  0t 2(N) for all N  0 implies that
G0t(y) = Efr0n(y+ t+ t)+0t 1(y+ t+ t)g  Efr0n(y+ t+ t)+0t 2(y+ t+ t)g = G0t 1(y);
for all y. By Lemma 19(b), Jt(xt(N); pt(N); N) = Kt(yt(N); N) + 
 + () and
Jt 1(xt 1(N); pt 1(N); N) = Kt 1(yt 1(N); N) +  + ().
We rst prove that yt(N)  yt 1(N) for all N . Assume, to the contrary, that yt(N) < yt 1(N) for
some N . Lemma 18 implies that @ytKt(yt(N); N)  @yt 1Kt 1(yt 1(N); N), i.e.,
 2yt(N) + (N) + G0t(yt(N) + N)   2yt 1(N) + (N) + G0t 1(yt 1(N) + N):
Because G0t()  G0t 1() for all y and yt(N) < yt 1(N), the concavity of Gt() and Gt 1() implies that
G0t(yt(N) + N)  G0t 1(yt 1(N) + N). Thus, we have  2yt(N)   2yt 1(N), which contradicts
the assumption that yt(N) < yt 1(N). Hence, yt(N)  yt 1(N) for all N  0. By Theorem 2.4.1(c), it
follows immediately that xt(N) = yt(N) + 
  yt 1(N) +  = xt 1(N) for all N  0.
Next, we show that pt(N)  pt 1(N) for all N  0. By Lemma 19(a), Jt(xt(N); pt(N); N) =
Lt(pt(N); N) + 
 + () and Jt 1(xt 1(N); pt 1(N); N) = Lt 1(pt 1(N); N) +  + (). As-
sume, to the contrary, that pt(N) > pt 1(N) for some N . Lemma 18 implies that @ptLt(pt(N); N) 
@pt 1Lt 1(pt 1(N); N), i.e.,
  2pt(N) + Vt + c+ (N)  G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N)
  2pt 1(N) + Vt 1 + c+ (N)  G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N):
Because G0t()  G0t 1() for all y and pt(N) > pt 1(N), the concavity of Gt() and Gt 1() implies
that G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N)  G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N). Since Vt = Vt 1,
we have  2pt(N)   2pt 1(N), which contradicts the assumption that pt(N) > pt 1(N). Hence,
pt(N)  pt 1(N) for all N  0.
Finally, to complete the induction, we show that 0t(N)  0t 1(N) for all N . By the envelope
theorem,
0t(N) = (pt(N)  c)0(N) + ( + 0(N))G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N);
and
0t 1(N) = (pt 1(N)  c)0(N) + ( + 0(N))G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N);
If pt(N) = pt 1(N), 0t(N)  0t 1(N) follows immediately from 0(N)  0 and G0t()  G0t 1(). If
pt(N) < pt 1(N), Lemma 18 yields that @ptLt(pt(N); N)  @pt 1Lt 1(pt 1(N); N), i.e.,
  2pt(N) + Vt + c+ (N)  G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N)
  2pt 1(N) + Vt 1 + c+ (N)  G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N):
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Hence, by Vt = Vt 1,
pt(N) + G
0
t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N)
pt 1(N) + G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N) + (pt 1(N)  pt(N)):
(A.5)
Since  > 0, pt(N) < pt 1(N) implies that G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N)  G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) +
(N)) + N). Therefore,
0t(N)  0t 1(N) =[(pt(N)  pt 1(N)) + (G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N)
 G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N))]0(N)
+ (G0t(( Vt   pt(N) + (N)) + N) G0t 1(( Vt 1   pt 1(N) + (N)) + N))
0:
Hence, 0t(N)  0t 1(N) for all N . This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 2.4.6.
Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.4.7: We show Theorem 2.4.7 by backward induction. More specically, we
show that if ^0t 1()  0t 1() for all Nt 1  0 and r^0n()  r0n() for all N  0, (i) y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt) for all
Nt  0; (ii) x^t(Nt)  xt(Nt) for all Nt  0; (iii) p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) for all Nt  0; and (iv) ^0t(Nt)  0t(Nt)
for all Nt  0. Since ^00() = 00()  0, the initial condition is satised.
Note that ^0t 1(Nt 1)  0t 1(Nt 1) for all Nt 1  0 and r^0n()  r0n() for all N  0 imply that
G^0t(y) = Efr^0n(y + t + t) + ^0t 1(y + t + t)g  Efr0n(y + t + t) + 0t 1(y + t + t)g = G0t(y);
for all y. By Lemma 19(a), J^t(x^t(Nt); p^t(Nt); Nt) = K^t(y^t(Nt); Nt) + 
 + () and
Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = Kt(yt; Nt) + 
 + ().
We rst show that y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt). Assume, to the contrary, that y^t(Nt) < yt(Nt) for some Nt.
Lemma 18 yields that @ytK^t(y^t(Nt); Nt)  @ytKt(yt(Nt); Nt), i.e.,
 2y^t(Nt) + (Nt) + G^0t(y^t(Nt) + Nt)   2yt(Nt) + (Nt) + G0t(yt(Nt) + Nt):
Because G^0t()  G0t() and y^t(Nt) < yt(Nt), the concavity of G^t() and Gt() implies that G^0t(y^t(Nt) +
Nt)  G0t(yt(Nt) + Nt). Hence, we have  2y^t(Nt)   2yt(Nt), which contradicts the assumption
that y^t(Nt) < yt(Nt). Thus, y^t(Nt)  yt(Nt) and, hence, x^t(Nt) = y^t(Nt)+  yt(Nt)+ = xt(Nt).
Next, we show that p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt). By Lemma 19(a), J^t(x^t(Nt); p^t(Nt); Nt) = L^t(p^t(Nt); Nt) +
 +() and Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = Lt(pt(Nt); Nt) +  +() Assume, to the contrary, that
p^t(Nt) > pt(Nt) for some Nt. Lemma 18 implies that @ptL^t(p^t(Nt); Nt)  @ptLt(pt(Nt); Nt), i.e.,
  2p^t(Nt) + Vt + c+ (Nt)  G^0t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
  2pt(Nt) + Vt + c+ (Nt)  G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt):
Because G^0t()  G0t() for all y and p^t(Nt) > pt(Nt), the concavity of G^t() and Gt() implies that
G^0t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)  G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt). We have  2p^t(Nt)   2pt(Nt),
which contradicts the assumption that p^t(Nt) > pt(Nt). Hence, p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt) for all Nt  0.
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Finally, to complete the induction, we show that ^0t(Nt)  0t(Nt) for all Nt. By the envelope
theorem,
^0t(Nt) = (p^t(Nt)  c)0(Nt) + ( + 0(Nt))G^0t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt);
and
0t(Nt) = (pt(Nt)  c)0(Nt) + ( + 0(Nt))G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt);
If p^t(Nt) = pt(Nt), ^
0
t(Nt)  0t(Nt) follows immediately from 0(N)  0 and G^0t()  G0t() for all y. If
p^t(Nt) < pt(Nt), Lemma 18 yields that @ptL^t(p^t(Nt); Nt)  @ptLt(pt(Nt); Nt), i.e.,
  2p^t(Nt) + Vt + c+ (Nt)  G^0t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
  2pt(Nt) + Vt + c+ (Nt)  G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt):
Hence,
p^t(Nt) + G^
0
t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
pt(Nt) + G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) + (pt(Nt)  p^t(Nt)):
(A.6)
Since  > 0, p^t(Nt) < pt(Nt) implies that G^
0
t(( Vt  p^t(Nt)+(Nt))+Nt)  G0t(( Vt pt(Nt)+(Nt))+
Nt). Therefore, by (A.6),
^0t(Nt)  0t(Nt) =[(p^t(Nt)  pt(Nt)) + (G^0t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
 G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt))]0(Nt)
+ (G^0t(( Vt   p^t(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) G0t(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt))
0:
Hence, ^0t(Nt)  0t(Nt) for all Nt. This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 2.4.7.
Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 5: Part (a). The concavity, dierentiability, and monotonicity of dt () and Jdt (; ; ; )
follow from the same backward induction argument as the proof of Lemma 2. Hence, we omit the proof
of part (a) for brevity.
Part (b). The optimal value function vdt (It; Nt) satises the following recursive scheme:
vdt (It; Nt) = cIt + max
(xt;pst ;p
i
t)2Fd(It)
Jdt (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt); (A.7)
where Fd(It) := f(xt; pst ; pit) 2 [It;+1) [p; p] [p; p] : pst  pitg denotes the set of feasible decisions with
price discrimination and
Jdt (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt) = Rt(p
s
t ; Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt))
+	dt (xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt); ( Vt   pst + (Nt)) + Nt); (A.8)
with 	dt (x; y) := Ef[rn(y + t + t) + vdt 1(x  t; y + t + t)  cx]g:
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The derivation of (A.8) is as follows:
Jdt (xt; p
s
t ; p
i
t; Nt) :=  cIt + EfpstDst (pst ; Nt) + pitDit(pit; Nt)  c(xt   It)  h(xt  Dst (pst ; Nt)
 Dit(pit; Nt))+   b(xt  Dst (pst ; Nt) Dit(pit; Nt))  + rn(Dst (pst ; Nt) + Nt + t)
+vdt 1(xt  Dst (pst ; Nt) Dit(pit; Nt); Dst (pst ; Nt) + Nt + t)jNtg;
= (pst   c  b)( Vt   pst + (Nt)) + (1  )(pit   c  b)( Vt   pit + (Nt))
+(b  (1  )c)xt
+Efrn(Dst (pst ; Nt) + Nt + t)  (h+ b)(xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt)  t)+
+[vdt 1(xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt)  t;
( Vt   pst + (Nt) + t) + Nt + t)
 c(xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt)  t)]jNtg
= Rt(p
s
t ; Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt))
+	dt (xt   Vt + pst + (1  )pit   (Nt); ( Vt   pst + (Nt)) + Nt):
We use (x^dt (Nt); p^
s
t (Nt); p^
i
t(Nt)) to denote the unconstrained maximizer of (A.8). The same argument as
the proof of Lemma 2 yields that Jdt (; ; ; ) is jointly concave in (xt; pst ; pit; Nt). Hence, if It  x^dt (Nt),
(xdt (It; Nt); p
s
t (It; Nt); p
i
t (It; Nt)) = (x^
d
t (Nt); p^
s
t (Nt); p^
i
t(Nt)); otherwise (It > x^t(Nt)), x
d
t (It; Nt) = It.
The same argument as the proof of Lemma 3 implies that P[x^dt (Nt) Dst (p^st (Nt); Nt) Dit(p^it(Nt); Nt) 
x^dt 1(Nt 1)] = 1. Hence, the same argument as the proof of Lemma 4 yields that (x^
d
t (Nt); p^
s
t (Nt); p^
i
t(Nt)) =
(xdt (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt)) for all Nt  0. Thus, if IT  xdT (NT ), It  xdt (Nt) for all t with probability 1.
Hence, part (b) follows. Q:E:D:
The following lemma is a counterpart of Lemma 19 in the model with price discrimination.
Lemma 20 For each period t and any network size Nt  0, the following statements hold.
(a) xdt (Nt) = y
s
t (Nt)+y
i
t(Nt)+
, where  is the optimal safety stock characterized in Lemma 3(b).
(b) Jdt (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) = L
s
t (p
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1   )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt) +  + (), where
Lst (pt; Nt) := (pt c)( Vt pt+(Nt))+Gdt (( Vt pt+(Nt))+Nt), and Rt(pt; Nt) := (pt c)( Vt 
pt + (Nt)). Hence, p
s
t (Nt) = argmaxpst2[p;p]L
s
t (pt; Nt) and p
i
t(Nt) = argmaxpit2[p;p]Rt(pit; Nt).
(c) Jdt (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) = K
s
t (y
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1   )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt) +  + (), where
Kst (yt; Nt) := ( Vt+(Nt) yt  c)yt+Gdt (yt+Nt). Hence, yst (Nt)argmax[yst2[yst (Nt);yst (Nt)]K
s
t (yt; Nt),
where ys
t
(Nt) := ( Vt + (Nt)  p) and yst (Nt) := ( Vt + (Nt)  p).
(d) Let mst (Nt) := y
s
t (Nt) + Nt be the optimal expected network size in period t  1, given the current
network size Nt. We have J
d
t (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) =M
s
t (m
s
t (Nt); Nt)+(1 )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt)+
 + (), where Mst (mt; Nt) := ( Vt + (Nt)   mt Nt   c)(mt   Nt) + Gdt (mt). Hence,
mst (Nt)argmaxmst2[mst (Nt); mst (Nt)]M
s
t (m
s
t ; Nt), wherem
s
t (Nt) := y
s
t
(Nt)+Nt and m
s
t (Nt) := y
s
t (Nt)+
Nt.
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Proof of Lemma 20: Part (a). Part (a) follows from the same argument as the proof of Lemma
3(b), so we omit its proof for brevity.
Part (b). By part (a), xdt (Nt)  yst (Nt)  yit(Nt) =  for all Nt  0. By the Bellman equation
2.10, for all Nt,
Jdt (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) =Rt(p
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt) + xdt (Nt)
+ (xdt (Nt)  yst (Nt)  yit(Nt))
+Gdt (( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt):
Therefore,
Jdt (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) =Rt(p
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt)
+ ( + Vt   pst (Nt)  (1  )pit(Nt) + (Nt)) + ()
+Gdt (( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt)
=(pst (Nt)  c)( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt)
+Gdt (( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) +  + ()
=Lst (p
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt) +  + ();
(A.9)
where Lst (pt; Nt) := (pt   c)( Vt   pt + (Nt)) +Gdt (( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt), and Rt(pt; Nt) :=
(pt c)( Vt pt+(Nt)). Since (xdt (Nt); pst (Nt); pit(Nt)) maximizes Jdt (; ; ; Nt) for all Nt, pst (Nt) =
argmaxpst2[p;p]L
s
t (p
s
t ; Nt) and p
i
t(Nt) = argmaxpit2[p;p]Rt(pit; Nt). This proves part (b).
Part (c). Since yst (Nt) = ( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) and  > 0, pst (Nt) = Vt   y
s
t (Nt)
 + (Nt). Plug
this into (A.9), we have
Jdt (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) =(p
s
t (Nt)  c)( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt)
+Gdt (( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) +  + ()
=( Vt   y
s
t (Nt)

+ (Nt)  c)yst (Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt)
+Gdt (y
s
t (Nt) + Nt) + 
 + ()
=Kst (y
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt) +  + ();
whereKst (yt; Nt) := ( Vt  yt +(Nt) c)yt+Gdt (yt+Nt). Since (xdt (Nt); pst (Nt); pit(Nt)) maximizes
Jdt (; ; ; Nt) for allNt, yst (Nt) = argmaxyst2[yst (Nt);yst (Nt)]K
s
t (y
s
t ; Nt). The expressions of y
s
t
(Nt) and
yst (Nt) follow immediately from the identity y
s
t = ( Vt   pst + (Nt)) and that pst 2 [p; p]. This
proves part (c).
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Part (d). Observe that mst (Nt) = y
s
t (Nt) + Nt and  > 0 imply that p
s
t (Nt) = Vt   y
s
t (Nt)
 +
(Nt) = Vt + (Nt)  m
s
t (Nt) Nt
 . Plug this into (A.9), we have
Jdt (x
d
t (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt); Nt) =(p
s
t (Nt)  c)( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt)
+Gdt (( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) +  + ()
=( Vt + (Nt)  m
s
t (Nt)  Nt

  c)(mst (Nt)  Nt) +Gdt (mst (Nt))
+  + ()
=Mst (m
s
t (Nt); Nt) + (1  )Rt(pit(Nt); Nt) +  + ();
whereMst (mt; Nt) := ( Vt+(Nt) mt Nt  c)(mt Nt)+Gdt (mt). Since (xdt (Nt); pst (Nt); pit(Nt))
maximizes Jdt (; ; ; Nt) for all Nt, mst (Nt) = argmaxmst2[mst (Nt); mst (Nt)]Mst (mst ; Nt). The expres-
sions of mst (Nt) and m
s
t (Nt) follow immediately from the identity m
s
t = y
s
t + Nt and that
yst 2 [yst (Nt); yst (Nt)]. This establishes part (d). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1: Part (a). Direct computation yields that @ptL
s
t (pt; Nt) = [ 2pt  c+ Vt+
(Nt) @yGdt (( Vt pt+(Nt))+Nt)] and @ptRt(pt; Nt) =  2pt c+ Vt+(Nt). Since pit(Nt) > p, the
rst order condition with respect to pt implies that @ptRt(pit(Nt); Nt) = 0, i.e.,  2pit(Nt) c+Vt+(Nt) =
0. Hence, @ptL
s
t (p
i
t(Nt); Nt) =  Gdt (( Vt   pit(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt). Since 0() > 0 for all Nt  0,
Gdt (( Vt   pit(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) > 0. Moreover,  > 0 implies that @ptLst (pit(Nt); Nt) < 0. Because
Lst (; Nt) is concave in pt and pit(Nt) > p, pst (Nt) = argmaxpt2[p;p]Lst (pt; Nt) < pit(Nt). This proves part
(a).
Part (b). Assume, to the contrary, that pt(Nt) > p
i
t(Nt). Lemma 18 yields that @ptLt(pt(Nt); Nt) 
@ptRt(pit(Nt); Nt), i.e., [ 2pt(Nt)  c+ Vt+ (Nt) G0t(( Vt  pt(Nt) + (Nt))+ Nt)]  [ 2pit(Nt) 
c+ Vt+ (Nt)]. G
0
t()  0 implies that pt(Nt)  pit(Nt), which contradicts the assumption that pt(Nt) >
pit(Nt). This proves part (b).
Part (c). Observe that, if pi () = ps () = p () for each   t and any N  0, dt (Nt) = t(Nt)
for all Nt  0. Hence, t() is a lower bound for dt (). Now assume that pit(N ) > pst (Nt). Because
pst () and pit() are the lexicographically smallest optimizers, we must have dt (Nt) > t(Nt). Otherwise
there are two policies (one with pst (Nt) = p
i
t(Nt) and the other with p
s
t (Nt) < p
i
t(Nt)) that are lexi-
cographically dierent but generate the same optimal prot, which contradicts that the optimal policy
(xdt (Nt); p
s
t (Nt); p
i
t(Nt)) is the lexicographically smallest optimizer. On the other hand, if ()  0 and
r()  0 for all Nt  0, @Ntt()  0 for all t and, hence, pit() = pst () for all t and Nt  0. Moreover, since
pt() is the optimal pricing policy if the rm charges a single price to all customers in each period t, the
optimal price discrimination strategy should be pit() = pst () = pt() for each t. Hence, dt (Nt) = t(Nt)
for all Nt  0. This proves part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 6: Part (a). Part (a) follows from the same argument as the proof of Lemma
2, so we omit its proof for brevity.
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Part (b). The optimal value function vpt (It; Nt) satises the following recursive scheme:
vpt (It; Nt) = cIt + max
(xt;pt;nt)2Fp(It)
Jpt (xt; pt; nt; Nt); (A.10)
where Fp(It) := [It;+1) [p; p] [0;+1) denotes the set of feasible decisions and
Jpt (xt; pt; nt; Nt) = Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt))  cn(nt)
+	pt (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt + nt); (A.11)
with 	pt (x; y) := Efrn(y + t + t) + vpt 1(x  t; y + t + t)  cxg:
The derivation of (A.11) is given as follows:
Jpt (xt; pt; nt; Nt) :=  cIt + EfptDt(pt; Nt)  c(xt   It)  h(xt  Dt(pt; Nt))+   b(xt  Dt(pt; Nt)) 
+rn(Dt(pt; Nt) + Nt + nt + t)  cn(nt)
+vpt 1(xt  Dt(pt; Nt); Dt(pt; Nt) + Nt + nt + t)jNtg;
= (pt   c  b)( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + (b  (1  )c)xt   cn(nt)
+Efrn(( Vt   pt + (Nt) + t) + Nt + nt + t)
 (h+ b)(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  t)+
+[vpt 1(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  t; ( Vt   pt + (Nt) + t) + Nt + nt + t)
 c(xt   Vt + pt   (Nt)  t)]jNtg
= Rt(pt; Nt) + xt + (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt))  cn(nt)
+	pt (xt   Vt + pt   (Nt); ( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt + nt):
We use (x^pt (Nt); p^
p
t (Nt); n^t(Nt)) as the unconstrained optimizer of (A.11). The same argument as the
proof of Lemma 2 yields that Jdt (; ; ; ) is jointly concave in (xt; pt; nt; Nt). Hence, if It  x^pt (Nt),
(xpt (It; Nt); p
p
t (It; Nt); n

t (It; Nt)) = (x^
p
t (Nt); p^
p
t (Nt); n^t(Nt)); otherwise (It > x^
p
t (Nt)) x
p
t (It; Nt) = It.
The same argument as the proof of Lemma 3 implies that P[x^pt (Nt) Dt(p^pt (Nt); Nt)  x^pt 1(Nt 1)] =
1. Hence, the same argument as the proof of Lemma 4 yields that
(x^pt (Nt); p^
p
t (Nt); n^t(Nt)) = (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt)) for all Nt  0. Thus, if IT  xpT (NT ), It  xpt (Nt)
for all t with probability 1. Hence, part (b) follows. Q:E:D:
The following lemma is a counterpart of Lemma 19 in the model with network expanding promotion.
Lemma 21 For each period t and any network size Nt  0, the following statements hold.
(a) xpt (Nt) = y
p
t (Nt) + 
, where  is the optimal safety stock characterized in Lemma 3(b).
(b) Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) = L
p
t (p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + (), where Lpt (pt; nt; Nt) :=
(pt   c)( Vt   pt + (Nt))  cn(nt) +Gpt (( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt + nt).
Hence, (ppt (Nt); nt(Nt)) = argmax(pt;nt)2[p;p][0;+1)L
p
t (pt; nt; Nt).
(c) Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) = K
p
t (y
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + (), where Kpt (yt; nt; Nt) :=
( Vt + (Nt)  yt   c)yt   cn(nt) +Gdt (yt + Nt + nt).
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Hence, (ypt (Nt); nt(Nt)) = argmax(yt;nt)2f(yt;nt):yt2[yst2yt(Nt);yt(Nt)]gK
p
t (yt; nt; Nt), where yt(Nt)
and yt(Nt) are dened in Lemma 19(b).
(d) Let mpt (Nt) := y
p
t (Nt) + Nt be the optimal expected network size in period t   1, given the
current network size Nt. We have J
p
t (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) = M
p
t (m
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) +
+(), where Mpt (mt; nt; Nt) := ( Vt+(Nt)  mt Nt   c) (mt Nt)   cn(nt)+Gpt (mt+nt).
Hence, (mpt (Nt); nt(Nt)) = argmax(mtnt)2f(mt;nt):mt2[mt(Nt); mt(Nt)]gM
p
t (mt; nt; Nt), where mt(Nt)
and mt(Nt) are dened in Lemma 19(c).
Proof of Lemma 21: Part (a). Part (a) follows from the same argument as the proof of Lemma
3(b), so we omit its proof for brevity.
Part (b). By part (a), xpt (Nt)  ypt (Nt) =  for all Nt  0. By the Bellman equation 2.11, for
all Nt,
Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) =Rt(p
p
t (Nt); Nt) + x
p
t (Nt)  cn(nt(Nt))
+ (xpt (Nt)  yt(Nt))
+Gpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + nt(Nt) + Nt):
Therefore,
Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) =Rt(p
p
t (Nt); Nt) + x
p
t (Nt)  cn(nt(Nt))
+ (xpt (Nt)  yt(Nt))
+Gpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + nt(Nt) + Nt)
=(ppt (Nt)  c)( Vt   pst (Nt) + (Nt))  cn(nt(Nt))
+Gpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt)) +  + ()
=Lpt (p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + ();
(A.12)
where Lpt (pt; nt; Nt) := (pt   c)( Vt   pt + (Nt))   cn(nt) + Gpt (( Vt   pt + (Nt)) + Nt + nt).
Since (xpt (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt)) maximizes J
p
t (; ; ; Nt) for all Nt,
(ppt (Nt); nt(Nt)) = argmax(pt;nt)2[p;p][0;+1)L
p
t (pt; nt; Nt). This proves part (b).
Part (c). Since ypt (Nt) = Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt), ppt (Nt) = Vt   ypt (Nt) + (Nt). Plug this into
(A.12), we have
Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) =Rt(p
p
t (Nt); Nt) + x
p
t (Nt)  cn(nt(Nt))
+ (xpt (Nt)  yt(Nt))
+Gpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + nt(Nt) + Nt)
=( Vt   ypt (Nt) + (Nt)  c)ypt (Nt)  cn(nt(Nt))
+Gpt (y
p
t (Nt) + Nt + nt(Nt)) + 
 + ()
=Kpt (y
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + ();
whereKpt (yt; Nt) := ( Vt yt+(Nt) c)yt cn(nt)+Gdt (yt+Nt+nt). Since (xpt (Nt); ppt (Nt); nt(Nt))
maximizes Jpt (; ; ; Nt) for all Nt,
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(ypt (Nt); nt(Nt)) = argmax(yt;nt)2f(yt;nt):yt[y
t
(Nt);yt(Nt)]gK
p
t (yt; nt; Nt). This proves part (c).
Part (d). Observe that mpt (Nt) = y
p
t (Nt) + Nt and  > 0 imply that p
p
t (Nt) = Vt   ypt (Nt) +
(Nt) = Vt + (Nt)  m
p
t (Nt) Nt
 . Plug this into (A.12), we have
Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) =Rt(p
p
t (Nt); Nt) + x
p
t (Nt)  cn(nt(Nt))
+ (xpt (Nt)  yt(Nt))
+Gpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + nt(Nt) + Nt)
=( Vt + (Nt)  m
p
t (Nt)  Nt

  c) (m
p
t (Nt)  Nt)

+Gpt (m
p
t (Nt) + nt(Nt)) + 
 + ()
=Mpt (m
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) + 
 + ();
where Mpt (mt; Nt) := ( Vt + (Nt)  mt Nt   c) (mt Nt)   cn(nt) +Gpt (mt). Since
(xpt (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt)) maximizes J
p
t (; ; ; Nt) for all Nt,
(mpt (Nt); nt(Nt)) = argmax(mt;nt)2f(mt;nt):mt2[mst (Nt); mst (Nt)]gM
p
t (mt; nt; Nt). This establishes part
(d). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.5.2: Part (a). We rst show that if (2.12) holds, nt (It; N) > 0 for all It.
Observe that, since @y	
p
t 1(x; y)  0,
@Nt 1v
p
t 1(It 1; Nt 1)  (p  b  c)0(Nt+1)  0(Nt 1)0(wt 1);
where wt 1 = x

t 1(It 1; Nt 1)  yt 1(It 1; Nt 1). The rst-order condition with respect to xt 1 yields
that 0(wt 1)   . Thus,
@Nt 1vt 1(It 1; Nt 1)  (p  c)0(Nt 1): (A.13)
Therefore, for any xt  It and pt 2 [p; p],
@ntJ
p
t (xt; pt; 0; N) Efr0n(Nt 1) + @Nt 1vpt 1(xt  Dt(pt; N); Nt 1)jNt = Ng   c0n(0)
Efr0n(Nt 1) + (p  c)0(Nt 1)jNt = Ng   c0n(0)
(1  )[r0n( S(N)) + (p  c)0( S(N))]  c0n(0)
>0;
(A.14)
where the second inequality follows from (A.13), and the fourth from the assumption (2.12). The third
inequality of (A.14) follows from the following inequality:
E[r0n(Nt 1) + (p  c)0(Nt 1)jNt = N ] = ENt 1 S(N)[r0n(Nt 1) + (p  c)0(Nt 1)jNt = N ]
+ENt 1< S(N)[r
0
n(Nt 1) + (p  c)0(Nt 1)jNt = N ]
 0 + ENt 1< S(N)[r0n( S(N)) + (p  c)0( S(N))]
 (1  )[r0n( S(N)) + (p  c)0( S(N))];
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where the rst inequality follows from the concavity of rn() and (), and the second from the denition
of S(N). The inequality (A.14) yields that nt (It; N) > 0 for all It.
Since () is continuously increasing in Nt, S(N) is continuously increasing in N . The concavity of
rn() and () implies that r0n( S(N)) and 0( S(N)) are continuously decreasing in N . Therefore, let
N() := maxfN  0 : (1  )[r0n( S(N)) + (p  c)0( S(N))] > c0n(0)g:
We have (2.12) holds for all N < N(). This completes the proof of part (a).
Part (b). Since ()  0 and rn() is concavely increasing in Nt, @Nt 1vpt 1(It 1; Nt 1) 
@Nt 1v
p
t (It 1; 0)  (
Pt 1
=1(
 1 )r0n(0). Thus, if (
Pt 1
=0()
 )r0n(0)  c0n(0),
@ntJ
p
t (xt; pt; nt; Nt) Efr0n(nt) + @Nt 1vpt 1(xt  Dt(pt; N); Nt 1 + nt)jNtg   c0n(0)
r0n(0) + (
t 1X
=1
( 1 ))r0n(0)  c0n(0)
(
t 1X
=0
() )r0n(0)  c0n(0)
0:
Hence, nt (It; Nt) = 0 for all (It; Nt). This completes the proof of part (b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2.5.3: Parts (a)-(c). We prove parts (a)-(c) together by backward induction.
More specically, we show that if @Nt 1
p
t 1()  @Nt 1t 1() for all Nt 1  0, (i) ppt (Nt)  pt(Nt),
(ii) ypt (Nt)  yt(Nt), (iii) xpt (Nt)  xt(Nt), and (iv) @Ntpt ()  @Ntt() for all Nt  0. Since
@N0
p
0() = @N00()  0, the initial condition is satised.
We rst show that ypt (Nt)  yt(Nt). Note that @Nt 1pt 1(Nt 1)  @Nt 1t 1(Nt 1) for all Nt 1  0
implies that
@yG
p
t (y) =Efr0n(y + t + t) + @Nt 1pt 1(y + t + t)g
Efr0n(y + t + t) + @Nt 1t 1(y + t + t)g
=@yGt(y);
for all y. By Lemma 19(b) and Lemma 21(c), Jpt (x
p
t (Nt); p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt) = K
p
t (y
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt)+
+() and Jt(xt(Nt); pt(Nt); Nt) = Kt(yt(Nt); Nt)++(). Assume, to the contrary, that
ypt (Nt) > yt(Nt) for some Nt. Lemma 18 yields that @ytK
p
t (y
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt)  @ytKt(yt(Nt); Nt), i.e.,
 2ypt (Nt) + (Nt) + @yGpt (ypt (Nt) + Nt + nt(Nt))   2yt(Nt) + (Nt) + @yGt(yt(Nt) + Nt):
Since ypt (Nt) > yt(Nt),
@yG
p
t (y
p
t (Nt) + Nt + nt(Nt)) > @yGt(yt(Nt) + Nt): (A.15)
Because @yGt()  @yGpt () and ypt (Nt) > yt(Nt), the concavity of Gpt () and Gt() implies that ypt (Nt)+
Nt + nt(Nt) < yt(Nt) + Nt. However, nt(Nt)  0 and ypt (Nt) > yt(Nt) imply that ypt (Nt) + Nt +
nt(Nt) > yt(Nt) + Nt, which forms a contradiction. Thus, y
p
t (Nt)  yt(Nt) for all Nt  0. Hence,
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xpt (Nt) = y
p
t (Nt)+
  yt(Nt)+ = xt(Nt) and ppt (Nt) = Vt ypt (Nt)+(Nt)  Vt yt(Nt)+(Nt) =
pt(Nt).
Finally, to complete the induction, we show that @Nt
p
t (Nt)  @Ntt(Nt) for all Nt  0. By the
envelope theorem,
@Nt
p
t (Nt) = (p
p
t (Nt)  c)0(Nt) + ( + 0(Nt))@yGpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt));
and
@Ntt(Nt) = (pt(Nt)  c)0(Nt) + ( + 0(Nt))@yGt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt):
If ppt (Nt) = pt(Nt), @Nt
p
t (Nt)  @Ntt(Nt) follows immediately from 0(N)  0 and @yGpt ()  @yGt()
for all y.
If ppt (Nt) > pt(Nt), Lemma 18 yields that @ptL
p
t (p
p
t (Nt); nt(Nt); Nt)  @ptLt(pt(Nt); Nt), i.e.,
  2ppt (Nt) + Vt + c+ (Nt)  @yGpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt))
  2pt(Nt) + Vt + c+ (Nt)  @yGt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt):
Hence,
ppt (Nt)  c+ @yGpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt))
pt(Nt)  c+ @yGt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt) + (pt(Nt)  ppt (Nt)):
(A.16)
Since  > 0, ppt (Nt) > pt(Nt) implies that @yG
p
t (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt))  @yGt(( Vt  
pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt). Therefore,
@Nt
p
t (Nt)  @Ntt(Nt) =[(ppt (Nt)  pt(Nt)) + (@yGpt (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt))
  @yGt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt))]0(Nt)
+ (@yG
p
t (( Vt   ppt (Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt + nt(Nt))
  @yGt(( Vt   pt(Nt) + (Nt)) + Nt))
0:
Hence, @Nt
p
t (Nt)  @Ntt(Nt) for all Nt  0. This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of parts
(a)-(c).
Part (d). Note that t() is the normalized optimal prot with the Bellman equation (2.9) and
feasible decision set f(xt; pt; nt) : xt  0; pt 2 [p; p]; nt = 0g  Fp, which is the feasible decision set
associated with the prot pt (). Thus, pt (Nt)  t(Nt) for all t and any Nt  0. If nt(Nt) > 0,
we must have pt (Nt) > t(Nt). Otherwise there are two lexicographically dierent policies (one with
nt(Nt) = 0 and the other with nt(Nt) > 0) that generate the same optimal normalized prot t(Nt). This
contradicts the assumption that the lexicographically smallest policy is selected. Thus, pt (Nt) > t(Nt),
which establishes part (d). Q:E:D:
A.2 More Conditions on Assumption 2.3.1
Assumption 2.3.1 is essential to show the analytical results in this paper. Thus, we characterize the
conditions under which this assumption is satised in the following lemma.
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Lemma 22 The following statements hold:
(a) If Rt(; ) is jointly concave on its domain, then we have:
(i) For any Nt such that 
0(Nt) = 0, 00(Nt) = 0 as well. Thus, there exists a threshold N  0,
such that 0(Nt)
8><>:> 0; if Nt < N
,
= 0; otherwise,
and 00l (Nt)
8><>:< 0; if Nt < N
,
= 0; otherwise.
(ii) There exists a constant 0 < M < +1 such that, for any Nt  0, (0(Nt))2   M00l (Nt).
(b) If there exists a constant 0 < M < +1 such that, for any Nt  0, (0(Nt))2   M00l (Nt), then
we have:
(i) There exists a threshold  < +1 such that, for any   , with V t := Vt + , p = p + ,
and p = p+ , Rt (pt; Nt) := (pt   b  c)( V t   pt + (Nt)) is jointly concave in (pt; Nt) for
pt 2 [p; p] and Nt  0.
(ii) For any network externalities function (), there exists an threshold 0 < & < +1 such that,
for any &  &, with &() := &()=&, R&t(pt; Nt) := (pt   b   c)( Vt   pt + &(Nt)) is jointly
concave in (pt; Nt) for pt 2 [p; p] and Nt  0.
Part (a) characterizes a simpler necessary condition for the joint concavity of Rt(; ). It implies that
Rt(; ) is jointly concave only if, for all Nt, j00(Nt)j is suciently big compared with 0(Nt). In other
words, in the region where network externalities exist (i.e., 0(Nt) > 0), the curvature of () should
be suciently big. Part (b) shows that if the necessary condition characterized by part (a) is satised,
Rt(; ) is jointly concave if (i) pt is suciently big relative to the expected demand Vt pt+(Nt); or (ii)
0() is suciently small. Hence, the necessary conditions characterized in part (a) are also sucient to
some extent. The sucient conditions in part (b) have a clear economic interpretation: the price elastic-
ity of demand (i.e., j( dE[Dt(pt; Nt)]=E[Dt(pt; Nt)])=( dpt=pt)j) is suciently big relative to the network
size elasticity of demand (i.e., j( dE[Dt(pt; Nt)]=E[Dt(pt; Nt)])=( dNt=Nt)j). This condition is generally
satised in practice, because, compared with the primary demand leverage (i.e., sales price), network
externalities have less impact upon demand in general.
Proof of Lemma 22: Part (a-i). If 00(Nt) = 0, the left-hand-side of (2.3) equals 0. Moreover,
the right-hand-side of (2.3) is greater than or equal to 0 to ensure the joint concavity of Rt(; ) (see
Lemma 1). Hence, the right-hand-side of (2.3) has to be 0. Thus, 0(Nt) = 0 for this case. For the
second half of part (a-i), it suces to show that if 0(N0) = 0 then 0(Nt) = 0 for all Nt  N0. Since
00(Nt)  0 for all Nt  0, 0(Nt)  0(N0) = 0. On the other hand, 0(Nt)  0 for all Nt  0. Thus,
0(Nt) = 0 for all Nt  N0.
Part (a-ii). By part (a-i), for any Nt, 
00(Nt) = 0, 0(Nt) = 0 as well. Thus, (0(Nt))2   M00(Nt)
for any 0 < M < +1. We now consider the case 00(Nt) < 0. By (2.3), dene M := 2(p  c  b) > 0,
the joint concavity of Rt(; ) implies that  M00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2. This establishes part (a).
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Part (b-i). By Lemma 1, Rt (; ) is jointly concave if and only if  2(p  c  b)00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2 for
all Nt  0. We dene  := M2   p+ c+ b. Hence, if   ,  2(p   c  b)   M . Therefore,
 2(p   c  b)00(Nt)   M00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2
for all Nt  0, where the last inequality follows from the assumption that  M00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2 for all
Nt  0. Part (b-i) follows.
Part (b-ii). Note that @Nt
&(Nt) = 
0(Nt)=& and @2Nt
&(Nt) = 
00(Nt)=& for any & > 0 and Nt  0.
Thus, by Lemma 1, R&t(; ) is jointly concave if and only if
 2(p  c  b)
00(Nt)
&
 (
0(Nt))2
&2
()  2&(p  c  b)00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2:
Dene & = M2(p c b) > 0. We have, if &  &,
 2&(p  c  b)00(Nt)   M00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2;
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that  M00(Nt)  (0(Nt))2 for all Nt. Hence,
R&t (; ) is jointly concave if &  &. Q:E:D:
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B. Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs of Statements
We use @ to denote the derivative operator of a single variable function, and @x to denote the
partial derivative operator of a multi-variable function with respect to variable x. For any multivariate
continuously dierentiable function f(x1; x2;    ; xn) and ~x := (~x1; ~x2;    ; ~xn) in f()'s domain, 8i, we
use @xif(~x1; ~x2;    ; ~xn) to denote @xif(x1; x2;    ; xn)jx=~x. The following lemma is used throughout
our proof.
Lemma 23 Let Gi(z; Z) be a continuously dierentiable function in (z; Z), where z 2 [z; z] (z and z
might be innite) and Z 2 Rni for i = 1; 2. For i = 1; 2, let (zi; Zi) := argmax(z;Z)Gi(z; Z) be the
optimizers of Gi(; ). If z1 < z2, we have: @zG1(z1; Z1)  @zG2(z2; Z2):
Proof: z1 < z2, so z  z1 < z2  z. Hence, @zG1(z1; Z1)
8><>:= 0 if z1 > z, 0 if z1 = z;
and @zG2(z2; Z2)
8><>:= 0 if z2 < z, 0 if z2 = z, i.e., @zG1(z1; Z1)  0  @zG2(z2; Z2): Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorems 3.4.1-3.4.2 and Propositions 3.4.1-3.4.2: We show Theorem 3.4.1, Propo-
sition 3.4.1, Proposition 3.4.2, and Theorem 3.4.2 together by backward induction. More specically,
we show that, if Vi;t 1(It 1;t 1jsct 1) = wi;t 1Ii;t 1 + sci;t 1i;t 1 for all i, (a) Proposition 3.4.1
holds for period t, (b) Proposition 3.4.2 holds for period t, (c) there exists a Markov strategy prole
f(sci;t (; ); psci;t (; ); xsci;t (; )) : 1  i  Ng which forms a Nash equilibrium in the subgame of period t,
(d) under conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4.1(c), the Nash equilibrium in the subgame of period t,
f(sci;t (; ); psci;t (; ); xsci;t (; )) : 1  i  Ng, is unique, and (e) there exists a positive vector sct , such that
Vi;t(It;tjsct ) = wi;tIi;t + sci;ti;t for all i. Because Vi;0(I0;0) = wi;0Ii;0 for all i, the initial condition
is satised.
Since Vi;t 1(It 1;t 1jsct 1) = wi;t 1Ii;t 1 + sci;t 1i;t 1 for all i, Equation (3.12) implies that the
objective function of player i in Gsc;2t is
sci;t(yt) = (iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + isci;t 1(ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t])):
Thus, for any given strategy of other players y i;t, player i maximizes the following univariate function:
sci;t(yi;t) := (iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + isci;t 1ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]):
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If yi;t < 0, (yi;t   i;t)+ = 0, (yi;t   i;t)  = i;t   yi;t, and, thus,  Li;t(yi;t) =  bi;tE(i;t   yi;t) =
 bi;t + bi;tyi;t. Moreover, yi;t < 0 implies that isci;t 1ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])  isci;t 1ii;t(0). Hence, if
yi;t < 0,
sci;t(yi;t) =  bi;t + (iwi;t 1   wi;t + bi;t)yi;t + isci;t 1ii;t(0):
Because bi;t > wi;t   iwi;t 1, sci;t() is strictly increasing in yi;t for yi;t  0.
Observe that  Li;t() is concave and continuously dierentiable in yi;t. Since E(y+i;t^i;t) is concavely
increasing and continuously dierentiable in yi;t for yi;t  0, and ii;t() is concavely increasing and
continuously dierentiable, ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) is concavely increasing and continuously dierentiable in
yi;t for yi;t  0. Hence, sci;t() is concave and continuously dierentiable in yi;t for yi;t  0. Observe that
@yi;t
sc
i;t(0+) = iwi;t 1 wi;t+bi;t+isci;t 1 Fi;t(0)0ii;t(E(0^i;t)) = iwi;t 1 wi;t+bi;t+isci;t 10ii;t(0) > 0;
where the inequality follows from iwi;t 1   wi;t + bi;t > 0 and 0ii;t(0)  0. Therefore, the optimizer of
sci;t(), ysci;t , is the solution to the rst-order condition: @yi;tsci;t(ysci;t ) = 0, or, equivalently,
(iwi;t 1   wi;t)  L0i;t(ysci;t ) + isci;t 1 Fi;t(ysci;t )0ii;t(E(ysci;t ^ i;t)) = 0:
Because i;t is continuously distributed, y
sc
i;t is unique for each i. Moreover, y
sc
i;t > 0 and 
sc
i;t(y
sc
i;t ) >
sci;t(0) =  bi;t + isci;t 1ii;t(0) for each i.
We now show that Proposition 3.4.2 holds for period t. Since sci;t(y
sc
i;t ) > 
sc
i;t(0) =  bi;t +
i
sc
i;t 1ii;t(0) and i;t(zt)  ii;t(0) 
P
j 6=i ij;t(1)  0, we have sci;t > sci;t(0) isci;t 1
P
j 6=i ij;t(1) 
 bi;t. Observe that
pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t > pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t)  bi;t > 0:
Thus, if pi;t = pi;t, pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t > 0. Therefore, each rm i could at least earn a
positive payo of (pi;t iwi;t 1 i;t(i;t) bi;t)i;t by charging the maximum allowable price pi;t, where
i;t := minf i;t(t)i;t(pt) : t 2 [0; 1;t]     [0; N;t] [p1;t; p1;t]     [pN;t; pN;t]g > 0:
Let
i;t := maxf i;t(t)i;t(pt) : t 2 [0; 1;t]     [0; N;t] [p1;t; p1;t]     [pN;t; pN;t]g  i;t:
Hence, we can restrict the feasible action set of rm i in Gsc;1t to
Asc;1i;t := f(i;t; pi;t) 2 [0; i;t] [pi;t; pi;t] : pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t
 (pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t)  bi;t)i;t
i;t
> 0g;
which is a nonempty and complete sublattice of R2. Thus, sci;t(t; pt) > 0 and
log(sci;t(t; pt)) = log(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t ) + log( i;t(t)) + log(i;t(pt)) (B.1)
is well-dened on Asc;1i;t . Because i;t() and  i;t() satisfy (3.3) and (3.4), for each i and j 6= i, we have
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@pi;t
=
@2 log(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )
@i;t@pi;t
=
0i;t(i;t)
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
 0;
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@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@pj;t
= 0;
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@j;t
=
@2 log( i;t(t))
@i;t@j;t
 0;
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@j;t
= 0; and
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@pj;t
=
@2 log(i;t(pt))
@pi;t@pj;t
 0:
Hence, Gsc;1t is a log-supermodular game and, thus, has pure strategy Nash equilibria which are the
smallest and largest undominated strategies (see Theorem 5 in [124]).
Next, we show that if conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4.1(c) hold, the Nash equilibrium of Gsc;1t
is unique. First, we show that under conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4.1(c),
@2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@p2i;t
< 0; j@
2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@p2i;t
j >
X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@pj;t
+
NX
j=1
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@j;t
; (B.2)
@2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@2i;t
< 0; and j@
2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@2i;t
j >
X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@j;t
+
NX
j=1
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@pj;t
: (B.3)
Note that, by (B.1) and (3.4),
@2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@p2i;t
=
@2 log i;t(pt)
@p2i;t
  1
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
< 0;
and
j@
2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@p2i;t
j = j@
2 log i;t(pt)
@p2i;t
j+ 1
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
:
Since
@2 log(sci;t(t;pt))
@pi;t@j;t
= 0 for j 6= i, and
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@i;t
=
0i;t(i;t)
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
;
we have
j@
2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@p2i;t
j = j@
2 log i;t(pt)
@p2i;t
j+ 1
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
>
X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@pj;t
+
0i;t(i;t)
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
=
X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@pj;t
+
NX
j=1
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@pi;t@j;t
;
where the inequality follows from (3.4) and condition (i). Hence, (B.2) holds for all i and all (t; pt).
Since 00i;t()  0 and (3.3), we have
@2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@2i;t
=
@2 log i;t(t)
@2i;t
  
00
i;t(t)(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t ) + (0i;t(t))2
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
< 0;
and
j@
2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@2i;t
j = j@
2 log i;t(t)
@2i;t
j+ 
00
i;t(t)(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t ) + (0i;t(t))2
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
:
Since
@2 log(sci;t(t;pt))
@i;t@pj;t
= 0 for j 6= i, and
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@pi;t
=
0i;t(i;t)
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
;
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we have
j@
2 log sci;t(t; pt)
@2i;t
j = j@
2 log i;t(t)
@2i;t
j+ 
00
i;t(t)(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t ) + (0i;t(t))2
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
>
X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@j;t
+
00i;t(t)(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + ci;t) + (0i;t(t))2
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2

X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@j;t
+
0i;t(i;t)
(pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )2
=
X
j 6=i
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@j;t
+
NX
j=1
@2 log(sci;t(t; pt))
@i;t@pj;t
;
where the rst inequality follows from (3.4) and sci;t  ci;t, and the second from condition (ii). Hence,
(B.3) holds for all i and all (t; pt).
We now show that if (B.2) and (B.3) hold, Gsc;1t has a unique Nash equilibrium. Recall that the set
of Nash equilibria in Gsc;1t forms a complete lattice (see Theorem 2 in [194]). If, to the contrary, there
exist two distinct equilibria (t ; p

t ) and (^

t ; p^

t ), where p^

i;t  pi;t for all i and ^j;t  j;t for all j, with
the inequality being strict for some i or j. If, for some i, p^i;t > p

i;t, p^

i;t   pi;t  p^l;t   pl;t for all l, and
p^i;t   pi;t  ^l;t   l;t for all l, without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1. Lemma 23 suggests that
@p1;t log(
sc
1;t(^

t ; p^

t ))  @p1;t log(sc1;t(t ; pt )): (B.4)
On the other hand, by Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@p1;t log(
sc
1;t(^

t ; p^

t ))  @p1;t log(sc1;t(t ; pt ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(p^j;t   pj;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@p1;t@pj;t
+
NX
j=1
(^j;t   j;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@p1;t@j;t
] ds

Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(p^1;t   p1;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@p1;t@pj;t
+
NX
j=1
(p^1;t   p1;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@p1;t@j;t
] ds
< 0;
where the rst inequality follows from p^1;t   p1;t  p^l;t   pl;t for all l and p^1;t   p1;t  ^l;t   l;t for all l,
and the second from p^1;t   p1;t > 0 and (B.2). This contradicts (B.4).
If, for some j, ^j;t > 

j;t, ^

j;t   j;t  p^l;t   pl;t for all l, and ^j;t   j;t  ^l;t   l;t for all l, without
loss of generality, we assume that j = 1. Lemma 23 suggests that
@1;t log(
sc
1;t(^

t ; p^

t ))  @1;t log(sc1;t(t ; pt )): (B.5)
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On the other hand, by Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@1;t log(
sc
1;t(^

t ; p^

t ))  @1;t log(sc1;t(t ; pt ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(^j;t   j;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@1;t@j;t
+
NX
j=1
(p^j;t   pj;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@1;t@pj;t
] ds

Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(^1;t   1;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@1;t@j;t
+
NX
j=1
(^1;t   1;t)
@2 log(sc1;t((1  s)t + s^t ; (1  s)pt + sp^t ))
@1;t@pj;t
] ds
< 0;
where the rst inequality follows from ^1;t   1;t  p^l;t   pl;t for all l and ^1;t   1;t  ^l;t   l;t for all l,
and the second from ^1;t   1;t > 0 and (B.3). This contradicts (B.5). Therefore, the Nash equilibrium
in Gsc;1t is unique, if conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4.1(c) hold.
If i;t(i;t) = i;t, we have 
0
i;t(i;t) = 1 and 
00
i;t(i;t) = 0 for all i;t 2 [0; i;t]. Thus, if i;t(i;t) = i;t,
conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4.1(c) hold.
Note that for any  2 [0; 1] and (i;t; pi;t); (^i;t; p^i;t) 2 [0; 1;t] [0; 2;t]     [0; N;t] [p1;t; p1;t]
[p
2;t
; p2;t]     [pN;t; pN;t],
 log(p^i;t   iwi;t   i;t(^i;t) + sci;t ) + (1  ) log(pi;t   iwi;t   i;t(i;t) + sci;t )
 log(p^i;t + (1  )pi;t   iwi;t   i;t(^i;t)  (1  )i;t(i;t) + sci;t )
 log(p^i;t + (1  )pi;t   iwi;t   i;t(^i;t + (1  )i;t) + sci;t );
where the rst inequality follows from the concavity of log(), and the second from that log() is an in-
creasing function and i;t() is a convex function. Thus, log(pi;t iwi;t i;t(i;t)+sci;t ) is jointly concave
in (i;t; pi;t). Hence, the diagonal dominance condition (3.3) and (3.4) implies that log(
sc
i;t(t; pt)) is
jointly concave in (i;t; pi;t) for any given ( i;t; p i;t). Therefore, the rst-order conditions with respect
to i;t and pi;t is the necessary and sucient condition for (
sc
t ; p
sc
t ) to be the unique Nash equilibrium
in Gsc;1t . Since
@i;t log(
sc
i;t(t; pt)) =
@i;t i;t(t)
 i;t(t)
  
0
i;t(t)
pi;t   wi;t   i;t(i;t) + sci;t
;
and
@pi;t log(
sc
i;t(t; pt)) =
@pi;ti;t(pt)
i;t(pt)
+
1
pi;t   wi;t   i;t(i;t) + sci;t
;
the Nash equilibrium of Gsc;1t is a solution to the system of equations (3.15). Since Gsc;1t has a unique
equilibrium, (3.15) has a unique solution, which coincides with the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of Gsc;1t . As shown above, for all i,
sci;t(
sc
t ; p
sc
t )  (pi;t   iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t)  bi;t)i;t > 0:
Hence, sci;t = 
sc
i;t(
sc
t ; p
sc
t ) > 0 for all i.
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Next, we show that f(sci;t ; psci;t ;i;tysci;t i;t(psct ) i;t(sct )) : 1  i  Ng is an equilibrium in
the subgame of period t. Since ysci;t > 0, i;ty
sc
i;t i;t(p
sc
t ) i;t(
sc
t ) > 0 for all i. Therefore, re-
gardless of the starting inventory in period t, Ii;t, rm i could adjust its inventory to x
sc
i;t (It;t) =
i;ty
sc
i;t i;t(p
sc
t ) i;t(
sc
t ). Thus, by Propositions 3.4.1-3.4.2, f(sci;t ; psci;t ;i;tysci;t i;t(psct ) i;t(sct )) :
1  i  Ng forms an equilibrium in the subgame of period t. In particular, if conditions (i) and (ii)
hold, f(sci;t ; psci;t ;i;tysci;t i;t(psct ) i;t(sct )) : 1  i  Ng is the unique equilibrium in the subgame of
period t.
Next, we show that there exists a positive vector sct = (
sc
1;t; 
sc
2;t;    ; scN;t), such that
Vi;t(It;tjsct ) = wi;tIi;t + sci;ti;t. By (3.12), we have that
Vi;t(It;tjsct ) = Ji;t(sct ; psct ;i;tysci;t i;t(psct ) i;t(sct ); It;tjsct 1) = wi;tIi;t+(isci;t 1i;t+sci;t )i;t:
Since sci;t 1  0 and sci;t > 0, sci;t = isci;t 1i;t + sci;t > 0. This completes the induction and, thus,
the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, Proposition 3.4.1, Proposition 3.4.2, and Theorem 3.4.2. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3: By Theorems 3.4.1-3.4.2, and Propositions 3.4.1-3.4.2, it suces to show
that, if there exists a constant scs;t 1  0, such that Vi;t 1(It 1;t 1jsct 1) = ws;tIi;t 1 + scs;t 1i;t 1
for all i, we have: (a) the unique Nash equilibrium in Gsc;2t is symmetric, i.e., ysci;t = yscj;t for all i; j;
(b) the unique Nash equilibrium in Gsc;1t is symmetric, i.e., (sci;t ; psci;t ) = (scj;t ; pscj;t ) for all i 6= j,
and (c) there exists a constant scs;t > 0, such that Vi;t(It;tjscs;t ) = ws;tIi;t + scs;ti;t for all i. Since
Vi;0(It;t) = ws;0Ii;0 for all i, the initial condition is satised with 
sc
s;0 = 0.
Since Vi;t 1(It 1;t 1jsct 1) = ws;tIi;t 1 + scs;ti;t 1 for all i, by (3.12),
sci;t(yt) = (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + sscs;t 1(sa;t(E(y+i;t ^ i;t)) 
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E(y+j;t ^ j;t))):
Hence, sci;t(yi;t) = (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + sscs;t 1sa;t(E(y+i;t ^ i;t)): Thus, sci;t()  scj;t() for
all i and j. Therefore, for all i and j,
ysci;t = argmaxy
sc
i;t(y) = argmaxy
sc
j;t(y) = y
sc
j;t
and, hence,
sci;t = 
sc
i;t(y
sc
t ) = 
sc
j;t(y
sc
t ) = 
sc
j;t :
We denote yscs;t = y
sc
i;t for each i, and 
sc
s;t = 
sc
i;t for each i. Observe that, the objective functions of
Gsc;1t ,
fsci;t(t; pt) = s;t(pt) s;t(t)[pi;t   sws;t 1   s;t(i;t) + scs;t ] : 1  i  Ng
are symmetric. Hence, if there exists an asymmetric Nash equilibrium (sct ; p
sc
t ), there exists another
Nash equilibrium (sc
t
; psc
t
) 6= (sct ; psct ), where sct is a permutation of sct and psct is a permutation
of psct . This contradicts the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in Gsc;1t . Thus, the unique Nash
equilibrium in Gsc;1t is symmetric. Hence, sci;t = sci;t(scss;t; pscss;t) = s;t(pscss;t) s;t(scss;t)[pscs;t   sws;t 1 
s;t(
sc
s;t ) + 
sc
s;t ] = 
sc
j;t(
sc
ss;t; p
sc
ss;t) = 
sc
j;t ; which is positive. Thus, we denote the payo of each rm i
as scs;t . By Theorem 3.4.2(a),
sci;t = s
sc
s;t 1s;t +
sc
i;t = s
sc
s;t 1s;t +
sc
j;t = 
sc
j;t > 0:
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Thus, we denote the SC market size coecient of each rm i as scs;t. This completes the induction and,
thus, the proof of Proposition 3.4.3. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3: Part (a). Clearly, by (3.13), ysci;t is independent of 
sc
j;t 1 for all j 6= i.
Moreover, because
@2sci;t(yi;t)
@yi;t@sci;t 1
=
8><>:i
Fi;t(yi;t)
0
ii;t(E(yi;t ^ i;t))  0; if yi;t  0;
0; otherwise;
sci;t(yi;t) is supermodular in (yi;t; 
sc
i;t 1) . Therefore, y
sc
i;t = argmaxyi;t2R
sc
i;t(yi;t) is increasing in
sci;t 1. The continuity of y
sc
i;t in 
sc
i;t 1 follows directly from the continuous dierentiability of 
sc
i;t()
in (yi;t; 
sc
i;t 1). This completes the proof of part (a).
Part (b). Note that, by part (a),
P
l 6=i il;t(E((yscl;t )+ ^ l;t)) is independent of sci;t 1 and continu-
ously increasing in scj;t 1 for j 6= i. Moreover,
sci;t(yi;t) = (iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + isci;t 1ii;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])
is continuously increasing in sci;t 1 and independent of 
sc
j;t 1 for all j 6= i. Thus,
sci;t = [max
yi;t0
sci;t(yi;t)] 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(E(yscj;t ^ j;t))
is continuously increasing in sci;t 1 and continuously decreasing in 
sc
j;t 1 for all j 6= i. This completes
the proof of part (b).
Part (c). We denote the objective function of each rm i in Gsc;1s;t as sci;t(; jscs;t ) to capture the
dependence of the objective functions on scs;t . The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in Gsc;1s;t is denoted
as (scss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )), where 
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ) = (
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ); 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t );    ; scs;t (scs;t )) and pscss;t(scs;t ) =
(pscs;t (
sc
s;t ); p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t );    ; pscs;t (scs;t )). It suces to show that, if scs;t > scs;t , scs;t (scs;t )  scs;t (scs;t ),
and pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ).
We rst show that pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ) for all scs;t > scs;t . Assume, to the contrary, that
pscs;t (
sc
s;t ) > p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ). Lemma 23 implies that
@p1;t log(
sc
1;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t ))  @p1;t log(sc1;t(scss;t(scs;t ); pscss;t(scs;t )jscs;t )), i.e.,
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) +
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
@p1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) +
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
(B.6)
By (3.4) and Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  @p1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ))
@2 log s;t((1  s)pscss;t(scs;t ) + spscss;t(scs;t ))
@p1;t@pj;t
] ds
< 0:
Hence, inequality (B.6) suggests that
pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t < pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t : (B.7)
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Since pscs;t (
sc
s;t ) > p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) and 
sc
s;t > 
sc
s;t , s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t )) > s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t )). Thus, 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) >
scs;t (
sc
s;t ). Lemma 23 yields that
@1;t log(
sc
1;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t ))  @1;t log(sc1;t(scss;t(scs;t ); pscss;t(scs;t )jscs;t )), i.e.,
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) 
0s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
@1;t log s;t(scss;t(scs;t )) 
0s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
(B.8)
Since s;t() is convexly increasing, 0s;t(scs;t (scs;t )  0s;t(scs;t (scs;t )). Thus, inequality (B.7) implies that
  
0
s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
<   
0
s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
Hence, (B.8) suggests that
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) > @1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )): (B.9)
By (3.3) and Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  @1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(scs;t (
sc
s;t )  scs;t (scs;t ))
@2 log s;t((1  s)scss;t(scs;t ) + sscss;t(scs;t ))
@1;t@j;t
] ds
< 0;
which contradicts (B.9). Therefore, for all scs;t > 
sc
s;t , we have p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ).
We now show that scs;t (
sc
s;t )  scs;t (scs;t ) for all scs;t > scs;t . Assume, to the contrary, that
scs;t (
sc
s;t ) < 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ). Lemma 23 implies that
@1;t log(
sc
1;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t ))  @1;t log(sc1;t(scss;t(scs;t ); pscss;t(scs;t )jscs;t )), i.e.,
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) 
0s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
@1;t log s;t(scss;t(scs;t )) 
0s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
(B.10)
By (3.3) and Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  @1;t log s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(scs;t (
sc
s;t )  scs;t (scs;t ))
@2 log s;t(s
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ) + (1  s)scss;t(scs;t ))
@1;t@j;t
] ds < 0:
Hence, inequality (B.10) implies that
  
0
s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
<   
0
s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
Since s;t() is convexly increasing, 0s;t(scs;t (scs;t ))  0s;t(scs;t (scs;t )). Hence,
pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t < pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t :
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Since s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))  s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) and scs;t > scs;t , pscs;t (scs;t ) < pscs;t (scs;t ). Lemma 23 implies that
@p1;t log(
sc
1;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t ))  @p1;t log(sc1;t(scss;t(scs;t ); pscss;t(scs;t )jscs;t )), i.e.,
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) +
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
@p1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) +
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
(B.11)
Because
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
>
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
;
we have that
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) < @p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )): (B.12)
By (3.4) and Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  @p1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ))
@2 log s;t(sp
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ) + (1  s)pscss;t(scs;t ))
@p1;t@pj;t
] ds
< 0;
which contradicts (B.12). Therefore, for all scs;t > 
sc
s;t , we have 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t )  scs;t (scs;t ). The continuity
of scs;t (
sc
s;t ) and p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) in 
sc
s;t follows directly from that 
sc
i;t(t; ptjscs;t ) is twice continuously
dierentiable and the implicit function theorem. This completes the proof of part (c).
Part (d). By Theorem 3.4.2(a), scs;t = s
sc
s;ts;t + 
sc
s;t , it suces to show that 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) is
continuously increasing in scs;t , where 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) := 
sc
i;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )).
Assume that scs;t > 
sc
s;t . Since part (c) implies that p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ) and scs;t (scs;t ) 
scs;t (
sc
s;t ), the monotonicity condition (3.17) implies that
s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) and  s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))   s;t(scss;t(scs;t )). (B.13)
If pscs;t (
sc
s;t ) = p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) and 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) = 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ), by 
sc
s;t > 
sc
s;t , we have
pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t > pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t :
Thus,
scs;t (
sc
s;t ) = 
sc
i;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t )
= (pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t )s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
> (pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t )s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
= sci;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t )
= scs;t (
sc
s;t ):
If pscs;t (
sc
s;t ) < p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ), Lemma 23 yields that
@p1;t log(
sc
1;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); 
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t ))  @p1;t log(sc1;t(pscss;t(scs;t ); scss;t(scs;t )jscs;t )), i.e.,
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) +
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
@p1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) +
1
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
(B.14)
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By (3.4) and Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@p1;t log s;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  @p1;t log s;t(pscss;t(scs;t ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  pscs;t (scs;t ))
@2 log s;t((1  s)pscss;t(scs;t ) + spscss;t(scs;t ))
@p1;t@pj;t
] ds < 0:
Hence, (B.14) implies that
pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t > pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t :
Therefore,
scs;t (
sc
s;t ) = 
sc
i;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t )
= (pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t )s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
> (pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t )s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
= sci;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t )
= scs;t (
sc
s;t ):
If pscs;t (
sc
s;t ) = p
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) and 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) > 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ), Lemma 23 yields that
@1;t log(
sc
1;t(p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); 
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t ))  @1;t log(sc1;t(pscss;t(scs;t ); scss;t(scs;t )jscs;t )), i.e.,
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )) 
0s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
@1;t log s;t(scss;t(scs;t )) 
0s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
(B.15)
By (3.4) and Newton-Leibniz formula, we have
@1;t log s;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ))  @1;t log s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
=
Z 1
s=0
[
NX
j=1
(scs;t (
sc
s;t )  scs;t (scs;t ))
@2 log s;t(s
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ) + (1  s)scss;t(scs;t ))
@1;t@j;t
] ds < 0:
Hence, (B.15) implies that
  
0
s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t (scs;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
>   
0
s;t(
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ))
pscs;t ((scs;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t
:
(B.16)
Since s;t() is convexly increasing, 0s;t(scs;t (scs;t ))  0s;t(scs;t (scs;t )). Hence, (B.16) implies that
pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t > pscs;t ((scs;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t :
Therefore,
scs;t (
sc
s;t ) = 
sc
i;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t )
= (pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t )s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
> (pscs;t (
sc
s;t )  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t (scs;t )) + scs;t )s;t(pscss;t(scs;t )) s;t(scss;t(scs;t ))
= sci;t(
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t ); p
sc
ss;t(
sc
s;t )jscs;t )
= scs;t (
sc
s;t ):
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Thus, we have shown that, if scs;t > 
sc
s;t , 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) > 
sc
s;t (
sc
s;t ) and, hence, by Theorem 3.4.2(a),
scs;t(
sc
s;t ) > 
sc
s;t(
sc
s;t ). The continuity of 
sc
s;t in 
sc
s;t follows directly from the continuous dierentiability
of sci;t(t; ptjscs;t ) in (t; pt; scs;t ) and the continuity of (scss;t; pscss;t) in scs;t . This completes the proof of
part (d).
Part (e). By part (c), it suces to show that, scs;t is continuously increasing in 
cs
s;t 1. The
monotonicity follows from the assumption, whereas the continuity follows directly from part (a) and
that the compound function is continuous if each individual function is continuous. This completes the
proof of part (e).
Part (f). By the proof of part (e), scs;t is continuously increasing in 
cs
s;t 1. By part (d), 
sc
s;t is
continuously increasing in scs;t 1. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.4.4: Part (a). Because sci;t 1  ~sci;t 1 = 0 for each i and t, Theorem 3.4.3(a)
implies that ysci;t  ~ysci;t for all i and t. Thus,
zsci;t = E[(ysci;t )+ ^ i;t]  E[(~ysci;t )+ ^ i;t] = zsci;t ; for all i and t.
Moreover, since ~sci;t 1 = 0, ~
sc
i;t(yt) = (iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t). Moreover, if yi;t  0, ~sci;t(yt) is
strictly increasing in yi;t. Hence, ~
sc
i;t = maxf(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) : yi;t  0g: Thus,
sci;t =maxf(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + isci;t 1(ii;t(E[yi;t ^ i;t]) 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(E[yj;t ^ j;t])) : yi;t  0g
maxf(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) + isci;t 1(ii;t(0) 
X
j 6=i
ij;t(1)) : yi;t  0g
maxf(iwi;t 1   wi;t)yi;t   Li;t(yi;t) : yi;t  0g
=~sci;t ;
where the rst inequality follows from that ii;t() is increasing in yi;t and ij;t() is increasing in yj;t,
and the second from that i;t()  0 for all i, t, and zt. This proves part (a).
Part (b-i). Part (a) suggests that scs;t  ~scs;t for all t. Thus, by Theorem 3.4.3(c), scs;t  ~scs;t
for all t. By Theorem 3.4.2(b), sci;t (It;t) = 
sc
s;t  ~scs;t = ~sci;t (It;t) for all t and (It;t) 2 S. This
proves part (b-i).
Part (b-ii). Part (a) suggests that scs;t  ~scs;t for all t. Thus, by Theorem 3.4.3(c), pscs;t  ~pscs;t
for all t. By Theorem 3.4.2(b), psci;t (It;t) = p
sc
s;t  ~pscs;t = ~psci;t (It;t) for all t and (It;t) 2 S. This
proves part (b-ii).
Part (b-iii). By Proposition 3.4.3(d), xsci;t (It;t) = y
sc
s;t s;t(p
sc
ss;t) s;t(
sc
ss;t)i;t and ~x
sc
i;t (It;t) =
~yscs;t s;t(~p
sc
ss;t) s;t(~
sc
ss;t)i;t. Part (a) implies that y
sc
s;t  ~yscs;t . Since, by parts (b-i) and (b-ii), pscs;t  ~pscs;t
and scs;t  ~scs;t , the monotonicity condition (3.17) yields that s;t(pscss;t)  s;t(~pscss;t), and  s;t(scss;t) 
 s;t(~
sc
ss;t). Therefore, for each (It;t) 2 S,
xsci;t (It;t) = y
sc
s;t s;t(p
sc
ss;t) s;t(
sc
ss;t)i;t  ~yscs;t s;t(~pscss;t) s;t(~scss;t)i;t = ~xsci;t (It;t):
This completes the proof of part (b-iii). Q:E:D:
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Proof of Theorem 3.4.5: Part (a). We show part (a) by backward induction. More specically,
we show that if ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt and ^scs;t 1  scs;t 1, (i) ^scs;t  scs;t , (ii) ^scs;t  scs;t , (iii)
^sci;t (It;t)  scs;t (It;t) for each i and (It;t) 2 S, (iv) p^scs;t  pscs;t , (v) p^sci;t (It;t)  psci;t (It;t) for
each i and (It;t) 2 S, and (vi) ^scs;t  scs;t. Since ^scs;0 = scs;0 = 0, the initial condition is satised.
Since ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt,
^sa;t(yi;t)  (N   1)^0sb;t  sa;t(yi;t)  (N   1)0sb;t  0; for all yi;t  0:
Therefore,
^scs;t = maxf(sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + s^scs;t 1(^sa;t(E[yi;t ^ i;t])  (N   1)^0sb;t) : yi;t  0g
 maxf(sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + sscs;t 1(sa;t(E[yi;t ^ i;t])  (N   1)0sb;t) : yi;t  0g
= scs;t :
Since ^scs;t  scs;t , Theorem 3.4.3(c) implies that ^scs;t  scs;t and p^scs;t  pscs;t . Thus, ^sci;t (It;t) =
^scs;t  scs;t = sci;t (It;t) for each i and all (It;t) 2 S. Analogously, p^sci;t (It;t) = p^scs;t  pscs;t =
psci;t (It;t) for each i and all (It;t) 2 S. By Theorem 3.4.3(d), ^scs;t  scs;t implies that ^scs;t  scs;t.
This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of part (a).
Part (b). By part (a), it suces to show that, if ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt, ^0sa;t(zi;t)  0sa;t(zi;t)
for all zi;t, and ^
sc
s;t 1  scs;t 1, we have (i) y^scs;t  yscs;t and (ii) x^sci;t (It;t)  xsci;t (It;t) for each i and
(It;t) 2 S.
First, we show that y^scs;t  yscs;t . If, to the contrary, y^scs;t < yscs;t , Lemma 23 yields that
@yi;t [(sws;t 1   ws;t)y^scs;t   Ls;t(y^scs;t ) + s^scs;t 1(^sa;t(E[y^scs;t ^ i;t])  (N   1)^0sb;t)]
 @yi;t [(sws;t 1   ws;t)yscs;t   Ls;t(yscs;t ) + sscs;t 1(sa;t(E[yscs;t ^ i;t])  (N   1)0sb;t)];
i.e.,
(sws;t 1   ws;t)  L0s;t(y^scs;t ) + s^scs;t 1 Fs;t(y^scs;t )^0sa;t(E[y^scs;t ^ i;t])
 (sws;t 1   ws;t)  L0s;t(yscs;t ) + sscs;t 1 Fs;t(yscs;t )0sa;t(E[yscs;t ^ i;t]): (B.17)
Since  Ls;t() is strictly concave in yi;t and y^scs;t < yscs;t , (B.17) implies that
s^
sc
s;t 1 Fs;t(y^
sc
s;t )^
0
sa;t(E[y^scs;t ^ i;t]) < sscs;t 1 Fs;t(yscs;t )0sa;t(E[yscs;t ^ i;t]): (B.18)
However, since ^0sa;t(zi;t)  0sa;t(zi;t) for all zi;t and y^scs;t < yscs;t , we have ^0sa;t(E[y^scs;t ^ i;t]) 
0sa;t(E[yscs;t ^ i;t]) and Fs;t(y^scs;t )  Fs;t(yscs;t ). Because ^scs;t 1  scs;t 1,
s^
sc
s;t 1 Fs;t(y^
sc
s;t )^
0
sa;t(E[y^scs;t ^ i;t])  sscs;t 1 Fs;t(yscs;t )0sa;t(E[yscs;t ^ i;t]);
which contradicts (B.18). The inequality y^scs;t  yscs;t then follows immediately.
Now we show that x^sci;t (It;t)  xsci;t (It;t) for each i and (It;t) 2 S. By Proposition 3.4.3(d),
x^sci;t (It;t) = y^
sc
s;t s;t(p^
sc
ss;t) s;t(^
sc
ss;t)i;t and x
sc
i;t (It;t) = y
sc
s;t s;t(p
sc
ss;t) s;t(
sc
ss;t)i;t. We have shown
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that y^scs;t  yscs;t . Since (3.17) holds for period t, s;t(p^scss;t)  s;t(pscss;t), and  s;t(^scss;t)   s;t(scss;t).
Therefore, for each i and (It;t) 2 S,
x^sci;t (It;t) = y^
sc
s;t s;t(p^
sc
ss;t) s;t(^
sc
ss;t)i;t  yscs;t s;t(pscss;t) s;t(scss;t)i;t = xsci;t (It;t):
This completes the proof of part (b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.4.6: We show parts (a)-(b) together by backward induction. More speci-
cally, we show that if scs;t 1  scs;t 2, (i) yscs;t  yscs;t 1, (ii) scs;t  scs;t 1, (iii) sci;t (I;)  sci;t 1(I;)
for each i and (I;) 2 S, (iv) pscs;t  pscs;t 1, (v) psci;t (I;)  psci;t 1(I;) for each i and (I;) 2 S, (vi)
xsci;t (I;)  xsci;t 1(I;) for each i and (I;) 2 S, and (vii) scs;t  scs;t 1. Since, by Proposition 3.4.3(a),
scs;1  scs;0 = 0. Thus, the initial condition is satised.
Since the model is stationary, by Theorem 3.4.3(a), scs;t 1  scs;t 2 suggests that yscs;t  yscs;t 1.
Analogously, Theorem 3.4.3(e) yields that scs;t  scs;t 1 and pscs;t  pscs;t 1. Hence, sci;t (I;) = scs;t 
scs;t 1 = 
sc
i;t 1(I;) and p
sc
i;t (I;) = p
sc
s;t  pscs;t 1 = psci;t 1(I;) for each i and (I;) 2 S. Be-
cause the monotonicity condition (3.17) holds, we have s;t(p
sc
ss;t)  s;t 1(pscss;t 1), and  s;t(scss;t) 
 s;t 1(scss;t 1). Therefore, for each i and (I;) 2 S,
xsci;t (I;) = y
sc
s;t s;t(p
sc
ss;t) s;t(
sc
ss;t)i  yscs;t 1s;t 1(pscss;t 1) s;t 1(scss;t 1)i = xsci;t 1(I;):
Finally, scs;t  scs;t 1 follows immediately from Theorem 3.4.3(f) and scs;t 1  scs;t 2. This completes
the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 3.4.6. Q:E:D:
Before presenting the proofs of the results in the PF model, we give the following lemma that is used
throughout the rest of our proofs.
Lemma 24 Let At be an N  N matrix with entries dened by Aii;t = 2ii;t and Aij;t =  ij;t where
i 6= j. The following statements hold:
(a) At is invertible. Moreover, (A
 1
t )ij  0 for all 1  i; j  N .
(b) 12  ii;t(A 1t )ii < 1.
(c) 12 
PN
j=1 jj;t(A
 1
t )ij < 1.
Proof: Part (a) follows from Lemma 2(a) in [24] and Part (b) follows from Lemma 2(c) in [24].
Part (c). Let I be the N N identity matrix, Bt be the N N matrix with
(Bt)ij =
8><>:0 if i = j,ij;t
ii;t
if i 6= j;
and Ct be the N N diagonal matrix with
(Ct)ij =
8><>:2ii;t if i = j,0 if i 6= j.
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Because ii;t >
P
j 6=i ij;t, Bt is a substochastic matrix.
Observe that, At = Ct(I  12Bt) and, hence, A 1t = (I  12Bt) 1C 1t . Let t = (11;t; 22;t    ; NN;t)0
be the N dimensinal vector. Thus, PNj=1 jj;t(A 1t )ij = (A 1t t)i. Moreover,
A 1t t = (I  
1
2
Bt)
 1C 1t t = (I  
1
2
Bt)
 1(C 1t t) =
1
2
(I   1
2
Bt)
 1;
where the last equality follows from C 1t t =
1
2I. Therefore,
NX
j=1
jj;t(A
 1
t )ij =
1
2
NX
j=1
[(I   1
2
Bt)
 1]ij =
1
2
NX
j=1
[I +
+1X
l=1

1
2
l
(Bt)
l]ij ;
where the second equality follows from the fact that I   12Bt is a diagonal dominant matrix. Thus, for
all i,
PN
j=1 jj;t(A
 1
t )ij  12
PN
j=1 Iij = 12 . On the other hand, for all i,
1
2
NX
j=1
[I +
+1X
l=1

1
2
l
(Bt)
l]ij =
1
2
NX
j=1
[
+1X
l=0

1
2
l
(Bt)
l]ij =
1
2
+1X
l=0
[

1
2
l NX
j=1
(Bt)
l
ij ] <
1
2
+1X
l=0

1
2
l
= 1;
where the inequality follows from that Bt is a sub-stochastic matrix. This completes the proof of part
(c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorems 3.5.1-3.5.2 and Propositions 3.5.1-3.5.3: We show Theorem 3.5.1, Propo-
sition 3.5.1, Proposition 3.5.2, Proposition 3.5.3, and Theorem 3.5.2 together by backward induction.
More specically, we show that, if Vi;t 1(It 1;t 1jpft 1) = wi;t 1Ii;t 1+pfi;t 1i;t 1 for all i, (a) Propo-
sition 3.5.1 holds for period t, (b) Proposition 3.5.2 holds for period t, (c) Proposition 3.5.3 holds for
period t, (d) there exists a Markov strategy prole f(pfi;t (; ); ppfi;t (; ; ); xpfi;t (; ; )) : 1  i  Ng, which
forms an equilibrium in the subgame of period t, (e) if i;t(i;t) = i;t for all i and i;t, the equilibrium
in the subgame of period t, f(pfi;t (; ); ppfi;t (; ; ); xpfi;t (; ; )) : 1  i  Ng, is unique, and (f) there
exists a positive vector pft = (
pf
1;t; 
pf
2;t;    ; pfN;t), such that Vi;t(It;tjpft ) = wi;tIi;t + pfi;ti;t for all
i. Because Vi;0(I0;0) = wi;0Ii;0 for all i, the initial condition is satised.
First, we observe that Proposition 3.5.1 follows directly from the same argument as the proof of
Proposition 3.4.1. We now show Proposition 3.5.2 holds in period t. Because @2pi;t
pf;2
i;t (ptjt) =  2ii;t <
0, pf;2i;t (; p i;tjt) is strictly concave in pi;t for any given p i;t. Hence, by Theorem 1.2 in [79], Gpf;2t
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium ppft (t). Since, for each i and t, pi;t is suciently low whereas
pi;t is suciently high so that they will not aect the equilibrium behaviors of all rms, p
pf
t (t) can be
characterized by rst-order conditions @pi;t
pf;2
i;t (p
pf
t (t)jt) = 0 for each i, i.e.,
  ii;t(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t (t)) + i;t(ppft (t))
=  2ii;tppfi;t (t) +
X
j 6=i
ij;tp
pf
j;t (t) + fi;t(t) = 0; for all i:
(B.19)
In terms of the matrix language, we have Atp
pf
t (t) = ft(t). By Lemma 24(a), At is invertible and, thus,
ppft (t) is uniquely determined by p
pf
t (t) = A
 1
t ft(t). To show that p
pf
i;t (t) =
P
j(A
 1
t )ijfj;t(t) is
continuously increasing in j;t, we observe that
@ppfi;t (t)
@j;t
= (A 1t )ijjj;t
0
j;t(j;t):
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Since, by Lemma 24(a), (A 1t )ij  0 for all i and j, we have @j;tppfi;t (t)  0 and, thus, ppfi;t (t) is
continuously increasing in j;t for each j.
Now, we compute pf;2i;t (t).
pf;2i;t (t) = i;t(p
pf
t (t))(p
pf
i;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )
= (i;t   ii;tppfi;t (t) +
X
j 6=i
ij;tp
pf
j;t (t))(p
pf
i;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )
= (ii;tp
pf
i;t (t)  fi;t(t) + i;t)(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )
= ii;t(p
pf
i;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2;
where the third equality follows from (B.19) and the last from fi;t(t) = i;t+ ii;t(iwi;t 1+ i;t(i;t) 
pfi;t ). The above computation also implies that i;t(p
pf
t (t)) = ii;t(p
pf
i;t (t) iwi;t 1 i;t(i;t)+pfi;t ).
We now show that pf;2i;t (t) > 0. Note that 
pf;2
i;t (t) =
1
ii;t
[i;t(p
pf
t (t))]
2 > 0, where the inequality
follows from the assumption that i;t() > 0 for all pt. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.5.2.
Next, we show Proposition 3.5.3. Since pf;2i;t (t) > 0 for all t, 
pf;1
i;t (t) = 
pf;2
i;t (t) i;t(t) > 0
and, hence, log(pf;1i;t ()) is well dened. Therefore,
log(pf;1i;t (t)) = log(ii;t) + 2 log(p
pf
i;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t ) + log( i;t(t)): (B.20)
Since
ppfj;t (t) =
NX
l=1
(A 1t )jlfl;t(t) =
NX
l=1
[(A 1t )jl(l;t + ll;t(lwl;t 1 + l;t(l;t)  pfl;t ))]; for all j;
by direct computation,
@2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@i;t@j;t
=
2(1  ii;t(A 1t )ii)jj;t(A 1t )ij0i;t(i;t)0j;t(j;t)
(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2
+
@2 log( i;t(t))
@i;t@j;t
; for all j 6= i:
(B.21)
By Lemma 24(a,b), 1  ii;t(A 1t )ii > 0 and (A 1t )ij  0. Thus, the rst term of (B.21) is non-negative.
Because  i;t() satises (3.3),
@2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@i;t@j;t
 @
2 log( i;t(t))
@i;t@j;t
 0; for all j 6= i:
and, thus, Gpf;1t is a log-supermodular game. The feasible action set of player i, [0; i;t], is a compact
subset of R. Therefore, by Theorem 2 in [194], the pure strategy Nash equilibria of Gpf;1t is a nonempty
complete sublattice of RN
We now show that if i;t(i;t) = i;t, the Nash equilibrium of Gpf;1t is unique. We rst show that
@2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@2i;t
< 0; and j@
2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@2i;t
j >
X
j 6=i
@2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@i;t@j;t
; for all i and t. (B.22)
Since l;t(l;t) = l;t for all l (i.e., 
0
l;t()  1 for all l), direct computation yields that
@2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@2i;t
=
@2 log( i;t(t))
@2i;t
  2(1  ii;t(A
 1
t )ii)
2
(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2
:
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Inequality (3.3) implies that @2i;t log( i;t(t)) < 0 and, thus, @
2
i;t log(
pf;1
i;t (t)) < 0. Moreover,
j@
2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@2i;t
j = j@
2 log( i;t(t))
@2i;t
j+ 2(1  ii;t(A
 1
t )ii)
2
(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2
and X
j 6=i
@2 log(pf;1i;t (t))
@i;t@j;t
=
X
j 6=i
@2 log( i;t(t))
@i;t@j;t
+
X
j 6=i
2(1  ii;t(A 1t )ii)jj;t(A 1t )ij
(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2
:
Inequality (3.3) implies that
j@
2 log( i;t(t))
@2i;t
j >
X
j 6=i
@2 log( i;t(t))
@i;t@j;t
:
Lemma 24(b) implies that 1  ii;t(A 1t )ii > 0. Moreover, Lemma 24(c) suggests that 1  (A 1t )iiii;t >P
j 6=i(A
 1
t )ijjj;t and, hence,
2(1  ii;t(A 1t )ii)2
(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2
>
X
j 6=i
2(1  ii;t(A 1t )ii)jj;t(A 1t )ij
(ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t )2
:
Therefore, inequality (B.22) holds for all t.
Because Gpf;1t is a log-supermodular game, by Theorem 5 in [124], if there are two distinct pure
strategy Nash equilibria ^pft 6= pft , we must have ^pfi;t  pfi;t for each i, with the inequality being
strict for some i. Without loss of generality, we assume that ^pf1;t > 
pf
1;t and ^
pf
1;t   pf1;t  ^pfi;t   pfi;t
for each i. Lemma 23 yields that
@ log(pf;11;t (^
pf
t ))
@1;t
 @ log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
t ))
@1;t
(B.23)
Since @1;t@i;t log(
pf;1
1;t (t)) is Lebesgue integrable for all i 6= 1 and t, Newton-Leibniz formula implies
that
@ log(pf;11;t (^
pf
t ))
@1;t
  @ log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
t ))
@1;t
=
Z 1
s=0
NX
j=1
(^pfj;t   pfj;t )
@2 log(pf;11;t ((1  s)pft + s^pft ))
@1;t@j;t
ds

Z 1
s=0
NX
j=1
(^pf1;t   pf1;t )
@2 log(pf;11;t ((1  s)pft + s^pft ))
@1;t@j;t
ds
<0;
where the rst inequality follows from ^pf1;t   pf1;t  ^pfi;t   pfi;t for all i, and the second from (B.22),
and ^pf1;t   pf1;t > 0. This contradicts (B.23). Thus, Gpf;1t has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium
pft .
We now show that the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium pft can be characterized by the
system of rst-order conditions (3.26). First, (B.22) implies that log(pf;1i;t (;  i;t)) is strictly concave
in i;t for any i and any xed  i;t. Hence, 
pf
t must satisfy the system of rst-order conditions,
i.e., for each i, @i;t log(
pf;1
i;t (
pf
t ))  0 if pfi;t = 0; @i;t log(pf;1i;t (pft )) = 0 if pfi;t 2 (0; i;t); and
@i;t log(
pf;1
i;t (
pf
t ))  0 if pfi;t = i;t. Dierentiate (B.20), and we have
@i;t log(
pf;1
i;t (t)) =
@i;t i;t(t)
 i;t(t)
  2(1  ii;t(A
 1
t )ii)
0
i;t(i;t)
ppfi;t (t)  iwi;t 1   i;t(i;t) + pfi;t
:
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Thus, pft satises the system of rst-order conditions (3.26). Since, by Proposition 3.5.2(c), 
pf;2
i;t (
pf
t ) >
0 and  i;t(
pf
t ) > 0, we have 
pf;1
i;t = 
pf;2
i;t (
pf
t ) i;t(
pf
t ) > 0 for all i. This completes the proof of
Proposition 3.5.3.
Next, we show that f(pfi;t ; ppfi;t (t);i;typfi;t i;t(ppft (t)) i;t(t)) : 1  i  Ng is an equilibrium
in the subgame of period t. By Proposition 3.5.1, ypfi;t > 0, i;ty
pf
i;t i;t(p
pf
t (t)) i;t(t) > 0 for all i.
Therefore, regardless of the starting inventory level in period t, Ii;t, rm i could adjust its inventory
to xpfi;t (It;t; t) = i;ty
pf
i;t i;t(p
pf
t (t)) i;t(t). Thus, f(pfi;t ; ppfi;t (t);i;typfi;t i;t(ppft (t)) i;t(t)) :
1  i  Ng forms an equilibrium in the subgame of period t. In particular, this equilibrium is the unique
one, if i;t(i;t) = i;t for all i.
Finally, we show that there exists a positive vector pft = (
pf
1;t; 
pf
2;t;    ; pfN;t), such that
Vi;t(It;tjpft ) = wi;tIi;t + pfi;ti;t. By (3.22), we have that
Vi;t(It;tjpft ) =Ji;t(pfi;t ; ppfi;t (pft );i;typfi;t i;t(ppft (pft )) i;t(pft ); It;tjpft 1)
=wi;tIi;t + (i
pf
i;t 1i;t +
pf;1
i;t )i;t:
Since pfi;t 1 > 0, 
pf
i;t = i
pf
i;t 1i;t + 
pf;1
i;t > 0. This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of
Theorem 3.5.1, Proposition 3.5.1, Proposition 3.5.2, Proposition 3.5.3, and Theorem 3.5.2. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3.5.4: By Theorems 3.5.1-3.5.2, and Propositions 3.5.1-3.5.3, it suces to show
that, if there exists a constant pfs;t 1  0, such that Vi;t 1(It 1;t 1jpft 1) = ws;tIi;t 1 + pfs;t 1i;t 1
for all i, we have: (a) the unique Nash equilibrium in Gpf;3t is symmetric, i.e., ypfi;t = ypfj;t for all
i; j; (b) the unique Nash equilibrium in Gpf;2t (t) is symmetric if i;t = j;t for all i and j, (c), the
unique Nash equilibrium in Gpf;1t , pft is symmetric, and (d) there exists a constant pfs;t > 0, such that
Vi;t(It;tjpfs;t ) = ws;tIi;t + pfs;ti;t for all i. Since Vi;0(It;t) = wi;0Ii;0 for all i, the initial condition is
satised with pfs;0 = 0.
First, we observe that ypfi;t = y
pf
j;t and 
pf
i;t = 
pf
j;t for all i and j follow directly from the same proof
of Proposition 3.4.3. Thus, we omit their proofs for brevity, and denote ypfs;t := y
pf
i;t and 
pf
s;t = 
pf
i;t
for each rm i in Gpf;3t .
Next, we show that if i;t = j;t for all i and j, p
pf
i;t (t) = p
pf
j;t (t). Direct computation yields that,
for the symmetric PF model,
PN
j=1(A
 1
t )ij is independent of i. Thus, if the value of j;t is independent
of j,
ppfi;t (t) =
NX
j=1
(A 1t )ijfj;t(t) =
NX
j=1
[(A 1t )ij(s;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(j;t)  pfs;t ))]
=(s;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(j;t)  pfs;t ))
NX
j=1
(A 1t )ij ;
(B.24)
which is independent of rm i, which we denote as ppfs;t (t).
Note that the objective functions of Gpf;1t ,
fpf;1i;t (t) = sa;t(ppfi;t (t)  sws;t 1   s;t(i;t) + pfs;t ) s;t(t) : 1  i  Ng
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are symmetric. Thus, if there exists an asymmetric Nash equilibrium pft , there exists another Nash
equilibrium pf
t
6= pft , where pft is a permutation of 
pf
t . This contradicts the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium in Gpf;1t . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium in Gpf;1t is symmetric, which we denote
as pfss;t = (
pf
s;t ; 
pf
s;t ;    ; pfs;t ). Hence,
pf;1i;t = 
pf;1
i;t (
pf
ss;t) = 
pf;1
j;t (
pf
ss;t) = 
pf;1
j;t > 0:
Thus, we denote the payo of each rm i in Gpf;1t as pf;1s;t . By Theorem 3.5.2(a),
pfi;t = s
pf
s;t 1s;t +
pf;1
i;t = s
pf
s;t 1s;t +
pf;1
j;t = 
pf
j;t > 0:
Thus, we denote the PF market size coecient of each rm i as pfs;t. This completes the induction and,
thus, the proof of Proposition 3.5.4. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.5.3: Parts (a)-(b). The proof of parts (a)-(b) follows from the same argu-
ment as that of Theorem 3.4.3(a)-(b) and is, hence, omitted.
Part (c). Because
ppfi;t (t) =
NX
j=1
(A 1t )ijfj;t(t) =
NX
j=1
[(A 1t )ij(j;t + jj;t(jwj;t 1 + j;t(j;t)  pfj;t ))];
we have
@pfj;t
ppfi;t (t) =  jj;t(A 1t )ij  0;
where the inequality follows from Lemma 24(a). Thus, ppfi;t (t) is continuously decreasing in 
pf
j;t for
each j. Part (c) follows.
Part (d). We denote the objective function of each rm i in Gpf;1s;t as pf;1i;t (jpfs;t ) to capture
its dependence on pfs;t . The unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Gpf;1s;t is denoted as
pfss;t(
pf
s;t ) to capture the dependence of the equilibrium on 
pf
s;t , where
pfss;t(
pf
s;t ) = (
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ); 
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t );    ; pfs;t (pfs;t )). We rst show that, if pfs;t > pfs;t , pfs;t (pfs;t ) 
pfs;t (
pf
s;t ).
If, to the contrary, pfs;t (
pf
s;t ) < 
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ), Lemma 23 yields that @1;t log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )jpfs;t )) 
@1;t log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )jpfs;t )), i.e.,
@1;t log( s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )) 
2(1  sa;t(A 1t )ii)0s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
 @1;t log( s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) 
2(1  sa;t(A 1t )ii)0s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
:
Note that
[ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t ]  [ppfs;t (pfss;t(pfs;t ))  sws;t 1
  s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t ]
=(1 
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1jsa;t)(s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ))  s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))) + (1 
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1jsa;t)(
pf
s;t   pfs;t )
>0
(B.25)
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where the inequality follows from Lemma 24(c). Thus,
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
>ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t > 0:
Lemma 24(b) implies that 1  sa;t(A 1t )ii > 0. Hence,
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )ii)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )ii)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
:
Thus, we have
@1;t log( s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ))  @1;t log( s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )): (B.26)
By (3.3) and Newton-Leibniz formula,
@1;t log( 1;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )))  @1;t log( 1;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )))
=
Z 1
s=0
NX
j=1
(pfs;t (
pf
s;t )  pfs;t (pfs;t ))[
@2 log( s;t(s
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ) + (1  s)pfs;t (pfs;t )))
@1;t@j;t
] ds
< 0;
which contradicts (B.26). Therefore, pfs;t (
pf
s;t ) is increasing in 
pf
s;t . The continuity of 
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ) in
pfs;t follows directly from that 
pf;1
i;t (tjpfs;t ) is twice continuously dierentiable in (t; pfs;t ) and the
implicit function theorem.
Next we show that if (3.17) holds, pfs;t(
pf
s;t ) is increasing in 
pf
s;t . By Theorem 3.5.2(a), it suces to
show that pf;1s;t (
pf
s;t ) := 
pf;1
s;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t )jpfs;t ) is increasing in pfs;t . Assume that pfs;t > pfs;t . Since
we have just shown pfs;t (
pf
s;t )  pfs;t (pfs;t ), (3.17) implies that  s;t(pfss;t(pfs;t ))   s;t(pfss;t(pfs;t )):
If pfs;t (
pf
s;t ) = 
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ),
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t )) sws;t 1 s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))+pfs;t > ppfs;t (pfss;t(pfs;t )) sws;t 1 s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))+pfs;t ;
and, hence,
pf;1s;t (
pf
s;t ) = sa;t(p
pf
s;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t )2 s;t(pfss;t(pfs;t ))
> sa;t(p
pf
s;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t )2 s;t(pfss;t(pfs;t ))
= pf;1s;t (
pf
s;t ):
If pfss;t(
pf
s;t ) > 
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ), Lemma 23 implies that
@1;t log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )jpfs;t ))  @1;t log(pf;11;t (pfs;t (pfs;t )jpfs;t )), i.e.,
@1;t log( s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )) 
2(1  sa;t(A 1t )ii)0s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
 @1;t log( s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) 
2(1  sa;t(A 1t )ii)0s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
:
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By (3.3) and Newton-Leibniz formula,
@1;t log( 1;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )))  @1;t log( 1;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )))
=
Z 1
s=0
NX
j=1
(pfs;t (
pf
s;t )  pfs;t (pfs;t ))[
@2 log( s;t((1  s)pfs;t (pfs;t ) + spfs;t (pfs;t )))
@1;t@j;t
] ds
< 0;
Hence,
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )ii)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
>  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )ii)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t ))
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t
:
Because, by Lemma 24(b) and the convexity of s;t(), 1   sa;t(A 1t )ii > 0 and 0s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) 
0s;t(
pf
s;t (
pf
s;t )), we have
ppfs;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t )) sws;t s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))+pfs;t > ppfs;t (pfss;t(pfs;t )) sws;t 1 s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t ))+pfs;t :
Therefore,
pf;1s;t (
pf
s;t ) = sa;t(p
pf
s;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t )2 s;t(pfss;t(pfs;t ))
> sa;t(p
pf
s;t (
pf
ss;t(
pf
s;t ))  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t (pfs;t )) + pfs;t )2 s;t(pfss;t(pfs;t ))
= pf;1s;t (
pf
s;t ):
We have, thus, shown that pfs;t(
pf
s;t ) is increasing in 
pf
s;t . The continuity of 
pf
s;t(
pf
s;t ) in 
pf
s;t follows
directly from that of pfs;t (
pf
s;t ) and that 
pf;1
i;t (tjpfs;t ) is continuous in (t; pfs;t ). This concludes the
proof of part (d).
Part (e). By part (d), we have that pfs;t is continuously increasing in 
pf
s;t and, thus, 
pf
s;t 1. By
part (c), we have that ppfi;t (t) is continuously decreasing in 
pf
s;t and, thus, 
pf
s;t 1. Moreover, if (3.17)
holds, part (d) yields that pfs;t is continuously increasing in 
pf
s;t and, thus, 
pf
s;t 1 as well. This completes
the proof of part (e). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.5.4: Part (a). Part (a) follows from the same argument as the proof of Theorem
3.4.4(a) and is, hence, omitted.
Part (b). By part (a), pfi;t  ~pfi;t for each i. Hence, Theorem 3.5.3(c) yields that ppfi;t (t) 
~ppfi;t (t) for each rm i and each t.
When the PF model is symmetric,
PN
j=1 jj;t(A
 1
t )ij is independent of i. Direct computation yields
that
~ppfi;t (t)  ppfi;t (t) = (
NX
j=1
jj;t(A
 1
t )ij)(
pf
s;t   ~pfs;t )  0; for all t,
which is independent of i. Thus, (3.17) and Newton-Leibniz formula imply that
s;t(~p
pf
t (t))  s;t(ppft (t)) =
Z 1
s=0
NX
i=1
(~ppfi;t (t)  ppfi;t (t))
@s;t((1  s)ppft (t) + s~ppft (t))
@pi;t
ds  0:
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Hence, s;t(p
pf
t (t))  s;t(~ppft (t)). Since ypfs;t  ~ypfs;t , Theorem 3.5.2(b) implies that, for any
(It;t) 2 S and t 2 [0; s;t]N ,
xpfi;t (It;t; t) = y
pf
s;t s;t(p
pf
t (t)) s;t(t)  ~ypfs;t s;t(~ppft (t)) s;t(t) = ~xpfi;t (It;t; t):
This completes the proof of part (b).
Part (c). Because pfs;t  ~pfs;t , Theorem 3.5.3(d) yields that pfs;t  ~pfs;t and, hence, pfi;t (It;t) =
pfs;t  ~pfs;t = ~pfs;t (It;t) for each i and (It;t) 2 S. This completes the proof of part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.5.5: Part (a). We show part (a) by backward induction. More specically,
we show that if ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt and ^pfs;t 1  pfs;t 1, (i) ^pfs;t  pfs;t , (ii) p^pfs;t (t)  ppfs;t (t),
(iii) p^pfi;t (It;t; t)  ppfi;t (It;t; t) for each i, (It;t) 2 S, and t 2 [0; s;t]N , (iv) ^pfs;t  pfs;t , (v)
^pfi;t (It;t)  pfs;t (It;t) for each i and (It;t) 2 S, and (vi) ^pfs;t  pfs;t. Since ^pfs;0 = pfs;0 = 0, the
initial condition is satised.
The same argument as the proof of Theorem 3.4.5(a) implies that ^pfs;t  pfs;t . Hence, Theorem
3.5.3(c) implies that p^pfi;t (t)  ppfi;t (t) for all i and t. Thus, p^pfi;t (It;t; t) = p^pfi;t (t)  ppfi;t (t) =
ppfi;t (It;t; t) for each i, (It;t) 2 S, and t 2 [0; s;t]N . Analogously, Theorem 3.5.3(d) implies that
^pfs;t  pfs;t . Hence, ^pfi;t (It;t) = ^pfs;t  pfs;t = pfi;t (It;t) for each i and all (It;t) 2 S. By
Theorem 3.5.3(d), under inequality (3.17), ^pfs;t  pfs;t implies that ^pfs;t  pfs;t. This completes the
induction and, thus, the proof of part (a).
Part (b). By part (a), it suces to show that, if ^s;t(zt)  s;t(zt) for all zt, ^0sa;t(zi;t)  0sa;t(zi;t)
for all zi;t, and ^
pf
s;t 1  pfs;t 1, we have (i) y^pfs;t  ypfs;t and (ii) x^pfi;t (It;t; t)  xpfi;t (It;t; t) for each
i, (It;t) 2 S, and t 2 [0; s;t]N .
The same argument as the proof of Theorem 3.4.5(b) suggests that y^pfs;t  ypfs;t . We now show that
x^pfi;t (It;t; t)  xpfi;t (It;t; t) for each i, (It;t) 2 S, and t 2 [0; s;t]N . Because the PF model is
symmetric,
PN
j=1 jj;t(A
 1
t )ij is independent of i. Direct computation yields that
ppfi;t (t)  p^pfi;t (t) = (
NX
j=1
jj;t(A
 1
t )ij)(^
pf
s;t   pfs;t )  0; for all t,
which is independent of i. Thus, (3.17) and Newton-Leibniz formula implies that
s;t(p
pf
t (t))  s;t(p^pft (t)) =
Z 1
s=0
NX
i=1
(ppfi;t (t)  p^pfi;t (t))
@s;t((1  s)p^pft (t) + sppft (t))
@pi;t
ds  0:
Hence, s;t(p^
pf
t (t))  s;t(ppft (t)) for all t. Since y^pfs;t  ypfs;t , Theorem 3.5.2(b) implies that, for
any (It;t) 2 S and t 2 [0; s;t]N ,
x^pfi;t (It;t; t) = y^
pf
s;t s;t(p^
pf
t (t)) s;t(t)  ypfs;t s;t(ppft (t)) s;t(t) = xpfi;t (It;t; t):
This completes the proof of part (b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.5.6: We show parts (a)-(b) together by backward induction. More speci-
cally, we show that if pfs;t 1  pfs;t 2, (i) ypfs;t  ypfs;t 1, (ii) ppfi;t ()  ppfi;t 1() for all  2 [0; s;t]N ,
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(iii) ppfi;t (I;; )  ppfi;t 1(I;; ) for each i, (I;) 2 S, and  2 [0; s;t]N , (iv) pfs;t  pfs;t 1, (v)
pfi;t (I;)  pfi;t 1(I;) for each i and (I;) 2 S, (vi) xpfi;t (I;; )  xpfi;t 1(I;; ) for each i, (I;) 2 S,
and  2 [0; s;t]N , and (vii) pfs;t  pfs;t 1. Since, by Theorem 3.5.2(a), pfs;1  pfs;0 = 0. Thus, the initial
condition is satised.
Since the model is stationary, by Theorem 3.5.3(a), pfs;t 1  pfs;t 2 suggests that ypfs;t  ypfs;t 1.
Since pfs;t is increasing in 
pf
s;t 1, 
pf
s;t 1  pfs;t 2 implies that pfs;t  pfs;t 1. Theorem 3.5.3(c) yields
that ppfs;t ()  ppfs;t 1() for all  2 [0; s;t]N . Theorem 3.5.3(e) implies that pfs;t  pfs;t 1. Hence,
ppfi;t (I;; ) = p
pf
i;t ()  ppfi;t 1() = ppfi;t 1(I;; ) for each i, (I;) 2 S, and  2 [0; s;t]N , and
pfi;t (I;) = 
pf
s;t  pfs;t 1 = pfi;t 1(I;) for each i and (I;) 2 S. We now show that xpfi;t (I;; ) 
xpfi;t 1(I;; ) for each i, (I;) 2 S, and  2 [0; ]N . Because the PF model is symmetric,
PN
j=1 jj;t(A
 1)ij
is independent of i. Direct computation yields that
ppfi;t 1()  ppfi;t () = (
NX
j=1
jj(A
 1)ij)(
pf
s;t   pfs;t 1)  0; for all ,
which is independent of i. Thus, (3.17) and Newton-Leibniz formula implies that
s(p
pf
t 1())  s(ppft ()) =
Z 1
s=0
NX
i=1
(ppfi;t 1()  ppfi;t ())
@s((1  s)ppft () + sppft 1())
@pi
ds  0:
Hence, s(p
pf
t ())  s(ppft 1()) for all . Since ypfs;t  ypfs;t 1, Theorem 3.5.2(b) implies that, for any
(I;) 2 S and  2 [0; s;t]N ,
xpfi;t (I;; ) = y
pf
s;t s(p
pf
t ()) s(t)  ypfs;t 1s(ppft 1(t)) s;t(t) = xpfi;t 1(I;; ):
Finally, we show that pfs;t  pfs;t 1. Since the model is stationary and pfs;t  pfs;t 1, pfs;t  pfs;t 1
follows from Theorem 3.5.3(d) immediately. This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theo-
rem 3.5.6. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 3.6.1: Part (a). Because pfs;t 1  scs;t 1, pfs;t  scs;t . The same argument
as the proof of Theorem 3.4.3(a) implies that ypfs;t  yscs;t .
We now show that, if pfs;t  scs;t , pfs;t  scs;t . Proposition 3.5.2 implies that ppft (pfss;t) =
A 1t ft(
pf
ss;t). By Proposition 3.4.2, the equilibrium sales prices, p
sc
ss;t, satisfy the system of rst-order
equations (3.15). Equivalently, pscss;t = A
 1
t ft(
sc
ss;t).
We assume, to the contrary, that pfs;t < 
sc
s;t . Lemma 23 implies that @1;t log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
ss;t)) 
@1;t log(
sc
1;t(
sc
ss;t; p
sc
ss;t)), i.e.,
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )11)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t )PN
j=1(A
 1
t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(
pf
s;t )  pfs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t
+ @1;t log( s;t(
pf
ss;t))
  
0
s;t(
sc
s;t )PN
j=1(A
 1
t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(scs;t )  scs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t
+ @1;t log( s;t(
sc
ss;t)):
(B.27)
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Inequality (3.3) and the Newton-Leibniz formula imply that
@1;t log( s;t(
sc
ss;t))  @1;t log( s;t(pfss;t)) =
Z 1
s=0
NX
j=1
(scs;t   pfs;t )[
@2 log( s;t((1  s)pfs;t + sscs;t ))
@1;t@j;t
] ds
< 0:
By (B.27),
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )11)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t )PN
j=1(A
 1
t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(
pf
s;t )  pfs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t
<  
0
s;t(
sc
s;t )PN
j=1(A
 1
t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(scs;t )  scs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t
:
Lemma 24(b) suggests that 0  2(1  sa;t(A 1t )11)0s;t(pfs;t )  0s;t(scs;t ). Hence,
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(
pf
s;t )  pfs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t
<
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(
sc
s;t )  scs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t :
(B.28)
Since pfs;t  scs;t and s;t(pfs;t )  s;t(scs;t ), pfs;t   s;t(pfs;t )  scs;t   s;t(scs;t ). Lemma 24(c)
implies that 1 PNj=1(A 1t )1jsa;t > 0. Therefore,
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(
pf
s;t )  pfs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t
=
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1j(sa;t + sa;tsws;t 1)  sws;t 1 + (1 
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1jsa;t)(
pf
s;t   s;t(pfs;t ))

NX
j=1
(A 1t )1j(sa;t + sa;tsws;t 1)  sws;t 1 + (1 
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1jsa;t)(
sc
s;t   s;t(scs;t ))
=
NX
j=1
(A 1t )1j [sa;t + sa;t(sws;t 1 + s;t(
sc
s;t )  scs;t )]  sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t ;
which contradicts the inequality (B.28). Therefore, pfs;t  scs;t . This completes the proof of part (a).
Part (b). We rst show, by backward induction, that, if sb;t = 0 for each t, 
pf
s;t  scs;t for each t.
Since pfs;0 = 
sc
s;0 = 0, the initial condition is satised. Now we prove that if 
pf
s;t 1  scs;t 1 and sb;t = 0,
we have pfs;t  scs;t.
First, we observe that if sb;t = 0, (A
 1
t )11sa;t =
1
2 and, thus, 2(1   sa;t(A 1t )11) = 1. Part (a)
shows that pfs;t  scs;t . If pfs;t = scs;t ,
pf;1s;t =sa;t((A
 1
t ft(
pf
ss;t))i   sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t )2 s;t(pfss;t)
sa;t((A 1t ft(scss;t))i   sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t )2 s;t(scss;t)
=scs;t ;
where the inequality follows from pfs;t  scs;t .
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If pfs;t > 
sc
s;t , Lemma 23 implies that @1;t log(
pf;1
1;t (
pf
ss;t))  @1;t log(sc1;t(scss;t; pscss;t)), i.e.,
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )11)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t )
(A 1t ft(
pf
ss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t
+ @1;t log( s;t(
pf
ss;t))
  
0
s;t(
sc
s;t )
(A 1t ft(scss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t
+ @1;t log( s;t(
sc
ss;t)):
(B.29)
Inequality (3.3) and the Newton-Leibniz formula imply that
@1;t log( s;t(
pf
ss;t))  @1;t log( s;t(scss;t)) =
Z 1
s=0
NX
j=1
(pfs;t   scs;t )[
@2 log( s;t((1  s)scs;t + spfs;t ))
@1;t@j;t
] ds < 0:
By (B.29), we have
  2(1  sa;t(A
 1
t )11)
0
s;t(
pf
s;t )
(A 1t ft(
pf
ss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t
>   
0
s;t(
sc
s;t )
(A 1t ft(scss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t
:
Because 2(1  sa;t(A 1t )11) = 1 and pfs;t > scs;t , 2(1  sa;t(A 1t )11)0s;t(pfs;t )  0s;t(scs;t ). Therefore,
(A 1t ft(
pf
ss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t > (A 1t ft(scss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t > 0:
By inequality (3.17), pfs;t > 
sc
s;t implies that  s;t(
pf
ss;t) >  s;t(
sc
ss;t). Thus, we have
pf;1s;t =sa;t((A
 1
t ft(
pf
ss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(pfs;t ) + pfs;t )2 s;t(pfss;t)
>sa;t((A
 1
t ft(
sc
ss;t))1   sws;t 1   s;t(scs;t ) + scs;t )2 s;t(scss;t)
=scs;t :
We have thus shown that if pfs;t 1  scs;t 1, pf;1s;t  scs;t . By Theorem 3.4.2(a) and Theorem
3.5.2(a),
pfs;t = s
pf
s;t 1s;t +
pf;1
s;t  sscs;t 1s;t +scs;t = scs;t:
This completes the induction and, by part (a), the proof of part (b) for the case sb;t = 0.
For any xed sa;t, both 
pf
s;t and 
sc
s;t are continuous in sb;t. Thus, for each period t, there exists a
t  0, such that, if sb;t  tsa;t, pfs;t  scs;t. It remains to show that t  1N 1 . This inequality follows
from the diagonal dominance condition that sa;t > (N   1)sb;t. This completes the proof of part (b).
Q:E:D:
B.2 Sucient Conditions for the Monotonicity of scs;t [
pf
s;t ] in 
sc
s;t 1 [
pf
s;t 1]
In this section, we give some sucient conditions under which scs;t [
pf
s;t ] is increasing in 
sc
s;t 1
[pfs;t 1]. Observe that, if t = 1, 
sc
s;t 1 = 
pf
s;t 1 = 0. So we only consider the case t  2.
We dene the N player noncooperative game, Gs;t, as the symmetric game with each player i's
payo function given by
i;t(yt) = (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + s(sa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) 
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t]));
and feasible set given by R+. Hence, Gsc;2s;t [Gpf;3s;t ] can be viewed as Gs;t with  = scs;t 1 [ = pfs;t 1]. By
Propositions 3.4.3 and 3.5.4, Gs;t has a unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, we use
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ys;t() and 

s;t() to denote the equilibrium strategy and payo of each player in the game Gs;t with
parameter .
Let ys;t(;; 1) and 

s;t(;; 1) ( > 0) be the equilibrium strategy and payo of each rm in
Gs;t(; 1), where Gs;t(; 1) is identical to Gs;t except that s;t(zt) is replaced with sa;t(zi;t)  1 (
P
j 6=i sb;t(zj;t))
in the objective function i;t(), i.e.,
i;t(yt) = (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + s(sa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) 
1

(
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t]))):
Analogously, let ys;t(;; 2) and 

s;t(;; 2) (  0) be the equilibrium strategy and payo of each rm
in Gs;t(; 2), where Gs;t(; 2) is identical to Gs;t except that with s;t(zt) is replaced with s;t(zt) +  in
the objective function i;t(), i.e.,
i;t(yt) = (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + s(sa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) 
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t]) + ):
Finally, let ys;t(;; 3) and 

s;t(;; 3) ( > 0) be the equilibrium strategy and payo of each rm
in Gs;t(; 3), where Gs;t(; 3) is identical to Gs;t except that s;t(zt) is replaced with s;t(zt) in the
objective function s;t(), i.e.,
i;t(yt) = (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + s(sa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) 
X
j 6=i
sb;t(E[y+j;t ^ j;t])):
In some of our analysis below, we assume that s;t() satises the monotonicity condition similar to
(3.17),
NX
i=1
@s;t(zt)
@zi;t
> 0: (B.30)
i.e., a uniform increase in the current expected ll rates gives rise to a higher expected market size of
each rm in the next period.
First, we give a lower bound for the value of scs;t 1 and 
pf
s;t 1. By Theorem 3.4.2(a) and Theorem
3.5.2(a), scs;t 1  s;t 1 and 
pf
s;t 1  s;t 1, where

s;t 1 := s;1
t 1Y
=1
(ss; );
with s;1 := minfscs;1 ;pf;1s;1 g > 0. Thus, we assume in this section that   s;t 1 > 0.
Let the density of s;t be dened as qs;t() = F 0s;t() and its failure rate dened as rs;t() :=
qs;t()= Fs;t(). We have the following lemma on the Lipschitz continuity of ys;t() and ys;t(;; i)
(i = 1; 2; 3).
Lemma 25 If sa;t() is twice continuously dierentiable and the failure rate of s;t is bounded from
below by rs;t > 0 on its support, there exists a constant Ks;t > 0, independent of , i, and , such that
jys;t(^)  ys;t()j  Ks;tj^ j and jys;t(^;; i)  ys;t(;; i)j  Ks;tj^ j for all  > 0, i = 1; 2; 3, and
^;   0.
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Proof: Since sa;t() is twice continuously dierentiable, by the implicit function theorem, ys;t()
and ys;t(;; i) (i = 1; 2; 3) are continuously dierentiable in  with the derivatives given by:
@ys;t()
@
=
@ys;t(;; 1)
@
=
@ys;t(;; 2)
@
=
s Fs;t(y

s;t())
0
sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
L00(ys;t()) + sqs;t(ys;t())0sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])  s F 2s;t(ys;t())00sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
;
and
@ys;t(;; 3)
@
=
s Fs;t(y

s;t())
0
sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
L00(ys;t()) + sqs;t(ys;t())0sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])  s F 2s;t(ys;t())00sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
:
Observe that
s Fs;t(y

s;t())
0
sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
L00(ys;t()) + sqs;t(ys;t())0sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])  s F 2s;t(ys;t())00sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
 s
Fs;t(y

s;t())
0
sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
sqs;t(ys;t())0sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
 1

s;t 1rs;t(y

s;t())
 1

s;t 1rs;t
;
where the rst inequality follows from the convexity of Ls;t() and the concavity of sa;t(), the second
from 0sa;t()  0, and the last from rs;t()  rs;t. Analogously, we have
s Fs;t(y

s;t())
0
sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
L00(ys;t()) + sqs;t(ys;t())0sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])  s F 2s;t(ys;t())00sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
 s
Fs;t(y

s;t())
0
sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
sqs;t(ys;t())0sa;t(E[ys;t() ^ s;t])
 1

s;t 1rs;t(y

s;t())
 1

s;t 1rs;t
:
By the mean value theorem,
jys;t(^)  ys;t()j = j^   jj
@ys;t( ~)
@
j  Ks;tj^   j;
where ~ is a real number that lies between  and ^, and Ks;t :=
1

s;t 1rs;t
. The inequality jys;t(^;; i) 
ys;t(;; i)j  Ks;tj^   j for all  > 0 and i = 1; 2; 3 follows from exactly the same argument. Q:E:D:
We remark that the assumption that the failure rate rs;t() is uniformly bounded away from 0 is not
a restrictive assumption, and can be satised by, e.g., all the distributions that satisfy (i) the increasing
failure rate property, and (ii) the density qs;t() being positive on the lower bound of its support. The
same argument as the proof of Theorem 3.4.3(a) and Theorem 3.5.3(a) imply that, for all ^ > ,
ys;t(^)  ys;t() and ys;t(^;; i)  ys;t(;; i) (i = 1; 2; 3). We now characterize sucient conditions for
s;t() and 

s;t(;; i) (i = 1; 2; 3) to be increasing in .
Lemma 26 The following statements hold:
(a) If sb;t()  0sb;t for some constant 0sb;t, s;t() is increasing in .
(b) Assume that s;t() > 0 for all zt and that the conditions of Lemma 25 hold, we have:
(i) If sb;t() is Lipschitz continuous, there exists an M1s;t < +1, such that for all   M1s;t,
s;t(;; 1) is increasing in .
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(ii) If the monotonicity condition (B.30) holds, there exists an M2s;t < +1, such that for all
 M2s;t, s;t(;; 2) is increasing in .
(iii) If the monotonicity condition (B.30) holds, there exists an M3s;t < +1, such that for all
 M3s;t, s;t(;; 3) is increasing in .
Proof: Part (a). Observe that, ssa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t]) is increasing in  for any yi;t. Therefore,
s;t() = maxf(sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + ssa;t(E[y+i;t ^ i;t])  (N   1)0sb;t : yi;t  0g
is increasing in . This completes the proof of part (a).
Part (b-i). Let ^ > , and kt < +1 be the Lipschitz constant for sb;t(). Since s;t() is a
continuous function on a compact support, s;t() > 0 for all zt implies that s;t()  s;t > 0 for some
constant s;t. We dene
i;t(yi;t) := (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t) + ssa;t(E[yi;t ^ i;t]):
By the envelope theorem,
@i;t(y

s;t(;; 1))
@
= ssa;t(E[ys;t(;; 1) ^ i;t])  ss;t > 0;
where the rst inequality follows from sa;t(zi;t)  s;t(zt)  s;t. By the mean value theorem and
^ > ,
i;t(y

s;t(^;; 1))  i;t(ys;t(;; 1))  ss;t(^   ): (B.31)
At the same time, since s; (), s; (), and  s; () are all uniformly bounded from above for   t  1,
scs;t 1 and 
pf
s;t 1 have a uniform upper bound, which we denote as s;t 1 < +1. On the other hand,
s

(N   1)[^sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 1) ^ s;t])  sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 1) ^ s;t])]
=
s

(N   1)[^sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 1) ^ s;t])  ^sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 1) ^ s;t])
+ ^sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 1) ^ s;t])  sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 1) ^ s;t])]
s

(N   1)[ s;t 1kt(ys;t(^;; 1)  ys;t(;; 1)) + (^   )sb;t]
s

(N   1)( s;t 1ktKs;t + sb;t)(^   );
(B.32)
where the rst inequality follows from the Lipschitz continuity of sb;t(), ys;t(^;; 1)  ys;t(;; 1), and
E[ys;t(^;; 1) ^ s;t]   E[ys;t(;; 1) ^ s;t]  ys;t(^;; 1)   ys;t(;; 1), with sb;t := maxfsb;t(zi;t) :
zi;t 2 [0; 1]g < +1, and the second from Lemma 25. Dene
M1s;t :=
(N   1)( s;t 1ktKs;t + sb;t)
s;t
< +1:
If  M1s;t,
s;t(^;; 1)  s;t(;; 1) = i;t(ys;t(^;; 1))  i;t(ys;t(;; 1))
  (N   1)s

[^sb;t(y

s;t(^;; 1))  sb;t(ys;t(;; 1))]
 (ss;t  
s

(N   1)( s;t 1ktKs;t + sb;t))(^   )
 (ss;t   ss;t)(^   )
= 0;
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where the rst inequality follows from (B.31) and (B.32), and the second from  M1s;t. This establishes
part (b-i).
Part (b-ii). Let Hs;t(yi;t) := (sws;t 1   ws;t)yi;t   Ls;t(yi;t). Since
sws;t 1   ws;t   hs;t  H 0s;t(yi;t)  bs;t + sws;t 1   ws;t;
Hs;t() is Lipschitz continuous with the Lipschitz constant equal to lt := maxfjsws;t 1 ws;t hs;tj; jbs;t+
sws;t 1   ws;tjg < +1. Thus,
Hs;t(y

s;t(;; 2)) Hs;t(ys;t(^;; 2))  lt(ys;t(^;; 2)  ys;t(;; 2))  ltKs;t(^   ); (B.33)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 25 and ys;t(^;; 2)  ys;t(;; 2). On the other hand,
s^(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t]) + )
  s(sa;t(E[ys;t(;; 2) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 2) ^ s;t]) + )
s^(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t]) + )
  s(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t]) + )
s(^   ) + ss;t(^   )
=s(+ s;t)(^   );
(B.34)
where the rst inequality follows from (B.30) and the second from the denition of s;t. Dene
M2s;t :=
ltKs;t
s
  s;t < +1:
If  M2s;t,
s;t(^;; 2)  s;t(;; 2) = s^(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 2) ^ s;t]) + )
 s(sa;t(E[ys;t(;; 2) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 2) ^ s;t]) + )
 (Hs;t(ys;t(;; 2)) Hs;t(ys;t(^;; 2)))
 (s+ ss;t   ltKs;t)(^   )
 (ltKs;t   ss;t + ss;t   ltKs;t)(^   )
= 0;
where the rst inequality follows from (B.33) and (B.34), and the second from  M2s;t. This establishes
part (b-ii).
Part (b-iii). As shown in part (b-ii), Hs;t() is a Lipschitz function with the Lipschitz constant lt.
Thus,
Hs;t(y

s;t(;; 3)) Hs;t(ys;t(^;; 3))  lt(ys;t(^;; 3)  ys;t(;; 3))  ltKs;t(^   ); (B.35)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 25 and ys;t(^;; 3)  ys;t(;; 3). The monotonicity
condition (B.30) and ys;t(^;; 3)  ys;t(;; 3) implies that
sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])
 sa;t(E[ys;t(;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 3) ^ s;t]):
250
Therefore,
s^(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t]))
  s(sa;t(E[ys;t(;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 3) ^ s;t]))
s^(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t]))
  s(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t]))
s(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t]))(^   )
ss;t(^   );
(B.36)
where the last inequality follows from the denition of s;t. Dene
M3s;t :=
ltKs;t
ss;t
< +1:
If  M3s;t,
s;t(^;; 3)  s;t(;; 3) = s^(sa;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(^;; 3) ^ s;t]))
 s(sa;t(E[ys;t(;; 3) ^ s;t])  (N   1)sb;t(E[ys;t(;; 3) ^ s;t]))
 (Hs;t(ys;t(;; 3)) Hs;t(ys;t(^;; 3)))
 (ss;t   ltKs;t)(^   )
 (ltKs;t   ltKs;t)(^   )
= 0;
where the rst inequality follows from (B.35) and (B.36), and the second from  M3s;t. This establishes
part (b-iii). Q:E:D:
Lemma 26 has several economical interpretations. Parts (a) and (b-i) imply that, if the adverse eect
of a rm's competitors' service level upon its future market size is not strong, scs;t [
pf
s;t ] is increasing in
scs;t 1 [
pf
s;t 1]. Part (b-ii) implies that if the network eect is suciently strong, 
sc
s;t [
pf
s;t ] is increasing
in scs;t 1 [
pf
s;t 1]. Finally, part (b-iii) implies that if the both the service eect and the network eect
are suciently strong, scs;t [
pf
s;t ] is increasing in 
sc
s;t 1 [
pf
s;t 1].
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C. Appendix for Chapter 4
C.1 Equilibrium Denitions
We now give the denitions of the RE equilibria in the four scenarios considered in this paper: (a)
the base model with strategic customers, (b) the base model with myopic customers, (c) the NTR model
with strategic customers, and (d) the NTR model with myopic customers. Let A(Q1) := E[X^Q1]=E[X]
(Q1  0) be the availability function given the rst-period production quantity Q1 (see [160]).
Denition C.1.1 (Base model with strategic customers.) An RE equilibrium in the base model
with strategic customers consists of (p1; Q

1; 

r ; r
; a; pn2 ; p
r
2 ) satisfying
(a) p1 = r
; Q1 = argmaxQ10f (Q1) where f () is given in Lemma 8;
(b) r = + E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+;
(c) r = r ;
(d) a = A(Q1); (p
n
2 ; p
r
2 )
d
= (pn2 ; p
r
2 ).
Denition C.1.2 (Base model with myopic customers.) An RE equilibrium in the base model
with myopic customers consists of (~p1; ~Q

1;
~r ;~r
) satisfying
(a) ~p1 = ~r
; ~Q1 = argmaxQ10 ~f (Q1) where ~f () is given in Lemma 8;
(b) ~r = ;
(c) ~r = ~r .
Denition C.1.3 (NTR model with strategic customers.) An RE equilibrium in the NTR model
with strategic customers consists of (pu1 ; Q
u
1 ; 
u
r ; r
u; au; pu2 ) satisfying
(a) pu1 = r
u; Qu1 = argmaxQ10
u
f (Q1), where 
u
f () is given in Lemma 8;
(b) ur = + E[(k + )V   pu2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pu2 ]+;
(c) ru = ur ;
(d) au = A(Qu1 ); p
u
2
d
= pu2 ((X Qu1 )+; X^Qu1 ), where pu2 (; ) is characterized in Theorem 4.4.2(a).
Denition C.1.4 (NTR model with myopic customers.) An RE equilibrium in the NTR model
with myopic customers consists of (~pu1 ; ~Q
u
1 ;
~ur ;~r
u) satisfying
(a) ~pu1 = ~r
u; ~Qu1 = argmaxQ10 ~
u
f (Q1) where
~uf () is given in Lemma 8;
(b) ~ur = ;
(c) ~ru = ~ur .
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In Denitions C.1.1-C.1.4, conditions (a) and (b) follow from that the decisions are optimal given
the rational beliefs, and conditions (c) and (d) follow from that the rational beliefs are consistent with
actual outcomes.
C.2 Proofs of Statements
We use h01() to denote the derivative operator of a single variable function h1(), @xh2() to de-
note the partial derivative operator of a multi-variable function, h2(), with respect to variable x,
and 1fg to denote the indicator function. For any multivariate continuously dierentiable function
h2(x1; x2;    ; xn) and x0 := (x01; x02;    ; x0n) in h2()'s domain, 8i, we use @xih2(x01; x02;    ; x0n) to de-
note @xih2(x1; x2;    ; xn)jx=x0 .
Proof of Lemma 7: Part (a). Given (pn2 ; p
r
2) (p
r
2  pn2 ), a new customer will make a purchase if and
only if (1+)V  pn2 , whereas a repeat customer will make a purchase if and only if (k+)V  pr2. Thus,
the ex ante probability that a new customer will purchase the second-generation product is G

pn2
1+

,
whereas the probability that a repeat customer will join the trade-in program is G

pr2
k+

. Therefore,
conditioned on the realized market size (Xn2 ; X
r
2 ), the expected prot of the rm in period 2 is given by:
2(p
n
2 ; p
r
2jXn2 ; Xr2 ) :=Xn2 (pn2   c2) G

pn2
1 + 

+Xr2 (p
r
2   c2 + r2) G

pr2
k + 

=Xn2 v
n
2 (p
n
2 ) +X
r
2v
r
2(p
r
2);
(C.1)
where vn2 (p
n
2 ) := (p
n
2   c2) G( p
n
2
1+ ) and v
r
2(p
r
2) := (p
r
2   c2 + r2) G( p
r
2
k+ ). We now show that v
n
2 () is
quasiconcave in pn2 , and v
r
2() is quasiconcave in pr2. Note that
@pn2 v
n
2 (p
n
2 ) =  

pn2   c2
1 + 

g

pn2
1 + 

+ G

pn2
1 + 

and
@pr2v
r
2(p
r
2) =  

pr2   c2 + r2
k + 

g

pr2
k + 

+ G

pr2
k + 

:
Because g(v)= G(v) is continuously increasing in v, g(
pn2
1+ )=
G(
pn2
1+ ) is continuously increasing in p
n
2 and
g(
pr2
k+ )=
G(
pr2
k+ ) is continuously increasing in p
r
2. Hence, @pn2 v
n
2 (p
n
2 ) = 0 has a unique solution p
n
2 and
@pr2v
r
2(p
r
2) = 0 has a unique solution p
r
2 , where v
n
2 () [vr2()] is strictly increasing on [0; pn2 ) [[0; pr2 )] and
strictly decreasing on (pn2 ;+1) [(pr2 ;+1)]. Therefore, for any realized (Xn2 ; Xr2 ), Xn2 vn2 () is quasicon-
cave in pn2 , andX
r
2v
r
2() is quasiconcave in pr2. Thus, for any realized (Xn2 ; Xr2 ), (pn2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ); pr2(Xn2 ; Xr2 )) =
(pn2 ; p
r
2 ) maximizes 2(; jXn2 ; Xr2 ).
It remains to show that pn2 > p
r
2 if and only if k < 1 or r2 > 0. Note that p
n
2 satises
pn2   c2
1 + 
 g  pn21+
G

pn2
1+
 = 1; (C.2)
and pr2 satises 
pr2   c2 + r2
k + 
 g  pr2k+
G

pr2
k+
 = 1: (C.3)
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If k < 1 or r2 > 0,
pn2  c2+r2
k+ >
pn2  c2
1+ , and the increasing failure rate condition implies that
g

pn2
k+

= G

pn2
k+

 g

pn2
1+

= G

pn2
1+

. Thus,

pn2   c2 + r2
k + 
 g  pn2k+
G

pn2
k+
 > pn2   c2
1 + 
 g  pn21+
G

pn2
1+
 = 1;
and, hence, @pr2v
r
2(p
n
2 ) < 0. Since v
r
2() is quasiconcave, pr2 < pn2 . On the other hand, if k = 1 and
r2 = 0, v
n
2 ()  vr2() and thus pn2 = pr2 . This completes the proof of Part (a).
Part (b). Because all new customers with willingness-to-pay (1+)V greater than pn2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  pn2
would make a purchase. Hence,
Qn2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = E[Xn2 1f(1+)Vpn2 gjXn2 ] = G

pn2
1 + 

Xn2 :
Analogously, all repeat customers with willingness-to-pay (k+)V greater than pr2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  pr2 would
make a purchase. Hence,
Qr2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = E[Xr21f(k+)Vpr2 gjXr2 ] = G

pr2
k + 

Xr2 :
This proves Part (b).
Part (c). Since 2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) := maxf2(pn2 ; pr2jXn2 ; Xr2 ) : 0  pr2  pn2g, it follows immediately that
2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = [max v
n
2 (p
n
2 )]X
n
2 + [max v
r
2(p
r
2)]X
r
2 :
To complete the proof, it remains to show that n = [max v
n
2 (p
n
2 )] > 0 and 

r = [max v
r
2(p
r
2)] > 0. By
equations (C.2) and (C.3), we have pn2   c2 > 0, G

pn2
1+

> 0, pr2   c2 + r2 > 0, and G

pr2
k+

> 0.
Hence, n = (p
n
2   c2) G

pn2
1+

> 0 and r = (p
r
2   c2 + r2) G

pr2
k+

> 0. This completes the proof of
Part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1: Part (a). Since r satises that Up = Uw, we have
a(E[V ] + E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   r ) + (1  a)E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+ = E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+:
Direct algebraic manipulation yields that r = + E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+. Hence,
by Denition C.1.1 and Lemma 7(a),
p1 = r

1 = 

r = + E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+
= + E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+:
Hence,
f (Q1) = p

1E(X ^Q1)  c1Q1 + r1E(Q1  X)+ + Ef2(X   (X ^Q1); X ^Q1)g
= (p1   r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[n(X   (X ^Q1)) + r (X ^Q1)]
= (p1 + (

r   n)  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + nE(X)
= (m1   r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + nE(X);
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where the second equality follows from (Q1   X)+ = Q1   (X ^ Q1), and the last from the identity
m1 =  + E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+ + (r   n). Therefore, Q1 is the solution to
a newsvendor problem with marginal revenue m1   r1, marginal cost c1   r1, and demand distribution
F (). Hence, Q1 = F 1( c1 r1m1 r1 ) and 

f = f (Q

1) = (m

1   r1)E(X ^ Q1)   (c1   r1)Q1 + nE(X).
This proves Part (a).
Part (b). Since myopic customers will make a purchase if and only if p1  , ~p1 = ~1 = . Hence,
~f (Q1) = ~p

1E(X ^Q1)  c1Q1 + r1E(Q1  X)+ + Ef2(X   (X ^Q1); X ^Q1)g
= (~p1   r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[n(X   (X ^Q1)) + r (X ^Q1)]
= (~p1 + (

r   n)  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + nE(X)
= ( ~m1   r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + nE(X);
where the second equality follows from (Q1   X)+ = Q1   (X ^ Q1), and the last from the identity
~m1 =  + (

r   n). Therefore, ~Q1 is the solution to a newsvendor problem with marginal rev-
enue ~m1   r1, marginal cost c1   r1, and demand distribution F (). Hence, ~Q1 = F 1( c1 r1m1 r1 ) and
~f = ~f ( ~Q

1) = (m

1   r1)E(X ^ ~Q1)  (c1   r1) ~Q1 + nE(X). This proves Part (b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 8: The expressions for f () and ~f () have already been given in the proof of
Theorem 4.3.1(a) and Theorem 4.3.1(b), respectively. We now compute uf (Q1). Following the same
argument as the proof of Theorem 4.3.1(a), given the rst-period production quantity Q1, the rst-period
equilibrium price is
pu1 (Q1) =E[V ] + [E((k + )V   pu2 )+   E((1 + )V   pu2 )+]
=+ [E((k + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+   E((1 + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+];
where Xn2 = (X  Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^Q1. Let u2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) := maxpu2 u2 (pu2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ). Hence,
u2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = max
pu20
fXn2 (pu2   c2) G

pu2
1 + 

+Xr2 (p
u
2   c2) G(
pu2
k + 
)g
= Xn2 (p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

+Xr2 (p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

;
where Xn2 = (X  Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^Q1. Therefore,
uf (Q1) = p
u
1 (Q1)E(X ^Q1)  c1Q1 + r1E(X  Q1)+ + E[u2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )]
= (pu1 (Q1)  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(X  Q1)+(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

+(X ^Q1)(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

]
= (pu1 (Q1) + E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

  (pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

]
 r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

X]
= (mu1 (Q1)  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

X];
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where
mu1 (Q1) : = + fE[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

] + E((k + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+
 E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

]  E((1 + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+g;
with Xn2 = (X  Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^Q1.
Analogously, since ~pu1 = E[V ] = ,
~uf (Q1) = ~p
u
1 E(X ^Q1)  c1Q1 + r1E(X  Q1)+ + E[u2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )]
= (  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(X  Q1)+(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

+(X ^Q1)(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

]
= (+ E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

  (pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

]
 r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

X]
= ( ~mu1 (Q1)  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

X];
where
~mu1 (Q1) : = + fE[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

]  E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

]g;
with Xn2 = (X  Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^Q1. Q:E:D:
Before giving the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, we rst prove Theorem 4.4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.2: Part (a). If the rm charges a single price pu2 in period 2, all new (repeat)
customers with willingness-to-pay (1 + )V ((k + )V ) greater than pu2 will make a purchase (join the
trade-in program). Hence, the second-period prot function of the rm u2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) is given by
u2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = Xn2 (pu2   c2) G

pu2
1 + 

+Xr2 (p
u
2   c2) G

pu2
k + 

= Xn2 v
n
2 (p
u
2 ) +X
r
2 v^
r
2(p
u
2 );
where v^r2(p2) := (p2   c2) G

p2
k+

. Clearly, v^r2() has a unique maximizer p^r2 , where p^r2  pr2 with the
inequality being strict if r2 > 0. Moreover, 
u
2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = ^2(pu2 ; pu2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ), where, by the proof
of Lemma 7(a), ^2(p
n
2 ; p
r
2jXn2 ; Xr2 ) := Xn2 vn2 (pn2 ) +Xr2 v^r2(pr2) is quasiconcave function of (pn2 ; pr2). Thus,
the equilibrium second-period pricing strategy pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) is the maximizer of the second-period prot
function, i.e., pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = argmaxpu20
u
2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ). Note that since ^2(; jXn2 ; Xr2 ) is quasiconcave
in (pn2 ; p
r
2), 
u
2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = ^2(pu2 ; pu2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) is also quasiconcave in pu2 .
Observe that
@pu2
u
2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = Xn2
h
G

pu2
1+

 

pu2 c2
1+

g

pu2
1+
i
+ Xr2
h
G

pu2
k+

 

pu2 c2
k+

g

pu2
k+
i
. Since
g(v)= G(v) is increasing in v, @pu2
u
2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) < 0 if pu2 > pn2 , and @pu2u2 (pu2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) > 0 if pu2 < p^r2 .
Thus,
pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) 2 [p^r2 ; pn2 ]  [pr2 ; pn2 ] = [pr2(Xn2 ; Xr2 ); pn2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )]:
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If k < 1, by the proof of Lemma 7(a), p^r2 < p
n
2 . Since X
n
2 ; X
r
2 > 0,
@pu2
u
2 (p^
r
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = Xn2
h
G

p^r2
1+

 

p^r2  c2
1+

g

p^r2
1+
i
> 0 and
@pu2
u
2 (p
n
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = Xr2
h
G

pn2
k+

 

pn2  c2
k+

g

pn2
k+
i
< 0. Therefore, pr2  p^r2 < pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) <
pn2 for all X
n
2 ; X
r
2 > 0.
When pu2 2 [p^r2 ; pn2 ], G( p
u
2
1+ )   (p
u
2 c2
1+ )g(
pu2
1+ )  0 and G( p
u
2
k+ )   (p
u
2 c2
k+ )g(
pu2
k+ )  0. Thus,
u2 (p
u
2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) is increasing in Xn2 and decreasing in Xr2 if pu2 2 [p^r2 ; pn2 ], i.e., u2 (pu2 jXn2 ; Xr2 ) is su-
permodular in (pu2 ; X
n
2 ) on the lattice [p^
r
2 ; p
n
2 ]  [0;+1), and submodular in (pu2 ; Xr2 ) on the lattice
[p^r2 ; p
n
2 ] [0;+1). Therefore, pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) is continuously increasing in Xn2 and continuously decreasing
in Xr2 . This proves Part (a).
Part (b). Note that pu1 = + [E((k + )V   pu2 )+   E((1 + )V   pu2 )+], where pu2 d= pu2 ((X  
Qu1 )
+; X ^Qu1 ) 2 [pr2 ; pn2 ]. Therefore, [E((k+)V  pu2 )+ E((k+)V  pr2 )+]  0, [E((1+)V  
pu2 )
+   E((1 + )V   pn2 )+]  0, and thus
pu1  p1 = [E((k+)V  pu2 )+ E((k+)V  pr2 )+] [E((1+)V  pu2 )+ E((1+)V  pn2 )+]  0:
If pr2 < p
n
2 , at least one of the following two inequalities are strict: [E((k + )V   pu2 )+   E((k +
)V   pr2 )+]  0 and [E((1 + )V   pu2 )+   E((1 + )V   pn2 )+]  0. Hence, pu1 < p1 if pr2 < pn2 .
It's straightforward to compute that, for any Q1  0,
f (Q1) uf (Q1) =(p1   pu1 (Q1))E(X ^Q1) + E[(n   vn2 (pu2 ((X  Q1)+; X ^Q1)))(X  Q1)+
+ (r   v^n2 (pu2 ((X  Q1)+; X ^Q1)))(X ^Q1)];
where pu1 (Q1) = +[E((k+)V  pu2 )+ E((1+)V  pu2 )+]  pu1 with pu2 d= pu2 ((X Q1)+; X^Q1).
Since n  vn2 (p2) and r  vr2(p2)  v^r2(p2) for any p2  0, f (Q1)  uf (Q1) for all Q1  0, and thus
f = maxQ1 f (Q1)  maxQ1 uf (Q1) = uf . If pr2 < pn2 , by the proof of part (a), p1 > pu1 (Q1) and,
hence, f (Q1) > 
u
f (Q1) for all Q1 > 0. Therefore, 

f = f (Q

1)  f (Qu1 ) > uf (Qu1 ) = uf . This
proves part (b).
Part (c). ~pu1 = ~p

1 =  follows immediately from that  is the willingness-to-pay of myopic
customers. Moreover, direct computation yields that, for any Q1  0,
~f (Q1)  ~uf (Q1) =E[(n   vn2 (pu2 ((X  Q1)+; X ^Q1)))(X  Q1)+
+ (r   v^n2 (pu2 ((X  Q1)+; X ^Q1)))(X ^Q1)]
0;
where the inequality follows from the proof of part (b). If pr2 < p
n
2 , at least one of E[(n  vn2 (pu2 ((X  
Q1)
+; X ^Q1)))(X  Q1)+] and E[(r   v^n2 (pu2 ((X  Q1)+; X ^Q1)))(X ^Q1)] is positive for Q1 > 0.
Hence, the same argument as the proof of part (b) yields that ~f > ~
u
f if
~Qu1 > 0. This proves part
(c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.4.1: Part (a). Since p1   ~p1 = m1   ~m1 = e, it follows immediately that
p1 > ~p

1 and Q

1 =
F 1( c1 r1m1 r1 ) >
F 1( c1 r1m1 r1 ) =
~Q1 if and only if e
 > 0. Moreover, for any
Q1, f (Q1)   ~f (Q1) = eE(X ^ Q1) > 0 if and only if e > 0. Therefore, f = maxf (Q1) >
max ~f (Q1) = ~

f if and only if e
 > 0 and Q1 > 0.
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Next, we show that e > 0 if and only if r2 > r. Observe that vr2(p
r
2) is submodular in (p
r
2; r2), so
pr2 is decreasing in r2. Moreover, e
 is decreasing in pr2 . Hence, e
 is increasing in r2 and e > 0 if and
only if r2 > r for some r. We now show that r  1 k1+c2. It suces to show that if r2 = 1 k1+c2, e  0.
If r2 =
1 k
1+c2, v
r
2(p
r
2) = (p
r
2   k+1+ c2) G( p
r
2
k+ ). It's straightforward to check that p
r
2 =
k+
1+p
n
2 . Hence,
e =E[(k + )V   pr2 ]+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+
=E[(k + )V   k + 
1 + 
pn2 ]
+   E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+
=  1  k
1 + 
E[(1 + )V   pn2 ]+  0:
This proves Part (a).
Part (b). Observe that,
pu1   ~pu1 = [E((k + )V   pu2 )+   E((1 + )V   pu2 )+];
where pu2
d
= pu2 ((X  Qu1 )+; X ^Qu1 ). Since k  1, pu1  ~pu1 and the inequality is strict if k < 1. This
establishes part (b-i).
We now show part (b-ii). Direct computation yields that
~mu1 (Q1) mu1 (Q1) = E((1 + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+   E((k + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+;
where Xn2 = (X  Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^Q1. Since k < 1, we have E((1 + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+   E((k +
)V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+ > 0.
Let (Q1; 1) = ~
u
f (Q1) and (Q1; 0) = 
u
f (Q1),
(Q1; 1) (Q1; 0) = ~uf (Q1) uf (Q1) = (  pu1 (Q1))E(X ^Q1)
= [E((1 + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+   E((k + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+]E(X ^Q1):
Since [E((1+)V  p)+ E((k+)V  p)+]0 =  P( p1+  V  pk+ )  0 and pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) is decreasing in
Q1, (Q1; 1) (Q1; 0) = ( pu1 (Q1))(X^Q1) is increasing in Q1, and, hence, (; ) is a supermodular
function on the lattice [0;+1)  f0; 1g. Thus, ~Qu1 = argmaxQ10(Q1; 1)  argmaxQ10(Q1; 0) =
Qu1 . This proves part (b-ii).
Finally, since ~uf (Q1)   uf (Q1) = (   pu1 (Q1))(X ^ Q1)  0 where the inequality is strict if
pr2 < p
n
2 . Hence,
~uf = maxQ10 ~
u
f (Q1)  maxQ10uf (Q1) = uf . Moreover, the same argument as
the proof of Theorem 4.4.2 (b-ii) implies that ~uf > 
u
f if p
r
2 < p
n
2 . This establishes part (b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.4.3: Part (a). We rst show that mu1 (Q1) is decreasing in Q1. Observe
that mu1 (Q1) = + [Ur(Q1)  Un(Q1)], where
Ur(Q1) := E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

] + E((k + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+;
and
Un(Q1) := E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

] + E((1 + )V   pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))+:
Let ur(p) := (p   c2) G( pk+ ) + E((k + )V   p)+ = E[(k + )V   c2]1f(k+)Vpg and un(p) := (p  
c2) G(
p
1+ ) + E((1 + )V   p)+ = E[(1 + )V   c2]1f(1+)Vpg. It's clear that ur() and up() are
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continuously decreasing in p. Moreover, Ur(Q1) = E[ur(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))] and Un(Q1) = E[un(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))],
where Xn2 = (X   Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^ Q1. Since pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) is increasing in Xn2 and decreasing in
Xr2 , it is stochastically decreasing in Q1. Hence, it suces to show that ur(p)  un(p) is increasing in p.
Observe that
ur(p)  un(p) =  [
Z p=(k+)
p=(1+)
((1 + )V   p)g(V ) dV +
Z v
p=(k+)
(1  k)V g(V ) dV ]
=  [
Z v
p=(1+)
((1 + )V  max(p; (k + )V ))g(V ) dV ];
which is continuously increasing in p. This establishes part (a-i).
We now show that mu1 (Q1) < m

1 for all Q1. Observe that
mu1 (Q1) m1 = E[ur(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))  ur(pr2 )]  E[un(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))  un(pn2 )]:
Because pr2  pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  pn2 , E[ur(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )) ur(pr2 )]  0 and E[un(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )) un(pn2 )]  0.
Hence, mu1 (Q1)  m1. If k < 1, pr2 < pn2 , one of the inequalities E[ur(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))  ur(pr2 )]  0 and
E[un(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))   un(pn2 )]  0 must be strict. Therefore, mu1 (Q1) < m1 for all Q1  0. This proves
part (a-ii).
Next, we show that Qu1  Q1. Observe that
uf (Q1) f (Q1) = (mu1 (Q1) m1)(X ^Q1) + E[(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

]  nE(X):
Let (Q1; 1) = f (Q1) and (Q1; 0) = 
u
f (Q1). Then,
(Q1; 1) (Q1; 0) = (m1  mu1 (Q1))(X ^Q1) + EX[n   (pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  c2) G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

]
Note that for any realization of X, pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) and thus (p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  c2) G(p
u
2 (X
n
2 ;X
r
2 )
1+ ) is decreasing in
Q1. Therefore, by part (a-ii), (Q1; 1) (Q1; 0) is increasing in Q1. Hence, (; ) is supermodular on
the lattice [0;+1)f0; 1g. Hence, Qu1 = argmaxQ10uf (Q1)  argmaxQ10f (Q1) = Q1. If Qu1 > 0,
since m1 > m
u
1 (Q
u
1 ) 
0
f (Q
u
1 ) > @Q1
u
f (Q
u
1 ) = 0. Since f () is concave in Q1, Q1 > Qu1 . This proves
part (a-iii).
Part (b). We rst show that ~mu1 (Q1) is increasing inQ1. Note that ~m
u
1 (Q1) = +E[v^r2(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )) 
vn2 (p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ))], where X
n
2 = (X   Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^ Q1. Because p^r2  pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )  pn2 and
pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) is increasing inX
n
2 and decreasing inX
r
2 . Thus, v^
r
2(p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )) is stochastically increasing in
Q1 and v
n
2 (p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )) is stochastically decreasing in Q1. Therefore, ~m
u
1 (Q1) = +E[v^r2(pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )) 
vn2 (p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ))] is increasing in Q1. This proves part (b-i).
We now show part (b-ii). Let ^r = maxp0 v^
r
2(p). It's clear that 

r   ^r is increasing in r2, with
r = ^

r if r2 = 0. Moreover, since k < 1, ^

n := v
n
2 (p^
r
2 ) < 

n. Therefore, let r2 > 0 be the threshold
such that r   ^r = n   ^n. Hence, for all r2 < r2, r   ^r < n   ^n. Moreover, by the monotone
convergence theorem,
lim
Q1!+1
~mu1 (Q1) = + [v
r
2(p^
r
2 )  vn2 (p^r2 )] = + [^r   ^n] > + [r   n] = ~m1:
Part (b-i) shows that ~mu1 (Q1) is increasing in Q1. Hence, there exists a threshold
Q(r2) such that
~mu1 (Q1)  ~m1 if and only if Q1  Q(r2). To show that Q(r2) is increasing in r2, we observe that ~m1 is
increasing in r2. Hence, Q(r2) := minfQ1 : ~mu1 (Q1)  ~m1g is increasing in r2. This proves part (b-ii).
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Part (b-iii). Without loss of generality, assume that Qu1 > 0. Otherwise, the result holds trivially.
It's clear that Qu1 " X and Q1 " X as c1 # 0, where X is the upper bound of the support of X. Hence,
there exists a threshold ~c(r2) > 0, dependent on r2, such that if c1 < ~c(r2), Q
u
1 ; Q

1 >
Q(r2). Let
^2(Q1) := E[vn2 (pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))X], where Xn2 = (X   Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^ Q1. It's clear that ^2() is
dierentiable and, by the chain rule
^02(Q1) = E[@pvn2 (pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ))(@Xn2 p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) + @Xr2 p
u
2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ))1fXQ1gX]:
As Q1 ! X, for any realization of X  X, @Xn2 pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) and @Xr2 pu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) converges to 0. Hence,
by the dominated convergence theorem, there exits a threshold Q^ 2 [ Q(r2); X), such that ^02(Q1) 2
[ P(X  Q1); 0] for all Q1  Q^, where  := ( ~mu1 (Q^)   ~m1)=2 > 0. Let c1(r2) 2 (0; ~c(r2)] be the
threshold such that, if c1 < c1(r1), we have Q
u
1 ; Q

1 > Q^  Q(r2). Therefore,
~0f (Q
u
1 ) = ( ~m

1   r1)P(X  Qu1 )  (c1   r1)
< ( ~mu1 (Q
u
1 )  r1)P(X  Qu1 )  P(X  Qu1 )  (c1   r1)
 ( ~mu1 (Qu1 )  r1)P(X  Qu1 ) + ^02(Qu1 )  (c1   r1)
 @Q1 ~uf (Qu1 )
= 0;
where the rst inequality follows from ~mu1 (Q
u
1 )   ~m1  ( ~mu1 (Q^)   ~m1) = 2 > , the second from
^02(Q
u
1 ) 2 [ P(X  Qu1 ); 0], and the last from the monotonicity that ~mu1 () is increasing in Q1. Be-
cause ~f () is concave in Q1, ~Q1 = argmaxQ1 ~f (Q1) < ~Qu1 follows immediately. This establishes part
(b-iii) and thus Theorem 4.4.3. Q:E:D:
Before presenting the proof Theorem 4.4.4, we give the following lemma that computes the equilib-
rium environmental impacts Ie and ~I

e .
Lemma 27 (a) With strategic customers, the total expected environmental impact of the RE equilib-
rium is Ie = Ie(Q

1), where
Ie(Q1) := (1   1)Q1 + (1 + (2   2) G

pr2
k + 

)E(Q1 ^X) + 2 G

pn2
1 + 

E(X  Q1)+:
(b) With myopic customers, the total expected environmental impact of the RE equilibrium is ~Ie =
Ie( ~Q

1).
(c) The function Ie() is strictly increasing in Q1. Hence, Ie  ~Ie if and only if Q1  ~Q1.
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Proof of Lemma 27: Parts (a) and (b). Direct computation yields that
Ie =Ef1Q1 + 2(Qn2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) +Qr2(Xn2 ; Xr2 ))  1(Q1  X)+
  2Qr2(Xn2 ; Xr2 )g
=Ef1Q1 + 2((X  Q1)+ G

pn2
1 + 

+ (X ^Q1) G

pr2
k + 

)  1(Q1  X)+
  2(X ^Q1) G

pr2
k + 

g
=(1   1)Q1 + (1 + (2   2) G

pr2
k + 

)E(X ^Q1) + 2 G

pn2
1 + 

E(X  Q1)+
=Ie(Q

1);
where the second inequality follows from Xn2 = (X   Q1)+ and Xr2 = X ^ Q1, the third from
(Q1  X)+ = Q1   (X ^Q1), and the last from the denition of the function Ie(). Analogously,
~Ie =Ef1 ~Q1 + 2(Qn2 ( ~Xn2 ; ~Xr2 ) +Qr2( ~Xn2 ; ~Xr2 ))  1( ~Q1  X)+   2Qr2( ~Xn2 ; ~Xr2 )g
=Ef1 ~Q1 + 2((X   ~Q1)+ G

pn2
1 + 

+ (X ^ ~Q1) G

pr2
k + 

)  1( ~Q1  X)+
  2(X ^ ~Q1) G

pr2
k + 

g
=(1   1) ~Q1 + (1 + (2   2) G

pr2
k + 

)E(X ^ ~Q1) + 2 G

pn2
1 + 

E(X   ~Q1)+
=Ie( ~Q

1):
This completes the proof of Parts (a) and (b).
Part (c). To establish the monotonicity of Ie(), observe that
I 0e(Q1) = 1 1+(1+(2 2) G

pr2
k+

)P(X > Q1) 2 G

pn2
1+

P(X > Q1) > 1 1 2 > 0,
where the rst inequality follows from G

pn2
1+

 1 and P(X > Q1)  1, and the second from
the assumption that 1 > 1 + 2. Hence, Ie() is strictly increasing in Q1. This proves Part (c).
Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.4.4: Part (a). First, we compute Iue . Given the market sizes (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ), the
equilibrium total second-period production quantity, Qu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ), is given by
Qu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = X
n
2
G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

+Xr2 G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

:
Therefore,
Iue = Ef1Qu1   1(Qu1  X)+ + 2Qu2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 )g
= (1   1)Qu1 + Ef[1 + 2 G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

](Qu1 ^X)g
+2E[ G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

(X  Qu1 )+];
where Xn2 = (X  Qu1 )+ and Xr2 = X ^Qu1 . If Q1 = 0, Qu1 = 0 as well by Theorem 4.4.3(a). Hence,
Ie = I
u
e regardless of the value of 2. In this case, part (a) trivially holds. On the other hand, if Q

1 > 0,
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Ie is strictly linearly decreasing in 2. Thus, let 
u
2 := maxf2 : Ie  Iue g. We have Ie  Iu2 if and only
if 2  u2 . In particular, if 2 = 0, Q1 > Qu1 implies that
(1   1)Q1 + 2 G

pn2
1 + 

E(X  Q1)+ > (1   1)Qu1 + 2E[ G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
1 + 

(X  Qu1 )+];
and
(1 + (2   2) G

pr2
k + 

)E(X ^Q1)  E[(1 + 2 G

pu2 (X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )
k + 

)(X  Qu1 )]:
Thus, u2 > 0. This establishes part (a).
Part (b). As in the proof of part (a), we rst compute ~Iue :
~Iue = Ef1 ~Qu1   1( ~Qu1  X)+ + 2Qu2 ( ~Xn2 ; ~Xr2 )g
= (1   1) ~Qu1 + Ef[1 + 2 G
 
pu2 (
~Xn2 ; ~X
r
2 )
k + 
!
]( ~Qu1 ^X)g
+2E[ G
 
pu2 (
~Xn2 ; ~X
r
2 )
1 + 
!
(X   ~Qu1 )+];
where ~Xn2 = (X   ~Qu1 )+ and ~Xr2 = X ^ ~Qu1 . By Theorem 4.4.4(b), ~Qu1  ~Q1. Hence,
(1   1) ~Q1 + 2 G

pn2
1 + 

E(X   ~Q1)+  (1   1) ~Qu1 + 2E[ G
 
pu2 (
~Xn2 ; ~X
r
2 )
1 + 
!
(X   ~Qu1 )+]:
Let ~u2 := (
G(
pr2
k+ )  G( p
n
2
k+ ))2=
G(
pr2
k+ ) < 2. If 2  ~u2 , since ~Qu1  ~Q1,
Ef[1 + 2 G
 
pu2 (
~Xn2 ; ~X
r
2 )
k + 
!
]( ~Qu1 ^X)g  Ef[1 + (2   2) G

pn2
k + 

]( ~Qu1 ^X)g
 Ef[1 + (2   2) G

pn2
k + 

](Qu1 ^X)g:
Therefore, if 2  ~u2 ,
~Iue = (1   1) ~Qu1 + Ef[1 + 2 G
 
pu2 (
~Xn2 ; ~X
r
2 )
k + 
!
]( ~Qu1 ^X)g
+2E[ G
 
pu2 (
~Xn2 ; ~X
r
2 )
1 + 
!
(X   ~Qu1 )+]
 (1   1) ~Q1 + 2 G

pn2
1 + 

E(X   ~Q1)+ + Ef[1 + (2   2) G

pn2
k + 

](Qu1 ^X)g
= ~Ie ;
which proves part (b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.4.5: Part (a). We rst compute the equilibrium total customer surplus in
the scenario of strategic customers, Sc . If a customer is a new customer in period 2, her expected total
surplus is E((1 + )V   pn2 )+ (since, by Lemma 7, pn2 (Xn2 ; Xr2 ) = pn2 ). Hence, the expected surplus of
a strategic customer in the base model is given by:
a(  p1 + E((k + )V   pr2 )+) + (1  a)E((1 + )V   pn2 )+
=a(  + E((1 + )V   pn2 )+   E((k + )V   pr2 )+ + E((k + )V   pr2 )+)
+ (1  a)E((1 + )V   pn2 )+
=E((1 + )V   pn2 )+:
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Therefore, the equilibrium total customer surplus is given by Sc = E[E((1+)V   pn2 )+X] = E[((1+
)V   pn2 )+X].
We now compute the equilibrium total customer surplus in the scenario of myopic customers, ~Sc .
Since the customers are myopic, they get zero utility in period 1. Hence, in period 2, the expected surplus
of a new customer is E((1 + )V   pn2 )+, whereas that of a repeat customer is E((k + )V   pr2 )+.
Therefore, the total customer surplus is given by
~Sc =E[E((1 + )V   pn2 )+(X   ~Q1)+] + E[E((k + )V   pr2 )+(X ^ ~Q1)]
=E[((1 + )V   pn2 )+(X   ~Q1)+] + E[((k + )V   pr2 )+(X ^ ~Q1)]:
This proves part (a).
Part (b). We rst compute Suc . If a customer is a new customer in period 2, her expected total
surplus is E((1 + )V   pu2 )+. Hence, the expected surplus of a strategic customer in the NTR model
is given by:
au(  pu1 + E((k + )V   pu2 )+) + (1  au)E((1 + )V   pu2 )+
=au(  + E((1 + )V   pu2 )+   E((k + )V   pu2 )+ + E((k + )V   pu2 )+)
+ (1  au)E((1 + )V   pu2 )+
=E((1 + )V   pu2 )+:
Therefore, the equilibrium total customer surplus is given by Suc = E[E((1+)V  pu2 )+X] = E[((1+
)V   pu2 )+X].
We now compute ~Suc . Since the customers are myopic, they get zero utility in period 1. Hence,
in period 2, the expected surplus of a new customer is E((1 + )V   pu2 )+, whereas that of a repeat
customer is E((k + )V   pu2 )+. Therefore, the total customer surplus is given by
~Suc =E[E((1 + )V   pu2 )+(X   ~Qu1 )+] + E[E((k + )V   pu2 )+(X ^ ~Qu1 )]
=E[((1 + )V   pu2 )+(X   ~Qu1 )+] + E[((k + )V   pu2 )+(X ^ ~Qu1 )]:
This proves part (b).
Part (c). Note that, by Theorem 4.4.2(a), pr2  pu2  pn2 with probability 1. It follows immedi-
ately that Suc = E[((1 + )V   pu2 )+X]  E[((1 + )V   pn2 )+X] = Sc . In particular, if k < 1 and
Qu1 > 0, p
u
2 < p
n
2 with probability 1 and thus S
u
c > S

c . This proves part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 9: Part (a). Let W2(p
n
2 ; p
r
2jXn2 ; Xr2 ) be the expected social welfare in period 2
when the price for new customers is pn2 , and that for repeat customers is p
r
2. Since all new (repeat)
customers with valuation (1 + )V  pn2 ((k + )V  pr2) will make a purchase (trade the used prod-
ucts in), the rm prot equals (pn2   c2) G( p
n
2
1+ )X
n
2 + (p
r
2   c2 + r2) G( p
r
2
k+ )X
r
2 , the expected customer
surplus equals Xn2 E((1 + )V   pn2 )+ + Xr2E((k + )V   pr2)+, and the environmental impact equals
2X
n
2
G(
pn2
1+ ) + (2   2)Xr2 G( p
r
2
k+ ). Therefore, W2(p
n
2 ; p
r
2jXn2 ; Xr2 ) = Xn2 wn(pn2 ) +Xr2wr(pr2), where
wn(p
n
2 ) := (p
n
2   c2   2) G(
pn2
1 + 
) + E((1 + )V   pn2 )+ = E((1 + )V   c2   2)1f(1+)Vp2g;
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and
wr(p
r
2) := (p
r
2 c2+r2 2+2) G(
pr2
k + 
)+E((k+)V  pr2)+ = E((k+)V  c2+r2 2+2)1f(k+)Vpr2g:
Thus, w0n(p
n
2 ) =
pn2 c2 2
1+ g(
pn2
1+ ) and w
0
r(p
r
2) =
pr2 c2+r2 2+2
k+ g(
pr2
k+ ). Thus, w
0
n(p
n
2 ) > 0 if p
n
2 < c2+2
and w0n(p
n
2 ) < 0 if p
n
2 > c2 + 2. Analogously, w
0
r(p
r
2) > 0 if p
r
2 < c2 + 2   r2   2 and w0r(pr2) < 0 if
pr2 > c2 + 2   r2   2. Hence, the unique maximizer of wn() is c2 + 2, and the unique maximizer of
wr() is c2 + 2   r2   2. Finally, it is straightforward to check that c2 + 2   r2   2  c2 + 2, with
the inequality being strict if and only if r2 > 0 or 2 > 0. Therefore, p
n
s;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  pns;2 = c2 + 2 and
prs;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 )  prs;2 = c2 + 2   r2   2 for any realized (Xn2 ; Xr2 ). This proves part (a).
Part (b). Under the equilibrium prices (pns;2; p
r
s;2), a new customer will make a purchase if and only
if her valuation (1 + )V  pns;2, whereas a repeat customer will make a purchase (and join the trade-in
program) if and only if her valuation (k + )V  prs;2. Therefore,
Qns;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = E[Xn2 1f(1+)Vpns;2gjXn2 ] = Xn2 G

pns;2
1 + 

;
and
Qrs;2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = E[Xr21f(k+)Vprs;2gjXr2 ] = Xr2 G

prs;2
k + 

;
which proves part (b).
Part (c). Plugging pns;2 and p
r
s;2 into w
n
2 () and wr2(), respectively, we have wn2 (pns;2) = E[(1+)V  
pns;2]
+ and wr2(p
r
s;2) = E[(1 +)V   prs;2]+. Therefore, w2(Xn2 ; Xr2 ) = Xn2 E[(1 +)V   pns;2]++Xr2E[(1 +
)V   prs;2]+. This completes the proof of part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 10: Part (a). Let Ws(Q1) be the expected social welfare with rst-period pro-
duction quantity Q1 under strategic customer behavior. Following the same argument as the proof of
Theorem 4.3.1(a), we have
ps;1 = + E[(k + )V   prs;2]+   E[(1 + )V   pns;2]+
= + E[(k + )V   prs;2]+   E[(1 + )V   pns;2]+
= + (s;r   s;n)
= ms;1;
which proves part (a-i).
We now compute Ws(Q1). By Lemma 9(c), w2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = 

s;nX
n
2 + 

s;rX
r
2 , so
Ws(Q1) = p

s;1E(X ^Q1) + (  ps;1)(X ^Q1)  (c1 + 1)Q1 + (r1 + 1)E(Q1  X)+
+Efw2(X   (X ^Q1); X ^Q1)g
= (  r1   1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1 + 1   1)Q1 + Efs;n(X   (X ^Q1)) + s;r(X ^Q1)g
= (ms;1   r1   1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1 + 1   1)Q1 + s;nE(X):
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Therefore, Qs;1 is the solution to a newsvendor problem with marginal revenue m

s;1   r1   1, marginal
cost c1+1 r1 1, and demand distribution F (). Hence, Qs;1 = F 1( c1+1 r1 1ms;1 r1 1 ), and the equilibrium
social welfare is
W s =Ws(Q

s;1) = (m

s;1   r1   1)E(X ^Qs;1)  (c1   r1 + 1   1)Q1 + s;nE(X):
This proves part (a-ii,iii).
Part (b). Let ~Ws(Q1) be the expected social welfare with myopic customers, if the rst-period
production quantity is Q1. The willingness-to-pay of myopic customers is their expected valuation of the
rst-generation product . Thus, ~ps;1 = . This proves part (b-i).
We now compute ~Ws(Q1). By Lemma 9(c), w2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) = 

s;nX
n
2 + 

s;rX
r
2 , so
~Ws(Q1) = ~p

s;1E(X ^Q1) + (  ~ps;1)(X ^Q1)  (c1 + 1)Q1 + (r1 + 1)E(Q1  X)+
+Efw2(X   (X ^Q1); X ^Q1)g
= (  r1   1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1 + 1   1)Q1 + Efs;n(X   (X ^Q1)) + s;r(X ^Q1)g
= ( ~ms;1   r1   1)E(X ^Q1)  (c  r1 + 1   1)Q1 + s;nE(X):
Therefore, ~Qs;1 is the solution to a newsvendor problem with marginal revenue ~m

s;1   r1   1, marginal
cost c1+1 r1 1, and demand distribution F (). Hence, ~Qs;1 = F 1( c1+1 r1 1~ms;1 r1 1 ), and the equilibrium
social welfare is
~W s = ~Ws( ~Q

s;1) = ( ~m

s;1   r1   1)E(X ^ ~Qs;1)  (c  r1 + 1   1) ~Q1 + s;nE(X):
This proves part (b-ii,iii).
Part (c). Since ps;1   ~ps;1 = s;r   s;n = es, ps;1  ~ps;1 if and only if es  0. The equalities
Qs;1 = ~Q

s;1 and W

s = ~W

s follow from the fact that m

s;1 = ~m

s;1. This establishes part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1: Part (a). With the unit subsidy rate sr for remanufactured products,
the expected per demand prot from repeat customers vr2(p
r
2) = (p
r
2 + sr + s2   c2 + r2) G( p
r
2
k+ ). Since
@pr2@srv
r
2(p
r
2) =   11+g( p
r
2
1+ )  0, vr2(pr2) is submodular in (pr2; sr). Hence, pr2 = argmaxpr20vr2(pr2)
is continuously decreasing in sr. This completes the proof of part (a-i). Because Q
r
2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) =
Xr2
G

pr2
k+

and pr2 is decreasing in sr, Q
r
2(X
n
2 ; X
r
2 ) is increasing in sr, which proves part (a-ii).
Part (b). By Theorem 4.3.1(a), p1 =  + [E((k + )V   pr2 )+   E((1 + )V   pn2 )+], which is
decreasing in pr2 . Since p
r
2 is decreasing in sr, p

1 is increasing in sr. With the unit subsidy rate sr for
remanufactured product,
f (Q1) = (p

1   r1   sr)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1   sr)Q1 + nE(X);
Hence, Q1 = F
 1

c1 r1 sr
p1 r1 sr

. The critical fractile c1 r1 srp1 r1 sr is decreasing in p

1 and sr. Therefore, Q

1 is
increasing in sr. For each Q1, f (Q1) is increasing in sr. Thus, 

f = maxQ10f (Q1) is increasing in
sr. By Lemma 27(a), I

e = Ie(Q

1), which is increasing in Q

1. Thus, I

e is increasing in sr as well. This
establishes part (b).
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Part (c). By Theorem 4.3.1(b), ~p1 = , which is independent of sr. With the unit subsidy rate sr
for remanufactured product,
~f (Q1) = (~p

1   r1   sr)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1   sr)Q1 + nE(X);
Hence, ~Q1 = F
 1

c1 r1 sr
~p1 r1 sr

. The critical fractile c1 r1 sr~p1 r1 sr is decreasing in sr. Therefore,
~Q1 is in-
creasing in sr. For each Q1, ~f (Q1) is increasing in sr. Thus, ~

f = maxQ10 ~f (Q1) is increasing in
sr. By Lemma 27(b), ~I

e = ~Ie(Q

1), which is increasing in
~Q1. Thus, ~I

e is increasing in sr as well. This
establishes part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.5.2: Part (a). If s2 is the solution to p
n
s;2 = argmaxpn20(p
n
2 + s2  c2) G

pn2
1+

,
it is clear that the subsidy/tax scheme with s2 = s

2 can induce the equilibrium price for new customers
pns;2. We now show that s

2 exists. Since v
n
2 (p
n
2 ) is quasiconcave in p
n
2 for any s2, the rst-order condition
@pn2 v
n
2 (p
n
2 ) = 0 guarantees the optimal price for new customers. Moreover,
@pn2 v
n
2 (p
n
s;2) = G

pns;2
1 + 

  p
n
s;2 + s2   c2
1 + 
g

pns;2
1 + 

;
which is strictly decreasing in s2. Hence, there exists a unique s

2, such that @pn2 v
n
2 (p
n
s;2) = 0, thus
inducing the socially optimal equilibrium price for new customers pns;2. This proves part (a-i).
If sr is the solution to p
r
s;2 = argmaxpr20(p
r
2 + s

2 + sr   c2 + r2) G

pr2
k+

, the subsidy/tax scheme
with sr = s

r can induce the equilibrium trade-in price for repeat customers p
r
s;2. We now show that
sr exists. Since v
r
2(p
r
2) is quasiconcave in p
r
2 for any (s2; sr), the rst-order condition @pr2v
r
2(p
r
2) = 0
guarantees the optimal price for new customers. Moreover, if s2 = s

2,
@pr2v
r
2(p
r
s;2) = G

prs;2
k + 

  p
r
s;2 + s

2 + sr   c2 + r2
k + 
g

prs;2
k + 

;
which is strictly decreasing in sr. Hence, there exists a unique s

r , such that @pr2v
r
2(p
r
s;2) = 0 if s2 = s

2,
thus inducing the socially optimal equilibrium trade-in price for repeat customers prs;2. This proves part
(a-ii).
Given the subsidy/tax scheme (s1; s

2; s

r), as shown above, the rm adopts the same second-period
pricing strategy as the social welfare maximizing one: (pns;2; p
r
s;2). Hence, the rst-period price should
also be the same as the one which is socially optimal and characterized by Lemma 10(a): ps;1 =  +
[s;r   s;n]. Thus, the expected prot of the rm in period 1 is
sf (Q1) = (p

s;1 + s1   r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + E[(X  X ^Q1)(pns;2 + s2   c2) G

pns;2
1 + 

+(X ^Q1)(prs;2 + s2 + sr   c2 + r2) G

prs;2
k + 

]
= (ms1(s1)  r1)E(X ^Q1)  (c1   r1)Q1 + (pns;2 + s2   c2) G

pns;2
1 + 

E(X);
where ms1(s1) = s1+m

s;1+ [(2+ s

2+ s

r   2) G( p
r
s;2
k+ )  (2+ s2) G(
pns;2
1+ )]. Thus, 
s
f (Q1) has a unique
optimizer F 1( c1 r1ms1(s1) r1 ). Moreover, as shown in Lemma 10, Q

s;1 =
F 1( c1+1 r1 1 s

r
ms;1 r1 sr ). Therefore,
if s1 is the unique solution to
c1 r1
ms1(s1) r1 =
c1+1 r1 1 sr
ms;1 r1 sr , the optimal production quantity with the
266
linear subsidy/tax scheme sg = (s

1; s

2; s

r) is Q

s;1, which is the socially optimal rst-period production
quantity. This proves part (a-iii).
We now show that s2 is increasing in 2. As shown in part (a-i), s

2 satises
G

pns;2
1+

  p
n
s;2+s

2 c2
1+ g

pns;2
1+

= 0, i.e.,
s2 =
(1 + ) G

pns;2
1+

g

pns;2
1+
   pns;2 + c2 = (1 + ) G

c2+2
1+

g

c2+2
1+
   2:
Because g(v)= G(v) is increasing in v, s2 is strictly decreasing in 2. Analogously, by part (a-ii), s

r
satises G

prs;2
k+

  p
r
s;2+s

2+sr c2+r2
k+ g

prs;2
k+

= 0, i.e.,
sr =
(k + ) G

prs;2
k+

g

prs;2
k+
   prs;2   s2 + c2   r2 = (k + ) G

c2 r2+2 2
k+

g

c2 r2+2 2
k+
   s2   2 + 2:
Because g(v)= G(v) is increasing in v, sr is strictly increasing in 2.
By part (a-iii), s1 satises
c1 r1
ms1(s

1) r1 =
c1+1 r1 1 sr
ms;1 r1 sr , the left-hand-side of which is strictly de-
creasing in s1, whereas the right-hand-side of which is strictly increasing in 1. Therefore, s

1 is strictly
decreasing in 1. This proves part (a-iv).
Dene s2 as the solution to
(1+) G( c2+21+ )
g( c2+21+ )
= 2, 
s
2 as the solution to
(k+) G( c2 r2+2 2k+ )
g( c2 r2+2 2k+ )
  s2  
2 + 2 = 0, and 
s
1 as the solution to
c1 r1
ms1(0) r1 =
c1+1 r1 1 sr
ms;1 r1 sr . Since g(v)=
G(v) is increasing in v,
s2, 
s
2, and 
s
1 are well-dened and unique. By the proof of part (a-iv), s

2 is strictly decreasing in 2, s

r
is strictly increasing in 2, and s

1 is strictly decreasing in 1. Therefore, s

1  0 if and only if 1  s1,
s2  0 if and only if 2  s2, and sr  0 if and only if 2  s2. This proves part (a-v).
Part (b). By Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 (c), the social-welfare-maximizing equilibrium outcome is
the same with strategic customers and with myopic customers, except that ps;1 = m

s;1 and ~p

s;1 = .
Therefore, exactly the same argument as the proof of part (a) proves part (b) as well. In particular,
since the second-period decisions should be independent of whether the customers are strategic or myopic,
s2 = ~s

2 and s

r = ~s

r .
Part (c). Since ms;1 = ~m

s;1, parts (a) and (b) imply that
c1 r1
ms1(s

1) r1 =
c1 r1
~ms1(~s

1) r1 . Thus, m
s
1(s

1) =
~ms1(~s

1) and, hence, s

1+m

s;1 = ~s

1+, i.e., s

1 ~s1 =  ms;1 =  es: Therefore, s1  ~s1 if and only if es 
0. Moreover, since s1 satises
c1 r1
ms1(0) r1 =
c1+
s
1 r1 1 sr
ms;1 r1 sr and
~s1 satises
c1 r1
~ms1(0) r1 =
c1+~
s
1 r1 1 sr
~ms;1 r1 sr .
Because ms;1 = ~m

s;1, 
s
1  ~s1 if and only if ms1(0)  ~ms1(0), i.e., es  0. This proves part (c). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 4.5.3: Part (a). We rst compute Cg = Cg(s

g) and ~C

g = ~Cg(~s

g), observe
that
Cg(s

g) =Efs1(X ^Qs;1) + sr(Qs;1  X)+
+ [s2Q
n
s;2((X  Qs;1)+; X ^Qs;1) + (sr + s2)Qrs;2((X  Qs;1)+; X ^Qs;1)]g;
and
~Cg(~s

g) =Ef~s1(X ^ ~Qs;1) + ~sr( ~Qs;1  X)+
+ [~s2 ~Q
n
s;2((X   ~Qs;1)+; X ^ ~Qs;1) + (sr + s2) ~Qrs;2((X   ~Qs;1)+; X ^ ~Qs;1)]g:
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By Lemma 10(c) and Theorem 4.5.2(c), Qs;1 = ~Q

s;1, s

2 = ~s

2, and s

r = ~s

r , it follows immediately that
Cg(s

g)  ~Cg(~sg) = (s1   ~s1)E(X ^Qs;1), which proves part (a).
Part (b). By part (a), Cg  ~Cg if and only if s1  ~s1. By Theorem 4.5.2(c), s1  ~s1 if and only
if es  0. Since es = E((k + )V   c2   2 + r2 + 2)+   E((1 + )V   c2   2)+ is strictly increasing
in r2 + 2. Hence, let V := minfr2 + 2 : es  0g. It follows immediately that es  0 if and only if
r2 + 2  V2. We observe that E((k + )V   c2   2)+   E((1 + )V   c2   2)+ < 0. Thus, V2 > 0.
This establishes part (b). Q:E:D:
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D. Appendix for Chapter 5
D.1 Proofs of Statements
We use @ to denote the derivative operator of a single variable function, @x to denote the partial
derivative operator of a multi-variable function with respect to variable x, and 1fg to denote the indicator
function. The following lemma is used throughout our proof.
Lemma 28 Let Fi(z; Z) be a continuously dierentiable and jointly concave function in (z; Z) for i =
1; 2, where z 2 [z; z] (z and z might be innite) and Z 2 Rn. For i = 1; 2, let
(zi; Zi) := argmax(z;Z)Fi(z; Z);
be the optimizers of Fi(; ). If z1 < z2, we have:
@zF1(z1; Z1)  @zF2(z2; Z2):
Proof: z1 < z2, so z  z1 < z2  z. Hence, @zF1(z1; Z1)
8><>:= 0 if z1 > z, 0 if z1 = z;
and @zF2(z2; Z2)
8><>:= 0 if z2 < z, 0 if z2 = z. i.e., @zF1(z1; Z1)  0  @zF2(z2; Z2): Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 11: Since p() and () are twice continuously dierentiable, R(; ) is twice con-
tinuously dierentiable, and jointly concave in (dt; I
a
t ) if and only if the Hessian of R(dt; I
a
t ) is neg-
ative semi-denite, i.e., @2dtR(dt; I
a
t )  0, and @2dtR(dt; Iat )@2Iat R(dt; It)  (@dt@Iat R(dt; Iat ))2, where
@2dtR(dt; I
a
t ) = p
00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt), @dt@Iat R(dt; I
a
t ) = p
0(dt)0(Iat ), and @
2
Iat
R(dt; I
a
t ) = (p(dt)  
b   (c + rd))00(Iat ). It is easily veried that the Hessian of R(dt; Iat ) is negative semi-denite if and
only if (p00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt))(p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))00(Iat )  (p0(dt)0(Iat ))2. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 12: For part (a), if 00(Iat ) = 0, the left hand side of (5.3) equals to 0. Since
the right hand side of (5.3) is greater than or equal to 0 and (p0(dt))2 > 0, the (5.3) holds only if
0(Iat ) = 0. For the second half of part (a), it suces to show that if 
0(I0) = 0, 0(Iat ) = 0 for any
Iat  I0. Since 00(Iat )  0 for all Iat  Ka, 0(Iat )  0(I0) = 0 for any Iat  I0. On the other hand,
0(Iat )  0 for all Iat  Ka, so 0(Iat ) = 0 and, thus, 00(Iat ) = 0 for all Iat  I0.
Part (b): By part (a), for any Iat such that 
00(Iat ) = 0, 
0(Iat ) = 0. (
0(Iat ))
2   M00(Iat ) for any
0 < M < +1. Now we suppose 00(Iat ) 6= 0. Since p(), p0() and p00() are continuous functions dened
on a compact set [d; d] with p0() < 0 and (Ka)  (Iat )  0, (p00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p0(dt))(p(dt)  b 
(c+ rd))=(p
0(dt))2 is uniformly bounded from below by a constant number, and we dene this number
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to be  M . Hence, by (5.3), (0(Iat ))2   M00(Iat ). Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 13:
Part (a). Observe that p^0()  p0() and p^00 ()  p00() for any  > 0. Thus, let
m := max
dt2[d; d];Iat Ka
f p^
00
 (dt)(dt + (I
a
t )) + 2p^
0
(dt)
(p^0(dt))2
g = max
dt2[d; d];Iat Ka
fp
00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt)
(p0(dt))2
g < 0;
k := min
dt2[d; d]
fp(dt)  b  (c+ rd)g  0;
and
 :=  M
m
  k < +1:
Therefore, for any   ; dt 2 [d; d]; Iat  Ka,
(p^00 (dt)(dt + (I
a
t )) + 2p^
0
(dt))(p^(dt)  b  (c+ rd))
(p^0(dt))2
00(Iat )
=
p00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt)
(p0(dt))2
(p(dt) +    b  (c+ rd))00(Iat )
p
00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt)
(p0(dt))2
( M
m
  k + p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))00(Iat )
p
00(dt)(dt + (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt)
(p0(dt))2
 ( M
m
)00(Iat )
 M00(Iat )
(0(Iat ))2;
where the rst inequality follows from   , the second from p(dt)   b   (c + rd)  k, the third
from the denition of m and the last from the assumption that  M00(Iat )  (0(Iat ))2 for any Iat  Ka.
Hence, by (5.3), for any   , R^(; ) is jointly concave on dt 2 [d; d]; Iat  Ka.
Part (b). Observe that ^0&()  0() and ^00& ()  00() for any & > 0. Since p00(dt) 6= 0, let
n := max
dt2[d; d]
f (p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))p
00(dt)
(p0(dt))2
g < 0; l := min
dt2[d; d];Iat Ka
f(Iat ) + dt +
2p0(dt)
p00(dt)
g > 0;
and
& :=  M
n
  l < +1:
Therefore, for any &  &; dt 2 [d; d]; Iat  Ka,
(p00(dt)(dt + ^&(Iat )) + 2p
0(dt))(p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))
(p0(dt))2
^00& (I
a
t )
=
(p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))(p00(dt)(dt + (Iat ) + &) + 2p0(dt))
(p0(dt))2
00(Iat )
=
(p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))p00(dt)
(p0(dt))2
(& + (Iat ) + dt +
2p0(dt)
p00(dt)
)00(Iat )
 (p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))p
00(dt)
(p0(dt))2
( M
n
  l + (Iat ) + dt +
2p0(dt)
p00(dt)
)00(Iat )
 (p(dt)  b  (c+ rd))p
00(dt)
(p0(dt))2
( M
n
)00(Iat )
 M00(Iat )
(0(Iat ))2 = (^0&(Iat ))2;
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where the rst inequality follows from &  &, the second from (Iat )+dt+ 2p
0(dt)
p00(dt)
 l, the third from the
denition of n and the last from the assumption that  M00(Iat )  (0(Iat ))2 for any Iat  Ka. Hence,
by (5.3), for any &  &, R^&(; ) is jointly concave on dt 2 [d; d]; Iat  Ka. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 14: We prove parts (a) - (b) together by backward induction.
We rst show, by backward induction, that if Vt 1(Iat 1; It 1) rdIat 1 cIt 1 is concavely decreasing
in both Iat 1 and It 1, both gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) := EfGt(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt   (p(dt); Iat ; t))g and
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) are jointly concave, gt(; ; ; Iat ) and Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It) are strictly concave for any xed
Iat and It, and Vt(I
a
t ; It)   rdIat   cIt is jointly concave and decreasing in Iat and It. It is clear that
V0(I
a
0 ; I0)  rdIa0   cI0 =  rdIa0   cI0 is jointly concave, and decreasing in Ia0 and I0. Hence, the initial
condition holds.
Assume that Vt 1(Iat 1; It 1) rdIat 1 cIt 1 is concavely decreasing in both Iat 1 and It 1. Therefore,
Gt(x; y) is jointly concave and decreasing in x and y. For every realization of t = (
a
t ; 
m
t ), we verify that
Gt(x
a
t   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt   (p(dt); Iat ; t)) is jointly concave in (xat ; xt; dt; Iat )as follows: let 0    1,
xa := x
a
1 + (1  )xa2 , x := x1 + (1  )x2, d := d1 + (1  )d2 and Ia := Ia1 + (1  )Ia2 , we have:
Gt(x
a
1   (d1 + (I1))mt   at ; x1   (d1 + (I1))mt   at )
+ (1  )Gt(xa2   (d2 + (I2))mt   at ; x2   (d2 + (I2))mt   at )
Gt(xa   (d + (I1) + (1  )(I2))mt   at ; x   (d + (I1) + (1  )(I2))mt   at )
Gt(xa   (d + (I))mt   at ; x   (d + (I))mt   at );
where the rst inequality follows from the joint concavity of Gt(; ), the second from the concavity of
(), the monotonicity that Gt(; ) is decreasing in both of its arguments, and mt  0. Since concavity is
preserved under expectation, gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) = EfGt(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt  (p(dt); Iat ; t))g is jointly
concave in (xat ; xt; dt; I
a
t ). Note that R(dt; I
a
t ) is jointly concave in (dt; I
a
t ),  (xt It)  is jointly concave
in (xt; It), and  (rd+rw)(xat  Iat )  is jointly concave in (xat ; Iat ). Therefore, Jt(xat ; xt; dt; Iat ; It) is jointly
concave in (xat ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It). The strict concavity of gt(; ; ; Iat ) follows directly from the continuous
distribution of Dt and that its support is an interval. Since gt(; ; ; Iat ) is strictly concave and R(; Iat )
is concave for any xed Iat , Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It) is strictly jointly concave for any xed Iat and It.
Concavity is preserved under maximization (see, e.g., Section 3.2.5 of [32]), so the joint concavity of
Vt(I
a
t ; It) follows immediately from the joint concavity of Jt(; ; ; ; ). We now verify that Vt(Iat ; It) is
decreasing in both Iat and It. Observe that (I
a
t ),  (rd+rw)(xat  Iat ) , and Gt(xat  (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt 
(p(dt); I
a
t ; t)) are decreasing in I
a
t , and  (xt   It)  is decreasing in It. Hence, Jt(xat ; xt; dt; Iat ; It) is
decreasing in Iat and It for any xed (x
a
t ; xt; dt). Assume I
a
1 > I
a
2 , we have F (I
a
1 )  F (Ia2 ). Hence, for
any It,
Vt(I
a
1 ; It)  rdIa1   cIt = max
(xat ;xt;dt)2F (Ia1 )
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
1 ; It)
 max
(xat ;xt;dt)2F (Ia2 )
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
2 ; It) = Vt(I
a
2 ; It)  rdIa2   cIt;
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where the inequality follows from the monotonicity that Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) is decreasing in I
a
t , and
F (Ia1 )  F (Ia2 ), thus verifying Vt(Iat ; It) is decreasing in Iat . Analogously, if I1 > I2, for any Iat ,
Vt(I
a
t ; I1)  rdIat   cI1 = max
(xat ;xt;dt)2F (Iat )
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; I1)
 max
(xat ;xt;dt)2F (Iat )
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; I2) = Vt(I
a
t ; I2)  rdIat   cI2;
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity that Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) is decreasing in It.
Second, we show, again by backward induction, that if Vt 1(; ) is continuously dierentiable,
gt(; ; ; ) and Vt(; ) are continuously dierentiable on the interior of their domains. For t = 0,
Vt(I
a
t ; It) = 0 is clearly continuously dierentiable. The initial condition holds.
Assume Vt 1(Iat 1; It 1) is continuously dierentiable,
gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; It) =Ef (b+ ha)(xat   (dt + (It))mt   at )+
+ [Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
  rd(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )  c(xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )]g:
Since at and 
m
t are continuous, it is easy to compute the partial derivatives of gt(; ; ; ) as follows:
@xat gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) =Ef (b+ ha)1fxat(dt+(It))mt +at g
+ @Iat 1Vt 1(x
a
t   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )g   rd;
@xtgt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) =Ef@It 1Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )g   c;
@dtgt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) =Ef(b+ ha)mt 1fxat(dt+(Iat ))mt +at g
  mt @Iat 1Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
  mt @It 1Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )g+ (rd + c);
@Iat gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) =Ef(b+ ha)0(Iat )mt 1fxat(dt+(Iat ))mt +at g
  0(Iat )mt @Iat 1Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
  0(Iat )mt @It 1Vt 1(xat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )g
+ (rd + c)
0(Iat );
(D.0)
where the exchangeability of dierentiation and expectation is easily justied using the canonical argu-
ment (see, for example, Theorem A.5.1 of [63], the condition of which can be easily checked observing
the continuity of partial derivatives of Vt 1(; ), and that the distribution of Dt is continuous.). Since
at least one of at and 
m
t follows a continuous distribution, @xat gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ), @xtgt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ),
@dtgt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) and @Iat gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ) are continuous. Therefore, gt(; ; ; ) is continuously dieren-
tiable.
Since gt(; ; ; Iat ) is strictly concave and continuously dierentiable, Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It) is strictly con-
cave and continuously dierentiable. Moreover, Jt(; ; ; ; ) is continuously dierentiable if xat 6= Iat and
xt 6= It, i.e., it is continuously dierentiable almost everywhere. By envelope theorem, Vt(; ) is also
dierentiable on the interior of the feasible set F (Iat ) for x
a
t (I
a
t ; It) 6= Iat and xt (Iat ; It) 6= It. For the
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case xat (I
a
t ; It) = I
a
t or x

t (I
a
t ; It) = It, we show the continuous dierentiability of Vt(; ) in the proof of
Theorem 5.4.1. This completes the induction and, hence, the proof of Lemma 14. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 5.4.1: Parts (a) - (d) and the dierentiability of Vt(I
a
t ; It). We rst show
parts (a) - (d) and the continuous dierentiability of Vt(I
a
t ; It).
Observe that if xt > It (i.e., the rm orders),
@xtJt(x
a
t ; xt; d; I
a
t ; It) =   + @xtgt(xat ; xt; dt; Iat ) < 0:
Hence, if xt (I
a
t ; It) > It, x
a
t (I
a
t ; It) = x

t (I
a
t ; It) > It  Iat and the optimal policy is given by Equation
(5.7). i.e., if xat (I
a
t ) > It, (x
a
t (I
a
t ; It); x

t (I
a
t ; It); d

t (I
a
t ; It)) = (x
a
t (I
a
t ); x
a
t (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t )). This completes
the proof of part (b).
If xt < It (i.e., the rm disposes),  (xt   It)  = (xt   It). Hence, the objective function
Jt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) =  It +R(dt; Iat ) + (    )xt   (rd + rw)(xat   Iat )  + xat
+ EfGt(xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t); xt   (p(dt); Iat ; t)):
Hence, if xt (I
a
t ; It) < It, the optimizer prescribed in Equation (5.9) is the optimal policy. i.e., if ~xt(I
a
t ) <
It, (x
a
t (I
a
t ; It); x

t (I
a
t ; It); d

t (I
a
t ; It)) = (~x
a
t (I
a
t ); ~xt(I
a
t );
~dt(I
a
t )). Part (c) follows.
Next we show that xat (I
a
t )  ~xt(Iat ). If xat (Iat ) > ~xt(Iat ), suppose It 2 (~xt(Iat ); xat (Iat )). We have that:8><>:Jt(x
a
t (I
a
t ); x
a
t (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ; It) > supxatIt;dt2[d; d]fJt(xat ; It; dt; Iat ; It)g;
Jt(~x
a
t (I
a
t ); ~xt(I
a
t );
~dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ; It) > supxatIt;dt2[d; d]fJt(xat ; It; dt; Iat ; It)g:
(D.1)
By the concavity of Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It),
sup
xatIt;dt2[d; d]
fJt(xat ; It; dt; Iat ; It)g  Jt(xat (Iat ); xat (Iat ); dt(Iat ); Iat ; It)+(1 )Jt(~xat (Iat ); ~xt(Iat ); ~dt(Iat ); Iat ; It);
where xat (I
a
t )+ (1 )~xt(Iat ) = It. The above inequality contradicts inequality (D.1). Hence, xat (Iat ) 
~xt(I
a
t ). Part (d) thus follows from part (b), part (c), x
a
t (I
a
t )  ~xt(Iat ), and the concavity of Jt(; ; ; Iat ; It).
The second part of part (a) summarizes parts (b) - (d).
Since the proof of Lemma 14 already shows that Jt(; ; ; ; ) is continuously dierentiable, it suces
to show that Vt(I
a
t ; It) is continuously dierentiable when x
a
t (I
a
t ; It) = I
a
t or x

t (I
a
t ; It) = It, given that
Jt(; ; ; ; ) is continuously dierentiable. We only show that @ItVt(Iat ; It) is continuous at the points
where xt (I
a
t ; It) = It, because the continuity of @Iat Vt(I
a
t ; It) at the points where x
a
t (I
a
t ; It) = I
a
t follows
from the same approach.
By the proof of Lemma 14, it suces to check that the left and right partial derivatives, @ItVt(I
a
t ; It )
and @ItVt(I
a
t ; It+), are equal when It = x
a
t (I
a
t ) and It = ~xt(I
a
t ). For It = x
a
t (I
a
t ), by the envelope
theorem,8><>:@ItVt(I
a
t ; x
a
t (I
a
t ) ) = c
@ItVt(I
a
t ; x
a
t (I
a
t )+) = c+  + @xat g(x
a
t (I
a
t ); x
a
t (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ) + @xtg(x
a
t (I
a
t ); x
a
t (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ):
The rst order condition with respect to xat and xt implies that
 + @xat g(x
a
t (I
a
t ); x
a
t (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ) + @xtg(x
a
t (I
a
t ); x
a
t (I
a
t ); dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ) = 0:
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Therefore, @ItVt(I
a
t ; x
a
t (I
a
t ) ) = @ItVt(Iat ; xat (Iat )+). For It = ~xt(Iat ), by the envelop theorem,8><>:@ItVt(I
a
t ; ~xt(I
a
t ) ) = c  
@ItVt(I
a
t ; ~xt(I
a
t )+) = c   + @xtg(~xat (Iat ); ~xt(Iat ); ~dt(Iat ); Iat ):
The rst order condition with respect to xt at It = ~xt(I
a
t ) implies that
@xtg(~x
a
t (I
a
t ); ~xt(I
a
t );
~dt(I
a
t ); I
a
t ) +     = 0:
Hence, @ItVt(I
a
t ; ~xt(I
a
t ) ) = @ItVt(Iat ; ~xt(Iat )+) and the partial derivative @ItVt(Iat ; It) is continuous.
Part (e): Let
Jat (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := R(dt; I
a
t ) + x
a
t + g
a
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t );
where gat (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) = E[Gat (xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))], with Gat (x) = Gat (x; x).
We rst show that xat (I
a
t ) is decreasing in I
a
t . Let t := (I
a
t ) and yt := dt + t. Then, we have
Jat (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) = J^
a
t (x
a
t ; yt; t), where
J^at (x
a
t ; yt; t) = R
(yt; t) + xat + EfGat (xat   ytmt   at )g;
with R(yt; t) := R(yt   t; Iat ). We need the following lemma that establishes the supermodularity of
R(; ) and R(; ):
Lemma 29 (a) R(yt; t) is strictly supermodular in (yt; t), where yt   t = dt 2 [d; d] and yt  0.
In addition, R(yt; t) is strictly concave in yt, for any xed t;
(b) R(dt; I
a
t ) is supermodular in (dt; I
a
t ), where dt 2 [d; d] and Iat  Ka. In addition, R(dt; Iat ) is
strictly concave in dt, for any xed I
a
t .
Proof of Lemma 29: R(yt; t) = (p(yt t) b (c+rd))yt is twice continuously dierentiable
when yt   t = dt 2 [d; d] and yt  0. To prove the supermodularity of R(; ), it suces to show
that @yt@tR
(yt; t)  0. Direct computation yields that: @yt@tR(yt; t) =  (p00(yt   t)yt +
p0(yt   t)). Since p0() < 0 and p00()  0,  (p00(yt   t)yt + p0(yt   t)) > 0. Hence, R(yt; t) is
strictly supermodular. Moreover, @2ytR
(yt; t) = p00(yt   t)yt + 2p0(yt   t) < 0, since p00()  0
and p0() < 0. Hence, R(yt; t) is strictly concave in yt, for any xed t. This establishes part
(a).
R(; ) is twice continuously dierentiable, @dt@Iat R(dt; Iat ) = p0(dt)0(Iat )  0. Hence, R(; ) is
supermodular. In addition, @2dtR(dt; I
a
t ) = p
00(dt)(dt+ (Iat )) + 2p
0(dt) < 0, so R(dt; Iat ) is strictly
concave in dt for any xed I
a
t .Q:E:D:
As shown in the proof of Lemma 14, Gt(; ) and, thus, Gat (), is concave. Note that mt  0, so,
for any realization of (at ; 
m
t ), it is easily veried that G
a
t (xt   ytmt   at ) is supermodular in (xt; yt).
Hence, EfGat (xt   ytmt   at )g is supermodular in (xt; yt), since supermodularity is preserved under
expectation. By Lemma 29, R(yt; t) is supermodular and, thus, J^at (xt; yt; t) is supermodular in
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(xt; yt; t). Therefore, the optimal order-up-to level, x
a
t (I
a
t ), and optimal expected demand yt(I
a
t ) :=
dt(I
a
t ) + t are increasing in t, and, since () is decreasing in Iat , decreasing in Iat .
We now proceed to show that the optimal expected price-induced demand dt(I
a
t ) is increasing in I
a
t .
Let Ia1 > I
a
2 , x
a
1 := x
a
t (I
a
1 ), x
a
2 := x
a
t (I
a
2 ), d1 := dt(I
a
1 ), d2 := dt(I
a
2 ) y1 := d1+(I
a
1 ), and y2 := d2+(I
a
2 ).
We prove that d1  d2 by contradiction. Assume that d1 < d2. By Lemma 28, d1 < d2 implies that
@dtJ
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 )  @dtJat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ).
@dtR(d1; I
a
1 )  @dtR(d1; Ia2 ) > @dtR(d2; Ia2 );
where the rst inequality follows from the supermodularity of R(; ) and the second inequality follows
from the strict concavity of R(; Iat ). Hence,
@dtg
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 ) = @dtJ
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 ) @dtR(d1; Ia1 ) < @dtJat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ) @dtR(d2; Ia2 ) = @dtgat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ):
(D.2)
Let
f(X) :=  (b+ ha)1fX0g + [@Iat 1Vt 1(X;X) + @It 1V at 1(X;X)  rd   c]  0;
which is decreasing in X. We have:
@xat g
a
t (x
a
i ; di; I
a
i ) = Eff(xai   yimt   at )g and @dtgat (xai ; di; Iai ) = Ef mt f(xai   yimt   at )g for i = 1; 2:
Recall that we have proved xa2  xa1 and ya2  ya1 .
If xa1 = x
a
2 , x
a
1   ya1mt   at  xa2   ya2mt   at for any realization of (at ; mt ). Hence,
@xat g
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 ) = Eff(xa1   y1mt   at )g  Eff(xa2   y2mt   at )g = @xat gat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 );
where the inequality follows from that f() is decreasing.
If xa2 > x
a
1 , by Lemma 28, @xat J
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 )  @xat Jat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ) and, hence,
@xat g
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 ) = @xat J
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 )    @xat Jat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 )   = @xat gat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ):
Note that there exists an t , such that x
a
1   y1mt  xa2   y2mt if mt  t and xa1   ya1mt > xa2   ya2mt if
mt > 

t (

t may equal m or m.). Since f() is decreasing, f(xa1   y1mt   at )  f(xa2   y2mt   at )  0 for
any mt 2 [m; t ] and any realization of at . So
 mt (f(xa1   y1mt   at )  f(xa2   y2mt   at ))   t (f(xa1   y1mt   at )  f(xa2   y2mt   at )); (D.3)
for any mt 2 [m; t ] and any realization of at . Analogously, for mt 2 [t ;m], f(xa1   y1mt   at )  f(xa2  
y2
m
t   at )  0, and (D.3) holds for mt 2 [t ;m] as well. Therefore, (D.3) holds for all mt 2 [m;m] and
any realization of at .
Taking expectation, we have:
@dtg
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 )  @dtgat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ) = Ef mt (f(xa1   y1mt   at )  f(xa2   y2mt   at ))g
 Ef t (f(xa1   y1mt   at )  f(xa2   y2mt   at ))g
=  t (@xat gat (xa1 ; d1; Ia1 )  @xat gat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ))
 0;
(D.4)
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where the last inequality follows from @xat g
a
t (x
a
1 ; d1; I
a
1 )  @xat gat (xa2 ; d2; Ia2 ). (D.4) contradicts (D.2) and,
hence, d1  d2, i.e., dt(Iat ) is increasing in Iat . The continuity of xat (Iat ) and dt(Iat ) follows directly from
that the objective function Jat (; ; Iat ) is strictly concave for any given Iat . The proof of part (e) follows.
Q:E:D:
Remark D.1.1 The supermodularity of R(yt; t) implies that to better take advantage of the high
demand induced by low inventory level, the rm should adjust its price to a level such that the expected
demand will increase.
Proof of Theorem 5.4.2: If hw  c   s,     = c   s   hw   (1   )c = c   s   hw  0. Since
gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) is also decreasing in xt, Equation (5.9) implies that ~xt(I
a
t ) = ~x
a
t (I
a
t ), for any t and
Iat , which proves part (a).
Observe that for any (xat ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It),
@xtgt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It)   (
tX
j=1
j)hw   (
TX
j=1
j)hw; t = T; T   1;    1;
where the rst inequality holds as an equality if xj (I
a
j ; Ij) = Ij , for all j  t 1. Hence, @xtgt(xat ; xt; dt; Iat ; It)
is uniformly bounded from below by  (PTj=1 j)hw, for any t. Thus, if     = c   hw   s 
(
PT
j=1 
j)hw, ~xt(I
a
t ) = +1 for any t and Iat . Hence, s = c  (
PT
j=0 
j)hw. This proves part (b).
If infIat <Ka 
0(Iat )   M , for any (xat ; xt; dt; Iat ; It),
@xat gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It)   M(
tX
j=1
j)(p+ ha)   M(
TX
j=1
j)(p+ ha); t = T; T   1;    1;
where p is the maximum marginal revenue and ha is the maximum marginal holding cost. Hence,
@xat gt(x
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It) is bounded from below by  M(
PT
j=1 
j)(p+ha), for any t. Thus, if rd+rw+ 
M(
PT
j=1 
j)(p+ ha), ~x
a
t (I
a
t )  Iat , for any Iat  Ka.
If infIat <Ka 
0(Iat ) =  1, limIat!Ka 0(Iat ) =  1. Hence, for any xt, dt, and It,
lim
Iat!Ka
@xat gt(I
a
t ; xt; dt; I
a
t ; It)  (p  b  (1  )(c+ rd)) lim
Iat!Ka
0(Iat ) =  1:
Hence, for any rw, and any xt, dt and It,
@xat Jt(I
a
t  ; xt; dt; Iat ; It) = rd + rw + + @xat gt(Iat ; xt; dt; Iat ; It)!  1; as Iat ! Ka:
The above limit completes the proof of Part (c).
For notational simplicity, we denote
xa := xat (I
a
t 1; It 1), x
 := xt (I
a
t 1; It 1) and d
 := dt (I
a
t 1; It 1). Observe that
@Iat 1Vt 1(I
a
t 1; It 1)  (p  b  (c+ rd))0(Iat 1) + @Iat 1gt 1(xa; x; d; Iat 1): (D.5)
By Equation (D.0),8>>>><>>>>:
@xat 1gt 1(x
a; x; d; Iat 1) = Eff1(mt 1)g;
@xt 1gt 1(x
a; x; d; Iat 1) = Eff2(mt 1)g;
@Iat 1gt 1(x
a; x; d; Iat 1) =  0(Iat 1)Efmt 1[f1(mt 1) + f2(mt 1)]g;
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where8>>>><>>>>:
f1(
m
t 1) = Eat 1f (b+ ha)1fxa(dt+(It))mt 1+at 1g
+@Iat 2Vt 2(x
a   (d + (Iat 1))mt 1   at 1; x   (d + (Iat 1))mt 1   at 1)g   rd
f2(
m
t 1) = Eat 1f@It 2Vt 2(xa   (d + (Iat 1))mt 1   at 1; x   (d + (Iat 1))mt 1   at 1)g   c:
The rst order conditions with respect to xat 1 and xt 1 suggest that
Eff1(mt 1) + f2(mt 1)g   (   ) =  :
Since f1()  0 and f()  0, we have:
Efmt 1[f1(mt 1) + f2(mt 1)]g  Efm[f1(mt 1) + f2(mt 1)]g = mEff1(mt 1) + f2(mt 1)g   m:
Therefore, by inequality (D.5),
@Iat 1Vt 1(I
a
t 1; It)  (p  b  (c+ rd) +m)0(Iat 1): (D.6)
So for any dt 2 [d; d] and any xt,
@xat gt(0; xt; dt; I
a
t ) E[@Iat 1Vt 1( (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )]
E[(p  b  (c+ rd) +m)0( (dt + (It))mt   at )]
(p  b  (c+ rd) +m)(1  )0(  D)
  (rd + rw + );
(D.7)
where the rst inequality follows from equation (D.0), the second from (D.6), and the last from the
assumption that (p   b   (c + rd) +m)(1   )0(  D) + (rd + rw + )  0. The third inequality of
(D.7) follows from the following inequality:
E[0( Dt)] = EDt D[0( Dt)] + EDt D[0( Dt)]  0 + EDt D[0(  D)]  (1  )0(  D);
where the rst inequality follows from the concavity of () and the second inequality follows from the
denition of D. (D.7) implies that xat (I
a
t ; It) = 0 for all I
a
t  Ka and all It, which completes the proof
of part (d). Q:E:D:
Before we proceed to prove the results in Section 5.5, we remark that Rst (dt; I
a
t ) shares the same prop-
erties as R(dt; I
a
t ). i.e., we have the following counterpart of Lemma 29 in the model without inventory
withholding:
Lemma 30 (a) Rs(yt; t) is strictly supermodular in (yt; t), where Rs(yt; t) := Rs(yt   t; Iat ),
yt   t = dt 2 [d; d] and yt  0. In addition, Rs(yt; t) is strictly concave in yt, for any xed t;
(b) Rs(dt; I
a
t ) is supermodular in (dt; I
a
t ), where dt 2 [d; d] and Iat  Ka. In addition, Rs(dt; Iat ) is
strictly concave in dt, for any xed I
a
t .
Proof of Lemma 30: The proof is identical to that of Lemma 29, and hence omitted. Q:E:D:
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Proof of Theorem 5.5.1: The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 14 and Theorem 5.4.1, so we
only sketch it.
For parts (a) - (c), the proof is exactly the same as that of Lemma 14, and hence omitted.
To show parts (d) - (f), we dene the following unconstrained optimizers:
(xLt (I
a
t ); d
L
t (I
a
t )) := argmaxxatKa;dt2[d; d]fRs(dt; Iat ) + sxat + E[Gst (xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))]g;
and
(xHt (I
a
t ); d
H
t (I
a
t )) := argmaxxatKa;dt2[d; d]fRs(dt; Iat ) + (s + )xat + E[Gst (xat   (p(dt); Iat ; t))]g:
We need the following lemma:
Lemma 31 Let t := (I
a
t ), 	(x
a
t ; yt; jt) := Rs(yt; t)+xat +EfGst (xat  ytmt  at )g is supermodular
in (xat ; yt; ) for any given t.
Proof of Lemma 31: Since Gst () is concave and mt  0, EfGst (xat  ytmt   at )g is supermodular
in (xat ; yt). It's also clear that x
a
t is strictly supermodular in (x
a
t ; ). Therefore, 	(x
a
t ; yt; jt) is
supermodular in (xat ; yt; ) for any given t. Q:E:D:
Lemma 31 and its proof imply that xLt (I
a
t ) < x
H
t (I
a
t ) since 
s+  > s. Exactly the same argument
as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.1(e) implies that xLt (I
a
t ) and x
H
t (I
a
t ) are continuously decreasing in I
a
t and
dLt (I
a
t ) and d
H
t (I
a
t ) are continuously increasing in I
a
t . I
L
t := supfIat : Iat < xLt (Iat )g and IHt := inffIat :
Iat > x
H
t (I
a
t )g: It's clear that ILt and IHt are the thresholds in part (d). Therefore,
xst (I
a
t ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
xLt (I
a
t ) if I
a
t < I
L
t ;
Iat if I
L
t  Iat  IHt ;
xHt (I
a
t ) if I
a
t > I
H
t .
It's clear that xst (I
a
t ) satises the statement in part (e). Therefore, we have
dst (I
a
t ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
dLt (I
a
t ) if I
a
t < I
L
t ;
argmaxdt2[d; d]J
s
t (I
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) if I
L
t  Iat  IHt ;
dHt (I
a
t ) otherwise.
To prove part (f), it remains to show that dst (I
a
t ) is increasing in I
a
t for I
L
t  Iat  IHt . Let
Ust (dt; I
a
t ) := J
s
t (I
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) and it is easily veried that U
s
t (dt; I
a
t ) is supermodular in (dt; I
a
t ). Thus,
dst (I
a
t ) is increasing in I
a
t , which completes the proof of Theorem 5.5.1. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 5.5.2: We show both parts by backward induction.
For part (a), we use backward induction to recursively show this result. For t = 0, V s0 () = V^ s0 () = 0
and, hence, @Ia0 V
s
0 (I
a
0 ) = @Ia0 V^
s
0 (I
a
0 ) for all I
a
0 . We show that: if @Iat 1V
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1) for all
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Iat 1  Ka, (a) ILt  I^Lt , (b) IHt  I^Ht , (c) xst (Iat )  x^st (Iat ), (d) dst (Iat )  d^st (Iat ) and (e) @Iat V st (Iat ) 
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) for all I
a
t  Ka. To prove these inequalities, we dene (x^Lt (Iat ); d^Lt (Iat )) and (x^Ht (Iat ); d^Ht (Iat ))
as the unconstrained optimizers in the model with demand D^t, corresponding to (x
L
t (I
a
t ); d
L
t (I
a
t )) and
(xHt (I
a
t ); d
H
t (I
a
t )), respectively. Let y
L
t (I
a
t ) := d
L
t (I
a
t ) + (I
a
t ), y^
L
t (I
a
t ) := d^
L
t (I
a
t ) + ^(I
a
t ) = d^
L
t (I
a
t ) + 0,
R^s(dt; I
a
t ) := R
s(dt; 1), and G^st (y) :=  (ha+b)y++[V^ st 1(y) cy]. We dene the objective functions
JLt (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := R
s(dt; I
a
t ) + 
sxat + g
s
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ), J^
L
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := R^
s(dt; I
a
t ) + 
sxat + g^
s
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ),
where g^st (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := EfG^st (xat   ^(p(dt); Iat ; t))g. Since mt = 1 with probability 1, gst (xat ; dt; Iat ) =
Hst (x
a
t   dt   (Iat )) and g^st (xat ; dt; Iat ) = H^st (xat   dt   0), where Hst (X) := EfGst (X   at )g and
H^st (X) := EfG^st (X   at )g.
First, we show that, if @Iat 1V
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka, xLt (Iat )  x^Lt (Iat ),
dLt (I
a
t )  d^Lt (Iat ), xHt (Iat )  x^Ht (Iat ), and dHt (Iat )  d^Ht (Iat ). Since @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1)  @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1),
@XH
s
t (X)  @XH^st (X) for any X. We only show that xLt (Iat )  x^Lt (Iat ) and dLt (Iat )  d^Lt (Iat ), while
xHt (I
a
t )  x^Ht (Iat ) and dHt (Iat )  d^Ht (Iat ) follow from the same argument.
We show by contradiction that xLt (I
a
t )  x^Lt (Iat ) and dLt (Iat )  d^Lt (Iat ). Note that, for the model with
inventory-independent demand (i.e., the rm faces D^t), it is reduced to the classical joint pricing and
inventory management problem with stochastic demand introduced in Federgruen and Heching (1999).
Hence, x^Lt (I
a
t ) and d^
L
t (I
a
t ) are constants independent of I
a
t .
Assume that xLt (I
a
t ) > x^
L
t (I
a
t ). Lemma 28 yields that
@xat J
L
t (x
L
t (I
a
t ); d
L
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @xat J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d^Lt (Iat ); Iat ). Hence,
@XH
s
t (x
L
t (I
a
t )  yLt (Iat )) =@xat JLt (xLt (Iat ); dLt (Iat ); Iat )  s
@xat J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d^Lt (Iat ); Iat )  s
=@XH^
s
t (x^
L
t (I
a
t )  y^Lt (Iat )):
Since @XH
s
t (X)  @XH^st (X) for any X and both of them are strictly decreasing, yLt (Iat ) > y^Lt (Iat ). Thus,
dLt (I
a
t ) = y
L
t (I
a
t ) (Iat ) > y^Lt (Iat ) 0 = d^Lt (Iat ). Invoking Lemma 28, we have @dtJLt (xLt (Iat ); dLt (Iat ); Iat ) 
@dt J^
L
t (x^
L
t (I
a
t ); d^
L
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t ), and
@dtR
s(dLt (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) =@dtJ
L
t (x
L
t (I
a
t ); d
L
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) + @XH
s
t (x
L
t (I
a
t )  yLt (Iat ))
@dt J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d^Lt (Iat ); Iat ) + @XH^st (x^Lt (Iat )  y^Lt (Iat ))
=@dtR^
s(d^Lt (I
a
t ); I
a
t )
Since @dtR
s(dt; I
a
t ) = @ytR
s(dt + (Iat ); (I
a
t )), @ytR
s(yLt (I
a
t ); (I
a
t ))  @ytRs(y^Lt (Iat ); 0). However,
the strict concavity of Rs(; t) and the supermodularity of Rs(; ) yield that
@ytR
s(yLt (I
a
t ); (I
a
t )) < @ytR
s(y^Lt (I
a
t ); (I
a
t ))  @ytRs(y^Lt (Iat ); 0);
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have xLt (I
a
t )  x^Lt (Iat ).
Assume that dLt (I
a
t ) < d^
L
t (I
a
t ), so y
L
t (I
a
t ) = d
L
t (I
a
t ) + (I
a
t ) < d^
L
t (I
a
t ) + 0 = y^
L
t (I
a
t ). Lemma 28
yields that @dtJ
L
t (x
L
t (I
a
t ); d
L
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d^Lt (Iat ); Iat ). The strict concavity of Rs(; Iat ) and
the supermodularity of Rs(; ) imply that
@dtR
s(dLt (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) > @dtR
s(d^Lt (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dtRs(d^Lt (Iat ); 1) = @dtR^s(d^Lt (Iat ); Iat ):
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Hence, we have:
@XH
s
t (x
L
t (I
a
t )  yLt (Iat )) =@dtRs(dLt (Iat ); Iat )  @dtJLt (xLt (Iat ); dLt (Iat ); Iat )
>@dtR^
s(d^Lt (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d^Lt (Iat ); Iat )
=@XH^
s
t (x^
L
t (I
a
t )  y^Lt (Iat )):
The rst order condition with respect to xat implies that @XH
s
t (x
L
t (I
a
t )  yLt (Iat )) = @XH^st (x^Lt (Iat ) 
y^Lt (I
a
t )) =  s, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, dLt (Iat )  d^Lt (Iat ). We have thus proved that,
if @Iat 1V
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka, xLt (Iat )  x^Lt (Iat ), dLt (Iat )  d^Lt (Iat ), xHt (Iat ) 
x^Ht (I
a
t ), and d
H
t (I
a
t )  d^Ht (Iat ). ILt  I^Lt and IHt  I^Ht follow immediately from xLt (Iat )  x^Lt (Iat ) and
xHt (I
a
t )  x^Ht (Iat ).
Next, we show that dst (I
a
t )  d^st (Iat ), for all Iat  Ka. Since dLt (Iat )  d^Lt (Iat ), dst (Iat ) = dLt (Iat ) 
d^Lt (I
a
t ), for all I
a
t  ILt . If Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ],
dst (I
a
t )  dst (ILt ) = dLt (ILt )  d^Lt (ILt ) = d^Lt (Iat );
where the rst inequality follows from Theorem 5.5.1, the second from dLt (I
a
t )  d^Lt (Iat ), and the last
equality from Federgruen and Heching (1999) Theorem 1. If Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ] (it might be an empty set),
xst (I
a
t ) = x^
s
t (I
a
t ) = I
a
t . The supermodularity of R
s(dt; I
a
t ) implies that
@dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dtRs(d^st (Iat ); 1) = @dtR^s(d^st (Iat ); Iat ):
Since 0  (Iat ), bothHst () and H^st () are concave, and @XHst (X)  @XH^st (X) for allX, so @XHst (Iat  
d^st (I
a
t )  (Iat ))   @XH^st (Iat   d^st (Iat )  0). Hence,
@dtJ
s
t (I
a
t ; d^
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) = @dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @XHst (Iat   d^st (Iat )  (Iat ))
 @dtR^s(d^st (Iat ); Iat )  @XH^st (Iat   d^st (Iat )  0)
= @dt J^
s
t (I
a
t ; d^
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t );
i.e., dst (I
a
t )  d^st (Iat ). If Iat 2 [IHt ; I^Ht ], xst (Iat )  x^st (Iat ) = Iat . The rst order condition with
respect to xat implies that @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  dst (It)  (Iat )) =  (s + )  @XH^st (Iat   d^st (Iat )  0). If
dst (I
a
t ) < d^
s
t (I
a
t ), Lemma 28 implies that @dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^st (Iat ; d^st (Iat ); Iat ). Hence,
@dtR
s(dst (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) =@dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) + @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  dst (It)  (Iat ))
@dt J^st (Iat ; d^st (Iat ); Iat ) + @XH^st (Iat   d^st (Iat )  0)
=@dtR^
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t ):
(D.8)
The strict concavity of Rs(; Iat ) and the supermodularity of Rs(; ) imply that
@dtR
s(dst (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) > @dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dtRs(d^st (Iat ); 1) = @dtR^s(d^st (Iat ); Iat );
which contradicts inequality (D.8). Hence, dst (I
a
t )  d^st (Iat ). Finally, if Iat  I^Ht , dst (Iat ) = dHt (Iat ) 
d^Ht (I
a
t ) = d^
s
t (I
a
t ). We have completed the proof of d
s
t (I
a
t )  d^st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka.
To complete the induction, it suces to show that if @Iat 1V
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1 
Ka, @Iat V
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ), for all Iat  Ka. Note that x^dt (It) and d^st (Iat ) are constant if Iat  I^Lt and
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It  I^Ht , by Theorem 1 in Federgruen and Heching (1999). Hence, @Iat V st (Iat )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) for all Iat  I^Lt
and Iat  I^Ht , since @Iat V st (Iat )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) = c, if Iat  I^Lt , and @Iat V st (Iat )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) = c   = s, if
Iat  I^Ht . If I^Lt  It  I^Ht , there are two possible cases: I^Lt  IHt  I^Ht and IHt  I^Lt  I^Ht .
If IHt  I^Lt , @Iat V st (Iat )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka follows immediately. Now assume that IHt 2
[I^Lt ; I^
H
t ]. If It 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ], xst (Iat ) = x^st (Iat ) = Iat . Hence,8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ 
s + @Iat R
s(dst (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) + @XH
s
t (I
a
t   yst (Iat ))  0(Iat )@XHst (Iat   yst (Iat ));
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ 
s + @XH^
s
t (I
a
t   y^st (Iat ));
where yst (I
a
t ) = d
s
t (I
a
t )+ (I
a
t ) and y^
s
t (I
a
t ) = d^
s
t (I
a
t )+ 0. It suces to show that @XH
s
t (I
a
t   yst (Iat )) 
@XH^
s
t (I
a
t   y^st (Iat ). We use the following lemma to prove this inequality:
Lemma 32 Let y1 = argmaxytfRs(yt; 0) + H^st (Iat   yt)g, y2 = argmaxytfRs(yt; 0) +Hst (Iat   yt)g
and y3 = argmaxytfRs(yt; (Iat )) + Hst (Iat   yt)g, for Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ]. We have @XH^st (Iat   y1) 
@XH
s
t (I
a
t   y2)  @XHst (Iat   y3).
Proof of Lemma 32: Since @XH^
s
t (X)  @XHst (X),
@ytR
s(y1; 0)   @XHst (Iat   y1)  @ytRs(y1; 0)   @XH^st (Iat   y1), i.e., y1  y2. If y1 = y2,
@XH^
s
t (I
a
t   y1)  @XHst (Iat   y2) follows from @XH^st (X)  @XHst (X) for any X. If y1 < y2,
@ytR
s(y1; 0) > @ytR
s(y2; 0) by the strict concavity of Rs(; ), and @ytRs(y1; 0) @XH^st (Iat  
y1)  @ytRs(y2; 0) @XHst (Iat  y2) by Lemma 28. Hence, @XH^st (Iat  y1) > @XHst (Iat  y2): For
the second inequality, the supermodularity of Rs(; ) yields that y2  y3 and, thus, @XHst (Iat  
y2)  @XHst (Iat   y3). Q:E:D:
Invoking Lemma 32,
@XH
s
t (I
a
t   yst (Iat )) = @XHst (Iat   y3)  @XH^st (Iat   y1) = @XH^st (Iat   y^st (Iat )):
Hence, @Iat V
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) for all Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ]. If Iat 2 [IHt ; I^Ht ],
@Iat V
s
t (I
a
t )  c   = @Iat V^ st (I^Ht )  @Iat V^ st (Iat );
where the rst inequality follows from the rst order condition with respect to xat . This completes the
induction and the proof of part (a).
To prove part (b), it suces to show that if @Iat 1V
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka,
(a) xLt (I
a
t )  x^Lt (Iat ), (b) xHt (Iat )  x^Ht (Iat ), and (c) @Iat V st (Iat )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ), for all Iat  Ka. For t = 0,
@Ia0 V
s
0 (I
a
0 ) = @Ia0 V^
s
0 (I
a
0 ) = 0 for I
a
0  Ka.
First, we show that xLt (I
a
t )  x^Lt (Iat ), and the proof of xHt (Iat )  x^Ht (Iat ) follows from the same
argument. If xLt (I
a
t ) > x^
L
t (I
a
t ), Lemma 28 yields that @xat J
L
t (x
L
t (I
a
t ); d0; I
a
t )  @xat J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d0; Iat ).
Hence,
@XH
s
t (x
L
t (I
a
t ) yLt (Iat )) = @xat JLt (xLt (Iat ); d0; Iat ) s  @xat J^Lt (x^Lt (Iat ); d0; Iat ) s = @XH^st (x^Lt (Iat ) y^Lt (Iat )):
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Since @XH
s
t (X)  @XH^st (X) for any X and both of them are strictly decreasing, yLt (Iat ) > y^Lt (Iat ).
However, yLt (I
a
t ) = d0 + (I
a
t )  d0 + ^(Iat ) = y^Lt (Iat ). This contradiction shows that xLt (Iat )  x^Lt (Iat ).
xHt (I
a
t )  x^Ht (Iat ) follows analogously.
To complete the proof, we need to show @Iat V
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka. For the case
Iat 2 [I^Lt ; I^Ht ], the proof is identical to that of part (a), and, hence, omitted. If Iat  ILt ,8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ (p0   b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ));
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p0   b  c)^0(Iat )  ^0(Iat )@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )):
Since xst (I
a
t )  x^st (Iat ), there are two cases: (a) xst (Iat ) = x^st (Iat ) and (b) xst (Iat ) < x^st (Iat ).
If xst (I
a
t ) = x^
s
t (I
a
t ), x
s
t (I
a
t )   yst (Iat )  x^st (Iat )   y^st (Iat ) and, hence, @XHst (xst (Iat )   yst (Iat )) 
@XH^
s
t (x^
s
t (I
a
t )   y^st (Iat )), since @XHst (X)  @XH^st (X) for any X. If xst (Iat ) < x^st (Iat ), Lemma 28
yields that @xat J
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d0; I
a
t )  @xat J^st (x^st (Iat ); d0; Iat ). Hence,
@XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ) yst (Iat )) = @xat Jst (xst (Iat ); d0; Iat ) s  @xat J^st (x^st (Iat ); d0; Iat ) s = @XH^st (x^st (Iat ) y^st (Iat )):
We have thus showed that @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat ))  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )) in both cases. Therefore,
@Iat V
s
t (I
a
t ) =c+ 
0(Iat )(p0   b  c  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat )))
c+ ^0(Iat )(p0   b  c  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))
=@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t );
where the inequality follows from 0(Iat )  ^0(Iat )  0 and
p0   b  c  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))  p0   b  c  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )) > 0:
The proof of the case Iat  I^Ht follows from the identical argument of the case Iat  ILt , and is, hence,
omitted.
If Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ],8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ 
s + (p0   b  c)0(Iat ) + @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))  0(Iat )@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ));
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p0   b  c)^0(Iat )  ^0(Iat )@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )):
Note that @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat ))   s = @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )). Therefore,
@Iat V
s
t (I
a
t ) =c+ 
s + @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat )) + 0(Iat )(p0   b  c  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat )))
c+ ^0(Iat )(p0   b  c  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )))
=@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t );
(D.9)
where the inequality follows from 0(Iat )  ^0(Iat )  0, @XHst (xst (Iat ) yst (Iat ))  @XH^st (x^st (Iat ) y^st (Iat )),
and
p0   b  c  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))  p0   b  c  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )) > 0:
We have thus showed @Iat V
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V^ st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka, which completes the proof of part (b).
Q:E:D:
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Proof of Theorem 5.5.3: We employ backward induction to prove parts (a) - (d) together. We
dene Hst (X) := Eat f (b + ha)(X   at )+ + (V st 1(X)   cX)g and H^st (X) := Eat f (b + ha)(X  
at )
+ + (V^ st 1(X)   cX)g, so that gst (xat ; dt; Iat ) := Hst (xat   dt   (Iat )) and g^st (xat ; dt; Iat ) := H^st (xat  
dt   (Iat )). We dene the objective functions JLt (xat ; dt; Iat ) := Rs(dt; Iat ) + sxat + gst (xat ; dt; Iat ),
J^Lt (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := R^
s(dt; I
a
t )+
sxat+g^
s
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ), J
H
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := R
s(dt; I
a
t )+(
s+)xat+g
s
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ),
and J^Ht (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) := R^
s(dt; I
a
t )+(
s+ ^)xat + g^
s
t (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ), where ^ = c  s^  c s = . Let t := (Iat ),
yst (I
a
t ) := d
s
t (I
a
t ) + t and y^
s
t (I
a
t ) := d^
s
t (I
a
t ) + t.
It suces to show that if @Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka, (1) I^Lt  ILt , (2)
x^st (I
a
t )  xst (Iat ) for all Iat  I^Ht , (3) d^st (Iat )  dst (Iat ), and (4) @Iat V^ st (Iat )  @Iat V st (Iat ). Since
@Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1), @XH^st (X)  @XHst (X). For t = 0, @Ia0 V^ s0 (Ia0 ) = @Ia0 V s0 (Ia0 ) = 0, so
the initial condition is satised.
We rst show that if @Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1), x^Lt (Iat )  xLt (Iat ), d^Lt (Iat )  dLt (Iat ), and
d^Ht (I
a
t )  dHt (Iat ). x^Lt (Iat )  xLt (Iat ) and d^Lt (Iat )  dLt (Iat ) follows from the same argument as the proof
of Theorem 5.5.2. We show by contradiction that d^Ht (I
a
t )  dHt (Iat ).
Assume that dHt (I
a
t ) < d^
H
t (I
a
t ), so y
H
t (I
a
t ) = d
H
t (I
a
t ) + t < d^
H
t (I
a
t ) + t = y^
H
t (I
a
t ). Lemma 28 yields
that @dtJ
H
t (x
H
t (I
a
t ); d
H
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^Ht (x^Ht (Iat ); d^Ht (Iat ); Iat ). The strict concavity of Rs(; Iat ) imply
that @dtR
s(dHt (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) > @dtR
s(d^Ht (I
a
t ); I
a
t ). Hence, we have:
@XH
s
t (x
H
t (I
a
t )  yHt (Iat )) =@dtRs(dHt (Iat ); Iat )  @dtJHt (xHt (Iat ); dHt (Iat ); Iat )
>@dtR^
s(d^Ht (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^Ht (x^Ht (Iat ); d^Ht (Iat ); Iat )
=@XH^
s
t (x^
H
t (I
a
t )  y^Ht (Iat )):
The rst order condition with respect to xat implies that
@XH
s
t (x
H
t (I
a
t )  yHt (Iat )) =  (s + ) <  (s + ^) = @XH^st (x^Ht (Iat )  y^Ht (Iat ));
which leads to a contradiction. Hence, dHt (I
a
t )  d^Ht (Iat ). We have thus proved that, if @Iat 1 V^ st 1(Iat 1) 
@Iat 1V
s
t 1(I
a
t 1), x^
L
t (I
a
t )  xLt (Iat ), d^Lt (Iat )  dLt (Iat ), and d^Ht (Iat )  dHt (Iat ).
Next, we show that d^st (I
a
t )  dst (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka. If Iat  ILt or Iat  maxfIHt ; I^Ht g,
d^st (I
a
t )  dst (Iat ) follows from d^Lt (Iat )  dLt (Iat ) and d^Ht (Iat )  dHt (Iat ). Now we assume that Iat 2
[ILt ;maxfIHt ; I^Ht g]. If Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ], xst (Iat ) = Iat  x^st (Iat ). If d^st (Iat ) > dst (Iat ), by Lemma 28,
@dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^st (x^st (Iat ); d^st (Iat ); Iat ). The rst order condition with respect to xat
implies that @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat ))   s = @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )). Therefore,
@dtR
s(dst (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) =@dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) + @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat ))
@dt J^st (x^st (Iat ); d^st (Iat ); Iat ) + @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))
=@dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t ):
However, d^st (I
a
t ) > d
s
t (I
a
t ) implies that @dtR
s(dst (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) > @dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t ). The contradiction
shows that if Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ], d^st (Iat )  dst (Iat ).
If Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ], xst (Iat ) = Iat  x^st (Iat ). If d^st (Iat ) > dst (Iat ), Lemma 28 implies that
@dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^st (x^st (Iat ); d^st (Iat ); Iat ). Since @XHst (X)  @XH^st (X) for any X and
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d^st (I
a
t ) > d
s
t (I
a
t ), @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat ))  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )). We apply the same argument as
in the case Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ] and the contradiction shows that d^st (Iat )  dst (Iat ) for all Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ].
If Iat 2 [IHt ; I^Ht ] (which might be an empty set), the rst order condition with respect to xat implies
that
@XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )  yst (Iat )) =  (s + ) <  (s + ^)  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )): (D.10)
If d^st (I
a
t ) > d
s
t (I
a
t ), Lemma 28 implies that @dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^st (x^st (Iat ); d^st (Iat ); Iat ).
The same argument as in the case Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ] proves that d^st (Iat )  dst (Iat ) for all Iat 2 [IHt ; I^Ht ].
Hence, d^st (I
a
t )  dst (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka.
To complete the induction, we next show that if @Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka,
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka.
If Iat  ILt , note that @dtJst (xst (Iat ); dst (Iat ); Iat ) = @dtRs(dst (Iat ); Iat )  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat )) and
@dt J^
d
t (x^
s
t (I
a
t ); d^
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t ) = @dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )). By the rst order condition
with respect to xat , @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )   yst (Iat )) = @XH^st (x^st (Iat )   y^st (Iat )) =  s. A simple contradiction
argument leads to that dst (I
a
t ) = d^
s
t (I
a
t ), for I
a
t  ILt . Therefore:8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d^
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )):
Hence, @Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = @Iat V
s
t (I
a
t ), for I
a
t  ILt .
If Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ],8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat ) + s + (1  0(Iat ))@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d^
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )):
Note that the rst order condition with respect to xat implies that @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )   yst (Iat ))   s =
@XH^
s
t (x^
s
t (I
a
t )  y^st (Iat )). If dst (Iat ) = d^st (Iat ),
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat )
=  0(Iat )(@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))) + s + @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))  0:
If dst (I
a
t ) > d^
s
t (I
a
t ), Lemma 28 yields that @dtJ
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t ); d
s
t (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dt J^st (x^st (Iat ); d^st (Iat ); Iat ), i.e.,
@dtR
s(dst (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))  @dtRs(d^st (Iat ); Iat )  @XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )): (D.11)
We have:
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat ) =[(p(d^st (Iat ))  p(dst (Iat )))  (@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))
  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat )))]0(Iat )  (s + @XHst (xst (Ia)  yst (Iat )))
[(p(d^st (Iat ))  p(dst (Iat )))  (@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))
  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat )))]0(Iat )
[(p(d^st (Iat ))  p(dst (Iat )))  (@dtRs(d^st (Iat ); Iat )  @dtRs(dst (Iat ); Iat ))]0(Iat )
=[p0(dst (I
a
t ))y
s
t (I
a
t )  p0(d^st (Iat ))y^st (Iat )]0(Iat )
0;
(D.12)
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where the rst inequality follows from @XH
s
t (x
s
t (I
a
t )   yst (Iat )) + s  0, the second inequality from
(D.11), and the last from the concavity of p() and dst (Iat ) > d^st (Iat ).
If Iat 2 [I^Lt ; IHt ], xst (Iat ) = Iat  x^st (Iat ),8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat ) + s + (1  0(Iat ))@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d^
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat ) + s + (1  0(Iat ))@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )):
If dst (I
a
t ) = d^
s
t (I
a
t ), @XH^
s
t (x^
s
t (I
a
t )   y^st (Iat ))  @XHst (xst (Iat )   yst (Iat )), and @Iat V^ st (Iat )  @Iat V st (Iat ).
If dst (I
a
t ) > d^
s
t (I
a
t ), as in (D.12),
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat ) [p0(dst (Iat ))yst (Iat )  p0(d^st (Iat ))y^st (Iat )]0(Iat )
+ (@dtR
s(d^st (I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @dtRs(dst (Iat ); Iat ))
>0;
(D.13)
where the second inequality follows from dst (I
a
t ) > d^
s
t (I
a
t ).
If Iat 2 [IHt ; I^Ht ] (which might be an empty set),8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))  
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d^
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat ) + s + (1  0(Iat ))@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat )):
(D.10) implies that @XH^
s
t (x^
s
t (I
a
t ) y^st (Iat )) > @XHst (xst (Iat ) yst (Iat )) and @XH^st (x^st (Iat ) y^st (Iat ))+
s +   0. The same argument as in the case Iat 2 [ILt ; I^Lt ] implies that @Iat V^ st (Iat )  @Iat V st (Iat ) for
Iat 2 [IHt ; I^Ht ].
If Iat  maxfIHt ; I^Ht g,8><>:@I
a
t
V st (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))  
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t ) = c+ (p(d^
s
t (I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )  0(Iat )@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))  ^:
Note that
@XH^
s
t (x^
s
t (I
a
t )  y^st (Iat )) =  (s + ^)   (s + ) = @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat )):
If dst (I
a
t ) = d^
s
t (I
a
t ),
V^ st (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat ) =  0(Iat )(@XH^st (x^st (Iat )  y^st (Iat ))  @XHst (xst (Iat )  yst (Iat ))) +    ^ > 0:
If dst (I
a
t ) > d^
s
t (I
a
t ), the same argument as (D.12) implies that
V^ st (I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat )  [p0(dst (Iat ))yst (Iat )  p0(d^st (Iat ))y^st (Iat )]0(Iat ) +    ^ > 0:
We have thus showed that, if @Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka, @Iat V^ st (Iat ) 
@Iat V
s
t (I
a
t ) for all I
a
t  Ka, which completes the proof of Theorem 5.5.3. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 5.5.4: We rst show part (a). Observe that if hw  ha and ^(Iat )  0 for
all Iat  Ka, withholding positive inventory is dominated by displaying this part of inventory to cus-
tomers, because the holding cost at the customer-accessible storage is smaller than that at the warehouse,
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and there is no demand-suppressing eect of customer-accessible inventory. Therefore, the rm should
not withhold any inventory if hw  ha and ^(Iat )  0 for all Iat  Ka.
Next, we show part (b) by backward induction. Since it is optimal for the rm not to withhold
any inventory in the model with demand D^t, this model is reduced to the one discussed in Section 5.5.1,
i.e., the model without inventory withholding. Let Kt(I
a
t ) := Vt(I
a
t ; I
a
t ). It suces to show that if
@Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1Kt 1(Iat 1), for all Iat 1  Ka, (a) xat (Iat )  x^st (Iat ), (b) dt(Iat )  d^st (Iat ), and
(c) @Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat Kt(Iat ), for all Iat  Ka. For t = 0, V^ s0 (Ia0 ) = K0(Ia0 ) = 0, so the initial condition is
satised.
If @Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1Kt(Iat 1) for Iat 1  Ka,
@XH^
s
t (X)  @XLt(X;Y ) + @Y Lt(X;Y ) for X = Y;
where H^st (X) is dened in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2, and
Lt(X;Y ) := Eat f (ha + b)(X   at )+ + [Vt 1(X   at ; Y   at )  cY ]g:
Therefore, the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2(a) shows that xat (I
a
t )  x^st (Iat ) and
dt(I
a
t )  d^st (Iat ).
To complete the induction, we show that if @Iat 1 V^
s
t 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1Kt 1(Iat 1) for all Iat 1  Ka,
@Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat Kt(Iat ), for Iat  Ka. Since xat (Iat )  x^st (Iat ), xat (ILt )  xst (ILt ) = ILt . If Iat  ILt ,
@Iat Kt(I
a
t )  c+ (p  b  c)0(Iat )  c = @Iat V^ st (Iat ):
For the case Iat  ILt , the argument is very similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2, so we only
sketch it. The key step is to show that
@XH^
s
t (I
a
t   y^st (Iat ))  @XLt(xat (Iat ; Iat )  yt(Iat ); Iat   yt(Iat )) + @Y Lt(xat (Iat ; Iat )  yt(Iat ); Iat   yt(Iat ));
where y^st (I
a
t ) is dened in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2 and yt(I
a
t ) := d
a
t (I
a
t ; I
a
t ) + (I
a
t ). To show the
above inequality, let yt (I
a
t ) be the optimal expected demand in the system with demand D^t such that
the rm is forced to display xat (I
a
t ; I
a
t ) to customers and withhold I
a
t  xat (Iat ; Iat ) > 0 in the warehouse,
when the current customer-accessible inventory level is Iat > I
L
t . Let
L^st (X;Y ) = Eat f (ha + b)(X   at )+ + [V^ st 1(Y   at )  cY ]g;
Following the same argument as the proof of Lemma 32, we have:
@XH^
s
t (I
a
t   y^st (Iat )) @X L^st (xat (Iat ; Iat )  yt (Iat ); Iat   yt (Iat )) + @Y L^t(xat (Iat ; Iat )  yt (Iat ); Iat   yt (Iat ))
@XLt(xat (Iat ; Iat )  yt(Iat ); Iat   yt(Iat )) + @Y Lt(xat (Iat ; Iat )  yt(Iat ); Iat   yt(Iat )):
(D.14)
Based on (D.14), the same argument as the proof of Theorem 5.5.2(a) yields that @Iat V^
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat Kt(Iat ),
for all Iat  Ka. This completes the induction and the proof of Theorem 5.5.4(b). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 5.5.5: We prove Theorem 5.5.5 by backward induction. Let Lt(X;Y ) := Eat fGt(X 
at ; Y   at )g and Ht(X) := Lt(X;X), then gat (xat ; dt; Iat ) = Ht(xat   dt  (Iat )). Let Kt(Iat ) = Vt(Iat ; Iat ).
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It suces to show that if @Iat 1Kt 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1), for any Iat 1  Ka, (a) xat (Iat )  xst (Iat ),
(b) dt (I
a
t ; It)  dst (Iat ), and (c) @Iat Kt(Iat )  @Iat V st (Iat ), for any Iat  Ka. For t = 0, V s0 (Ia0 ) = K0(Ia0 ) =
0, so the initial condition is satised. Because @Iat 1Kt 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1), for any Iat 1  Ka,
@XHt(X)  @XHst (X) for any X.
Following the same argument as the proof of Theorem 5.5.3, we have that if @XHt(X)  @XHst (X)
for any X, xat (I
a
t )  xLt (Iat ) and dt(Iat )  dLt (Iat ). Hence, ILt  It := supfIat : xat (Iat ) > Iat g. Therefore,
we have that
dt (I
a
t ; It) = dt(I
a
t )  dLt (Iat )  dst (Iat ); if Iat  It ;
where the last inequality follows from the supermodularity of Jst (x
a
t ; dt; I
a
t ) in (x
a
t ; dt) for any xed I
a
t .
If It = I
a
t > I

t , x
a
t (I
a
t ; It) < x

t (I
a
t ; It) = x
s
t (I
a
t ) = I
a
t = It. Therefore,
dst (I
a
t ) =argmaxdt2[d; d]fR(dt; Iat ) +Hst (Iat   dt   (Iat ))g  d^t(Iat )
:=argmaxdt2[d; d]fR(dt; Iat ) +Ht(Iat   dt   (Iat ))g;
since
@dtR(d^t(I
a
t ); I
a
t )  @XHst (Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ))  @dtR(d^t(Iat ); Iat )  @XHt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ));
where the inequality follows from @XHt(X)  @XHst (X) for all X. Similar argument yields that:
dt (I
a
t ; It) = argmaxdt2[d; d]fR(dt; Iat ) + Lt(xat (Iat ; It)  dt   (Iat ); Iat   dt   (Iat ))g
d^t(Iat ) = argmaxdt2[d; d]fR(dt; Iat ) + Lt(Iat   dt   (Iat ); Iat   dt   (Iat ))g;
because Lt(; Y ) is concave for any xed Y . Hence, dt (Iat ; It)  d^t(Iat )  dst (Iat ) for any It = Iat  It .
To complete the induction, we need to show that if @Iat 1Kt 1(I
a
t 1)  @Iat 1V st 1(Iat 1), for any
Iat 1  Ka, @Iat Kt(Iat )  @Iat V st (Iat ), for any Iat  Ka. For Iat  It , xat (Iat ; It) = xt (Iat ; It). Same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.5.3 implies that @Iat Kt(I
a
t )  @Iat V st (Iat ), if Iat  It .
If Iat > I

t , the proof is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 33 Assume that Iat > I

t . Let
V^ st (I
a
t ) = cI
a
t + max
dt2[d; d]
fR(dt; Iat ) + Iat + Lt(Iat   dt   (Iat ); Iat   dt   (Iat ))g:
We have:
@Iat V
s
t (I
a
t )  @Iat V^ st (Iat )  @Iat Kt(Iat ): (D.15)
Proof of Lemma 33: The rst inequality follows from the same argument as the proof of
Theorem 5.5.3. For the second inequality, observe that
@Iat V^t(I
a
t ) =c+  + (p(d^t(I
a
t ))  b  c)0(Iat )
+ (1  0(Iat ))@XLt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ); Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ))
+ (1  0(Iat ))@Y Lt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ); Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ));
and @Iat Kt(I
a
t ) =c+  + (p(d

t (I
a
t ; It))  b  c)0(Iat )
+ (1  0(Iat ))@XLt(xat (Iat ; It)  dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ); Iat   dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ))
+ (1  0(Iat ))@Y Lt(xat (Iat ; It)  dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ); Iat   dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ))):
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Thus,
@Iat Kt(I
a
t )  @Iat V^t(Iat ) = (p(dt (Iat ; It))  p(d^t(Iat )))0(Iat )
  0(Iat )[@XLt(xat (Iat ; It)  dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ); Iat   dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ))
  @XLt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ); Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ))
+ @Y Lt(x
a
t (I
a
t ; It)  dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ); Iat   dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ))
  @Y Lt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ); Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ))]
+ @XLt(x
a
t (I
a
t ; It)  dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ); Iat   dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ))
  @XLt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ); Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ))
+ @Y Lt(x
a
t (I
a
t ; It)  dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ); Iat   dt (Iat ; It)  (Iat ))
  @Y Lt(Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat ); Iat   d^t(Iat )  (Iat )):
(D.16)
Based on the rst order condition with respect to dt and Lemma 28, the same argument as
inequality (D.12) yields that @Iat Kt(I
a
t )  @Iat V^t(Iat )  0, and hence (D.15) holds. Q:E:D:
By Lemma 33, @Iat Kt(I
a
t )  @Iat V^ st (Iat )  @Iat V st (Iat ) for all Iat  Ka. This completes the induction
in the proof of Theorem 5.5.5. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 5.6.1: The proof, based on backward induction, is very similar to that of Lemma
14 and Theorem 5.4.1, so we only sketch it. In particular, the continuous dierentiability of V rt (I
a
t ; It)
follows from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 14 and is, hence, omitted. Note that
V r0 (I
r
0 ; I0)   cI0   rdIa0 =  cI0   rdIa0 is jointly concave, continuously dierentiable, and decreasing
in both of its arguments.
If V rt 1(I
a
t 1; It 1)   rdIat 1   cIt 1 is jointly concave and decreasing in Iat 1 and It 1, Grt (x; y) is
decreasing in both x and y. Hence, the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 14 shows that, for any
realization of (at ; 
m
t ),
  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat  Dt; xt  Dt)
=  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
is jointly concave in (yat ; xt; dt; I
a
t ). Concavity is preserved under maximization and expectation, so
EDtf max
minfDt;Iat gyatminfKa+Dt;xtg
f (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat  Dt; xt  Dt)gg
is jointly concave in (xt; dt; I
a
t ). Since R(dt; I
a
t ) + rd(dt + (I
a
t )) is jointly concave in (dt; I
a
t ), and
(xt   It)  is jointly concave in (xt; It),
R(dt; I
a
t ) + rd(dt + (I
a
t ))  (xt   It)     xt
+ EDtf max
minfDt;Iat gyatfKa+Dt;xtg
f (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat  Dt; xt  Dt)gg
is jointly concave in (xt; dt; I
a
t ). Since concavity is preserved under maximization, V
r
t (I
a
t ; It) is jointly
concave in (Iat ; It).
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Next, we show that V rt (I
a
t ; It)  rdIat   cIt is decreasing in Iat and It. Since all of terms in
 (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ) is decreasing in Iat ;
it is decreasing in Iat itself, if the constraints minfIat ; Dtg  yat  minfKa +Dt; xtg is not binding.
If yat = I
a
t ,
  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
=Iat +G
r
t (I
a
t   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ):
If Iat +G
r
t (I
a
t   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ) is strictly increasing in Iat ,
 (rd+rw)(yat  Iat ) +yat +Grt (yat  (dt+(Iat ))mt  at ; xt (dt+(Iat ))mt  at ) is strictly increasing in yat
in a small right-neighborhood of Iat : [I
a
t ; I
a
t + ), for a small enough  > 0. Under this condition, y
a
t = I
a
t
is not an optimizer. Hence,
 (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ) is decreasing in Iat ;
if it is optimal to choose yat = I
a
t .
If yat = Dt,
  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
=  (rd + rw)((dt + (Iat ))mt + at   Iat )  + ((dt + (Iat ))mt + at ) +Grt (0; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
is decreasing Iat .
Analogously, if yat = Ka +Dt,
  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
=  (rd + rw)(Ka + (dt + (Iat ))mt + at   Iat )  + (Ka + (dt + (Iat ))mt + at )
+Grt (Ka; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
is decreasing in Iat .
If yat = xt,
  (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat +Grt (yat   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
=  (rd + rw)(xt   Iat )  + xt +Grt (xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )
is decreasing in Iat .
Hence,
max
minfDt;Iat gyatminfxt;Dt+Kag
f (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat
+Grt (y
a
t   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at ; xt   (dt + (Iat ))mt   at )g
is decreasing in Iat . Because,  (xt   It)  is decreasing in It and F r(Ia1 )  F r(Ia2 ) for any Ia1  Ia2 ,
V rt (I
a
t ; It)  rdIat   cIt = max
(xt;dt)2F r(Iat )
fR(dt; Iat ) + rd(dt + (Iat ))  (xt   It)     xt
+ EDtf max
minfDt;Iat gyatminfxt;Ka+Dtg
f (rd + rw)(yat   Iat )  + yat
+Grt (y
a
t  Dt; xt  Dt)ggg
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is decreasing in Iat and It. This concludes the proof of part (a). Part (b) follows directly from the
concavity of V rt 1(; y) for any y and (5.12), while part (c) follows from the same argument as the proof
of Theorem 5.4.1. Q:E:D:
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E. Appendix for Chapter 6
E.1 Proofs of Statements
Proof of Lemma 17: We prove parts (a) - (c) together, using backward induction.
Since V0(j0)  0 is concave and continuously dierentiable in I0 for any 0, it suces to show
that if Vt 1(jt 1) is concave and continuously dierentiable in It 1 for any t 1, then, for any t, (i)
	t(jt) is concave and continuously dierentiable in z, (ii) Jt(; ; Itjt) is strictly jointly concave and
continuously dierentiable in (dt; qt), and (iii) Vt(jt) is concave and continuously dierentiable in It.
Since  H() and Vt 1(jt 1) are concave and concavity is preserved under expectation, by Equa-
tion (6.14), 	t(zjt) is concave in z for any t. Since t follows a continuous distribution, 	t(zjt) is
continuously dierentiable in z.
By Assumption 6.4.1, (
P
i2N 
i
tR
i(dit)) is strictly jointly concave in dt. The strict convexity of
Cj(jcjt ) for each j, implies that  
P
j2M C
j(qjt jcjt ) is strictly jointly concave in qt. Moreover, by the
concavity of 	t(jt), for any realization of &t, 	t(It+
P
j2M q
j
t   (
P
i2N 
i
td
i
t)&tjt) is jointly concave in
(dt; qt; It). Therefore, by Equation (6.13),
Jt(dt; qt; Itjt) = (
X
i2N
itR
i(dit)) 
X
j2M
Cj(qjt jcjt ) + E&tf	t(It +
X
j2M
qjt   (
X
i2N
itd
i
t)&tjt)g
is jointly concave in (dt; qt; It) and strictly jointly concave in (dt; qt). Since R
i() is continuously dif-
ferentiable in dit for any i, C
j(jcjt ) is continuously dierentiable in qjt for any j and cjt , and 	t(jt) is
continuously dierentiable in z for any t, Jt(; ; Itjt) is continuously dierentiable in (dt; qt) for any t.
Since concavity is preserved under maximization, by Equation (6.11), Vt(jt) is concave in It for
any t. The continuous dierentiability of Vt(jt) follows from the envelope theorem and its derivative
is given by
@ItVt(Itjt) = @ItE&tf	t(It +
X
j2M
qjt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&tjt)g
= E&tf@z	t(It +
X
j2M
qjt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&tjt)g; (E.1)
where the rst equality follows from the envelope theorem and the second from Theorem A.5.1 of [63]
and the continuous dierentiability of 	t(jt). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.1: We prove part (b) rst, part (c) second, and part (a) last.
Part (b). Let
t(yjt) := max
dt2[0;dmax]n
f(
X
i2N
itR
i(dit)) + E&tf	t(y   (
X
i2N
itd
i
t)&tjt)g: (E.2)
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It's clear that t(jt) is concave and continuously dierentiable in y, and
(q1t (It; t); q
2
t (It; t);    ; qmt (It; t)) = argmaxqt0f 
X
j2M
Cj(qjt jcjt ) + t(It +
X
j2M
qjt jt)g: (E.3)
Invoke Lemma 15 with p = m, q = 0,  =  It, yj = qjt (1  j  m), j = 1 (1  j  m),
fj(yj j) =  Cj(qjt jcjt ), h(y0j) = t(It+y0jt), and Yj = [0;+1) for all 1  j  m. Since t(It+y0jt)
is supermodular in ( It; y0), h(y0j) is supermodular in (y0; ). Hence, Lemma 15 implies that qjt (It; t)
is decreasing in It for any j and t. The strict concavity of Jt(; ; Itjt) yields that qjt (It; t) is continuous
in It for any j and t. Hence, I
q;j
t (t) = minfIt : qjt (It; t) = 0g. If j 2 Mt (I^t; t), since qjt (It; t)
is decreasing in It and I^t > It, q
j
t (It; t)  qjt (I^t; t) > 0. Thus, j 2 Mt (It; t), and Mt (I^t; t) 
Mt (It; t) follows immediately.
It remains to be shown that Iq;jt (t) < +1. First observe that Vt(Itjt) is uniformly bounded from
above by E[
Pt
s=1 
t s(
P
j2N 
j
s)jt] R < +1, where R := maxi2N ;dit2[0;dmax]Ri(dit). Hence,
lim
z!+1 @z	t(zjt)    limz!+1H
0(z+) < 0:
By the envelope theorem, we have
lim
y!+1 @yt(yjt)    limy!+1H
0(y+) < 0:
Thus, there exists a threshold yt < +1 such that @yt(yjt) < 0 for all y  yt. Therefore, for any
j 2M,
 @qjtC
j(qjt jcjt ) + @yt(It +
X
j2M
qjt jt) < 0 for all It  yt and qt  0.
Hence, qjt (It; t) = 0 for all It  yt and any j 2M. Thus, Iq;jt (t) < +1 for all t and any j 2M.
Part (c). The continuity of xt (It; t) follows from that of q
j
t (It; t) for each j 2 M. Assume,
to the contrary, that I^t > It and x

t (I^t; t) < x

t (It; t). Hence, there exists a j0 2 M, such that
qj0t (I^t; t) < q
j0
t (It; t). Without loss of generality, let j0 = 1. The strict convexity of C
1(jc1t ) implies
that @q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ) > @q1tC1(q1t (I^t; t)jc1t ). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that
 @q1tC1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @yt(xt (It; t)jt)   @q1tC1(q1t (I^t; t)jc1t ) + @yt(xt (I^t; t)jt):
Therefore, @yt(x

t (I^t; t)jt) < @yt(xt (It; t)jt), which contradicts the concavity of t(jt). Hence,
xt (It; t) is continuously increasing in It.
Part (a). The continuity of dit (It; t) follows from the concavity of Jt(; ; Itjt). For any given
I^t and It (I^t > It), assume, to the contrary, that d
1
t (It; t) > d
1
t (I^t; t). Thus, @d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) <
@d1tR
1(d1t (I^t; t)) by the strict concavity of R
1(). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)  @d1tJt(dt (I^t; t); qt (I^t; t); Itjt). Thus,
E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&tjt)g =@d1tR1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
<@d1tR
1(d1t (I^t; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (I^t; t); q

t (I^t; t); Itjt)
=E&tf&t@y	t(xt (I^t; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (I^t; t))&tjt)g:
(E.4)
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For any l = 2; 3;    ; n, further assume that dlt (It; t) < dlt (I^t; t). Hence, @dltRl(dlt (It; t)) >
@dltR
l(dlt (I^t; t)). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that
@dltJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)  @dltJt(dt (I^t; t); qt (I^t; t); Itjt). Thus,
E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&tjt)g =@dltRl(dlt (It; t)) 
1
lt
@dltJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
>@dltR
l(dlt (I^t; t)) 
1
lt
@dltJt(d

t (I^t; t); q

t (I^t; t); Itjt)
=E&tf&t@y	t(xt (I^t; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (I^t; t))&tjt)g:
(E.5)
Since (E.4) contradicts (E.5), dlt (It; t)  dlt (I^t; t) for all l = 2; 3;    ; n, if d1t (It; t) > d1t (I^t; t).
Hence, if d1t (It; t) > d
1
t (I^t; t), d
i
t (It; t)  dit (I^t; t) for all i 2 N . By part (c), xt (I^t; t) 
xt (It; t). Thus,
xt (I^t; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (I^t; t))&t  xt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&t
for any realization of &t. Thus, the concavity of 	t(jt) implies that
&t@y	t(x

t (I^t; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (I^t; t))&tjt)  &t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&tjt)
for any realization of &t. By taking expectation on both sides, we have
E&tf&t@y	t(xt (I^t; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (I^t; t))&tjt)g  E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t))&tjt)g;
which contradicts (E.4). Therefore, d1t (It; t)  d1t (I^t; t). The same argument implies that dit (It; t) is
increasing in It for all i 2 N . Hence, Id;it (t) = maxfIt : dit (It; t) = 0g. If i 2 N t (It; t), since dit (It; t)
is increasing in It and I^t > It, d
i
t (I^t; t)  dit (It; t) > 0. Thus, i 2 N t (I^t; t), and N t (It; t) 
N t (I^t; t) follows immediately.
To complete the proof, it remains to be shown that Id;it (t) < +1 for all i 2 N . By the proof of
part (b), limz!+1 @z	t(zjt) < 0. Moreover, observe that xt (It; t)! +1 as It ! +1. Thus, by the
monotone convergence theorem,
lim
It!+1
E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
i2N
itd
i
t)&t)g < 0 for any dt 2 [0; dmax]n.
Therefore,
@ditR
i(0)  lim
It!+1
E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
l2N ;l 6=i
ltd
l
t)&tjt)g > @ditRi(0) = pimax > 0
for any i and d it 2 [0; dmax]n 1, where d it := (d1t ; d2t ;    ; di 1t ; di+1t ;    ; dnt ). Hence, for all i 2 N ,
dit (It; t) > 0 for suciently large It, i.e., I
d;i
t (t) < +1. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.2:
Part (a). First, we show that if @ditR
i(z)  @
di^t
Ri^(z) for all z 2 [0; dmax], dit (It; t)  di^t (It; t) for
any (It; t). Assume, to the contrary, that d
i
t (It; t) < d
i^
t (It; t). By the inequality @ditR
i(z)  @
di^t
Ri^(z)
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for all z 2 [0; dmax] and the strict concavity of Ri(), @ditRi(dit (It; t)) > @di^tR
i^(di^t (It; t)). On the other
hand, Lemma 16 yields that @ditJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)  @di^tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
l2N
ltd
l
t (It; t))&tjt)g =@ditRi(dit (It; t)) 
1
it
@ditJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
>@
di^t
Ri^(di^t (It; t)) 
1
i^t
@
di^t
Jt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=E&tf&t@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
l2N
ltd
l
t (It; t))&tjt)g;
which forms a contradiction. Thus, dit (It; t)  di^t (It; t), and
Id;it (t) = maxfIt : dit (It; t) = 0g  maxfIt : di^t (It; t) = 0g = Id;^it (t):
For the second half of part (a), the inequality Id;1t (t)  Id;2t (t)      Id;nt (t) follows directly
from the rst half. It remains to be shown that N t (It; t) = f1; 2;    ; ig, where i = maxfi : It >
Id;it (t)g. Observe that It > Id;i

t (t)  Id;i
 1
t (t)      Id;1t (t). Thus, by the denition of Id;it (t),
f1; 2;    ; ig  N t (It; t). Moreover, by the denition of i, It  Id;i
+1
t (t)  Id;i
+2
t (t)     
Id;nt (t). Thus, i 62 N t (It; t) for all i  i + 1 and, hence, N t (It; t) = f1; 2;    ; ig.
Part (b). We rst show that if @qjt
Cj(zjcjt )  @qj^tC
j^(zjcj^t ) for any z  0, qjt (It; t)  qj^t (It; t)
for any (It; t). Assume, to the contrary, that q
j
t (It; t) > q
j^
t (It; t). The inequality @qjt
Cj(zjcjt ) 
@
qj^t
C j^(zjcj^t ) for any z  0, together with the strict convexity of Cj(jcjt ), implies that @qjtC
j(qjt (It; t)jcjt ) >
@
qj^t
C j^(qj^t (It; t)jcj^t ). On the other hand, Lemma 16 implies that @qjt Jt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt) 
@
qj^t
Jt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
E&tf@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
l2N
ltd
l
t (It; t))&tjt)g =@qjtC
j(qjt (It; t)jcjt ) + @qjt Jt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
>@
qj^t
C j^(qj^t (It; t)jcj^t ) + @qj^t Jt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=E&tf@y	t(xt (It; t)  (
X
l2N
ltd
l
t (It; t))&tjt)g;
which forms a contradiction. Thus, qjt (It; t)  qj^t (It; t), and
Iq;jt (t) = minfIt : qjt (It; t) = 0g  minfIt : qj^t (It; t) = 0g = Iq;j^t (t):
For the second half of part (b), the inequality Iq;1t (t)  Iq;2t (t)      Iq;mt (t) follows directly from the
rst half. It remains to be shown thatMt (It; t) = fj; j+1;    ;mg, where j = minfj : It < Iq;jt (t)g.
Observe that It < I
q;j
t (t)  Iq;j
+1
t (t)      Iq;mt (t). Thus, by the denition of Iq;jt (t),
fj; j + 1;    ;mg  Mt (It; t). Moreover, by the denition of j, It  Iq;j
 1
t (t)  Iq;j
 2
t (t) 
    Iq;1t (t). Thus, j 62 Mt (It; t) for all j  j 1 and, hence,Mt (It; t) = fj; j+1;    ;mg. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.3: We show all parts together by backward induction. More specically, we
prove that if @It 1Vt 1(It 1j^t 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) for all It 1 and ^t 1 > t 1, then we have (i)
dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for all i 2 N , (ii) qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2M, (iii) xt (It; ^t)  xt (It; t),
and (vi) @ItVt(Itj^t)  @ItVt(Itjt) for all It and ^t > t. Since @I0V0(I0j^0) = @I0V0(I0j0) = 0 for all
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I0 and ^0 > 0, the initial condition is satised. Since @It 1Vt 1(It 1j^t 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) and
;it (^
i
t) s:d: ;it (it) for any i 2 N , @z	t(zj^t)  @z	t(zjt) for any z.
First, we show that dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for all i 2 N . Without loss of generality, we assume, to
the contrary, that d1t (It; ^t) > d
1
t (It; t). The strict concavity of R
1() implies that @d1tR1(d1t (It; ^t)) <
@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that @d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  0 
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt), i.e.,
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)=^1t  0  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)=1t . Thus,
@z	t(

t (It; ^t)j^t) =@d1tR1(d1t (It; ^t)) 
1
^1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)
<@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
(E.6)
Since @z	t(zj^t) > @z	t(zjt) for all z and 	t(jt) is concave in z, t (It; ^t) > t (It; t), i.e.,
It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; ^t) (
X
i2N
^itd
i
t (It; ^t)) = 

t (It; ^t) > 

t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)):
Since ^t > t and d
1
t (It; ^t) > d
1
t (It; t), either (a) d
i
t (It; ^t) < d
i
t (It; t) for some 2  i  n, or (b)
qjt (It; ^t) > q
j
t (It; t) for some 1  j  m.
In case (a), without loss of generality, we assume that d2t (It; ^t) < d
2
t (It; t). Lemma 16 yields that
@d2tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  0  @d2tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt), i.e.,
@d2tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)=^2t  @d2tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)=2t . Thus, by (E.6),
@d2tR
2(d2t (It; ^t)) =
1
^2t
@d2tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t) + @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)
<
1
2t
@d2tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt) + @z	t(t (It; t)jt)
=@d2tR
2(d2t (It; t));
which contradicts the strict concavity of R2(). Hence, d2t (It; ^t)  d2t (It; t) under the condition
that d1t (It; ^t) > d
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that d
i
t (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for all
i = 2; 3;    ; n, under the condition that d1t (It; ^t) > d1t (It; t).
In case (b), without loss of generality, we assume that q1t (It; ^t) > q
1
t (It; t). Lemma 16 yields that
@q1t Jt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus, by (E.6),
@q1tC
1(q1t (It; ^t)jc1t ) =@z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; ^t); qt (It; ^t); Itj^t)
<@z	t(

t (It; t)jt)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t );
which contradicts the strict convexity of C1(jc1t ) in q1t . Hence, q1t (It; ^t)  q1t (It; t) under the condition
that d1t (It; ^t) > d
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that q
j
t (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all
j = 1; 2;    ;m, under the condition that d1t (It; ^t) > d1t (It; t). Combining cases (a) and (b), it follows
that the initial assumption d1t (It; ^t) > d
1
t (It; t) is incorrect. Therefore, d
1
t (It; ^t)  d1t (It; t). The
same argument yields that dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for any i = 1; 2;    ; n. Hence, for each i 2 N ,
Id;it (^t) = maxfIt : dit (It; ^t) = 0g  maxfIt : dit (It; t) = 0g = Id;it (t):
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For any i 2 N t (It; ^t), dit (It; t)  dit (It; ^t) > 0. Thus, i 2 N t (It; t), and N t (It; ^t)  N t (It; t)
follows immediately.
Next, we show that qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M. We assume, to the contrary, that
q1t (It; ^t) < q
1
t (It; t). The strict convexity of C
1(jc1t ) in q1t implies that @q1tC1(q1t (It; ^t)jc1t ) <
@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that
@q1t Jt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	t(

t (It; ^t)j^t) =@q1tC1(q1t (It; ^t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; ^t); qt (It; ^t); Itj^t)
<@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
(E.7)
Since @z	t(zj^t) > @z	t(zjt) for all z and 	t(jt) is concave in z, t (It; ^t) > t (It; t), i.e.,
It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; ^t) (
X
i2N
^itd
i
t (It; ^t)) = 

t (It; ^t) > 

t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)):
Since ^t > t, and q
1
t (It; ^t) < q
1
t (It; t), either (a) d
i
t (It; ^t) < d
i
t (It; t) for some 1  i  n, or (b)
qjt (It; ^t) > q
j
t (It; t) for some 2  j  m.
In case (a), without loss of generality, we assume that d1t (It; ^t) < d
1
t (It; t). Lemma 16 yields that
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  0  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt), i.e.,
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)=^1t  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)=1t . Thus, by (E.7),
@d1tR
1(d1t (It; ^t)) =
1
^1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t) + @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)
<
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt) + @z	t(t (It; t)jt)
=@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t));
which contradicts the strict concavity of R1(). Hence, d1t (It; ^t)  d1t (It; t) under the condition
that q1t (It; ^t) < q
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that d
i
t (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for all
i = 1; 2;    ; n, under the condition that q1t (It; ^t) < q1t (It; t). Thus, under this condition, dit (It; ^t) =
dit (It; t) for all i = 1; 2;    ; n.
In case (b), without loss of generality, we assume that q2t (It; ^t) > q
2
t (It; t). Lemma 16 yields that
@q2t Jt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  @q2t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus, by (E.7),
@q2tC
2(q2t (It; ^t)jc2t ) =@z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)  @q2t Jt(dt (It; ^t); qt (It; ^t); Itj^t)
<@z	t(

t (It; t)jt)  @q2t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@q2tC
2(q2t (It; t)jc2t );
which contradicts the strict convexity of C2(jc2t ) in q2t . Hence, q2t (It; ^t)  q2t (It; t) under the condition
that q1t (It; ^t) < q
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that q
j
t (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all
j = 2;    ;m, under the condition that q1t (It; ^t) < q1t (It; t). Combining cases (a) and (b), it follows
that the initial assumption q1t (It; ^t) < q
1
t (It; t) is incorrect. Therefore, q
1
t (It; ^t)  q1t (It; t). The
same argument yields that qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for any j = 1; 2;    ;m. Hence, for each j 2M,
Iq;jt (^t) = minfIt : qjt (It; ^t) = 0g  minfIt : qjt (It; t) = 0g = Iq;jt (t):
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For any j 2 Mt (It; t), qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) > 0. Thus, j 2 Mt (It; ^t), and Mt (It; t)  Mt (It; ^t)
follows immediately.
Finally, to complete the induction, we show that @ItVt(Itj^t)  @ItVt(Itjt). Recall that dit (It; ^t) 
dit (It; t) for any i 2 N . If d1t (It; ^t) < d1t (It; t), the strict concavity of R1() implies that
@d1tR
1(d1t (It; ^t)) > @d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  0  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt), i.e.,
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)=^1t  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)=1t . Thus,
@z	t(

t (It; ^t)j^t) =@d1tR1(d1t (It; ^t)) 
1
^1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)
>@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
By Equation (E.1),
@ItVt(Itj^t) = @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists an i 2 N , such that dit (It; ^t) < dit (It; t), we have
@ItVt(Itj^t) > @ItVt(Itjt).
Recall that qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M. If q1t (It; ^t) > q1t (It; t), the strict convexity of
C1(jc1t ) in q1t implies that @q1tC1(q1t (It; ^t)jc1t ) > @q1tC1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ). On the other hand, Lemma 16
yields that @q1t Jt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	t(

t (It; ^t)j^t) =@q1tC1(q1t (It; ^t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; ^t); qt (It; ^t); Itj^t)
>@q1tC
1(d1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
By Equation (E.1),
@ItVt(Itj^t) = @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists a j 2 M, such that qjt (It; ^t) < qjt (It; t), we have
@ItVt(Itj^t) > @ItVt(Itjt).
Now we assume that for any i 2 N and j 2 M, dit (It; ^t) = dit (It; t) and qjt (It; ^t) = qjt (It; t).
Since ^t > t,
t (It; ^t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; ^t) (
X
i2N
^itd
i
t (It; ^t))  It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)) = 

t (It; t):
Since @z	t(zj^t)  @z	t(zjt) for any z, it follows that @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) by the
concavity of 	t(jt) in z. Thus, by Equation (E.1),
@ItVt(Itj^t) = @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 6.4.3. Q:E:D:
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Proof of Theorem 6.4.4: We show all parts together by backward induction. More specically,
we prove that if @It 1Vt 1(It 1j^t 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) for all It 1 and c^t 1 > ct 1, then we have
(i) dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for all i 2 N , (ii) qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all fj 2 M : c^jt = cjtg, and
(iii) @ItVt(Itj^t)  @ItVt(Itjt) for all It and c^t > ct. Since @I0V0(I0j^0) = @I0V0(I0j0) = 0 for all I0
and c^0 > c0, the initial condition is satised. Since @It 1Vt 1(It 1j^t 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) and
c;jt (c^
j
t ) s:d: c;jt (cjt ) for any j 2M, @z	t(zj^t)  @z	t(zjt) for any z.
First, we show (i) and (ii). Without loss of generality, we assume that c^jt > c
j
t for j = 1; 2;    ;m1
(1  m1  m) and c^jt = cjt otherwise. Invoke Lemma 15 with p = n + m   m1, q = m1,   =
f0; 1g, yi =  dit (1  i  n), yn+j = qm1+jt (1  j  m   m1), yn+m m1+j = qjt (1  j  m1),
i = 
i
t (1  i  n), i = 1 (n + 1  i  n + m), fi(yi) = itRi(dit) (1  i  n), fj+n(yj+n) =
 Cj+m1(qj+m1t jcj+m1t ) (1  j  m m1), gj+n+m m1(yj+n+m m1 j) =
8><>: C
j(qjt jcjt ); if  = 0;
 Cj(qjt jc^jt ); if  = 1;
(1 
j  m1), h(y0j) =
8><>:	t(It + y0jt); if  = 0;	t(It + y0j^t); if  = 1; and Yi =
8><>:[ dmax; 0]; if 1  i  n;[0;+1); if n+ 1  i  n+m: Since
Cj(qjt jcjt ) is supermodular in (qjt ; cjt ) for any 1  j  m, and 	t(It + y0jt) is supermodular in (y0; cjt ),
gj+p(yj j) (1  j  q) is submodular in (yj ; ), and h(y0j) is supermodular in (y0; ). Lemma 15
implies that dit (It; ^t)  dit (It; t) for all i 2 N , and qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all fj 2 M : c^jt = cjtg.
For any i 2 N t (It; ^t), dit (It; t)  dit (It; ^t) > 0. Thus, i 2 N t (It; t), and N t (It; ^t)  N t (It; t)
follows immediately.
To complete the induction, we show that @ItVt(Itj^t)  @ItVt(Itjt). If d1t (It; ^t) < d1t (It; t), the
strict concavity of R1() implies that @d1tR1(d1t (It; ^t)) > @d1tR1(d1t (It; t)). On the other hand, Lemma
16 yields that
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	t(

t (It; ^t)j^t) =@d1tR1(d1t (It; ^t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)
>@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
By Equation (E.1),
@ItVt(Itj^t) = @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists an i 2 N , such that dit (It; ^t) < dit (It; t), then we have
@ItVt(Itj^t) > @ItVt(Itjt). Now we assume that for all i 2 N , dit (It; ^t) = dit (It; t).
If qjt (It; ^t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2M,
t (It; ^t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; ^t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; ^t))  It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)) = 

t (It; t):
Since @z	t(zj^t)  @z	t(zjt) for any z, the concavity of 	t(jt) in z implies that @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t) 
@z	t(

t (It; t)jt). Thus,
@ItVt(Itj^t) = @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
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In the remaining case, qjt (It; ^t) > q
j
t (It; t) for some 1  j  m, Without loss of generality, assume
that qlt (It; ^t) > q
l
t (It; t). In this case, the supermodularity of C
l(j) in (qlt; clt) and the strict convexity
of Cl(jclt) in qlt imply that @qltCl(qlt (It; ^t)jc^lt) > @qltCl(qlt (It; t)jclt). On the other hand, Lemma 16
implies that @qltJt(d

t (It; ^t); q

t (It; ^t); Itj^t)  @qltJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	t(

t (It; ^t)j^t) =@qltC1(qlt (It; ^t)jc^lt) + @qltJt(dt (It; ^t); qt (It; ^t); Itj^t)
>@qltC
l(qlt (It; t)jclt) + @qltJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
Thus, by Equation (E.1),
@ItVt(Itj^t) = @z	t(t (It; ^t)j^t) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 6.4.4. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.5: We show all parts together by backward induction. More specically,
we prove that if @It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) for all It 1, then we have (i) d^it (It; t) 
dit (It; t) for all i 2 N , (ii) q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M, (iii) x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t), (iv)
^t (It; t)  t (It; t), and (v) @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt) for all It. Note that @I0 V^0(I0j0) = @I0V0(I0j0)
for all I0, so the initial condition is satised. Since @It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) and
^;it (
i
t) s:d: ;it (it) for any i and t, by Theorem 6.4.3(a), @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z.
First, we show that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any i 2 N and q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M.
We apply Lemma 15 to prove these results. Let p = n +m, q = 0,   = f0; 1g, yi =  dit (1  i  n),
yj+n = q
j
t (1  j  m), i = it (1  i  n), i = 1 (n + 1  i  n + m), fi(yi) = itRi(dit)
(1  i  n), fj+n(yj+n) =  Cj(qjt jcjt ) (1  j  m), h(y0j0) = 	t(It+y0jt), h(y0j1) = 	^t(It+y0jt), and
Yi =
8><>:[ dmax; 0]; 1  i  n;[0;+1); n+ 1  i  n+m: Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z, h(y0j) is supermodular
in (y0; ). Lemma 15 implies that d^
i
t (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any i 2 N and q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for
any j 2 M. For any i 2 N^ t (It; t), dit (It; t)  d^it (It; t) > 0. Thus, i 2 N t (It; t), and N^ t (It; t) 
N t (It; t) follows immediately. For any j 2Mt (It; t), q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) > 0. Thus, j 2 M^t (It; t),
and Mt (It; t)  M^t (It; t) follows immediately.
Moreover,
x^t (It; t) = It +
X
j2M
q^jt (It; t)  It +
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) = x

t (It; t);
and
^t (It; t) = x^

t (It; t)  (
X
l2N
ltd^
l
t (It; t))  xt (It; t)  (
X
l2N
ltd
l
t (It; t)) = 

t (It; t):
To complete the induction, we show that @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt). Recall that d^it (It; t) 
dit (It; t) for any i 2 N . If d^1t (It; t) < d1t (It; t), the strict concavity of R1() implies that
299
@d1tR
1(d^1t (It; t)) > @d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)). On the other hand, Lemma 16 yields that
@d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) =@d1tR1(d^1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)
>@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
By Equation (E.1),
@It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(t (It; t)jt) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists an i 2 N , such that d^it (It; t) < dit (It; t), we have
@It V^t(Itjt) > @ItVt(Itjt).
Recall that q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M. If q^1t (It; t) > q1t (It; t), the strict convexity of
C1(jc1t ) in q1t implies that @q1tC1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) > @q1tC1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ). On the other hand, Lemma 16
yields that @q1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) =@q1tC1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t J^t(d^t (It; t); q^t (It; t); Itjt)
>@q1tC
1(d1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
By Equation (E.1),
@It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists a j 2 M such that q^jt (It; t) > qjt (It; t), we have
@It V^t(Itjt) > @ItVt(Itjt).
In the remaining case, d^it (It; t) = d
i
t (It; t) and q^
j
t (It; t) = q
j
t (It; t) for any i 2 N and j 2 M.
We have
^t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd^
i
t (It; t)) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)) = 

t (It; t):
Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z, @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt). Thus, by Equation
(E.1),
@It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 6.4.5. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.6: The proof of Theorem 6.4.6 follows from similar argument to that of Theorem
6.4.5, so we only sketch it.
We show all parts together by backward induction. More specically, we prove that if
@It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) for all It 1, then we have (i) d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for all
i 2 N , (ii) q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M, (iii) x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t), (iv) ^t (It; t)  t (It; t),
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and (v) @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt) for all It. Note that @I0 V^0(I0j0) = @I0V0(I0j0) for all I0, so the
initial condition is satised. Since @It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) and ^c;jt (cjt ) s:d: c;jt (cjt )
for any j and ct, by Theorem 6.4.4(a), @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z.
First, we employ Lemma 15 to show that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any i 2 N and q^jt (It; t) 
qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M. Let p = n + m, q = 0,   = f0; 1g, yi =  dit (1  i  n), yj+n = qjt
(1  j  m), i = it (1  i  n), i = 1 (n + 1  i  n + m), fi(yi) = itRi(dit) (1  i 
n), fj+n(yj+n) =  Cj(qjt jcjt ) (1  j  m), h(y0j0) = 	t(It + y0jt), h(y0j1) = 	^t(It + y0jt), and
Yi =
8><>:[ dmax; 0]; 1  i  n;[0;+1); n+ 1  i  n+m: Invoking Lemma 15, we have that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any
i 2 N and q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M. I^d;it (t)  Id;it (t) and N^ t (It; t)  N t (It; t) follow
immediately from d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any i 2 N , whereas I^q;jt (t)  Iq;jt (t) and Mt (It; t) 
M^t (It; t) follow immediately from q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M. x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t) and
^t (It; t)  t (It; t) also follow directly.
To complete the induction, we show that @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt). Following the same argument
as the proof of Theorem 6.4.5, we have that if there exists an i 2 N , such that d^it (It; t) < dit (It; t),
or there exists a j 2 M, such that q^jt (It; t) > qjt (It; t), then @It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) >
@z	t(

t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt).
In the remaining case, d^it (It; t) = d
i
t (It; t) and q^
j
t (It; t) = q
j
t (It; t) for any i 2 N and
j 2 M. Thus, ^t (It; t) = t (It; t). Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z, @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) 
@z	t(

t (It; t)jt). Thus, by Equation (E.1), @It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) =
@ItVt(Itjt). This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 6.4.6. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.7: We show all parts together by backward induction. More specically,
we prove that if @It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) for all It 1, then we have (i) d^it (It; t) 
dit (It; t) for all i 2 N , (ii) q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M, (iii) x^t (It; t)  xt (It; t), and (iv)
@It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt) for all It. Since @I0 V^0(I0j0) = @I0V0(I0j0) for all I0, the initial condition is
satised. Since @It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1), @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z. Denote
N = f1; 2;    ; ng and N^ = f1; 2;    ; n^g, where n^ > n.
First, we show that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for all i 2 N . We assume, to the contrary, that d^1t (It; t) >
d1t (It; t). The strict concavity of R
1() implies that @d1tR1(d^1t (It; t)) < @d1tR1(d1t (It; t)). On the other
hand, Lemma 16 yields that @d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) =@d1tR1(d^1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)
<@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
(E.8)
Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for all z, ^t (It; t) > t (It; t), i.e.,
It+
X
j2M
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N^
itd^
i
t (It; t)) = ^

t (It; t) > 

t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)):
301
Since N  N^ and d^1t (It; t) > d1t (It; t), either (a) d^it (It; t) < dit (It; t) for some i = 2; 3;    ; n, or
(b) q^jt (It; t) > q
j
t (It; t) for some j = 1; 2;    ;m.
In case (a), without loss of generality, we assume that d^2t (It; t) < d
2
t (It; t). By Lemma 16, we
have @d2t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @d2tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus, by (E.8),
@d2tR
2(d^2t (It; t)) =@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) +
1
2t
@d2t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)
<@z	t(

t (It; t)jt) +
1
2t
@d2tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@d2tR
2(d2t (It; t));
which contradicts the strict concavity of R2(). Hence, d^2t (It; t)  d2t (It; t) under the condition
that d^1t (It; t) > d
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that d^
i
t (It; t)  dit (It; t) for all
i = 2; 3;    ; n, under the condition that d^1t (It; t) > d1t (It; t).
In case (b), without loss of generality, we assume that q^1t (It; t) > q
1
t (It; t). By Lemma 16, we
have @q1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus, by (E.8),
@q1tC
1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) =@z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @q1t J^t(d^t (It; t); q^t (It; t); Itjt)
<@z	t(

t (It; t)jt)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t );
which contradicts the strict convexity of C1(jc1t ) in q1t . Hence, q^1t (It; t)  q1t (It; t) under the condition
that d^1t (It; t) > d
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that q^
j
t (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all
j = 1; 2;    ;m, under the condition that d^1t (It; t) > d1t (It; t). Combining cases (a) and (b), it follows
that the initial assumption d^1t (It; t) > d
1
t (It; t) is incorrect. Therefore, d^
1
t (It; t)  d1t (It; t). The
same argument yields that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any i = 1; 2    ; n. Hence, for each i 2 N ,
I^d;it (t) = maxfIt : d^it (It; t) = 0g  maxfIt : dit (It; t) = 0g = Id;it (t):
If i 2 (N^ t (It; t)\N ), dit (It; t)  d^it (It; t) > 0. Thus, i 2 N t (It; t), and (N^ t (It; t)\N )  N t (It; t)
follows immediately.
Next, we show that q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M. We assume, to the contrary, that
q^1t (It; t) < q
1
t (It; t). The strict convexity of C
1(jc1t ) in q1t implies that @q1tC1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) <
@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ). On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 16 that @q1t J^t(d^t (It; t); q^t (It; t); Itjt) 
@q1t Jt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) =@q1tC1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t J^t(d^t (It; t); q^t (It; t); Itjt)
<@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
(E.9)
Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for each z and 	t(jt) is concave in z, ^t (It; t) > t (It; t), i.e.,
It+
X
j2M
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N^
itd^
i
t (It; t)) = ^

t (It; t) > 

t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)):
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Since N  N^ and q^1t (It; t) < q1t (It; t), either (a) d^it (It; t) < dit (It; t) for some i = 1; 2;    ; n, or
(b) q^jt (It; t) > q
j
t (It; t) for some j = 2; 3;    ;m.
In case (a), without loss of generality, we assume that d^1t (It; t) < d
1
t (It; t). By Lemma 16, we
have @d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus, by (E.9),
@d1tR
1(d^1t (It; t)) =@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) +
1
1t
@d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)
<@z	t(

t (It; t)jt) +
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t));
which contradicts the strict concavity of R1(). Hence, d^1t (It; t)  d1t (It; t) under the condition
that q^1t (It; t) < q
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that d^
i
t (It; t)  dit (It; t) for all
i = 1; 2;    ; n, under the condition that q^1t (It; t) < q1t (It; t). Thus, under this condition, d^it (It; t) =
dit (It; t) for all i = 1; 2;    ; n.
In case (b), without loss of generality, we assume that q^2t (It; t) > q
2
t (It; t). By Lemma 16, we
have @q2t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @q2t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus, by (E.9),
@q2tC
2(q^2t (It; t)jc2t ) =@z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @q2t J^t(d^t (It; t); q^t (It; t); Itjt)
<@z	t(

t (It; t)jt)  @q2t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@q2tC
2(q2t (It; t)jc2t );
which contradicts the strict convexity of C2(jc2t ) in q2t . Hence, q^2t (It; t)  q2t (It; t) under the condition
that q^1t (It; t) > q
1
t (It; t). It follows from the same argument that q^
j
t (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all
j = 2; 3;    ;m, under the condition that q^1t (It; t) < q1t (It; t). Combining cases (a) and (b), it follows
that the initial assumption q^1t (It; t) < q
1
t (It; t) is incorrect. Therefore, q^
1
t (It; t)  q1t (It; t). The
same argument yields that q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j = 1; 2;    ;m. Hence, for each j 2M,
I^q;jt (t) = minfIt : q^jt (It; t) = 0g  minfIt : qjt (It; t) = 0g = Iq;jt (t):
If j 2 Mt (It; t), q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) > 0. Thus, j 2 M^t (It; t), and Mt (It; t)  M^t (It; t) follows
immediately. In addition,
x^t (It; t) = It +
X
j2M
q^jt (It; t)  It +
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) = x

t (It; t):
Finally, to complete the induction, we show that @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt). Recall that d^it (It; t) 
dit (It; t) for any i 2 N . If d^1t (It; t) < d1t (It; t), the strict concavity of R1() implies that
@d1tR
1(d^1t (It; t)) > @d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)). On the other hand, Lemma 16 implies that
@d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @d1tJt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) =@d1tR1(d^1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)
>@d1tR
1(d1t (It; t)) 
1
1t
@d1tJt(d

t (It; t); q

t (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
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By Equation (E.1),
@It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists an i 2 N , such that d^it (It; t) < dit (It; t), we have
@It V^t(Itjt) > @ItVt(Itjt).
Recall that q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j 2 M. If q^1t (It; t) > q1t (It; t), the strict convexity
of C1(jc1t ) in q1t implies that @q1tC1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) > @q1tC1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ). On the other hand, it follows
from Lemma 16 that @q1t J^t(d^

t (It; t); q^

t (It; t); Itjt)  @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt). Thus,
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) =@q1tC1(q^1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t J^t(d^t (It; t); q^t (It; t); Itjt)
>@q1tC
1(q1t (It; t)jc1t ) + @q1t Jt(dt (It; t); qt (It; t); Itjt)
=@z	t(

t (It; t)jt):
By Equation (E.1),
@It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
The same argument implies that, if there exists a j 2 M, such that q^jt (It; t) > qjt (It; t), we have
@It V^t(Itjt) > @ItVt(Itjt).
In the remaining case, d^it (It; t) = d
i
t (It; t) and q^
j
t (It; t) = q
j
t (It; t) for any i 2 N and j 2 M.
Since n^ > n (or equivalently, N  N^ ),
^t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N^
itd^
i
t (It; t))  It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)) = 

t (It; t):
Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for each z, it follows that @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) by the
concavity of 	t(jt) in z. Thus, by Equation (E.1),
@It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt):
This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 6.4.7. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.4.8: The proof of Theorem 6.4.8 follows from similar argument to that of Theorem
6.4.7, so we only sketch it.
We show all parts together by backward induction. More specically, we prove that if
@It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1)  @It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1) for all It 1, then we have (i) d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for all
i 2 N , (ii) q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M, and (iii) @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt) for all It. Since
@I0 V^0(I0j0) = @I0V0(I0j0) = 0 for all I0, the initial condition is satised. Since @It 1 V^t 1(It 1jt 1) 
@It 1Vt 1(It 1jt 1), @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for any z. Denote M = f1; 2;    ;mg and
M^ = f1; 2;    ; m^g, where m^ > m.
First, we show that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for all i 2 N . We assume, to the contrary, that
d^1t (It; t) < d
1
t (It; t). Following the same argument as that in the proof of Theorem 6.4.7, we have
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt), so ^t (It; t) < t (It; t), i.e.,
It+
X
j2M^
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd^
i
t (It; t)) = ^

t (It; t) < 

t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)):
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Since M  M^ and d^1t (It; t) < d1t (It; t), either (a) d^it (It; t) > dit (It; t) for some i = 2; 3;    ; n, or
(b) q^jt (It; t) < q
j
t (It; t) for some j = 1; 2;    ;m. We follow the same argument as that in the proof
of Theorem 6.4.7 to reach a contradiction in either case (a) or case (b). Thus, d^1t (It; t)  d1t (It; t).
The same argument applies to show that d^it (It; t)  dit (It; t) for any i = 1; 2    ; n. I^d;it (t)  Id;it (t)
and N t (It; t)  N^ t (It; t) follows immediately.
Next, we show that q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for all j 2 M. We assume, to the contrary, that
q^1t (It; t) > q
1
t (It; t). Following the same argument as that in the proof of Theorem 6.4.7, we have
@z	^t(^

t (It; t)jt) > @z	t(t (It; t)jt), so ^t (It; t) < t (It; t), i.e.,
It+
X
j2M^
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd^
i
t (It; t)) = ^

t (It; t) < 

t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)):
Since M  M^ and q^1t (It; t) > q1t (It; t), either (a) d^it (It; t) > dit (It; t) for some i = 1; 2;    ; n, or
(b) q^jt (It; t) < q
j
t (It; t) for some j = 2; 3;    ;m. We follow the same argument as that in the proof
of Theorem 6.4.7 to reach a contradiction in either case (a) or case (b). Thus, q^1t (It; t)  q1t (It; t).
The same argument applies to show that q^jt (It; t)  qjt (It; t) for any j = 1; 2    ;m. Thus, I^q;jt (t) 
Iq;jt (t) for any j 2M. (M^t (It; t) \M) Mt (It; t) follows immediately.
To complete the induction, we show that @It V^t(Itjt)  @ItVt(Itjt). Following the same argument as
that in the proof of Theorem 6.4.7, we have that if d^it (It; t) > d
i
t (It; t) for some i 2 N or q^jt (It; t) <
qjt (It; t) for some j 2M, @It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) < @z	t(t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt).
In the remaining case, d^it (It; t) = d
i
t (It; t) and q^
j
t (It; t) = q
j
t (It; t) for any i 2 N and j 2 M.
Since m^ > m (or equivalently, M M^),
^t (It; t) = It+
X
j2M^
q^jt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd^
i
t (It; t))  It+
X
j2M
qjt (It; t) (
X
i2N
itd
i
t (It; t)) = 

t (It; t):
Since @z	^t(zjt)  @z	t(zjt) for each z, it follows that @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt)  @z	t(t (It; t)jt)
by the concavity of 	t(jt) in z. Thus, by Equation (E.1), @It V^t(Itjt) = @z	^t(^t (It; t)jt) 
@z	t(

t (It; t)jt) = @ItVt(Itjt): This completes the induction and, thus, the proof of Theorem 6.4.8.
Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.5.1:
Part (a). We consider an auxiliary game of N players G^, in which the objective function of player i
is ^i(pjy; ) = (pi   ci)(i + f(Y )  bipi +
P
j 6=i ijpj)  Ci(yi), with decision variable pi 2 [pmini ; pmaxi ].
We rst prove that G^ has a unique equilibrium given by A 1(a(Y; ) + ).
It is clear that, given any (y; ), the objective function of player i in G^, ^i(pjy; ), is concave in pi.
Therefore, there exists an equilibrium in G^.
We now show that the equilibrium in G^, p^(y; ), is an interior vector in the feasible set. Since
pmaxi is suciently large so that it will not aect the equilibrium behavior, it remains to be shown that
p^i (y; ) > p
min
i for each i. Taking the rst order derivative of the function ^i(pjy; ) with respect to pi,
we have:
@pi^i(pjy; ) =  bi(pi   ci) + i + f(Y )  bipi +
X
j 6=i
ijpj :
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Evaluating the above derivative at pi = ci, we have:
@pi^i(pjy; )jpi=ci = [i + f(Y )  bipi +
X
j 6=i
ijpj ]pi=ci :
Following the assumption that i(p; y; i) > 0 when pi = ci, we have @pi^i(pjy; )jpi=ci = i(p; y; i)jpi=ci >
0 for any (p i; y; ), and, thus, p^i (y; ) > ci = p
min
i . Hence, p^
(y; ) satises the rst-order condition:
@pi^i(p^
(y; )jy; ) =  bi(p^i (y; )  ci) + ai(Y; )  bip^i (y; ) +
X
j 6=i
ij p^

j (y; ) = 0:
Equivalently,
Ap^(y; ) = a(Y; ) + ;
where the (N N)-matrix A and N -vectors a(Y; ) and  are dened in Section 6.5.1. Since A satises
the diagonal-dominance condition, A 1 exists. Hence,
p^(y; ) = A 1(a(Y; ) + ) (E.10)
is the unique equilibrium in G^.
Note that p^(y; ) continues to be an equilibrium in the original second-stage price competition, as
long as it generates positive demand for each rm. If the rms select the price vector p^(y; ) in the
second-stage price competition, by (6.15), the associated demand for rm i is given by
^i (y; ) =(ai(Y; )  (Ap^(y; ))i + bip^i (y; ))+
=bi(
ai(Y; )
bi
  (Ap^
(y; ))i
bi
+ p^i (y; ))
+
=bi(
ai(Y; )
bi
  (AA
 1(a(Y; ) + ))i
bi
+ p^i (y; ))
+
=bi(p^

i (y; ) 
i
bi
)+
=bi(p^

i (y; )  ci) > 0;
where the third equality follows from (E.10), and the last from i = bici. Hence, p^
(y; ) generates
positive demand for each rm and, thus, forms an equilibrium in the second-stage price competition.
It remains to be shown that the original second-stage price competition does not have other equilibria.
We assume, to the contrary, that there exists another equilibrium price vector p(y; ), with the associated
equilibrium demand vector (y; ). Since
@pii([pi; p

 i(y; )]; yj)jpi=ci = i([pi; p i(y; )]; y; i)jpi=ci > 0;
pi (y; ) > ci for all i. If 

i (y; ) > 0 for all i, p
(y; ) must satisfy the rst-order condition given by
(E.10), so p(y; ) = p^(y; ). In the remaining case, i (y; ) = 0 for some i. Without loss of generality,
we assume that 1(y; ) = 0. Since 1([p
min
1 ; p

 1(y; )]; y; ) > 0, there exists a price p1 > p
min
1 = c1 such
that 1([p1; p

 1(y; )]; y; ) > 0. Hence,
1([p1; p

 1(y; )]; yj) = (p1   c1)1([p1; p 1(y; )]; y; )  C1(y1) >  C1(y1) = 1(p(y; ); yj);
306
which contradicts the assumption that p(y; ) is an equilibrium. Therefore, given any (y; ), p(y; ) =
p^(y; ) = A 1(a(Y; ) + ) is the unique equilibrium in the second-stage price competition. Thus, for
any i, i (y; ) = ^

i (y; ) = bi(p

i (y; )  ci) > 0.
Part (b). By part (a), pi (y; ) =
PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l + f(Y ) + l). Therefore,
@yjp

i (y; ) = @Y p

i (y; ) =
NX
l=1
(A 1)ilf 0(Y ):
By Lemma 2 in [24], every entry of A 1 is nonnegative, so, together with the non-singularity of A 1 and
the strict monotonicity of f(),PNl=1(A 1)ilf 0(Y ) > 0. Thus, @yjpi (y; ) > 0 for any i and j, and pi (y; )
is strictly increasing in Y for each i. Hence, i (y; ) = bi(p

i (y; )   ci), which is strictly increasing in
pi (y; ), is strictly increasing in Y and yj for any i and j. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.5.2:
Part (a). By (6.17), we have that i(yj) = bi(
PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l + f(Y ) + l)   ci)2   Ci(yi). By
Theorem 6.5.1(a), pi (Y; ) > ci for any Y . Let Y = 0, we have  i := p

i (0; )   ci =
PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l +
f0 + l)  ci > 0. Therefore,
i(yj) =bi(
NX
l=1
(A 1)il(f(Y )  f0) +  i)2   Ci(yi)
=bi(
NX
l=1
(A 1)il)2(f(Y )  f0)2 + 2bi i(
NX
l=1
(A 1)il)(f(Y )  f0) + bi( i)2   Ci(yi):
Since  i > 0, f() is concavely increasing in Y , and Ci() is convexly increasing in yi, i(yj) is
jointly concave in y under Assumption 6.5.1. Since f() is bounded from above by M , we have that
limyi!+1 @yii(yj) < 0 for any . Hence, there exists an upper bound ymax < 1, such that the equi-
librium of the rst stage game is the same as that of a game with the same payo functions, but the
feasible set is constrained to [0; ymax]N . Since, for any given , i(yj) is concave in yi for any i, and
[0; ymax]N is compact, the rst-stage game has an equilibrium yEF () 2 [0; ymax]N . For any equilibrium
yEF (), we denote Y

EF () :=
PN
i=1 y

EF;i().
Now, we show that yEF () is unique. Let Fi(Y j) := bi(
PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l + f(Y ) + l)  ci)2. Thus,
i(yj) = Fi(Y j)   Ci(yi), where Y :=
PN
i=1 yi. By our argument above, Fi(j) is concave and
continuously dierentiable in Y for any i and . Assume, to the contrary, that there exist two equilibria
y^EF () and y

EF () (y^

EF () 6= yEF ()). Without loss of generality, assume Y^ EF ()  Y EF (). Hence,
there exists an i such that y^EF;i() > y

EF;i(). Without loss of generality, we take i = 1. Lemma 16 yields
that @y11(y

EF ()j)  @y11(y^EF ()j). Since Ci() is strictly convex, C 01(y^EF;1()) > C 01(yEF;1()).
Thus,
@Y F1(Y^

EF ()j) = @y11(y^EF ()j)+C 01(y^EF;1()) > @y11(yEF ()j)+C 01(yEF;1()) = @Y F1(Y EF ()j);
which contradicts the concavity of Fi(j). Hence, y^EF;1()  yEF;1(). The same argument shows
that, for each i, y^EF;i()  yEF;i(). Hence, Y^ EF () =
PN
i y^

EF;i() 
PN
i y

EF;i() = Y

EF (), where
the equality holds only when y^EF;i() = y

EF;i() for all i. Since Y^

EF ()  Y EF () by assumption,
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Y^ EF () = Y

EF () and y^

EF () = y

EF (), which contradicts the initial assumption that y^

EF () 6= yEF ().
Therefore, the equilibrium in the rst-stage eort level competition is unique.
Part (b). Part (b) follows immediately from part (a) and Theorem 6.5.1(a). Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.5.3:
Part (a). Since every entry of A 1 is nonnegative and A 1 is non-singular, @j@Y Fi(Y j) =
2bi(A
 1)ij(
PN
l=1(A
 1)il)f 0(Y )  0. Hence Fi(Y j) is supermodular in (Y; j) for any 1  i; j  N .
Assume that ^ >  and Y EF () > Y

EF (^). Hence, the concavity and supermodularity of Fi(j) implies
that, for each 1  i  N ,
@Y Fi(Y

EF ()j)  @Y Fi(Y EF (^)j^): (E.11)
If yEF;1() > y

EF;1(^), the strict convexity of C1() yields that C 01(yEF;1()) > C 01(yEF;1(^)). On the
other hand, Lemma 16 implies that @y11(y

EF ()j)  @y11(yEF (^)j^). Thus,
@Y F1(Y

EF ()j) = @y11(yEF ()j)+C 01(yEF;1()) > @y11(yEF (^)j^)+C 01(yEF;1(^)) = @Y F1(Y EF (^)j^);
which contradicts (E.11). Thus, under the condition Y EF () > Y

EF (^), y

EF;1()  yEF;1(^). Similar
argument implies that, under the condition Y EF () > Y

EF (^), y

EF;i()  yEF;i(^) for any i. Therefore,
if Y EF () > Y

EF (^), Y

EF (^) =
PN
i y

EF;i(^) 
PN
i y

EF;i() = Y

EF (), which forms a contradiction.
Thus, Y EF () is increasing in i for any i.
Part (b). Since every entry of A 1 is nonnegative, by part (a) and Theorem 6.5.1, pi (Y

EF (); ) =PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l+f(Y EF ())+l) is increasing in j for any i and j. Thus, 

EF;i() = bi(p

i (Y

EF (); ) ci)
is increasing in pi (Y

EF (); ) and, hence, j for any i and j. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.5.4:
Part (a). We consider an auxiliary game of N players ~G, in which the objective function of player
i is ~i(p; yj) = (pi   ci)(i + f(Y )  bipi +
P
j 6=i ijpj) Ci(yi), with decision variable pi 2 [pmini ; pmaxi ]
and yi  0. We rst prove that ~G has a unique equilibrium characterized by the unique solution of the
system of equations (6.18) and (6.19). Note that (6.18) and (6.19) characterize the rst-order condition:
for any i, @pi
~i = 0 and @yi
~i
8><>:= 0; if yi > 0; 0; otherwise:
We rst show that (6.18) and (6.19) have a unique solution on (pmin1 ; p
max
1 )  (pmin2 ; pmax2 )     
(pminN ; p
max
N ) [0;+1)N . Let Gi(Y j) := 12biPNl=1(A 1)ilFi(Y j) = 12PNl=1(A 1)il (
PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l+f(Y )+
l)   ci)2 for any i. By the proof of Theorem 6.5.2, Gi(Y j) is concave and continuously dierentiable
in Y for each i. Plugging (6.18) into (6.19), the left-hand-side of (6.19) becomes: @YGi(Y

SC()j)  
C 0i(y

SC;i()), and (6.19) is reduced to:
@YGi(Y

SC()j)  C 0i(ySC;i())
8><>:= 0; if y

SC;i() > 0,
 0; otherwise,
for all i = 1; 2;    ; N , (E.12)
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where Y SC() =
PN
i=1 y

SC;i(). We dene an auxiliary system of equations on
(YSC(); ySC;1(); ySC;2();    ; ySC;N ()):
@YGi(YSC()j)  C 0i(ySC;i())
8><>:= 0; if ySC;i() > 0, 0; otherwise, for all i = 1; 2;    ; N . (E.13)
Note that the dierence between (E.12) and (E.13) is that the identity Y SC() =
PN
i=1 y

SC;i() [YSC() =PN
i=1 ySC;i()] always holds [may not hold] in (E.12) [(E.13)]. Hence, for any solution of (E.13)
(YSC(); ySC;1(); ySC;2();    ; ySC;N ()), if it also satises the identity YSC() =
PN
i=1 ySC;i(), it is
also a solution to (E.12). Since Ci() is strictly convex in yi for any i, there exists a unique vector ySC()
that satises (E.13) for any xed YSC(). Thus, we use A : R+ ! RN to denote the mapping from
YSC() to ySC(), such that ySC() = A(YSC()) satises (E.13) for any given YSC(). Moreover, let
B : R+ ! R denote the following function: B(YSC()) =
PN
i=1 ySC;i(), where ySC() = A(YSC()).
Now, we show that B() has a unique xed point on R+. It follows from the concavity of Gi(j) and
the strict convexity of Ci() that (A(YSC()))i is continuously decreasing in YSC() for any i. Hence,
B(YSC()) is continuously decreasing in YSC(). By (E.13), (A(0))i  0 for each i. Thus, B(0)  0.
Let C(Y ) := B(Y )   Y . Thus, C() is strictly decreasing on R+ with C(0)  0 and limY!+1 C(Y ) 
limY!+1(B(0)   Y ) =  1. Therefore, C() has a unique root on R+. Hence, B() has a unique
xed point on R+ and, thus, (E.12) has a unique solution ySC(). As shown by the proof of Theorem
6.5.1, given ySC(), there exists a unique p

SC() that satises (6.18), and p

SC() 2 (pmin1 ; pmax1 ) 
(pmin2 ; p
max
2 )     (pminN ; pmaxN ). Therefore, (6.18) and (6.19) has a unique solution (pSC(); ySC()) on
(pmin1 ; p
max
1 ) (pmin2 ; pmax2 )     (pminN ; pmaxN ) [0;+1)N .
We now show that the equilibrium in ~G, (~p; ~y), if exists, must have an interior price vector ~p 2
(pmin1 ; p
max
1 ) (pmin2 ; pmax2 )     (pminN ; pmaxN ). Since pmaxi is suciently large for any i, it remains to be
shown that ~pi > p
min
i = ci for all i. Assume, to the contrary, that ~p

i = p
min
i = ci for some i. Without
loss of generality, we take i = 1. Since 1([p
min
1 ; ~p

 1]; ~y
; ) > 0, there exists a price ~p1 > pmin1 = c1 such
that 1([~p1; ~p

 1]; ~y
; ) > 0. Hence,
1([~p1; ~p

 1]; ~y
; ) = (~p1   c1)1([~p1; ~p 1]; ~y; )  C1(~y1) >  C1(~y1) = 1(~p; ~y; );
which contradicts the assumption that (~p; ~y) is an equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium in ~G, if
exists, must have an interior price vector, and by the KKT necessary condition, must satisfy the rst-
order condition characterized by the system of equations (6.18) and (6.19).
It remains to be shown that the unique solution to (6.18) and (6.19), (pSC(); Y

SC()), is an equi-
librium in ~G. It suces to prove that, for any i, given other rms' decisions (pSC; i(); ySC; i()),
(pSC;i(); y

SC;i()) maximizes
~i(pi; yijpSC; i(); ySC; i(); ) := (pi   ci)(i + f(yi +
X
j 6=i
ySC;j())  bipi +
X
j 6=i
ijp

SC;j())  Ci(yi):
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Following the same argument as that in the characterization of (pSC(); y

SC()), we have (p

SC;i(); y

SC;i())
is the unique vector that satises the rst-order condition:
@pi
~i(pi; yijpSC; i(); ySC; i(); ) = 0 (E.14)
@yi
~i(pi; yijpSC; i(); ySC; i(); )
8><>:= 0; if y

SC;i() > 0,
 0; otherwise.
(E.15)
Since ~i(pi; yijpSC; i(); ySC; i(); ) is a continuously dierentiable function on a compact domain
[pmini ; p
max
i ]  [0; ymax], where ymax is dened in the proof of Theorem 6.5.2, it has a maximizer char-
acterized by the rst-order condition (E.14) and (E.15) for any given (pSC; i(); y

SC; i()). Therefore,
given (pSC; i(); y

SC; i()) , the unique solution to (E.14) and (E.15), (p

SC;i(); y

SC;i()), is the unique
maximizer of ~i(pi; yijpSC; i(); ySC; i(); ) for any i. Therefore, the unique solution to (6.18) and
(6.19), (pSC(); y

SC()), is the unique equilibrium in
~G.
Note that (pSC(); y

SC()) continues to be an equilibrium in the original simultaneous competition,
as long as it generates positive demand for each rm. If the rms select the price vector pSC() and the
eort vector ySC() in the simultaneous competition, by (6.15) and (6.18), the associated demand for
rm i is given by ~i () = (ai(Y

SC(); )  (ApSC())i + bipSC;i())+ = bi(pSC;i()  ci) > 0, where the
inequality follows from pSC;i() > ci for any i. Hence, (p

SC(); y

SC()) generates positive demand for
each rm and, thus, forms an equilibrium in the simultaneous competition.
It remains to be shown that the original simultaneous competition does not have other equilibria.
We assume, to the contrary, that there exists another equilibrium (p(); y()), with the associated
equilibrium demand vector (). Since
@pii([pi; p

 i()]; y
()j)jpi=ci = i([pi; p i()]; y(); i)jpi=ci > 0;
p
i
> ci for all i. If 

i () > 0 for all i, (p
(); y()) must satisfy the rst-order condition (6.18) and
(6.19), i.e., (p(); y()) = (pSC(); y

SC()). In the remaining case, 

i () = 0 for some i. Without
loss of generality, we assume that 1() = 0. Since 1([p
min
1 ; p

 1()]; y
(); ) > 0, there exists a price
p
1
> pmin1 = c1 such that 1([p1; p

 1()]; y
(); ) > 0. Hence,
1([p1; p

 1()]; y
()j) = (p
1
 c1)1([p1; p 1()]; y(); ) C1(y1()) >  C1(y1()) = 1(p(); y()j);
which contradicts that (p(); y()) is an equilibrium in the simultaneous competition. Therefore, given
any , (pSC(); y

SC()), which is the unique solution of (6.18) and (6.19), is the unique equilibrium in
the simultaneous competition. Thus, for any i, SC;i() = bi(p

SC;i()  ci) > 0.
Part (b). By (E.12), ySC() is the unique equilibrium of an N -player game, in which the i
th player
has the payo function ^i(yj) := Gi(Y j)   Ci(yi) and feasible set R+, where Y =
PN
i=1 yi. By the
proof of Theorem 6.5.2(a) and Theorem 6.5.3(a), Fi(Y j), and hence Gi(Y j) = 12biPNl=1(A 1)ilFi(Y j),
are continuously dierentiable and concave in Y and supermodular in (yi; j) for any (i; j). Assume
^ >  and Y SC() > Y

SC(^). Hence, the concavity and supermodularity of Gi(j) imply that, for each
1  i  N ,
@YGi(Y

SC()j)  @YGi(Y SC(^)j^): (E.16)
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If ySC;1() > y

SC;1(^), the strict convexity of C1() yields that C 01(ySC;1()) > C 01(ySC;1(^)). On the
other hand, Lemma 16 implies that @y1 ^1(y

SC()j)  @y1 ^1(ySC(^)j^). Thus,
@YG1(Y

SC()j) = @y1 ^1(ySC()j)+C 01(ySC;1()) > @y1 ^1(ySC(^)j^)+C 01(ySC;1(^)) = @YG1(Y SC(^)j^);
which contradicts (E.16). Thus, under the condition that Y SC() > Y

SC(^), y

SC;1()  ySC;1(^). Sim-
ilar argument implies that, under the condition that Y SC() > Y

SC(^), y

SC;i()  ySC;i(^) for any i.
Therefore, if Y SC() > Y

SC(^), Y

SC(^) =
PN
i y

SC;i(^) 
PN
i y

SC;i() = Y

SC(), which forms a con-
tradiction. Thus, Y SC() is increasing in i for any i. Since every entry of A
 1 is nonnegative and
A 1 is non-singular, by (6.18), pSC;i() =
PN
l=1(A
 1)il(l + f(Y SC()) + l) is increasing in j for any
i and j. Thus, SC;i() = bi(p

SC;i() ci) is increasing in pSC;i() and, hence, j for any i and j. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 6.5.5: We prove part (b) rst, and parts (a) and (c) second.
Part (b). As shown in the proofs of Theorem 6.5.2 and Theorem 6.5.4, yEF () is the equilibrium of
an N -player game with the concave objective function i(yj) = Fi(Y j) Ci(yi) and feasible set R+ for
player i, and yCS() is the equilibrium of an N -player game with the concave objective function ^i(yj) =
Gi(Y j) Ci(yi) and feasible set R+ for player i. Note that @Y Fi(Y j) = 2bi(pi (Y; ) ci)@Y pi (Y; ) > 0;
where the inequality follows from Theorem 6.5.1. Recall that Fi(Y j) = 2bi
Pn
l=1(A
 1)ilGi(Y j). By
Lemma 2 in [24], 2bi
Pn
l=1(A
 1)il  2bi(A 1)ii  1. Thus, @Y Fi(Y j)  @YGi(Y j)  0 for each i and
. We assume, to the contrary, that Y SC() > Y

EF (). Hence, for each i,
@Y Fi(Y

EF ()j)  @YGi(Y SC()j): (E.17)
If ySC;1() > y

EF;1(), the strict convexity of C1() implies that C 01(ySC;1()) > C 01(yEF;1()). On the
other hand, Lemma 16 yields that @y1 ^1(y

SC()j)  @y11(yEF ()j). Thus,
@YG1(Y

SC()j) = @y1 ^1(ySC()j)+C 01(ySC;i()) > @y11(yEF ()j)+C 01(yEF;i()) = @Y F1(Y EF ()j);
which contradicts (E.17). Thus, under the condition that Y SC() > Y

EF (), y

SC;1()  yEF;1().
Similar argument implies that, under the condition that Y SC() > Y

EF (), y

SC;i()  yEF;i() for any
i. Therefore, if Y SC() > Y

EF (), Y

EF () =
PN
i y

EF;i() 
PN
i y

SC;i() = Y

SC(), which forms a
contradiction. Thus, Y SC()  Y EF () for any .
Part (a). Since Y SC()  Y EF () for any , by Theorems 6.5.1 and 6.5.4 and that every entry of
A 1 is nonnegative,
pEF;i(y

EF (); ) = (
NX
l=1
(A 1)il)(l + f(Y EF ()) + l)  (
NX
l=1
(A 1)il)(l + f(Y SC()) + l) = p

SC;i();
for any i and .
Part (c). Since pi (Y

EF (); )  pSC;i(), it follow immediately from Theorems 6.5.1 and 6.5.4 that
i (Y

EF (); ) = bi(p

i (Y

EF (); )  ci)  bi(pSC;i()  ci) = SC;i();
for any i and . Q:E:D:
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E.2 Discussions on Stopping Condition (ii) of the Iterative Procedure
Lemma 15 is silent about how yi () changes with  for p + 1  i  p + q in the convex program
(6.1). In this section, we rst present in detail how our comparative statics method stops in Step (d)
without leading to a contradiction for yi () (p+ 1  i  p+ q). We then give an example to illustrate
that, in the convex program (6.1), yi () (p+ 1  i  p+ q) may not be monotone in .
E.2.1 Comparative Statics Analysis of yi () (p+ 1  i  p+ q)
We consider two (hypothetical and incorrect) scenarios: (a) yi () is increasing in  for all  2   and
some p+ 1  i  p+ q; and (b) yi () is decreasing in  for all  2   and some p+ 1  i  p+ q.
For scenario (a), we assume, to the contrary, that yi (^) < y

i () for some ^ > . By Lemma 16,
@yiF (y
()j)  @yiF (y(^)j^), i.e., @yigi(yi ()j)+i@y0h(y0()j)  @yigi(yi (^)j^)+i@y0h(y0(^)j^).
Since gi(j) is strictly concave in yi and submodular in (yi; ), it may be possible that (i) @yigi(yi ()j) 
@yigi(y

i (^)j^) or (ii) @yigi(yi ()j) < @yigi(yi (^)j^). In case (i), the argument stops because we cannot
obtain any monotone relationship between @y0h(y

0()j) and @y0h(y0(^)j^). Hence, no contradiction
can be reached for this scenario.
For scenario (b), we assume, to the contrary, that yi (^) > y

i () for some ^ > . By Lemma 16,
@yiF (y
()j)  @yiF (y(^)j^), i.e., @yigi(yi ()j)+i@y0h(y0()j)  @yigi(yi (^)j^)+i@y0h(y0(^)j^).
Since gi(j) is submodular in (yi; ) and strictly concave in yi, @yigi(yi ()j) > @yigi(yi (^)j^). Thus,
we have that @y0h(y

0()j) < @y0h(y0(^)j^). Since h(j) is supermodular in (y0; ), we cannot obtain
any monotone relationship between y0() and y

0(^). Hence, the argument stops and no contradiction
can be reached for this scenario.
Since the iterative procedure is stopped without reaching a contradiction, we suspect that, in the
convex program (6.1), yi () (p+ 1  i  p+ q) may not be monotone in , and construct the following
example.
Example E.2.1 In the convex program (6.1), let p = q = 1, 1 = 2 = 1,   = R, and Y1 = Y2 = R.
Let
f1(y1) =  (y1)2; g2(y2j) =
8><>: (y2)
2; if   0;
 (y2 + )2; otherwise;
and h(y0j) =
8><>: (y0   )
2; if   0;
 (y0)2; otherwise.
Clearly, f1(), g2(j), and h(j) satisfy the conditions of (6.1). It's easy to obtain that
(y1(); y

2()) =
8><>:(

3 ;

3 ); if   0,
(3 ; 23 ); otherwise:
Therefore, in this example, y2() is strictly increasing in  for   0, and strictly decreasing in  for
 > 0.
Example E.2.1 implies that, in the convex optimization problem (6.1), yi () (p+1  i  p+ q) may
not be monotone in  for generally specied ffi(); gi(j); h(j)g1ip+q.
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